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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the'theories of Bataille and Baudrillard in relation to the 
problem of extreme violence. The particular events of concern are the death of 
James Bulger, the Dunblane massacre and the 'serial killers' Frederick and 
Rosemary West. The thesis argues that dominant traditions in the social sciences are 
unable to engage with the horror of such events with anything approaching adequate 
terminology and that alternatives are urgently required. 
The study is theoretical not empirical and these cases act as crucial reference 
points throughout the theoretical discussions. Such events seem to disable reason 
and are frequently referred to as 'inexplicable' or 'evil'. They appear to be 'in 
excess' of the established explanatory paradigms. The thesis investigates the 
possibility of 'thinking excess' in new and alternative ways, more commensurate 
with the intensity of such events. 
The importance of Bataille notions of the sacred, sacrificial expenditure and 
non-dialectical negativity in approaching changing forms of extreme violence are 
emphasised. Bataille specifies a fundamental 'need' for violent expenditure or 
sacrifice that persists in a contemporary age no longer equipped to recognise these 
principles. Baudrillard's approach is related but departs from Bataille's thought. 
Baudrillard's emphasis on symbolic exchange, seduction and the fatal denies the 
existence of fundamental 'needs' yet also emphasises the cultural and ritual nature of 
extreme violence. These themes are developed into a detailed reading of 'death- 
events'. They are theorised as distinctively contemporary, occupying a post- 
dialectical cultural space characterised by the elimination of sacred and symbolic 
principles, which nevertheless endure in fragmentary, displaced and deracinated 
form. These are conditions in which new forms of 'evil' may emerge. 
In emphasising the theoretical differences between the readings of violence 
offered by Bataille, and by Baudrillard, the thesis rey-eals shifts in the nature of 
radical theory from the middle to the late twentieth century. The notions of utility, 
limit and excess are central to this shift and to alternative ways of thinking the 
excessive nature of contemporary violence. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
This thesis draws upon certain marginalised themes of social theory in order 
to think through the notion of excess. These themes, derived from subterranean 
channels of social theory, are developed in the thought of Nietzsche, Bataille, the 
College of Sociology, and Baudrillard. The principal focal points of this thesis are 
the theoretical proximities, similarities and differences of the closely related 
approaches of Bataille and Baudrillard. 
A case will be made that themes drawn from these thinkers offer, 
potentially, a reading of excessive events which is superior to any yet available in 
dominant sociological lineages. The 'excessive events' this study will address are 
contemporary cases of extreme violence. I will argue that these events i nvolve 
distinctive features, which elude the grasp of mainstream social thought. A key 
example and constant reference point of such an event is the death of James Bulger 
in 1993. Other events, referred to in this thesis, include the Dunblane massacre in 
1996 and the crimes of Frederick and Rosemary West. 
Empirically based accounts of such events, both popular and academic have 
appeared but, I will argue, are inadequate. They present empirical background 
material, the 'facts of the cases' as if these are sufficient for 'understanding', as if the 
se the 'facts' can speak for themselves. As a result such studies seriously' rDii 
events (and, are-, sociol6gically and., philosophically uriiýtis factory. Further they offer 
analyses which are simply incommensurate with the intensity. or horror of the events 
addressed. This thesis offers the 'facts' of the., p ncival cases as avvendices and 
jijqt, qad-js, concerned. to -establish an alternative methodological and theoretical nexus 
that c cyppts of an extreme nature. The aim is not to establish L- Ach _Mýight 
hýýtter app gL, 
the 'truth' of the Bulger case; the events of Dunblane or 25 Cromwell Street but (0) 
reach'- fof aliernati-v- (theoretical-yresodr-c-e-iý) that are__- Jýetter --jzquipp_p4, more. lvý) C--i., _V_ commensurate N ýtILthe-excýýss-ive. n. eSs-o-fs-uch. ev, en. ts. 
These events are argued to be excessive in three related ways. Firstly they 
are excessive in terms of the acts of extreme violence involved. These acts 
transgress the most basic and broadly established norms, values and laws of human 
sbciety. They are transgressive in the most extreme and shocking forms, in ways that 
exce. ed the claims of strong or'total' cultural relativism. That is, such events horrify 
and terrorise beyond the particularities of cultural environment. I do not claim they 
are therefore 'absolutes', beyond all cultural difference. This is not a sustainable 
position; rather, methodologically I will be guided by what can be termed cultural 
'relationism', not extreme cultural relativism. Secondly these events are excessive in 
the degree of cultural trauma and panic they provoke. They generate intense media 
speculation, sometimes global interest much of it prurient and unhelpful. The events 
listed above also brought about intense, and sometimes collective mourning. 
Thirdly, and most importantly for the present purposes, these events are excessive in 
their intractability, their irreducibility to the codes and formulations of rationalising 
procedures. In short these events seem to elude all attempts at comprehension, they 
are close to the status of 'cultural indecipherability'. Accounts of such events, 
juridical, popular and academic encounter an unbridgeable void between the 
contextualisation of social and environmental 'contributing' or'triggering' factors and 
the sheer horror of the event. The focus of this study is the horror of such events, 
horror in excess of rationalising processes. 
'The theories of Bataille and Baudrillard are argued to possess themes and 
resonances which rather than attempting, unsuccessfully, to bridge this void do at 
least confront and affirm it. Their concepts, or more often intuitions and speculations 
depart, radically, from the codes of mainstream social thought. Of course this is the 
case with a number of contemporary thinkers. The Post-structuralist movement in 
general has interrogated the relations between limits and excesses, insides and 
outsides, identity and difference. Bataille and Baudrillard are both part of this 
tradition yet are marginal figures even here and are irreducible to Post-structuralism 
as intellectual movernent. ' 
I have chosen to focus on the theories of Bataille and Baudrillard for a 
number of related reasons. Firstly because they are specifically concerned with 
excess in their writings. Excess takes different forms in their theories, however it is 
2 
I -, ý:? -faindersý: true that both are fascinated by(limits "Lid the r( aV-1-'a:: y:, -b1'7ýe2 d them. yonr(t 
/Further, for both Bataille and Ba\uldn-fiard these remainders are not merely residual; 
passively awaiting annexation by reason, rather they express crucialfonný and(Borces 
annot. be,,, oi; iiterate, 'c&)'that, acible'ý\\ In this sense then Bataille and ýAEC'irredi 
Lth 
a c5'- Q=- 
Baudrillard think excesses, not mere remainders. They think excess by exceeding the 
boundaries of dominant social thought. 
Secondly and closely related to the above is the specific role of death and 
evil as excess in the writings of Bataille and Baudrillard. Here their readings of 
excess display a distinctive 'social' dimension; death and evil are thought on the 
terrain of the social, or in Baudrillard's case the death of tile social. These 
phenomena are situated as absolutely fundamental to social structures, organisations 
and relations. They are accorded especially prominent roles in the trajectories of 
their thought and their evaluations of modernity. Death, the horrifying nature of 
particular deaths and reactions to it are, of course, central to the excessive events I 
have listed, making their theories a highly appropriate starting point. Further while 
other modem thinkers have theorised death, Bataille and Baudrillard are largely 
unique in the particular ways they approach death, as cultural, excessive and related 
to forms of social organisation and modes of thought which seem forgotten, 
surpassed or no longer relevant to 'contemporary life'. 
The thinking of evil is a major dimension of both the theories and methods 
of Bataille and Baudrillard and notions of 'evil' are absolutely fundamental to this 
thesis. Excessive events, such as the death of James Bulger, provoke widespread 
popular use of the term 'evil'. The judge in the Bulger case called the murder "an act 
of unparalleled evil and barbarity". 'Evil' was used, widely, to designate the 
excessiveness or horror of this event, an event so 'bad' it was 'evil'. For many 'evil' 
was an appropriate term because it expresses horror beyond the bounds of 'reason', an 
event that seemed to hark back to a 'primitive state' of savagery, something excluded 
from modernity but not forgotten or obliterated. By contrast academic accounts of 
this event argued notions of 'evil' must be jettisoned from any responsible attempt to 
comprehend this event. For such writers appeals to 'evil' were backward and served 
only to obscure the 'reality' of the event, facilitating the abdication of compassion and 
allowing crude moral condemnations. In both cases 'evil' was central to 
3 
interpretation of and responses to, this event, either as ultimate 'explanation' or 
ultimate distortion. The theories of Bataille and Baudrillard were chosen for this 
study because of their strong emphasis on 'evil'. For both, Cke Cxistence f- evil' J? 0. 
I-D qpre§ses, Jhe i' ýýani s itu C-6EC ýIv ibility,,, of, fhe', enlightenment (pro ect an' ecl xe-ýsth IV I ITPosSI 
exces; 
fve 
'or tj! Of -"remai6d`ers4Fa ion-U-11TIhought Chabýýeithef(- --bb-liteiaf'--'-- s !o 
Yet their approaches to evil depart from theological and moral 
conceptualisations in significant ways which are crucial for a contemporary thinking 
on evil. 
Thirdly, the trajectories of their theories as distinctly social can counter the 
individualist and medico-psychological modes of thought, which usually monopolise 
thinking on deviance, violence and crime. Both Bataille and Baudrillard are 
methodologically anti-individualist, and are culturalist, or culturally materialist rather 
than textualist or discursively oriented. Of course these distinctions are not hard and 
fast and are always problematic. These methodological issues are explored in this 
chapter. Both theorists approach excess through sociological and philosophical 
methodologies, which minimise the role of individualism, consciousness and agency. 
I will argue excessive events of the kind spScified deaand an approach that is not 
limited to an individualist or psychologistic register. Yet the events of concern seem 
in excess of both social structural 'explanatory' factors and social action paradigms, 
indeed sheer horror undermines both with a devastating forc 
Further it seems to be modem, or better, contemporary culture in particular 
that suffers events of this kind. For this. reason Baudrillard's texts, many of which 
attempt to locate the distinctive excessiveness of contemporary life, were felt to be 
highly appropriate to any study of this kind. I do not claim that Baudrillard merely 
'updates' themes drawn from Bataille. I aim to show the important differences as 
well as similarities between their theoretical trajectories. This approach enables 
reflection on how the character of marginal social thought has shifted during the 20th 
century particularly in its approach to excesses, limits and remainders. 
Finally these writers have been chosen in conjunction because the major 
themes of their texts are very closely related, sometimes overlapping, though more 
often distinct. 
/Baudrillard's theory, I will argue, is often poorly understood precisely 
because the significance of Bataille as an influence is minimised or overlooked\ 
4 
Further Bataille's materiýýý! ýeýtly interpreted on a primarily literary level 
whereby his urgent relevance for social thought is obscured. By reading Bataille and 
Baudrillard in conjunction both of these failings are avoided and it is hoped a greater 
appreciation of their sociological importance can be attained. In short, it was felt 
there was a powerful complimentary aspect to studying the two thinkers together. 
These are the principal reasons why the theories of Bataille and Baudrillard were 
4 2 
chosen for this thesis_; ý 
i _'&cý s_'_ýctuall lo : )ge6er-, -'1ý QýaDn theory -andi beýýrc ýa rh e'y- 
ý )e yC 
1,, ý "', Gjoine(Viii4h, 
y_, Ns"6fi_s0, e-)This thesis aims at'a detai'led investigation of this possibility. 
The Bulger case is invoked as a powerful example of contemporary horror, as excess 
seemingly beyond rational comprehension. This thesis does not offer a detailed re- 
construction of all aspects of this case. Its concern is not with implications for social 
policy, the education or treatment of children, nor aspects of judicial process, 
policing or social work. These issues have been addressed elsewhere, for example 
by Sereny (1995/1998), Morrison (1997). ! ýych issues are, in my opinion, far less 
difficult and demanding than a conftontation with the death-event itself, which the 
latter attempt but with little success. This thesis is concerned, particularly, with the 
seeming intractability or inexplicability of such death-events. There is nothing to 
suggest the murderers of James Bulger were 'mad' nor even that they had themselves 
suffered child abuse, which they then in some way'mirrored. Thomas Hamilton and 
Michael Ryan seemed to suffer from nothing more severe than 'poor communication 
skills', and 'inadequacy'. Frederick and Rosemary West were popular, enjoying the 
trust of many, including the local pplice; again there was no suggestion of mental 
illness or impairment. All of the above may, or may not, have watched violent films, 
yet psychologists remain divided as to whether this would have any impact 
whatsoever on their behaviours. The 'normality' of such individuals disables any 
discourse of abnormality offered by psychiatry or psychology, indicating the 
profound intractability of such cases, a near total resistance to rationalising 
procedures. The poverty of conventional social scientific perspectives is exposed 
with alarming clarity. 
Existing accounts of events of extreme violence are, of course, varied. Here 
I will try to specify, in brief, what I consider inadequate in such theories. Many 
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popular accounts of excessive behaviours are, essentially, individualist or 
psychologistic. They make only scant and inadequate reference to wider social and 
cultural factors. Popularised readings of Freudian psychoanalytic themes often play 
a role in such work, for example Wilson and Seaman (1983,1992). Some popular 
accounts of extreme violence or 'evil' begin to combine individual and cultural 
factors but fail to theorise either sufficiently, making each the supplement of the 
other, see Masters (1996). 
Academic studies of violence that are rooted in psychoanalytic thought are 
also compromised by their individualist assumptions, failing to explore the social or 
cultural context of their objects of analysis. Further such work makes appeals to an 
instinctive or compulsive basis for aggression and violence. This is argued to be 
unsatisfactory and is criticised through readings of both Bataille and Baudrillard. 
Academic accounts of violence or 'evil', often influenced by Holocaust 
studies, have generated more detailed socio-cultural or 'contextual' factors. For 
example in Staub (1989) these range from the socio-economic (the existence of 
poverty, competition) to the ideological (racism, propaganda). These are then 
coupled with psychological-individual 'triggering' factors, such as stress, anxiety or 
fear. Structural and individual, or contextual and triggering factors are combined in 
order to achieve greater scope and persuasiveness. The result may be no more than 
an abstract typology of factors lacking incisive purchase on any particular event. 
Existing sociological and criminological accounts of violence fail to 
confront the excessiveness or extremity of certain cases with anything resembling 
cornmensurate terminology. 
/The 
sociology of crime, deviance and delinquency 
tends to offer relatively simplistic environmental, sub-cultural and structural factors 
to 'explain' why some individuals or groups should behave in 'deviant' ways\, These 
studies range from the crude to the imaginative bRt a majq_T contention of this thesis 
is that 'structural factors'; class, income, subculture, simply cannot 'explain' the 
excessiveness of violence involved in the contempor death-events I have 
ýýecified. Or, more pointedly, these factors do not operate significantly in the cases 
cited. 
Contemporary criminological studies of extreme violence (Newburn & 
Stanko 1994, Collier 1998) invoke, repeatedly, the vague category 'masculinity' as 
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explanation for aggressive, confrontational behaviour. However the precise nature or 
status of masculine subjectivity is never probed sufficiently and functions as a 
convenient 'ready-made' explanatory apparatus. The changing nature and meanings 
attached to individuality and subjectivity must be theorised in a more sophisticated 
manner, and the reading of Bataille and Baudrillard that follows aims for precisely 
thi s. 
Feminist accounts of extreme violence; for example, Cameron and Fraser 
(1987) and Cameron (1996) do focus on the intensity of violence and have theorised 
cultural factors, such as the role of the media, with some success. However, some 
feminist studies, such as the above, are restricted by their programmatic nature. The 
attempt to perceive events through established feminist concepts such as 'patriarchy', 
'masculinity' and aggression can be reductive and indiscriminate, in some cases 
actually limiting or 'containing' the intensity of violence in stereotypical 
terminology. 
A small number of detailed biographical and empirital studies of traumatic 
murder cases have appeared in recent years and there is a growing body of popular 
and academic literature on serial killers. Many of these provide useful background 
details but again are not sufficiently theoretical to grasp the intensity of the cases 
incisively. Sereny's (1995,1998ý'accounts of the case of Mary Bell and the murder 
of James Bulger are able and informative but hinge, ultimately, on the uncritical 
replication of standard binary themes of modem rationalitY/Particularly prominent 
in Sereny's studies are the innocence/guilt,. mad/sane and adult/child oppositions, all 
are treated as fixed, stable and consistent either/or categories\ Much the same is true 
of Morrison's (1997) study of the Bulger case. /Both Sereny and Morrison accept, far 
too uncritically, the validity of modem rationality seeking to use it to 'improve' or 
refocus its own direction. In this way they keep violence and rationality, horror and 
reason, safely apart, uncontaminated by each other. Further they fail to pp _Leciate 
how radically horror disables or diverts rationalityý 
Precisely these weaknesses are addressed by the theories of Bataille and 
Baudrillard. Reason and excess are not separate, they cannot be kept apart, and in 
fact reason generates excesses, blindspots, remainders that are crucial to its survival 
but cannot be thought within it. Simplistic binary oppositions slide and merge into 
7 
each other, each drawing upon the exclusion of its 'opposite' to secure its own 
identity. Stereotypical terms and vague appeals to 'unreason' serve to deflect and 
forestall more radical engagements with excess. The following reading of Bataille 
and Baudrillard unpicks the vague notions of 'unreason' 'irrationality' excess and 
utility in relation to extreme violence. It seeks to move beyond the fixity of binary 
oppositions, of reason and its exclusions, in order to think through the intensity and 
horror of extreme violence. 
8 
THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION 
'We need a thinking that does not fall apart in the face of horror, a self-consciousness that 
does not steal away when it is time to explore possibility to the limit' (Bataille 1976/1991: 14). 
'Every stake is symbolic. There have only ever been symbolic stakes' (Baudrillard 
1976/1993: 39). 
'At present we are witnessing the slow and simultaneous erosion of all the polar structures, 
and the movement towards a universe that is losing the very dimension of meaning. Disinvested, 
disenchanted, and disaffected - the end of the world as will and representation' (Baudrillard 
1979/1990: 104). 
A girl, aged 16, fell from favour with fellow members of her 'gang' after 
misplacing the gang leader's coat. They decided she should be 'taught a lesson'. 
The girl was kidnapped; all her body hair was cut off, including her eyebrows and 
pubic hair. She was tied up, blindfolded, kicked and beaten. She was imprisoned in 
a cupboard all night. The next day she was moved to another house, tied to an 
upturned bed and beaten again. She was injected with amphetamines and forced to 
listen to music at maximum volume through headphones for hours. After several 
days of laying in her own excrement she was doused with undiluted disinfectant and 
scrubbed until her skin was broken. Her front teeth were tom out with pliers and 
cigarettes were extinguished on her face. Finally she was driven to a secluded area, 
thrown into a thom bush, doused with petrol and then set alight. The gang was 
apparently elated by these events and was heard laughing and singing. Their victim 
survived, raised the alann and described what had happened. She died after four 
days, of 70% bums. Her 'fiiends'; two men and two women, were convicted of 
murder. 3 
This section introduces Bataille's notion of the sacred, its relations to death, 
eroticism and sacrificial practices and Baudrillard's notion of symbolic exchange. 
Baudrillard's central theoretical terms; symbolic exchange, simulation, seduction and 
evil are contextualised through Bataille's reading of the sacred and sacrificial. The 
9 
aim is to introduce the manner in which this thesis will, in later sections address 
contemporary death-events. 
Events, such as that described above, seem to resist or, in fact, defeat all 
ekisting attempts at scientific, sociological or even 'rational' explanation. They 
expose terrifying dimensions of 'human nature' and 'contemporary life'. They 
demand a thinking of the excessive, a notion of excess, an abandonment of the 
established modes of thought that have no purchase or relevance when faced with 
such horror. Central to this thesis then is a new reading of excess, in particular 
excess in the form of extreme or 'inexplicable' violence. 
The theories of Bataille and Baudrillard have been much maligned but are 
generally poorly understood. At the same time their texts are plundered and 
misrepresented, often ruthlessly, by a wide variety of thinkers. Some have claimed a 
bogus or superficial affinity with one or other, though it is Bataille in particular, in 
common with his greatest influence Nietzsche, who has suffered this fate. 
Baudrillard, by contrast, has certainly suffered from the mistaken subsuming of his 
work within the nebulous and ill-defined notion of 'postmodernism'. His somewhat 
polemical yet justified assaults on the orthodoxies of Foucauldianism and structural 
humanist feminism damaged his reputation and these relatively peripheral aspects of 
his work are frequently misrepresented in order to facilitate a cursory dismissal of the 
whole. 
Baudrillard's work has proved particularly unpopular with most proponents 
of Marxism and neo-Marxist structuralism (Callinicos 1989, Kellner 1989), as well 
as many feminists, particularly those of a socialist or humanist persuasion (Chapman 
/-ý -1: 2. - and Rutherford 1988). Bataille's fate has perhaps been more complex. ýtjih 
ignore Oocioloýy, philosophy and economics here his! workii ighlyý ertin 
Bataille's material is better known in literary and artistic circles particularly where 
his work on surrealism is a reference point. Until recently the fragments of work by 
Foucault and Derrida, dealing with Bataille, operated almost hegemonic control over 
its reception and contextualisation. Now however, as more and more of Bataille's 
writings become available to English speakers his work has undergone somethin of 9 
a renaissance in which the influence or constraints of Foucault and Derrida are being 
increasingly loosened. 
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There are a striking number of intersections, overlaps and similarities of 
formulation and intent between the thought of Bataille and that of Baudrillard. At the 
level of basic disposition and theoretical outlook both occupy a position of self- 
dbfined radicality. They operate strenuous assaults, diversions, subversions, even 
annihilations of competing theoretical formulations and constructions, drawing on a 
shared affinity for the philosophy of Nietzsche. The same could, of course, be said of 
Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard and others. My contention here is that the 
theories of Baudrillard and Bataille offer(ccýonýýets) or more often insights, 
_§peculations and suggestions. 
that mark out a distinctiveness in relation to other 
rrd 
strands of Post-structuralist thought, and offer,. (theoretical exus, as 
iap-ýpreciated, fdýýexploring`ýconte heýornenayqWdxt v lenc ýý] rem iolenc nd 
exc8ý3. 
Methodologically, Baudrillard has sought in his theoretical engagements 
with others, 'a detournement by excess' (in Gane 1993: 59). This is a'-divertin 701,30r 
Onceptgýr e 
-ildfini 
s! n `ý67these) , hijackýý (0 or) otheTýý,, arCdlytthd'Vaýýccc'idra or the 
&oncepýý-, b'3Ptlie'iý'- being drivefij'nto-ýexces's, that is, pushed beyond their useful limits 
as they are normally conceived. Similarly, in the theory of Bataille, there is a 
marked resistance to any accumulative tendency; for example he reads Marx, 
Durkheim and Nietzsche against each other refusing to 'accumulate' an enh_anced 
theoretical 'whole' froM t4eýe_sopTqes. Rather Bataille insists on expenditure, loss, 
and the impossibility of profitable accumulation. Baudrillard's methods too, can 
often be seen as a potlatching of other theorists. 4A failure to understand these 
methods condenms--the. --reader---, to,, --inimediate 
bewilderment and probable 
misunderstandiiýg, pý, rticý1ý1)ýJf they are expecting conformity to the nonns of 
mainstream sociology. Bataille is perhaps still best known as the author of 
'pornographic' novels, such as Story of the Eye (1928/1982). This fact has certainly 
influenced some of his more hostile critics, such as Dworkin (1981). While 
Baudrillard seems to have set out, deliberately, to provoke feminists, particularly in 
"his work Seduction (1979/1990). However the only obvious effect of this strategy 
has been the undermining, in the eyes of radical feminists, of his reputation as a 
serious thinker, with Seduction becoming something of an embarrassment to 
Baudrillard enthusiasts. This thesis will re-appraise Baudrillard's Seduction. 
II 
Such methods represent a clear contrast to the 'accumulative tendencies' of 
other contemporary theorists, for example Deleuze's accumulation of the concepts of 
Spinoza, Nietzsche and Bergsonl, ýHardt 1993, Goodchild 19963 precisely in terms of 
tfieir use-value, or Foucault and Derrida's shifting and ambivalent relationships to 
Hegel, Nietzsche and Heidegger. /fFurther, contemporary university-based 
knowledge-production operates in precisely such an accumulative way, boasting of 
an 'interdisciplinary' approach wherebyoheonetýn(f(, concept5, ýý(ý7plified(-ýfiaýdý Lredl; 20 
o'ider3o,, f6"r__m7' p5ýýý, orf, 
ýaý: ýiFoýt-h-, >-Ifom--, ogenised stocOof kfi 
Moreover, it is usually only established material, work that is of the canon that is 
blended with established work from other 'disciplines' to form an endless system of 
supplementarity. In this manner the 'margins' of thought suffer a compounded 
neglect, a double movement of restriction and erasure. 
Baudrillard has been blatant and personal in his theoretical assaults. 
Baudrillard published Forget Foucault in 1977 at the height of the latter's fame and 
influence. Baudrillard's attitude towards Foucault was certainly not softened by the 
death of his rival in 1984 as Baudrillard's Cool Memories (1987/1990) made clear. 
Baudrillard has been even more scathing of what he has called 'feminisme merdique' 
(in Gane 1991a: 6 1) 5 and has been deeply critical of such intellectual luminaries as 
Saussure, Freud, Lyotard, Deleuze, and even Bataille as we shall see. Bataille rarely 
used his published work as an outlet for personal and specific attacks on other 
thinkers though he did engage in a protracted dispute with Andre Breton, the 
Surrealist grandee. 6 Bataille's writing strategy, particularly with the long theoretical 
work The Accursed Share (orig. 1949,1967/1988 & 1976/1991) was to situate his 
concerns, somewhat immodestly, beyond those of established theoretical discourse. 
That is, he claimed a sort of prima facie distance or otherness, something that has not 
escaped his critics' notice. 7 
Here then is a basic similarity between the two thinkers. A subversive and 
oppositional attitude to the personalities and institutions of forinal academic debate, a 
determination not to contribute to the accumulation of official knowledge but rather 
to undermine and subvert it, even to consume it, destroy it. 
Another significant bond, related to the above concerris political allegiances 
and commitments. Both Bataille and Baudrillard spent periods of their lives as 
'I 
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committed supporters of communist and socialist causes. Both abandoned such 
beliefs in the wake of political upheavals, Bataille after the failure of revolution in 
1930's Europe followed by the rise of fascism, and Baudrillard after the failure of 
r6volution in the late 1960's, particularly the events of May 1968. Both then 
followed dissident paths abandoning political affiliations. Bataille pursued the 
solitary and mystical, producing the important work Inner Experience (1954/1988) 
while Baudrillard traced a new metaphysics or perhaps anti-metaphysics of images, 
objects and 'things', a favourite noun. More conventionally minded thinkers of the 
Left have forgiven neither for their abandonment of political praxis and systematic 
anti-capitalist critique. The irony is that it is hard to imagine two thinkers more 
fundamentally opposed to Capital than Bataille and Baudrillard. To the extent that 
political formulations matter to their respective bodies of work, both must be seen as 
resolutely of the ultra-left. This is despite frequent criticisms, particularly 
concerning Baudrillard of'aristocratic disdain' (Kellner 1989), of complicity with the 
aims and ideology of Capital, or of being right wing and reactionary by dint of 
supposed misogyny or political incorrectness. 
More specifically the thought of Bataille and Baudrillard converges around 
their markedly similar convictions concerning the nature and consequences of the 
process of human civilisation from 'pre-history' to the present age. In particular both 
became convinced of the aberrant nature of modernity and of the continued irruption 
of former social forms, forces and beliefs into the present. Of course such guiding 
assumptions are not without difficulties and these have attracted considerable critical 
commentary. For both Bataille and Baudrillard make strong claims regarding social 
or cultural organisation, and the nature of certain historical eras. In particular it can 
appear that both adopt variations of the 'return of the repressed' or 'noble savage' 
theses: by focusing on certain, inevitable, pathologies in late modernity, and reading 
these through the prism of an anthropology, they can seem to idealise or over-value 
the distant past. It has also been suggested that they fantasise a certain notion of'pre- 
capitalist' organisation. These difficult issues will receive detailed attention below. 
Finally, before turning to a detailed exploration of these many and varied 
intersections, it is important to emphasis a general shared fascination with excess, the 
excessive, that, which-is. in excess of any particular system, any particular rationality 
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be it moral, religiou , cultural, textual, biological, technological. This is both a 
fascination with excessive phenomena and the adoption of 'excessive' modes of 
thought, which 'exceed' the boundaries of dominant thought, in approaching excess. 
By considering Bataille and Baudrillard in conjunction it is possible to go 
some considerable way towardý-a new--socli'o-bo-g-iic--al thiai-Q that can better come, -to---- 
terms with the contemporary world, and specifically the extreme phenomena that 
-- -------- 
will be explorpýd-4qjow. We will seek the beginnings of an approach that does not 
'fall apart in the face of horror' (1976/1991: 14) as Bataille declares of established 
modes of enquiry, that is not characterised by the contemporary malaise Baudrillard 
terms "operational whitewash" (Baudrillard 1990/1993: 44). 
BATAILLE 
'Writing this book in which I was saying that energy finally can only be wasted, I myself 
was using my energy, my time, working ... Should I say that under these conditions I sometimes could 
only respond to the truth of my book and could not go on writing iff (Bataille 1967/1988: 11) 
Georges Bataille was bom in 1897 at Billon in the central region of France, 
close to Clermont-Ferrand. While Bataille was still a child his father was blinded 
and half-paralysed, probably by syphilis and his mother is said to have suffered bouts 
of insanity. For these reasons biographical and personal details have been argued to 
be more pertinent, in the case of Bataille, to any consideration of intellectual 
development than may be the case with other thinkers. 8 Indeed Bataille's best-known 
fiction, Story of the Eye (1928/1982), and the collection of early theoretical and 
fictional writings, collected and translated as Visions of Excess (1985), make 
numerous references to his past and to the influence of his parents. Story of the Eye 
includes autobiographical fragments both within the main text itself and in 
supporting fragments published alongside it. His witnessing of a bullfight in Madrid 
in 1922 while working at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes Hispaniques, in which the 
matador was killed after losing an eye, forms one of the central vignettes of his first 
novel. While the less well known novel My Mother (1966/1989) frequently veers 
uncomfortably close to autobiography. Similarly, certain of the events of Blue of 
Noon (1957/1979) parallel Bataille's own political experiences. In his fictional works 
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Bataille frequently adopted pseudonyms for the publication of works which have 
been regarded as obscene or pornographic. Lechte has noted that Bataille's writings 
in some sense occupy the paradoxical middle ground between "fiction and 
biography" (1994: 97). To this distinction we must immediately add 'theory' some of 
it highly experimental, some close to conventional analysis. Later in life, becoming 
disillusioned with organised politics Bataille retired from his post of librarian at the 
Bibliotheque National, and presided over a number of secret societies devoted to the 
pursuit and enactment of excess, particularly animal and human sacrifice. It is 
thought the latter was never fulfilled despite a number of offers for the role of 
sacrificial victim because a willing 'sacrificer' or executioner could not be found. 
During the Nazi occupation of France, Bataille, deeply affected, pursued a solitary 
and mystical path, culminating in the difficult Summa Atheologica texts. In fact this 
collection was never completed. 9 Towards the end of his life Bataille turned to a 
reassessment of the dominant themes of his work and produced more accessible, 
systematic accounts of his major ideas. 
It becomes clear when considering Bataille's life, that where for example 
Foucault and Derrida have been content to remain more or less respectable career 
academics professing an interest in excess, the remainder or the unthought, Bataille 
actively sought out these phenomena both in writing and in life. Here then is a 
powerful sense of materiality in Bataille's approach, one which contrasts with 
Derrida's minute analyses of 'textual excess', and with 'gen ealogical-discursive' 
method as it appears in some of Foucault's work. 
Bataille's influence has been restricted by the tardiness of the translation of 
his texts and more recently from accounts of his work which tend to de-radicalise it, 
to over-emphasise the literary and textual dimensions at the expense of the social. 
Some of these tendencies can be traced to Foucault's A Preface to Transgression 
(Foucault 1963/1977) and to Derrida's essay From Restricted to General Econonly: A 
Hegelianisni without Reserve (Derrida 1967/1978). 
/ýataille 
and Baudrillard are part 
of a tradition, apparent in the careers of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, of the 
intellectual outsider; hostile to the aims of institutional knowledge and inhabiting the 
outer edges or remainders of theory and reflection\, 
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Bataille's thought should be contextualised as operating in the rift opened, 
unwittingly, by the drive of modem secular rationality, a void expressed in 
Nietzsche's death of God and the failure of reason to provide a solid and universal 
giound for human knowledge and social organisation. Kant and Hegel tried to annex 
this territory, tried to bridge this void, yet they encountered insurmountable, 
insuperable limits to the scope of human reason, permanent barriers to its much 
vaunted completion. This is the space of the Kantian noumena, of 'things-in- 
themselves', of the object and the limited or fragmented subject. For Kant the dream 
of a fixed 'moral' identity was ravaged by 'will', by radical evil, drives, energies, and 
intensities beyond the competence of reason or morality. This is the realm of 
untameable 'infnlity', [nýn-ýqiLýIE-6ifc-ýl-T&g-at-i-vi-t--yý,, of inescapable 'biological' death, of 
indeterminacy, disproportion and radical uncertainty. These are in excess of utility, 
calculation, classification, even 'theorisation; they are 'non' 'anti' 'in' or at least not 
classically 'human'. Bataille probes such territory through his notion ofFdýp_eTz-s-ejor 
profitless expenditure. The importance of depense will be emphasised in the 
discussion of death-events below. 
In mobilising their assault against modem rationality both Bataille and 
Baudrillard have drawn on principles that pre-date the inception of modem secular 
rationality. For Bataille a theorisation of the ancient and widespread practice of 
ritual sacrifice and more generally of the sacred and its relationship to profitless 
expenditure provide the basis for his assault. The crucial formulations, developed by 
Bataille, include above all the notion oýla_ niau lite that is the cursed or diabolic. niau ue 
excess dwelling within all systems. Locked onto this theoretical centreplece are a 
whole range of conceptual oppositions; sacred and profane, heterogeneous and 
homogeneous, continuity and discontinuity, utility and inutility, verticality and 
horizontality. Bataille's notion constructed through his 
radicalisation of Durkheim and Mauss, performs a central role in this thesis as both a 
'critique' of, or better, a 'distancing' from dominant sociological thought and as the 
basis of an alternative thinking, applied to contemporary death-events. 
Bataille was particularly fascinated by the potlatch ceremony, an extreme 
form of gift exchange which was, until recently, practised by tribes of the American 
Northwest before being outlawed by the US goveminent. Bataille examines this 
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system in the first volume of The Accursed Share dedicated to consumption. There 
has been some suggestion (Richardson 1994, Baudrillard 1976/1987) that Bataille 
distorts or misinterprets ethnographic data, particularly concerning Aztec sacrifice 
and native American potlatch, exaggerating the importance of destruction in order to 
provide support for his notion of the Accursed share. It is not necessary to rehearse 
the intricacies of this argument here since it is clear that Bataille's purpose was not to 
make a contribution to existing bodies of anthropological material. Rather he aimed 
to explode the boundaries and limitations separating various disciplines and in their 
place affirm a General Theory of Economics. In the preface to The Accursed Share 
Bataille introduces his work in this way. Bataille speaks of the 'frigid research of the 
sciences ... the slumber of conventional knowledge' (1967/198 8: 10-11). In their place 
he proposes a General or solar economics, an approach that takes into account the 
movement of energy across the surface of the globe without imposing any artificial 
limitations and restrictions. He claims this approach: 
... may hold the key to all the problems posed by every discipline concerned 
with the movement of energy on the earth - from geophysics to political 
economy, by way of sociology, history and biology. Moreover, neither 
psychology nor, in general, philosophy can be considered free of this 
primary question of economy. Even what may be said of art, of literature, 
of poetry has an essential connection with the movement I study: that of 
[excess energy I(B ataille 1967/1988: 10). 
Central to Bataille's notion of the Accursed share is a theory of impulsion, 
or better of 'effervescence', rather than Freudian 'drives', inherent within human and 
indeed all life in the universe. Bataille reverses the assumptions of prior economic 
and political theory stating, 'it is not necessity but rather its contrary, 'luxury', that 
presents living matter and mankind with their fundamental problems' (1967/1988: 
r- 12). This is Bataille's t'General economyl the analysis of energy as it moves through 
all life in the universe, Bataille's asserts a "basic fact" even "law" (ibid. ): 
iving organism, in a situation determined by the play of energy on the 
jjgq ssa V. for surface of Lhe g,, Lobe, ordýiqari ly-. Tqlzqiv--es -more .. energ. y-than, 
is 
jnfCtLitaining jife;, tbq eh or the growth of _aqqýýpjqgy. 
(wealt ) can be used f 
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the aýitern i rganisM);, Jf_thesystzm. can, no jongSý (q. g. p_p- 
ýýgr 
or if the 
exce-ss-cannot-be, completely-: absorbed in -its. growth,. it. must. necessarily be lost without--profit; -it -must. -be . -spent, -willingly or no-t, _. glýýously or 
_qqt?, qtLop ___ -(Bataillel967/1988: 
21). hically 
NY 
EE: Tcess enejWjjs the accursed share, the damned or diabolical portion of 
energy that cannot be put to profitable use. /The choice, according to Bataille, is stark 
and clear, it is between glory or catastrophe, and since contemporary Western 
societies have eliminated their rituals of non-productive expenditure and instead 
devote themselves to amassing wealth, we are, in Bataille's terms 'damned' to a fate 
of catastrophe Excess energy must be expended and if there are no 'legitimate' 
means available for this to occur, 'illegitimate' ones will emerge. Bataille presents 
this as a political dilemma, as a fundamental choice, even suggesting socio-economic 
policies in the latter stages of this work, to avert the dangers of accumulation taken 
as an end in itselflo 
BAUDRILLARD 
'[1 have] no background' (Baudrillard, in Gane 1993: 19). 
There are two animal species of intellectual: those who like fresh meat and those who 
prefer dead flesh. Those who prefer to tear live concepts to pieces and those who would rather enjoy 
the leftovers (Baudrillard 1995/1996: 71). 
Baudrillard, writing some 25 years after Bataille's death, takes the 
catastrophe as fait accompli. Western culture has damned itself; catastrophe is now 
built into its destiny because 'excesses' cannot be expended. Bataille completed The 
Accursed Share in 1949, a time of optimism, re-structuring and belief in an improved 
future; Baudrillard writing at the present time has none of this optimism. 
Baudrillard's powerful opposition to all notions of accumulation, utility and 
individuality (progress, liberation and equality) forms the crucial distinction between 
his theory and that of the theoretical, specifically sociological mainstream. In fact 
catastrophe is one of the major terms in Baudrillard's later texts. Bataille's influence 
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here is crucial and this recognition militates against the tendency to subsume his 
thought within contemporary Post-structuralism in a simplified founding role. II 
Though there is a remarkable degree of similarity and even complimentarity 
between Bataille and Baudrillard in this respect it cannot be claimed that Baudrillard 
is merely applying the notion of the Accursed share to the contemporary age. There 
is some suggestion of this, particularly in The Transparency of Evil (1990/1993: 100- 
110) and elsewhere (Baudrillard 1987/1988: 11-27). This leads us to what is possibly 
the most important theoretical and methodological distinction between Bataille and 
Baudrillard. They both_-oppose_ what. might be--Jqnn_qd.. a. dominant order; for 
Baudrillard the orders of simulacra, for Bataille, the order of discontinuity, against 
another order-that--in some sense is. more crucial, dynamic or intensp. The crucial 
distinction though is that for Bataille this 'other' is expressed in ternis of 'real' and 
essential biochemical drives. Bataille's thermo-energetics of energy excess cannot 
be affin-ned or incorporated within the modem social system. Accursed or 
heterological elements appear 'alien', as excesses 'outside' of or 'beyond' the 
systems comprehension. Baudrillard is, as we shall see, critical of this dimension of 
Bataille's work and presents his own vision of the symbolic as a form which is 
irreducible to and subversive of any notion of biochemically based drives or 
sacrificial 'needs'. Indeed Baudrillard attempts to show in Synibolic Exchange and 
Death (1976/1993) that what other theorists, Bataille amongst them, have interpreted 
as drives are in fact unrecognised manifestations of what he terms the symbolic. 
There is little suggestion that Bataille is speaking metaphorically in his 
theory of General economy and the Accursed share, indeed Bataille's later writings 
declare a "hatred" of the metaphoric/poetic which he aligns with the metaphysics of 
transcendentalism in contrast to his continued privileging of immanence. In fact a 
markedly similar disposition regarding the poetics of metaphor is revealed in 
Baudrillard's later work. 12 For Baudrillard the symbolic, the fatal and seduction are 
the annihilation of the possibility of metaphor which he, in a similar manner to 
Bataille, aligns with the fallacies of metaphysical, transcendental, and 
representational thought. For the purposes of this thesis then it must be assumed that 
Bataille's 'thermo-dvnamics' is meant literally or rather materially, that is, as 
immanence: 
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Solar energy is the source of life's exuberant development. The origin and 
essence of our wealth are given in the radiation of the sun, 'which dispenses 
energy - wealth - without any return ... solar radiation results in a 
S uperabundance of energy on the surface of the globe. (Bataille 1967/1988: 
28-9). 
Baudrillard reproaches Bataille for his 'solar' speculation (1978/1976) 
regarding this assumption as characteristic of an earlier epistemological order, 
though often the actual differences in theoretical and analytical trajectory are not 
clearly marked. An example of just how close the two theorists sometimes are is 
expressed in the suggestion made by Bataille in the first section of The Accursed 
Share that the movement of excess energy has passed into the realm of technology 
and the service sector economy (1967/1988: 24). This is precisely where Baudrillard 
locates excess within what he terms the "3rd order of simulacra". The following 
chapters will consider in detail the similarities and differences between the theories 
of Bataille and Baudrillard. I will try to indicate how and why they differ in 
approach and address the sources and results of these differences. 
A central contention here is that the writings of Bataille and Baudrillard 
cannot be subsumed adequately within the general trends of contemporary 
sociological and philosophical work as they are currently configured. Contemporary 
sociology has tried to sustain an accumulation of concepts from many sources 
including those from the post-structuralist movement. This attempt at subsumption, 
at synthesis without remainder, in order to attempt to rejuvenate established 
approaches is entirely alien to post-structuralist thought in general and fails to 
appreciate the distinctiveness of Bataille and Baudrillard in particular. In fact these 
thinkers can be seen as the remainder, irreducible to the organising themes of modem 
and contemporary thought. Their formulations, speculations and strategies cannot, 
act as a mere supplement to conventional theoretical paradigms without serious 
reductionism and artificial containment. Such calculative approaches to theoretical 
&profits' are rendered impossible by the approaches of Bataille and Baudrillard. 
Baudrillard was bom in Reims in 1929 into humble circumstances. His 
parents were the first of their generation to experience the shift from an exclusively 
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rural existence to town dwelling. Baudrillard describes his parents as civil servants 
and his grandparents as "peasants" (in Gane (ed. ) 1993: 19). He was the first member 
of his family to do any "studying". Here, in Baudrillard's rural background we can 
gerhaps perceive a source of oppositional thinking, of being an outsider. Unlike the 
vast majority of prime movers in French intellectual life Baudrillard was not a 
product of the highly elitist academic system. Where Althusser, Foucault, Deleuze 
and Derrida all gained the patronage of the elite Ecole Norinale Superieure, 
Baudrillard was destined to remain the outsider. Taking up the story of his 
intellectual development he says: 
I didn't get into the Ecole Norniale Superieure. I took the agregation but I 
didn't succeed. So I didn't become an agrege either. I got into the university 
in the 1960's but by an indirect route. In short, as far as the normal stages of 
a career are concerned, I've always missed them, including the fact I was 
never a professor (in Gane (ed. ) 1993: 19). 
Initially Baudrillard worked in a department of German literature and 
became a successful translator, and ihen he taught sociology at Nanterre University, 
Paris, for about ten years before finally abandoning the university system altogether. 
Baudrillard's literary and Germanist background is one of the most seriously 
overlooked influences on his intellectual development as Gane (1991a) has argued. 
The influence of Durkheim and Mauss has received more attention though little 
detailed analysis, and the influence of Bataille has been scarcely touched upon. Most 
frequently amongst English-speaking critics Baudrillard is treated as if his work were 
created ex nihilo - or rather out of his own personal prejudices. Of course this view 
facilitates cursory dismissal, the suppression or reductio ad absurduni of his more 
threatening assertions and more generally his imprisonment... within. the poorly-_ 
defined conceDt of 'Postmodernism' such that his work can then be embraced or 
rejected according to the writer's specific attitude towards this notion. Baudrillard is 
in fact a leading anti-postmodemist, something that still goes largely unrecognised. 
ýIt is supremely ironic that as supposedly neo-Marxist theorists slip further and further 
into the quagmire of Postmodernism in order to rejuvenate their decrevit1worldview, rl- 
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BaudrUlard himself remains resolutely opposed to those phenomena of contemporary 
culture indicative of a'Postmodem condition\ 
Bataille's startling and immensely suggestive notion of la part maudite, the 
atcursed share, has had a crucial and continuing impact on Baudrillard's thought. 
The thesis aims to express the radical nature of Bataille's thought while drawing it 
into the sphere of Baudrillard's vision where it may be allowed a space to develop 
contemporary insights. The principal notions developed by Baudrillard that concern 
us here are, first and most importantly, r---v-mEo-li----! -eý This, I will argue, is the 
basis of Baudrillard's antagonistic approach. The terms and concepts he develops 
later; seduction, fatal strategies, and the principle of evil will be seen as successive 
refinements, reiterations and mutations within the notion of the symbolic and its 
changing relations to the semiotic, the orders of the sign. 
I shall address, briefly, commonplace rejections of Baudrillard's thought in 
Anglo-American sociology, in feminism and in some Post-structuralist thought, in 
particular the critique levelled by Lyotard. Many criticisms of Baudrillard are ill 
founded. Specifically that what has been termed his 'postmodernist nihilism', even 
fascism, or "aristocratic disdain", 13 and equally charges of misogyny and anti- 
feminism are more accurately components of an anti-humanist method of thought, 
also found in the philosophy of Nietzsche, Bataille and others. These well justified 
attacks on the dominant philosophical traditions of humanism; idealism and 
anthropocentrism are, in turn developed in a highly idiosyncratic manner by 
Baudrillard. 
According to Baudrillard the systems of reason: the balances, ratios, laws 
and limitations that have operated since the enlightenment are now breaking down 
under their own enormous weight, through self-exhaustion. Further Baudrillard 
specifies an ineradicable principle of disobedience, antagonism, irony or reversibility 
which, he reads as fundamentally characteristic of the relations between human 
reason and "the world". Reason then has become excessive, uncontrolled, over- 
reaching any plausible definition through utilitarian, moral or even rational 
categories. 
For Baudrillard the fundamental stakes, of theory and of society, have never 
concerned 'the real' (the subject's production of capital, desire, or technology) but are 
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symbolic; rooted in the illusion, enchantment and 'evil' of the object. As far as a 
'critique' of capital is concerned, according to Baudrillard capital only ever 'played' at 
production, its domination, fundamentally, was through a manipulation of the 
symbolic. The symbolic then is not 'outside' the system as such but exists in a 
"double spiral" (Baudrillard in Gane (ed. ) 1993: 201) with the semiotic orders. 
Excess for Baudrillard, particularly in his later thought, dwells within the system, in 
its antagonisms, its catastrophic development, and its sudden reversals. 
SACRED AND SYMBOLIC ORDERS 
'In an entirely profane world nothing would be left but the animal mechanism' (Bataille 
1957/1986: 128). A, %-ýA,, --4, 
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"The real" is merely an effect brought about by the ordered disjunction between the two 
key tern-ts, in the first instance the separation of life and deaýh and then the succeeding separations 
given above, the 'reality principle', with its normative and repressive implications, is only a 
generalisation of this disjunctive code to all levels' (Baudrillard 1976/1993: 130). 
A common aspect of Bataille and Baudrillard's stance towards modemity 
and the theoretical structures developed for its self-analysis, is the way both thinkers, 
undoubtedly influenced by Nietzsche, adopt a theoretical time-scale that reaches far 
beyond the parochial concerns of Western capitalism. Each attempts a radical 
reading of the 'pre-modem', the 'primitive' or 'pre-historic'; 14 for Bataille this is 
encapsulated in the notion oEthe 
=sacred 
and for Baudrillard in the principle of the 
symbolic. Such theoretical manoeuvres, though certainly not without difficulties, 
facilitate a powerful suspension of commonplace assumptions concerning the nature 
of human and social progress. The time-scale constructed by modem thought, 
counting down to the birth of Christ and then adding the years after this anchoring 
point not only divides ancient from modem civilisation, for the West, but also 
domesticates and makes manageable the enormous geological time-scales involved 
in life on earth. Most philosoph ical thought takes Athenian society as its 
foundational point, the inception of its history, while sociology, as a product of 
modemity, rarely ventures outside the zone of its self-creation. Both Bataille and 
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Baudrillard seek to explode these heuristic boundary markers. Their shared 
'anthropology' derives from a common familiarity with the socio-anthropology of 
Durkheim, Mauss and Weber, and in Bataille's case owes much to the College of 
Sociology project, particularly work by Caillois and Leiris. Neither Bataille nor 
Baudrillard aimed at a comprehensive survey of ethnographic data but exploit a 
general familiarity in order to expound their own particular concerns. Such material 
and the use it is put can, of course, be contested. 
Bataille's published work demonstrates a profound fascination with the 
earliest 'social' experience. In 1955 he produced Lascaux or the Birth of Art a finely 
crafted and richly illustrated exploration of the prehistoric caves at Lascaux, and in 
his final years he published The Tears ofEros, another highly illustrated piece on the 
manifestations of excess from pre-history to modernity. Similar concerns were also 
explicit in many of the papers completed under the banner of the College of 
Sociology in the late 1930's and in his central theoretical text The Accursed Share. 
According to Bataille the modem world: 
... cannot be loved to the point of death, in the same way that a man loves a 
woman, [and] represents only self-interest and the obligation to work. If it 
is compared to worlds gone by, it is hideous, and appears as the most failed 
of all (Bataille 1995: 14). 
This point is fundamental to Bataille's thinking as it relates to contemporary 
sociological issues. Bataille's pursues a mode of oppositional thinking that-is bold 
and sustained but not unproblematic. 
Bataille draws on the Kojevean reading of Hegel's Plienom etiology of Mind 
which was highly influential to a whole generation of French intellectuals in the 
1930's including Bataille, Sartre, Lacan, Barthes, Althusser and others. According to 
the Hegelian/Kojevian anthropology the human is torn from nature and separated 
from others of its kind, it dwells in a world of objects which it must order and utilise 
in order to compete against other creatures and opposing groups of its own kind. The 
human becomes bound into a logic of increasing rational calculation, a world of 
causality, duration and exteriority. 
24 
Bataille's proximity to this Hegelian anthropology, and to the Kantian focus 
on the nature of the limit is both dangerous and inevitable, threatening to contain his 
thought within enlightenment structures yet also providing the tensions that provoke 
Bataille's oppositional thinking. It has been asserted that Bataille owes too much to 
the Hegelian system of dialectics and is 'imprisoned' within it. Others contend his 
, =red 
ri iývit central notions, 
=thesac 
ad=icaljnjLqti d inner (or limit) qxperience operate 
by failing to allow the dialectic to do its work. Such readings aim to restrict the 
scope of Bataille's importance for contemporary thought. This is the attitude 
expressed by Deleuze and Guattari (1972/1984: 4), yet it is clear that Deleuze and 
Guattari also make large claims about the nature of 'savage' society in relation to 
contemporary life (1972/1984: 139-271). It may well be that all contemporary 
thought must take up a relation of some kind to Hegelian dialectics, if only to show 
something of its inadequacies. 15 
Bataille's deployment of the notion of the sacred is not merely historicist. 
The sacred is not presented as a fixed structure or functional principle of 'primitive' 
or 'saýage' society. The sacred is not said to be the 'reality' of early social 
organisation, a 'reality' subsequently forgotten or repressed. For Bataill-e(ikcFsa - 6i-ed-l 
constitutes a permanent and ineffable feature of the human relation to mortality, 
collectivity and intimacy. It is manifest in changing forrns; its lines are drawn, 
erased or reconstituted; yet it is as fundamental to the human condition as life and 
death. This 
-thesis, will -argue 
that Bataille's thinking, on-the sacred and death, and 
their relation to subjectivity and individuality, is highly pertinent to an alternative 
reading of contemporary violence. Bataille insists on the fundamental 'need' for 
sacrificial violence, destruction and expenditure, a need rooted in the 
superabundance of energy excess. 
For Bataille the human is not a creature of discipline, order and proportion 
but fundamentally, a being of pure, burning energy, alien(ated) and impoverished by 
a world of rational calculation. Philosophical constructs such as the Cartesian 
Cogito, Kant's Transcendental Ego, Hegel's Geist are seen as artefacts of the 
processes of the rationalisation and restriction of energies. These constructs deny 
and efface Bataille's fundamental assertion: all life exists in excess of its utilisable 
energy requirements, the "superabundance of biochemical energy" (1967/1988: 27) 
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perpetuating the human and animal worlds. This 'superabundance" must be 
eXDended. wasted. and this occurs either "gloriously" in collective ceremon in 
religious monuments, in sum tuary rituals, or catastrophically in war, death and 
ektreme violence. 
For Bataille being is ravaged to its very core by a compulsion towards 
eroticism, violence, sacrifice and death; this is the nature of depense, profitless 
expenditure. The tumult of sexuality, particularly the moment of orgasm, is for 
Bataille, the ultimate model, as well as 'real' instance of the expenditure of excess 
energy. He draws out this conviction in two later theoretical works, The Tears of 
Eros (1961/1982) and Eroticism (1957/1986), as well as The Accursed Share, and 
fictional pieces. It is crucial to emphasise that although eroticism as a model of 
'excess' is central to Bataille's approach it is always thought in relation to the sacred, 
transgression and (a)theology; the radical absence of God. Bataille is not merely a 
'philosopher of the eroticbut a systematic sociological and historical thinker. 
/ For Bataille the sacred is created by the movement from the lost order of 
continuity to discontinuity, here death occurs in isolation from 'nature. Rituals and 
practices emerge to regulate the new order, particularly to inscribe death as a social 
form. Death must be managed, 'humanised', this occurs through funeral and 
mourning rites. Death is brought within the codes and practices of human society but 
can never again be part of the natural "immanence" of all life as in the order of 
continuity\ For Bataille the sacred demands designated processes where the lost 
sense of continuity can be briefly restored, in collective social rituals which represent 
the most intense and exalted moments of community life. Only later the sacred is 
reduced and enervated, transformed into spiritualised and transcendental religious 
systems. 
One of the remarkable methodological features of Bataille's engagements 
with death, eroticism and violence, is that his studies span the literary and 
autobiographical, the sociological and even the scientific. There is a vast difference 
in style, intent and methodology separating early works of erotic fiction and, for 
example, the late study[The Teai-s of Eros, ý-wbLcb_piýq§qrýtý. 
-, 
4_ýhronologicaI reading of 
excess from pre-history to modernity. The common theme is that tqýjý demands 
violence, destructiveness, the breaking of structures that-- govern 
. 
pýqductive, 
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utilitarian life. Sacrifice had been the social mechanism of violence, but modernity 
lacks such ritual forms. However eroticism between individuals, according to 
Bataille, still bears a trace of the sacrificial form, resulting in the dissolution of self- 
identity and reason. An indelible mark of violence characterises all human 
individuals, and the 'inevitability' of violence is crucial to the following discussion of 
contemporary death-events. 
Bataille argues in Guilty (1961/1988) that the exercise of rational thought 
enables the experience of its limit point, of its ultimate futility. Ln this way thouýýt 
offers Mthe --ty, of_a-le4p. 
bqyqnd those limits' (1988: 72). Just as the p9ss. ibili 
anguish of the foreboding of death facilitates the 'impossible' plunge beyond 
subjectivity into excess (nothingness, sovereignty, horror, madness, and ecstasy). 
Bataille then should not be read as a naive celebrant of irrationalism or nihilism, 
denying all meaning: 
The ultimate development of knowledge is questioning. We can't endlessly 
defer to answers ... to knowledge ... and knowledge finally opens a void. At 
the summit of knowledge, knowledge stops. I yield, and everything's 
vertigo ... Questioning is a'feature of isolated being. Lucidity - and a 
radiance that shines through - are features of isolated being. But in the 
radiant shining through, in glory - this isolated being denies itself as isolated 
being (Bataille 1988: 89&104). 
Methodologically then Bataille uses, or exploits 'reason', 'project' 
&accumulation', not as ends in themselves, but as tools to subvert, radicalise and 
suspend rational thought. This is, of course, a difficult and paradoxical method, one 
which lacks all certainty-and closure, but which affirms these features as crucial to 
, thinkinR 
itself. Rationality then is a containment of thought, a restricted operation of 
thinking, a necessary and unavoidable tool but emphatically not the 'highest' form of 
thought. Bataille, drawing on the imagery developed by Nietzsche, sought a 
"sunimit" of lucidity beyond the contours of "servile" thought. A "sovereign" 
thinking of the limit, a limit-experience. 16 
Bataille's theoretical positions, particularly as they impact upon sociology, 
are of course, far from straightforward or unproblematic. While his fictional works 
and the inward-reflections of the Suninia Atheologica collection offer powerful 
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literary experiences, it is also clear Bataille aimed to produce rigorous and original 
sociological studies. Often commentaries-on-BatailleignQrq_Qrýýinimise the latter in 
order to celebrate a certain 
-'Purity' 
or singuj4KjtXqfyision; a passion or nihilism that 
has surpassed the bounds of all conventional academic enquiry (Shaviro 1990, Land 
1992). In fact Bataille's theoretical manoeuvres are far more interesting than these 
readings would suggest. Bataillc's approach is certainly transgressive of academic 
boundaries and conventions, but transgression does not imply either surpassing or 
critique, both of which remain forms of dialectical negation. /Transgression explores 
the limit, both requiring its presence and exploiting that presence in order to 'shake' 
or, in sociological language, problematize it Transgression probes limits, breaks k 
them and sets them aside yet it does this in order to return from the limit, to animate, 
bring to life, or rejuvenate what lies this side of the limit, through a confrontation 
with what lay beyond it, yet is fundamental to its survival. Bataille's evident 
admiration for religious heretics, for saints and other 'extremists' (Bataille 
1957/1986: 221-251), for the victims of torture and dismemberment (Bataille 
1961/1989) should be read in this context, and is clearly central to his approach to 
the sacred. 
A further area of difficulty resides in Bataille's abundant use of dualisms or 
polar oppositions; sacred and profane, continuity and discontinuity, and general and 
, rest-ricteq economy. 
being the most important. These pairings can suggest absolutist 
divisions and hence abstraction, limitation and localisation even where Bataille 
clearly aims to undo such boundaries, to explode such limitations. Baudrillard has, 
in fact, dra, %vn attention to these methodological issues (Baudrillard 1976/1993: 154- 
158), and these are discussed in detail in chapter two. 
Bataille then did not seek to destroy, or even deny the relevance of 
sociology, history, anthropology or economics. His approach was to cross their 
boundaries, running one into another, stretching and expanding their restricted 
economies, confronting them with the principle of General economy. Bataille's 
General econom dependent as it is on solar or bio-chemical 
foundations must, -b, e 
taken, seriously,. that is as possessing a literal and material force. 
Bataille developed the notion of solar economics in conjunction with the nuclear 
physisist Georges Ambrosino, but the question of whether it is satisfactory to 
7c 
7: 
28 
contemporary physicists is of only marginal interest and cannot be pursued here. 
What is at stake is how and 
(to 
what extent Bataille's theories offer, provoke or 
demand a re-thinking of contemporary death-events, which appear at present beyond 
the scope of sociological, psychological or criminological discourse). -7 
THE GENEALOGY OF THE SYMBOLIC 
Me symbolic is neither a concept, an agency, a category, nor a 'structure', but an act of 
exchange and a social relation which puts an end to the real, which resolves the reai, and, at the same 
time, puts an end to the opposition between the real and the imaginary' (Baudrillard 1976/1993: 133). 
Baudrillard's thought offers a sustained reading of the relations between 
s ers of the modem period. The 
symbolic order, for Baudrillard, preceded the introduction of utility or use-value as 
dominant princi2le or guiding cultural imperative. Within the symbolic order utility 
was restricted, strictly, to what was necessary for daily subsistence. The notion of 
'use', such as it existed at all, was demarcated, sharply, from symbolic rituals and 
ceremonies, which comprised the most exalted and truly 'social' occasions. Such 
ýe ., q cultures were defined by ritual practices, byýceremonial sp ýnLýo, by ries, not 
the demands of economic behaviour. Bataille terms these forins "sovereign" 
expenditure: Fr Ehite_c_tuL_afjEar eur militar emonia excessesi 
Clearly vestigial forms of ceremonial and ritual expenditure are apparent in 
contemporary life, for example in occasions of over-indulgence and wastage, in 
seasonal gift giving, in residual monarchic structures and ceremonial rites of passage, 
such as graduation. . 
Baudrillard'sý_ýqnýention is not merely that vestiges of the 
§ym ri ymbolic ýolic are able to endure in modernity but rather that the p nciple of the s 
takes on new sometimes virulent forms. For Baudrillard sypýolic 
exchange cannot be erased or obliterated, and returns to undermine contemporary 
cultural systems which, by these failed exclusions become highly vulnerable to the 
re-emergence of symbolic principles in forms it cannot manage or comprehend. This 
point relates specifically to contemporary death-events since these can be read as 
eruptions of the symbolic in displaced, de-ritualised and radically individualised 
forms. This line of argument is developed below. 
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Baudrillard began to develop the notion of symbolic exchange in his third 
major work For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign (1972/198 1), which 
also marked his departure from structural (neo) Marxism. He sought a new principle 
of radical contestation to counter modem capitalist social and political organisation. 
In common with a number of French intellectuals; Foucault, Deleuze and Lyotard, 
Baudrillard no longer believed that any form of dialectical critique, internal to the 
historical order of capitalism, could be sufficiently distanced and radical to 
comprehend its logic, let alone to displace or overcome it. 
Before expanding on Baudrillard's theme of the symbolic it is worth noting 
the rejection of it delivered by Lyotard in his Libidinal Econonzy (1974/1993). 
Lyotard claims to be at once'very close and very far from what Baudrillard is doing' 
(Lyotard. 1974/1993: 104). While the two thinkers share the goal to 'destroy the 
bastions of alleged economic rationality', Lyotard argues Baudrillard. is still caught 
up in the use of theory and critique to obtain'the true': 
... he [Baudrillard] does not see that the whole problematic of the gift, of 
symbolic exchange, such as he receives it from Mauss, with or without the 
additions and diversions of Bataille, Caillois, Lacan, belongs in its entirety 
to Western racism and imperialism - that it is still ethnology's good savage, 
slightly libidinized, which he inherits with the concept? (Lyotard 
1974/1993: 106). 
By contrast Lyotard argues there is not, and can never be, a "subversive 
region", a privileged place accqs§jbIg by "hypothesis, theory or critique", that can be 
re-introduced 
'into 
capital in order to destroy it. Here he argues Baudrillard is too 
close to Marx, whom he critiques in order to surpass, while Lyotard aims to refuse 
the very fonn 'critique': 
... we do not want to fall into the trap set by this rationality at the same 
moment that it is vanquished. This trap consists quite simply in responding 
to the demand of the vanquished theory, and this demand is: put something 
in my place. The important thing is this place, however, not the contents of 
the theory. It is the place of theory that must be vanquished ... It makes little difference to say: there is no universal political economy, if we add: the 
truth of the social relation is the ambivalence of symbolic exchange, this 
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alone gives rights to the erotic and lethal force of desire (Lyotard 
1974/1993: 105-6). 
Lyotard insists 'desire underlies capitalism too', this point, he indicates, is 
recognised by Baudrillard but not pursued to its full extent. Baudrillard's problems, 
according to Lyotard, stem from his failure to read political economy as itself 
libidinal, while the symbolic is. the phantasy of an externalized region where desire 
would be sheltered from. every treacherous transcription into production, labour and 
thelawofvalue. The phantasy of a non-alienated region' (1974/1993: 107). 
Lyotard's appraisal is perspicacious though somewhat overstated. Generally 
speaking it is a sound and instructive reading of Baudrillard's earliest and least 
developed presentation of the symbolic. Baudrillard, in his haste to condemn 
economic rationality, was incautious in his affirmation of the symbolic, which at this 
stage was closely identified with a historical 'place', a 'truth, a "subversive region", 
as Lyotard calls it, a delimited theoretical space occupied by the 'truth' of primitive 
societies. While traces of the 'noble savage' thesis linger in Baudrillard's work, right 
up to the present, 17 this is also the case with many other radical thinkers, including 
Bataille, ---Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, and even Lyotard himself in his 
celebrations of paganism. 18 It could well be that a certain 'idealisation' is an 
unavoidable parameter of genealogical critique since no 'materiality' can be said to 
exist outside of discursive formations, yet all discursive formations contain traces of 
instability, incompletion or 'excess'. For this reason any attempt to think these 
excesses or aporias must encounter idealism of some kind. Idealism may well be an 
unavoidable dimension of all thought and systems. However theories which attempt 
to deny or efface their own idealism will be less satisfactory than those which admit 
or affirrn them. Further thought which aims to be neither genealogical nor'critique' 
encounters grave difficulties. Psychoanalytic thought is certainly a case in point. 
Here the space of 'truth' is replaced by claims concerning innate drives, desires or 
phantasies and their fundamental determining influence on human and social events. 
Resulting arguments often appear crude, partial and above all rather indiscriminate or 
indistinct. This thesis will not offer a thorough evaluation of psychoanalysis, these 
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are already available, but will pursue the arguments of certain figures, namely 
Lyotard and Zizek, as their work intersects with the present concerns. 
Lyotard's piecý on Baudrillard is interesting since despite repeatedly 
denouncing critique as an intellectual tool, he nevertheless admits resorting to a 
critique of Baudrillard, and for that matter of Marx. Again this suggests the 
inevitability of producing 'critique' of some kind. Moreover Lyotard's emphasis on 
libidinal economy seems to move dangerously close to a foundationalism of drives or 
desires, much the same point as he makes against Baudrillard's use of the symbolic. 
Since some gesture of this kind is exceptionally hard to avoid, if only as strategic 
device rather than 'fixed' principle, what is more interesting here are some of the 
wider implications of Lyotard's approach. Referring to Baudrillard's symbolic, 
Lyotard emphasises, repeatedly, that 'desire underlies capitalism too, that 'every 
political economy is libidinal', that capitalism is also a primitive society, or: the 
primitive society is also capitalism. ' (Lyotard 1974/1993: 107-9, emphasis in orig. ). 
However this point does not reveal a flaNv in Baudrillard's thinking, actually it points 
to crucial, yet rarely explored, aspects of his thought. In fact Baudrillard affirms 
Lyotard's point, the mechanisms and flows of desire are indeed central to capitalism, 
not only as social form, but also to the theoretical attempts at self-understanding 
which it produces. 
While 'intensities' are indeed characteristic of all human gatherings; 
'primitive', 'archaic', 'modem', it is crucial to be able to offer some means of 
differentiating between forms or manifestations of 'intensity'. To merely affirm 
intensity in general is to leave too much silent. Ultimately Lyotard is forced to make 
just such differentiations, as is Deleuze in . 4Yzti-Oedipzis (1972/1984). In Deleuze's 
thought these differentiations take the form of the twin notions, active and reactive, 
which more or less correspond to the terrns general (unrestricted) and restricted and 
109' ' ' ' ' by implication positive and negative or even good and bad . 
According to Baudrillard, Lyotard is insufficiently discriminating here, his 
thought is too embedded within the wider structures and assumptions naturalised by 
capitalism to distinguish different manifestations of intensity. As a result Lyotard 
replicates the modem capitalist notion of desire in his own work. Baudrillard 
responds, indirectly, to Lyotard's appraisal in Synibolic Exchange atid Death 
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(1976/1993) and in Seduction (1979/1990). distinguish 
between 'intensities' unfolding within the symbolic: ceremonial, enchanted or mythic 
forms, and those 'intensities' occurring within the largely disenchanted, 
demythologized, 'real' of modem capitalism. Nor are the distinctions between 
symbolic and semiotic confined to claims concerning the 'truth' of particular 
historical epochs. Baudrillard regards 'history' as a discursive technique 
characteristic of the modem, disenchanted period, as such it can have no objective 
mastery over that which lay outside its zone of self-construction. The main terms that 
Baudrillard deploys to denote this shifting and paradoxical relation began with the 
symbolic and the economic. Later the 'economic' sphere was defined through the 
sign, as semiotic (or simulational), but these ternis have now, largely, been 
superseded. The symbolic was, indeed, too closely associated with the structures of 
pre-capitalist societies in contrast with the semiotic systems of modernity. While this 
historical relation is itself extremely important, recently Baudrillard has distanced 
himself, increasingly, from its use arguing that it has become bound up in nostalgia; 
both for the idea of the 'primitive' social group and, amongst his readers, for the more 
explicitly sociological dimensions of his earlier works. 
FatqJ__Strategies (Baudrillard 1983/1990) reformulates this antagonistic 
relation less socio-historically yet more metaphysically through the terins banal, 
ironic and 
_fatal. 
At this stage Baudrillard departs from the genealogical method as 
established by Foucault. For Baudrillard such methods remain too rationalist and 
subjectivist, unable to account for the . 
"singularity" of extreme events. The 
conditions of modem, rational thought are traced in Symbolic Exchange and Death 
and related to the erosion of symbolic ritual and the constructiqn ofAisenchanted 
selations-of-referentiality that characterise the modem sign-form. However the 
acceleration of the sign in contemporary simulation and virtual technologies render 
the Foucauldian method inadequate (Baudrillard 1983/1990: 181-191,1987/1988: 11- 
27&97-104). 
Fatal Strategies specifies something of the acceleration of the semiotic and 
technological beyond the bounds of subjective reason into objective irony, and 
through the notion of the fatal he challenges thought and theory to respond in kind by 
transgressing its own limits. At this stage Baudrillard begins to approach the 
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principle of a primeval antagonism in terms of evil. This is not 'moral' evil fixed in 
relation to the (subjective) good but a principle of objective or,. 'objectal'_ 
disobedience, exceeding any duality with the good and operating through the reversal 
ot involution of those very systems of the (attempted) technological and scientific 
-mastery of the obj! ýct. 
Evil for Baudrillard is manifest in and through transparency, 
evil resides in the "transparition" of objects. This aspect of Baudrillard's is central to 
my reading of seduction and contemporary death-events developed below. 
Baudrillard opposes "fatal theory", the only true fatal strategy, to banal 
theory. Banal theo 
, encom assing, -the -enlightenment 
traditi on and much 
......... 
__y 
qyght, _. g§ýjtMqs 
the mastery of the object by the subject. Fatal contempopr 
theory, the theory of Baudrillard, on the contrary, never assumes the inertia, 
accessibility or complicity of the object but stresses the objects ironic, seductive 
superiority over the subject. The object is what drives events, what provokes and 
fascinates\ 
After Baudrillard's formal rejection of academic Marxist analysis he 
returned to address the symbolic as a principle irreducible to theories of libidinal 
desire emerging in the work of Lyotard and Deleuze. Baudrillard's most important 
text Synibolic Exchange and Death (1976/1993, hereafter S. E. D. ) greatly expanded 
the theorisation of the symbolic and wrested it from some of the justified critical 
points made by Lyotard. In the preface to this work Baudrillard presents a powerM 
vision of symbolic exchange, once the very organising principle of society, now 
suppressed but never obliterated by modern social organisation: 
... this radical utopia is slowly beginning to intrude at every level of 
contemporary society; this intoxicating revolt no longer has anything to do 
with the laws of history, nor even ... with the liberation of desire ... This form [the Symbolic] is equally dismissive of political and libidinal economy, 
outlining instead a beyond of value, a beyond of the law, a beyond of 
repression and a beyond of the Unconscious. (Baudrillard 1976/1993: 1). 
Baudrillard's contends that other theorists have ignored, effaced or failed to 
0 appreciate the radicality of the symbolic. He suggests Mauss, Freudý-ýSaussure and 
also Bataille do, to varying degrees, provide possible glimpses of this world if their 
thought is sufficiently radicalised, or "turned against itself'. For Baudrillard the 
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symbolic is not conceived as mystical or even sacred, but is rather the "primal 
illusion" of "the world".. It is not 4'reality' that can be comprehended in scientific or 
orthodox theoretical terms, not the 'real' but, for Baudrillard, the simulacrum, illusion 
--the,. changing systems of images and signs that mask the fact that there is no 
fundamental or base 'reality'. Here. in particular, the influence of Manichaeism can 
be detected in Baudrillard, something he makes explicit (in Gane (ed. ) 1993: 139- 
140,1997/1998: 46). For Baudrillard there is no essential final 'real', no deep or 
hidden 'reality' anterior to the symbolic; rather the illusions and enchantments of the 
symbolic order are, for Baudrillard, the fundamental relations of sociality. The 
symbolic is not a structure or social institution, nor is it reducible to any recognisable 
system of exchange. The symbolic is neither the fundamental 'order of things' nor 
the fundamental disorder of things (the level he takes Foucault and Deleuze to be 
operating on), rather it is the seduction of the order of things. It is fate and destiny, 
the roll of the dice, and it is manifest most particularly, for Baudrillard, in the 
principle of reversibility. CRjeyjeýrsibility is presented as the'radical otherof rationalist 
thought it infects, threatens and undermines all rational systems, structures and 
organisations: 
... reversibility, cyclical reversal and annulment put an end to the linearity of 
time, language, economic exchange, accumulation and power. Hence the 
reversibility of the gift in the counter-gift, the reversibility of exchange in 
the sacrifice, the reversibility of time in the cycle, the reversibility of 
production in destruction, the reversibility of life in death, and the 
reversibility of every term and value of the langue in the anagram 
(Baudrillard 1976/1993: 2). 
The theorisation of the symbolic marks Baudrillard's thought, of this period 
especially, as distinctively social. The principles of the symbolic; reversibility, 
reciprocity are principles of social, collective existence and the effervescence 
generated therein. There is no mystical, religious or otherworldly dimension here, no 
reliance on Taoist or Zen philosophy. In modernity the cyclical movements of the 
, symbolic 
are ruptured, separated or re-articulated along economic lines 
-- - I- --i -ý .-I- -- - 1---l ........ -1--. 1-1- Bqudrillar, d -qeyp1, qt3s termipology, tq- think tlýrough these new relations. 
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At this point we begin to appreciate the complimentary and partly analogous 
approaches of Bataille and Baudrillard. Baudrillard's continued references to the 
Accursed share (Baudrillard 1990/1993: 106-110,1997/1998: 26-28) demands 
recognition of Bataille's influence. This enables an approach better equipped to 
confront instances of extreme violence and horror, suspending enlightenment and 
rationalist assumptions and focusing attention on excesses that cannot be assimilated 
ýy P. Lýgýýs ýýive or "servile" thought. I will approach contemporary death-events as 
excess, 'inexplicabilities' beyond the competence of rational thought as it is usually 
conceived. Bataille's sacred and Baudrillard's symbolic are notions which seek to 
express distinctive forms and forces that should not be reduced to the general 
category 'unreason', as if they represented merely the absence of reason. 
/ihe 
sacred 
and the symbolic are crucial features generated by collective existence b ut, in 
modemity, 
(Lend 
-Lq_be rnýyginalised or exclude4) appearing residual and 
'irrational'. \ 
However these principles remain, they are necessary for the security and 
maintenance of modem rationality which, lacking its own foundations, must be able 
to draw upon 'other' forms to maintain its appearance of legitimacy. In fact modem 
p wer, Baudrillard contends, is actually achieved through symbolic strategies - or 
rather the imposition of an order where symbolic reversibility is rendered impossible 
(Baudrillard 1976/1993: 6-49). Further the principles of the sacred and the 
symbolic, though quite distinct in the theorisations of Bataille and Baudrillard, both 
insist on the centrality of death, violence, and sacrificial expenditure. This is why 
these formulations are particularly suggestive for a reading of contemporary death- 
events. 
It would be mistaken to claim any identity or synonymity between Bataille's 
sacred and Baudrillard's symbolic, or their thought more generally conceived. 
Baudrillard is not interested in any originary state of animality, anything analogous 
to Bataille's "continuity" or "intimacy" indeed he would probably reproach Bataille 
for such speculations concerning ultimate origins, despite moving dangerously close Z 
to this 
-himself 
Baudrillard has stated explicitly that his notion of the symbolic is not 
identical with the sacred as such (Baudrillard 1987: 94). The key point, for 
Baudrillard, is that there is no continuity, no fusion with or absolute immersion in 
nature, and if there ever was it can be of little interest today, there is no gateway to 
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"continuity", provided by the sacred. For Baudrillard 'the sacred' was perhaps one 
form or expression of the symbolic that has now eroded and been replaced by other 
cultural forms in a Western world devoid of any but the most residual understanding 
of the sacred. Further, for both Bataille and Baudrillard this 'condition' represents a 
catastrophic danger for modem social systems. 
The sacred and the symbolic bear a strikingly similar relationship to 
language, self-identity and the metaphysics of rationality, individuality, utility and 
accumulation. They occupy positions of radical antagonism to these forms, they 
cannot be comprehended by them, rather they irrupt, subvert and terrorise rationality 
with all the force of the unknown. Both the sacred and the symbolic are in a sense 
non-linguis, tic', non-discursive. and asemiotic; 
_ 
they express "sensual awareness" 
(Bataille 1990: 21) dissolving subjective identity, and moral agency, rendering 
! mastery-' impossible. For Bataille human consciousness, language and discursivity 
are bound to a logic of the debasement of sovereignty and the ever-increasing 
enslavement of the human spirit. Human intellect (discursive thought) 'developed as 
functions of servile labour' (Bataille 1990: 25) from the moment the positing of the 
first objects, tools, broke continuity., For Bataille sacred or ritualistic words resonate 
with something of this 'lost' sensibility, a realm before or beyond Hegelian dialectics. 
Sacrifice was sovereign while it remained "uninformed by meaningful discourse" 
(ibid. ). In time sacrifice was transformed into a mechanism to facilitate crop growth 
or the general wellbeing of the community that is subordinated to rational ends. For 
Bataille the "absolute dismemberment" with which Hegel identifies 'truth' can only 
be a rupture in the fabric of discourse. Baudrillard too, in his work on Saussure's 
anagrams (Baudrillard 1976/1993: 195-242) sought a mythic or enchanted modality 
of language that is irreducible to the conventions of linguistic rationality in general 
and structuralism in particular. While the symbolic itself appears, in modernity, as 
an "effraction" or rupture of the discursive order, the third and fourth orders of 
simulacra. 
In a simple sense both Bataille's sacred and Baudrillard's symbolic are 
forged around self-consciousness, or consciousness of death. The terrifying, yet for 
Bataille simultaneously joyous, reality of death is central to the operation of the 
sacred. According to Bataille natural phenomena and processes intimating mortality 
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evoke a sense of dread and horror, and must be controlled and regulated by taboo. 
Taboos mediate all human contact with death and related phenomena that disgust and 
terrify. Yet Bataille also makes clear that individuals are drawn, irrevocably, to what 
ig taboo in a fundamental relation of attraction and repulsion-On certain occasions 
the violation or transgression of taboo is demanded offering a glimpse of what lies 
beyond continuity, intimacy, death. The fatal repulsion/attraction of death, 
specified by Bataille, will be central to the following reading of contemporary death- 
events. 
Baudrillard's reading of death is perhaps more complex. For him 
contemporary social theories based around immanence and materialism derive from 
this same primary disjunction of life and death. For Baudrillard the 'real' derives 
solely from the "disjunction of life and death" which comes about as s mboic 
exchangqyith thp, dqaOJý qp1qTqq, 
_and 
lost. The symbolic operates outside and in 
subversion of all such disjunctive codes and binary oppositions, 'In the symbolic 
operation, the two terms lose their reality'. At this point Baudrillard departs most 
sharply from forms of well-intentioned, left/humanist Western anthropology. 21 For 
Baudrillard it is mistaken to assume 'primitive' peoples 'conjured up' symbolic 
exchange rituals in order to cover over or mask the terrifying reality of biological 
death. Such assertions allow Western thinkers to claim, in however a subtle or 
qualified manner, modem societies possess an intellectual sophistication that is 
objectively valid, which has penetrated through myths and superstitions however 
charming, comforting or 'useful' these may be. For Baudrillard the 'biological reality' 
of birth and death are not absolutes, 'our idealism converges on the illusion of a 
biological materiality' (1976/1993: 13 1), Lhi§ s pp ed 'reality' is only an effect ote _ýýU 
! jo- 
erosion and denial of the symbolic. As Baudrillard puts it: 
... our conception of biological life and death is not the real rather it is our imaginary and it is purchased at the cost of biological irreversibility, this 
absurd. physical destiny, life has then been lost in advance, since it is 
condemned to decline with the body (1976/1993: 13ý). 
Particularly important for the purpose of this thesis is the process, specified 
by Baudrillard, whereby death loses meaning, loses pathos, passion, and value, 
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becoming ridiculous or merely embarrassing. Death is tamed but only at the cost of 
its disarticulation from life. As a result, according to Baudrillard, the remaining 
fascination with death devolves onto catastrophic, accidental, suicidal or "willed" 
death. These deaths mark an__intense symbolic challenge to the system; they are 
,, deaths that -cannot-be_. controlled, - 
processed, concealed. hey challenge the /T 
fundamental basis of power by wresting the right to manage death from the state and 
fixing it around the individual, around subjectivity and desire, in extreme cases 
_quickly and violence and murder. 
ýIýoK 
this e4ýojj 'responsibility' for death must be 
decisively apportioned. The issue of moral responsibility and extreme violence is 
addressed in detail in the c4ýp T§ on seduction and evil. 
Baudrillard's interest is, primarily, terrorist and hostage deaths and road 
accidents since these are "undeserved" and make the domestication of death harder to 
accomplish. The suicide pact or cult-death is another example of such symbolic 
challenges to the dominant order. Baudrillard does not dwell on murder in general. 
The vast majority of murders are successfully contained within the rationalising 
procedures of police investigation, legal inquest and, sometimes, criminal trial. Even 
murder can, like hospitalised death, be managed to the point of banality. However 
the contemporary death-events specified in the appendix to this study are irreducible 
to manageable forms of death. This quality distinguishes them, accounts for their 
notoriety, for the trauma and horror that surround them. 
/These are catastrophic 
events, they undennine the claims of 'rational' economic social organisation, they 
mock the postures of state-sanctioned moralism, they tear apart the categories and 
concepts of institutional knowledge of crime, 'deviance' and violence. \ Rendering 
impossible the modem devices of death-management such events demand symbolic 
ritual and so a thinking on the symbolic level. Certain death events, such as the 
murder of James Bulger, provoke mourning that is no longer restricted to individual 
affectivity and becomes collective, national even global. Here death retains the 
intensity of sacred repulsion. Such events involve a temporary suspension of 
rationality. In order to maintain notions of moral -responsibi 
lity_-and 'g iilt' where 
actions themselves seem to suggest an absence or suspension of identity and excesses 
beyond the subsumption within a stable self, social institutions are pushed to the 
limit. Such events prompt legal authorities to abandon 'reason' and sDeak of, 
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'inexplicable' evil; the media scavenge for scraps of intelligibility situating 'blame' in 
tq q! AqjjeE any_ývailqb More considered opinion is drawn to 'clues' secreted in early 
childhood experience, social background, peer pressure. None of these accounts has 
the power to convince or persuade they are unable tokýose the breach of 'reason) 
torn open by such events. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter has introduced the thought of both Bataille and Baudrillard, 
focusing specifically on the social dimensions of their theory. The earliest, most 
fundamental relations of society and collective being are addressed through Bataille's 
notion of the sacred and Baudrillard's symbolic. These terms are not synonymous, 
nor can comparisons between them establish their ultimate meaning or value. 
Bataille's theory does not hold the 'key' to a definitive interpretation of Baudrillard's 
ideas. Indeed Baudrillard himself refuses to play the role of ultimate pedagogic 
source of his own thought as Genosko (1998: 12-22) has argued. Similarly it is not 
possible to claim that Baudrillard draws out the 'truth' of Bataille's thought nor offers 
a definitive 'updating' of its characteristic themes. The chapters which follow will 
draw upon Bataille's and Baudrillard's thought which, though conflicting offer 
alternative possibilities for thinking the 'excess' of extreme violence. 
This chapter has reviewed some critical appraisals their thought has 
attracted. Much criticism has been dismissed as of little value though Lyotard's more 
pertinent remarks have been addressed and more developed feminist evaluations will 
be considered below. 
Most importantly I have begun to indicate how the notions of the sacred, 
death, violence and sacrificial expenditure, the symbolic, the object and reversibility, 
can offer a radical and incisive reading of contemporary death-events, events which 
elude the grasp of more conventional or established modes of thought. 
This chapter has considered a number of theoretical and methodological 
issues that have a direct bearing upon how persuasive an account of such events that 
draw on Bataille and Baudrillard may be. These issues are neither 'resolved' as such, 
nor are they finally 'resolvable', but must remain as instabilities that will inform and 
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direct the following readings. Perhaps the principal theoretical assumption here is 
that the contemporary order seems to have generated a new fon-n or style of event, or 
rather that new events have undern-iined existing explanatory systems, relocating the 
meanings of excess, jn-rel. ation- to. violence and death. This demands a re-thinking of 
theory and excess in order that a more commensurate approach might be attained. 
The following reading does not strive for a closed or sealed 'account' of these 
events. 22 It aims for a thinking which 'does not fall apart in the face of horror', 
which does not shrink away from this task but which must be willing to constantly 
re-examine its own assertions, recognising that the event disables thought, thought 
does notcapture' the event. Anything less would be a failure to follow through the 
implications of Bataille and Baudrillard's thinking. What follows then will not be the 
'true explanation' of the 'inexplicable' event, but a new and alternative means of 
confronting excess, thinking horror. 
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NOTES 
1) There are a number of published studies on Bataille that overlook or 
sbriously underplay his sociological investigations. For example Libertson (1984) 
focuses primarily on the literary dimensions of Bataille's writings as does Shaviro 
(1990) clearly influenced by Libertson. Such material not only overlooks 
sociological elements, which can cause severe difficulties when attempting to come 
to tenns with concepts like power and exchange, and the sacred, but also tends to 
suggest that Bataille opposed all systematic and rational thought. The implication is 
that Bataille could not even have contemplated producing such studies. For Land's 
(1992) radical interpretation of Bataille, the fact that Bataille did produce a large 
amount of systematic sociology becomes almost a matter of embarrassment. In 
reading such works whatever their other merits which are considerable, it becomes 
difficult to acknowledge that Bataille could have been greatly influenced by 
relatively mainstream sociological writers such as Durkheim, Mauss and Weber, 
though this was undoubtedly the case. 
2) The work of Foucault will be drawn upon on occasions but is not central to 
this thesis. It was felt that Foucault's work had less to offer for the following 
reasons. Firstly, Foucault's investigations tend to be focused on the classical and 
modem periods, and do not consider the contemporary age as such. This is an 
important factor since the distinctiveness of the contemporary period is central to this 
thesis. Here it was felt that Baudrillard's approach had more to offer, especially as it 
is informed, partially, by a similar genealogical thinking. 
/n fact it seems that 
Baudrillard's intention in the mid-1970's was to take up Foucauldian themes and 
expand or radicalise them by theorising the social exclusion of death as prior to and 
more essential than the exclusions treated by Foucault's studies of madness and 
sexualitY\ Baudrillard's theory seems to provide precisely what this thesis requires, a 
reflection on excess that is aware of Foucault's importance but which attempts to 
extend its scope into the contemporary age. Secondly, Foucault's own reading of 
Bataille, discussed below, seems to limit Bataille's thinking on excess in an 
unsatisfactory way. Other readings of Bataille's texts are certainly possible and the 
thesis aims to provide precisely this, emphasising aspects of Bataille's thinking which 
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are minimised by Foucault. Both Bataille and Baudrillard's irreducibility to the 
genealogical-discursive method will be emphasised. Specifically we aim to move 
beyond a sketch of the 'conditions of possibility' of contemporary excess because 
sbch approaches, even those as sophisticated as Foucault's, remain 'incommensurate' 
with the intensity of horror provoked by such events. See, for example, Foucault 
(1973/1978: 199-212), see also Pawlett (1997a) for a discussion of Foucault's reading 
of Bataille. 
3) This is a description of the murder of Suzanne Capper in Manchester in 
1993. The details are taken from The Times, Saturday December I 81h 1993.1 would 
term this a contemporary death-event however the case is not discussed at length in 
this study since it never generated the interest, nor achieved the notoriety of the other 
cases. Nevertheless its horror remains absolutely excessive, almost unspeakable. 
4) The term potlatch is taken, primarily, from Mauss' influential study The 
Gift, which will be discussed below. For Mauss' discussions of the potlatch 
ceremony see Mauss (1950/1990: 6-7,12-13). 
5) This passage is translated in Baudrillard (1987/1990). 
6) For Bataille's writings on surrealism and attitude to Breton, see Bataille 
(1994) The Absence of Myth - ivritings on surrealism, in particular the essay entitled 
'The Castrated Lion'. 
7) See in particular Bennington's essay in Bailey-Gill, Ed. (1995: 46-57). 
8) It is not the intention here to map out, in any detail, biographical or personal 
information. It will be sufficient to sketch, very briefly, the basic historical and 
political context and intellectual influences operating on both Bataille and 
Baudrillard. For biographical matter on Bataille see Surya (1987), Hollier 
(1974/1992) and Richardson (1994). On Baudrillard see Gane 1991b and 1993 (ed. ). 
9) This collection was to include Inner Experience, Guilty and On Nietzsche 
with the addition of shorter fictional pieces, in a clear reference to the vast and highly 4. ) 
systematic Sulnina Theologia of St. Aquinas. 
10) See Bataille (1967/1988: 169-190) on the Marshall plan for example. 
11) The difficulties involved in these assumptions are discussed in Richman 
(1988) and Stoekl (1985). 
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12) See Bataille (1962/1991) The Impossible or the hatred ofpoetry. See also 
Baudrillard (1987/1990) and (1976/1993: 195-242 ). 
13) Kellner (1989,1994) and Norris (1992) make these charges. Norris' critique 
of Baudrillard is riddled with flaws, some of which are exposed by Merrin (1994). 
14) 'It is insofar as we are human that the object exists in time, where its 
duration is perceptible. But the animal eaten by another exists this side of duration; 
it is consumed, destroyed, and this is only a disappearance in a world where nothing 
is posited beyond the present' (Bataille 1973/1989: 18). It should be noted that this 
order is not 'prehistorical' in the popular sense that there is little or no reliable data of 
its forms and practices but rather in the philosophical sense that history, or historicity 
begins with Modernity and its drive to produce history (Baudrillard 1993). 
15) These themes are discussed in Hardt (1993) and in Butler (1987). 
16) See in particular the Summa Atheologica collection of texts including Inner 
Experience, Guilty and On Nietzsche (in fact this project was never completed but 
was clearly intended as a collection). See also Blanchot "Affirmation and the 
Passion of Negative Thought" in Botting and Wilson (Eds. ) (I 998b: 41-58). 
17) This theme re-appears, briefly, even in recent publications such as Tile 
Perfect Crime (1995/1996) and Art and Artefact (1997), however it is not, or need 
not be, a fundamental axis of Baudrillard's thought. 
18) Foucault is perhaps closest to this position in Madness and Civilisation 
(1961/1967), Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-Oedipus (1972/1984: 139-271), see also 
Lyotard (1989). 
19) A crucial distinction between the approaches of Bataille and Baudrillard, 
and Lyotard and Deleuze is that for the latter 'unrestricted' libidinal flows are more 
intense, 
-more vital. 
For Bataille, and., even., more so Baudrillard a degree of 
4restriction' actually facilitates greater intensity. This is the case with Bataille's 
notion of transgression and with Baudrillard's themes of the game and the rule. 
Further, as I will argue below, neither Bataille's eroticism nor Baudrillard's 
seduction is reducible to theories of 'drive' or 'libido'. 
20) In fact Freud claimed that 'the aim of all life is death' influenced by 
Schopenhauer's earlier assertion that death is the 'true result and to that extent the 
purpose of life', see Freud (199 1 b: 311). Baudrillard's discussion of these themes is 
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developed below. It is important to note Baudrillard's proximity to Durkheim and 
Mauss concerning the primacy ofthe social' and his distanced from Freud and also 
Bataille in his avoidance of any conception of innate drives. The fundamental issue 
is not of internal drives or energies but rather of the 'social repression of death. 
Baudrillard defines the unconscious, as a 'huge litigation, involving all the 
obligations and reciprocities that we have denounced ... The unconscious is social in 
the sense that -it-is. -made-up-of -all -that could not-be exchanged socially_qr 
symbolically' (1976/1993: 134). In Lacanian psychoanalysis the 'Father-God- 
Ancestor' is said to be the Law, it is absolute authority and it cannot be exchanged or 
reciprocated with. This assumption leads to the whole problematic of repression and 
liberation which for Baudrillard is a false concern. Further, Baudrillard argues the 
Law of the Father is a concept inextricably bonded to language, speech and subject; 
it is and can only be individualist. The symbolic by contrast is social and collective, 
and psychoanaly-tic concepts are. for Baudrillard, the artefact of its denial. To what 
extent Lvotard and Deleuze break with Freudian psychoanalysis is an important 
_qLue 
tion, but is too large to pursue here. 
21) For example the work of Levi-Strauss, for Baudrillard's attitude to Levi- 
Strauss see Baudrillard 1976/1993: 188, n 10). 
22) This would be to recreate a pseudo-stable restricted economy as 
'replacement' for those that have been rejected. Here, in fact, we rejoin the terrain of 
Lyotard's dismissal of Baudrillard. However, barring the occasional lapse, 
Baudrillard's thought has moved beyond that zone which Lyotard specified as 
restriction, limitation and closure. In fact Baudrillard's responses to this critique 
involve important manoeuvres which problematise Lyotard's own thinking, as well 
as that of other thinkers including Bataille. 
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CHAPTERTWO 
EXCESS: UTILITY AND EXCESS 
INTRODUCTION 
'there are periods in history when, under the influence of some great collective shock, social 
interactions have become much more frequent and active ... men become different. Under the influence 
of the general exaltation, we see the most mediocre and inoffensive bourgeois become either a hero or 
a butcher' (Durkheirn 1912/1961: 24 1). 1 
This chapter examines the operations of utility and excess within, broadly 
speaking, the 'enlightenment tradition'. This is the current of thought from 
Descartes, through to Kant and Hegel, into 19th and 20th century political and social 
theory, and the influence it continues to exert on contemporary sociological thought. 
It is important to acknowledge the multiplicity of differences contained within what 
is loosely referred to as the 'enlightenment tradition'. Particularly important is the 
distance the fýunders of modem sociology; Marx, Durkheim and Weber sought to 
establish between the abstractions and idealisms of Kantian and Hegelian philosophy 
and their own analyses of social systems and institutions. Similarly, each of the 
above sought to distance themselves, to varying degrees, from explicitly Utilitarian 
and Social Darwinist philosophies of the latter 19th century. 2 This chapter contends 
that the crucial importance within dominant philosophical and sociological traditions 
of the notions of utility, utilitarianism and use-value can be established as a very 
,-j -ty and broadly basýd set of common assumptions. Further Lhe,, -presencý ý(qf tilit 
utilitarianism as structuring principles of social thought undernimes/its, abilit6o 
(, 'thiW'events noi, base&owc-akulations Ofutility. Inutile events, actions and-Orocesses 
yielding no 'profit' or gain ciin only appear as excess or residue. Aneventsuchasthe 
death of James Bulger is an inutile crime of the most shocking kind; it is in excess of 
conventional sociological explanation. This chapter aims to locate the deficiencies in 
the sociological tradition and to begin to draw upon certain marginal themes which 
may be better able to approach excesses of this kind. 
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The centrality of utilitarian assumption has not been diminished, 
significantly, by the widespread, though partial, criticisms of explicit forms of 
Utilitarianism (as developed by Bentham or Mill). The specifically Benthamite 
doctrine of Utilitarianism itself quickly became unfashionable but as Deleuze 
(1962/1983: 143) has remarked of Utilitarianism, dominant belief-systems of this 
kind only allow themselves to be apparently 'superseded' once so fin-nly entrenched 
they are able to mediate and adapt succeeding systems of thought/! The persistence of 
the central importance of the principle of utility within dominant thought, and 
concomitant impoverishment and restriction of human and social potential, fuelled 
much of Nietzsche's critique of modem culture and, I argue, this motif 
structures a great deal of the work of Bataille and Baudrillar 
A restricted economy of useful faculties and categorical divisions forms 
both the ultimate foundation of morality and reason in Kantian Philosophy, 3 while it 
is the very motive force of the Hegelian Aujhebung. 4 The impact of these founding 
systems of enlightenment reason has of course been profound in structuring 
contemporary thought and life. It is often asserted that the primary or definitional 
focus of Post-structuralist and Postmodernist thought has been the attempted 
overturning of these philosophical systems while others have argued that any attempt 
at 'escape' from enlightenment thought is always and necessarily partial such is the 
5 scope and depth of its influence. 
In the natural sciences the principle of utility received powerful, 
controversial and enduring expression in Darwin's Origin of Species. 6 Marx was 
particularly enthusiastic about Darwinian evolutionism; which argued that 
physiological 'survival utilities 7 were the fundamental principal of all species 
evolution, indeed all matter/That Marx should greet Darwin's work in such a way, 
even requesting that he might dedicate the English edition of Das Kapital to 
Darwin, 8 reveals that Marx's critique of Benthamite Utilitarianism did not in any way 
amount to a critique of the principle of utility, only its more individualist guises. 9 
Utility is of particular importance in the first volume of Marx's Capital where it 
appears as the central foundation of all human activity, potentiality and creativity; ' 
here Marx actually converts or absorbs a notion of 'expenditure' into one of use- 
value since useful labour is claimed as the raison detre of human existence. This 
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lessentialising' or 'naturalisation' of use-value, as contrasted with the alienative 
Capitalist 'exchange-value', is central to Marxist sociology and has been criticised, 
vigorously, by both Bataille and Baudrillard as we shall examine below. The 
lirinciple of utility also plays a considerable role in Durkheim's Division ofLabour in 
Society, " and Weber's theses regarding the proliferation of rationalisation in modem 
society. 12 From these sources the concept of -utility filters into many strands of 
contemporary sociology5 
In 1824 Bentham coalesced a diversity of liberal and radicalist views current 
in British society into a manifesto of the principle of utility. By utility Bentham 
intended 'that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, 
pleasure, good, or happiness ... or 
(what comes to the same thing) to prevent the 
happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is 
considered' (in Mill & Bentham 1987; Chl: 2-3). There are many problems 
associated with the philosophy of Utilitarianism which cannot be addressed here, but 
what is immediately clear is that Bentham had no adequate means of addressing 
possible clashes of interest between conflictual 'parties' nor an appreciation of 
constraining political power in social or community collectivities. Bentham declares 
'The community is a fictitious body ... the community then is, what? - the sum of the 
interests of the several members who compose it' (1987; Chl: 4). Durkheim and 
Mauss aimed to refute the liberal notion of the isolate rational ego by insisting, in a 
remarkable project, on the irreducibility of the social and collective to the sum of 
individual action. 14 It is also worth noting here that the strict opposition or mutual- 
exclusivity of the concepts of pleasure and pain becomes untenable in the'writings of 
Freud and later Bataille. 15 Clearly the pleasure, good or 'happiness' to which 
Bentham and later Mill refer was, and can only be 'usual, temperate and moderate', 
never excessive, a notion Bentham and Mill associate with brute animality or avoid 
altogether. 16 
While Marx, Durkheim and Weber, the founders of modem sociology, 
formed, in part, a critique of liberal, free-market and Utilitarian theory they 
remained, to varying degrees, bound up with the qbjq9tive, or in the case of Weber 
the inpyRab 
_p_Cqver grýqater rationality, 
f] 
_4nd,, 
ef iciency in human affairs. They 
differed, essentially, only on whether these 'forces of utility' should be owned 
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privately, communally or by the State (in the case of Marx). Durkheim, particularly 
in his anthropological writings as we shall examine below, provided a means of 
addressing, sociologically, the poverty or inadequacy of the principle of utility within 
the (General) economy of any social system. 
The dominant trends of contemporary sociology display a widespread 
tendency to treat the principle of utility as unproblematic even unquestioned 
assumption, and not only within work that still aims to serve the cause of 
Enlightenment rationality as it is classically conceived. 17 The corollary is that the 
notion of 'the excessive' is often treated as something to be reduced, contained or 
'secured'. Recently, excessive phenomena have been treated in terms of the 
calculation of security and risk (Beck, 1992) or relatedly, as an affliction more or less 
peculiar to the technological and knowledge practices of Modernity (Bauman, 1989; 
1991). The merit of such work is undermined by, at times, xca i Lý ý_jating ahistorical 
it _io_ný 18 The important and influential sociological system of Anthony S 
Giddens manages to elide the notion of excess altogether. By insisting on the 
centrality of rational meaning-creating actors in dual relationship with 'enabling' 
social structures, Giddens effects a prima facie expulsion of all that cannot be 
accorded rational meaning or purpose, that is all that could be regarded as 
excessive, 109 In modem Feminism there is a division or tension between work which 
pursues the 'goal' of a full equalisation of human rights and which decries, far too 
simplistically and to the detriment of its own argument, any material that does not 
serve this purpose, and that which, often drawing on psychoanalytic sources, does 
20 attempt to comprehend forms of excess; violence, "evil" and death. 
Some recent sociological work has viewed forms of excess as a field of 
potentiality that may disrupt dominant power hierarchies, this is especially true of 
material that is influenced by Foucault, for example Boyne (1990) and ýConnolly 
However such work tends to focus on that which is in excess of any 
particular framework of rationality; medico-legal, theological or patriarchal, as if 
21 
these forces were merely textual, not material. ;, Such a move tends topre-structure 
and contain excess by femovingýit, from he social orld and containing it within the 
Idealist and transcende 22 
ýn'-realm- 
of text<ften facilitating progressivist or humanist 
PLescrip iR! jý benqfýt§ or 'profits. There are tensions and inconsistencies, in this 
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respect, both in Foucault's own work and more particularly in interpretations and 
applications of his thought. Some writers such as Blanchot (1990) and Erebon 
(1992) emphasise the passion and excess of Foucault's thought, a thinking from -the 
'outside' or from 'infinity'. Others, such as Rose (1990) and Ramazanoglu (1992) 
restrict Foucault's thought to manageable or useful chunks, seriously underestimating 
its shifting, open and excessive style. Finally, the currently fashionable work of 
Deleuze is divided along similar lines, with some writers overplaying the Deleuzian 
emphasis on utility, production and operationality creating, oddly, an indiscriminate 
or homogenised vision, flattening epistemological nuance for the sake of ontological 
principles. These approaches stand in contrast with both Bataille and Baudrillard's 
thought. Bataille refuses materialism for 'base-materialism', 23 Baudrillard rejects 
'anti-humanist' theory and method as Idealist, both insist on expenditure, loss and 
radical uncertainty. 
Utility must be regarded as the historical, political and economic 'reality 
nciple' of the Western capitalist nations, conditioning or pre-structuring 
practically all knowledge and truth-claims, theoretical speculation and 
methodological design. A great deal of academic thought and university-based 
kRo_wledge is little other than the search. discovery or creation of useful thought, 
knowledge that may be applied, developed, circulated; utilised for greater human 
------- ---214 
ductivity, potentiality or, increasingly, security. Governmental and private 
institutions provide funding for useful, balanced and ordered research proposals, 
while'useless', unbalanced or disordered proposals are systematically rejectedoThe 
principle of utility is so widespread, so firmly entrenched, so taken-for-granted that it 
becomes almost imperceptible, invisible against the canvas of late Modem society. 
The notion ofýExce`ss is much harder to explicate. Dictionary definitions 6 
offer a preliminary insight with the following, 'going beyond what is usual, proper or 
' (Chambers 
1995). However Utility and Excess must not be conceived as binary oppositions, as 
mutually exclusive. Clearly what might be in excess of the usual, right or proper in 
one age may be deemed perfectly acceptable in an earlier or later one. For example, 
in early 20th Century Europe to have more than one sexual partner in a lifetime may 
have been regarded as excessive while today to restrict oneself to one partner may 
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seem like excessive fastidiousness. Although what is regarded as excessive is 
generally, implicitly or explicitly, coded negatively, the distinction between Utility 
and Excess cannot be seen as merely analogous to that residing between what is 
ýrescribed by behavioural nonns, and what is proscribed, though this can be seen as 
a sub-component of the above. Excess does not merely lay beyond the 
commonplace, residing in territory that might be annexed or incorporated, nor is it 
that which is represented ýy political pressure grou institutionalised oppositional 
organisations vying for a degree of policy change Rather excess refers to that which 
-ýýirty jointless, 
terrifying, sickening, evil, even non-existent yet still somehow is I /I I 
, 
ý! ble-ýqutsidejhe categories and-cqrjýýpAs-of mainstream society and thought. pýlp 
Throughout the course of modernity it has been believed or at least hoped that ever- 
increasing moral and educational guidance, coupled latterly with enhanced lifestyle 
opportunities will in time eradicate or greatly curtail human excesses, particularly 
extreme violence, which is often conceived as in some sense instinctive or archaic in 
origin. 
However in more recent years this belief-system has become increasingly 
fragile for an enormous diversity of reasons. It has been fractured by a number of 
catastrophic events, global wars, the Nazi holocaust, environmental disasters, and 
recent occurrences of 'inexplicable' violence and death like the murder of James 
Bulger and massacre in Dunblane, Scotland. As the 20th Century comes to an end, 
excess, rather than appearing as the marginalised or confined 'other' of rational utility 
and progress as it had seemed to Foucault in his study of madness, 27 is increasingly 
manifest within the mainstream. It appears as cataclysm and disaster, as 'inhuman' 
event and paradoxically, as a means of serving supposedly rational ends, that is in 
machine technology; for example military defence technologies, and in the realm of 
scientific and medical research programmes. At times it has appeared that excess,,, -/ý/ 
rather than utility, has become the dynamic of -contemporary social 
transformation, 
that the endless pursuit of utility has driven society into-excess. To such phenomena 
Baudrillard is particularly attuned. 
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FROM RESTRICTED TO GENERAL ECONOMY - TOWARDS A 
SOCIOLOGY WITHOUT RESERVE 
The radical implications of the philosophies of Nietzsche and Bataille have, 
on numerous occasions, been drawn out in a variety of ways in disciplines as diverse 
as Literary and Gender theory, Theology, and Political EthiCS'28 however specifically 
sociological treatments are rare. This is surprising since both employed distinctly 
sociological terminology to draw specifically sociological conclusions. Of particular 
concern here is the common ground shared by Nietzsche and Bataille in 
methodological disposition. 
Nietzsche began the critical assault on the dominant tendencies of thought in 
29 his earliest engagements with Socratic philosophy. Unlike the founders of 
sociology, particularly Marx, Nietzsche was scathing of Darwin's Origin of Species. 
He opposed "Life"; the active and dynamic play of human emotion, passion and 
Will, to mere "KnowledRe" denoting the 'reactive' that which limits, measures, serves 
and thenjudges life. It was the latter level he took Darwinian, biological and natural 
sciences to be operating on. Knowledge becomes the ultimate end of thought rather 
than being a means to facilitate human creativity. /fhought and knowledge are the 
servants of humanity, yet in this process they restrict its diversity, then in the service 
of this restricted configuration of Humanity they wall it up within their imageý. 
Thought is made to 'serve' human interests, it must be utile, and its potential to 
volatilise political and cultural orthodoxies must be contained. For Nietzsche, 'Life' 
could still be seen as existing_in excess of knowledge pis, On the Geneqýqgy_qf 
Morals (1887/1994) describes the process by which the excess; passions, creativity 
and Will are calcified into the material from which the suppositions, concepts and 
__mqý4phors 
of rational thought are shaped. Rationality and utility appear as selective 
defon-nations of creative Will, or as myths that have lost their binding power 
(Nietzsche 1887/1994: 12-13&91-92). The emergent scientific worldview views 
bodily excesses and instinctive impulses (lust, violence, death) as increasingly 
opposed to all that is deemed rational, reasonable, moderate and useful. In scientific 
discourse these things are the essence of error and confusion while in religion and 
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morality, analogously, they are related to sin and evil. The result for Nietzsche is a 
reactive, resentful and nihilistic culture: 
Science today is a hiding place for every kind of discontent, disbelief, 
gnawing worm, despectio sui [contempt of self], bad conscience (1994: 117). 
However it would be a grave error to conclude that Nietzsche was opposed to all 
science, that he was the enemy of rigorous thought. Thought, he argued, must aspire 
once more to the sensibilities of art, poetry and above all tragedy in order that tragic 
fullness and "eternal suffering" are once more affirmed in human awareness. 
Precisely these experiences are absent from the restricted economies of 'Christian- 
moral' culture and can onl be exvressed within the fullness of a General economy. Y- 
------- 
In this respect Nietzsche and Bataille were very close, as Bataille fWly 
acknowledged. The Nietzschean notion of "grosse Okonomie", that is 'great' or 
'grand' economy (Nietzsche: 1964: 291: 164) is remarkably similar to Bataille's notion 
of General economy both etymologically and in content though they should not be 
seen as entirely coterminous. (PlOtnitsky (1993 has explored the multiplicities 
involved in the term General economy as they occur in the writings of Nietzsche, 
Bataille and latterly, Derrida. Plotnitsky, rightly, ' situates the notion of General 
economy in relation to Bohr's principle of complementarity and Hiesenberg's 
Indeierminacy as well as the philosophical, historical and literary sources of this 
powerful notion. 30 General and restricted economies are necessarily woven together 
and take differing forms both within the texts of Nietzsche and Bataille and of course 
between the two thinkers. The restricted economies Nietzsche and Bataille took 
issue with are those of the enlightenment tradition, especially Kant and Hegel and the 
political and sociological systems of the 19th century particularly Utilitarianism and 
Marxism. The crucial insight of the General economic approach is that any restricted 
economy will necessarily be forced to draw upon a matrix of 
.. 
assumplion, 
ýp. eculations and conditions to which it has no right or competence within the tenns, 
limits and constructions of that restricted economy. That is, there will always be 
partially or unacknowledged excesses or indeterminacies operating upqn and 
throughout ap ticular. syýtT.. My contention here is, the explanatory economies of 
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classical and modem sociology are clearly restricted economies, some far more 
restricted than others. 
In order to appreciate Bataille's application of a Nietzschean General 
economy of excess to the specific field of sociological enquiry it is crucial to grasp 
the influence of the anthropological work of Duikheirn and Mauss. Such a reading 
can reveal the manner in which Nietzsche's aspirational "grosse Okonomie" of the 
'oven-nan' (Ubennensch) became, in Bataille an economy of expenditure, 
disablement, evil, and death. 
THE INFLUENCE OF DURKHEIM AND MAUSS 
It is common within the sociological canon to view Durkheim's sociology as 
an influential but flawed system of structural-functionalism. 31 More recently it has 
been viewed as compromised by a positivist view of human subjectivity that takes 
little account of intention and desire, meaning and interpretation, and vastly over- 
estimates the determining power of social structure (Giddens 1971,1993). Such 
accounts tend to minimise the importance of Durkheim's treatments of the sacred and 
of "profitless expenditure". Pickering (1984) has noted the profound sense of 
confusion; hostility and misunderstanding that attended the publication of 
Durkheim's monumental work on archaic religion Elenzetitary Fornis of the Religious 
Life (1912/1961). It is not my aim to erect a defence of Durkheimian sociology but 
merely to indicate its importance for Batqille and the important but largely neglected 
College of Sociology, and for any contemporary sociological treatment of the 
concepts of sacrifice, expenditure, death; that is excess. 
In 1895 Durkheim's Rules of Sociological Method, (translated into English 
1938 and 1982), had established the irreducible primacy of the social fact, over and 
above, the behaviour of individuals. A social fact can and must be explained only by 
other social facts. In this assertion Durkheim had delineated in rigorous scientific 
fashion, a realm of irreducible externality or otherness in the life of all human 
individuals, and a certain passivity and vulnerability in the human subject. The 
Social, its rituals and processes greater than, and so in excess of the individual, towers 
over the subject which is argued to comprise self and other, an otherness that cannot 
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be viewed as the mere sum of component individuals. This ý insistence on an 
irreducibly 'other' social field of forces became the methodological and theoretical 
crux of work in Bataille's College Of Sociology, some members, notably Roger 
Caillois, remained bonded to it, while Bataille himself strove to surpass or exceed it 
(a move can be traced, in part to his readings of Mauss). 32 
In the closing years of the 19th century Mauss, with Henri Hubert, 
published a brief study of the practice of sacrifice in LAnnee Sociologiqlle. 33 The 
geographically widespread, indeed virtually universal practice of sacrifice in pre- 
Modem societies had already received detailed attention from Western 
anthropology. 34 It was taken to be evidence of the steady but irrepressible progress 
or evolution of the human from a state of 'savagery' to one of modem civilisation and 
responsibility. Yet we shall see that for Durkheim and Mauss, then Bataille, and 
finally Baudrillard, th6 crucial /ýitality. 
"qf ; iuclý eýcesýlPvý('ýocýaýý, proce§sýs, becomes 
--7'apathol6giesýo mode , ntýrl tbracc uiiný7t 
ýsf 
th ral tof , ntr rnit) and the destiny of the social. A (, c e- 
ýR 
of 
society practising ritual sacrifice is already an economy of loss, though not of 
Bataillean expenditure or 'depense. 35 It had been assumed that the purpose of 
ancient sacrifice was merely to appease ferocious gods who might otherwise turn 
their wrath on that society and destroy it. The offering of sacrificial gifts was 
intended to procure certain favours, protection, stability, good fortune, the motive 
being profit or gain. Mauss, by closer examination of the sacrificial mechanism 
argued that its most general observable purpose was to create or mark the sacred 
quality of the sacrificer often in order to manage an occurrence that demanded 
calling upon sacred forces. However the quality of 'sacredness' is no ordinary 
commodity, its accretion no simple profit. The sacred is an intensely ambivalent 
force, as Durkheim argued, a deadly contagion that could equally aid or devastate a 
society, threatening _tkcý. qqtires, ocial structure. 
36 Prior to the inception of Western 
monotheism the sacred was regarded as both malefic and benevolent. Mauss 
described sacrifice as facilitating productive and utilitarian purposes, in particular by 
allowing the lifling of prohibitions on the use of sacred land; however in more 
general social and economic terms sacrifice cannot be regarded as a tool in the 
service of production. In fact all productive and utile actions were felt as a 
potentially catastrophic profanation of sacred objects and land. Sacrifice was the 
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social means by which profane productive activities were rendered temporarily 
permissible. Hubert and Mauss spoke of sacrifice in terms of the division of 'shares' 
of energy. T-Iiq-dqpgqrous and threatening 'excess' share is devoted to the god or 
sAcred object so that the remainder might then become useful for the community 
-(1964: 
71), 
- 
In other cases the sacrificed object or victim, after immolation, is 
'desacralised' in order that it might be consumed by the society. 1! 1_ý_4ýh case the god 
or religious force absorbs the malefic excess share. Hubert and Mauss conclude: 
[Sacrifice] consists in establishing a means of communication between the 
sacred and profane worlds through the mediation of a victim, that is, of a 
thing that in the course of the ceremony is destroyed ... In order that the 
sacred may subsist its share must be given to it, and it is from the share of 
the profane that this apportionment is fflade (1964: 97-100). 
In another early study, Essai sur les variations saisonnieres des societes 
Eskinios (1904-5, English trans. 1979), Mauss and Beuchat aimed to demonstrate the 
immensely powerful social energy of rituals of expenditure and transgression. While 
Durkheim, in a lecture at the International Congress of Philosophy in 1911 had 
already explicated the sociological phenomena of profitless luxury, inutility: 
By definition what is superfluous is not useful or is less useful than what is 
necessary ... luxuries are by nature costly and cost more than they return. 
We 
find doctrine spirits. who despise them and who try to reduce them to a more 
congruous position, but in fact there is nothing that has more value in the 
_aes oE man ... 
the highest virtue consists not in the strict and regular 
performance of those acts immediately necessary to the well-being of the 
--moy-prn. P. s --and social order, 
but rather in-thQse free and spontaneous et 
Which. are. not deman. d-ed and are sometimes even contrary, to the 
, principles of a- sound, economy 
(Durkheirn 1974: 85-6). 
Clearly many of the most important themes of Bataille's work were already 
present in the French sociological tradition. Mauss' later study Essai sur le Doll 
(1950) - translated as The Gift (1990) had a profound and fully acknowledged 
influence on Bataille, Caillois and later, Baudrillard. In his exploration. of the gift 
Mauss had attempted to show that where exchange rituals might appear as the 
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individual(ist) pursuit of wealth, they were in fact powerfully constrained social and 
collective activities. 37 A great deal of the distinctiveness of Bataille's contribution to 
the College of Sociology derives from his idiosyncratic reading of The Gifii ich 
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eMphasised the agonistic and unilaterally destructive nature of the Potlatchia, in 
contrast to Mauss' concern with cycles of reciprocity and equilibrium. For Bataille 
the custom of Potlatch was a social and material expression of the deep human" 
impulse to profitlessly expend its wealth and resources to the extent that self, 
survival and order where threatened. Bataille's emphasis on Potlatch should be seen 
as the locus of his General economic disruption of the Maussian economy, a 
theoretical move which re-introduces death, violence and destruction as the central 
principle of the social order. 
BATAILLE AND THE COLLEGE OF SOCIOLOGY 
'The social nucleus [the sacred] is, in fact, taboo, that is to say, untouchable and 
unspeakable; from the outset it partakes of the nature of corpses, menstrual blood, or 
pariahs ... Everything leads us to believe that early human beings were brought together by disgust and 
by common terror, by an insurmountable horror focused precisely on what originally was the central 
attraction of their union' (Bataille in Hollier (ed. ) 1988: 106). 
'Certainly, it is dangerous, in extending the frigid research of the sciences, to come to a 
point where one's object no longer leaves one unaffected, where, on the contrary, it is what inflames. 
Indeed, the ebullition I consider, which animates the globe, is also my ebullition. Thus, the object of 
my research cannot be distinguished from the subject at its boiling point' (Bataille, 1967/1988: 10). 
Bataille's first sociological and political articles articulated a very particular 
combination of Nietzschean philosophy, Marxist economics and French sociology. 
These early works appeared mostly in La Critique Sociale, "La notion de Depense" 
prefigured many of Bataille's later concerns, seeking to establish the primary social, 
and therefore sociological, importance of unproductive or profitless expenditure 
(depense); that is, the crucial relationship between utility and excess. Bataille 
operated in a distinctly Nietzschean register, declaring that any thought, concept or 
analysis dependent 'on the fundamental value of the word useful', must necessarily 
be 'warped' presenting only a 'flat and untenable conception of existence' whereby 
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the fundamental questions and 'needs of society' are ignored (Bataille. 1985: 116-7). 
Although Bataille had come into contact with the Surrealists from the mid-1920's he 
had quickly distanced himself from its dominant orthodoxy under Breton. During 
this period Bataille also read Freud with considerable interest (Hollier 1989: 104-112) 
however in his development of the notion of General economy and of depense 
specifically, Bataille's interests diverged sharply from Surrealist and 
psychoanalytical modes of addressing the 'irrational'. For -B 
manifestations of violence, cruelty and excess where not 'irrational' but inevitable, 39 
given the failure of modem societies to stage rituals of destructive expenditure. The 
dominant political and knowledge practices, of modernity systematically exclude or 
dýny the social and material centrality of unproductive expenditure, the most, 
catastrop! ýic and ruinous form being death, in their operation-of restricted economies. 
jjýj ty describes those objects; events and activities Bataille's notion of 
Keieý g ! --J 
society excludes in an attempt to secure its restricted economies. However the 
exclusionary practices of modem society cannot be viewed merely-as 'repression', as 
in the Freudian tradition, which might then be liberated, for example within the 
successfully analysed subiect or by the liberalising of certain social regimes and 
practices. For Bataille, pre. figuring many of the concerns of Post-structuralism, the 
subject, its languagq_. 
_and 
society as a whole, only become possible as the 
heterogeneous is expelled beyond the limits of productive society. These expulsions 
posit both the shameful and obscene and, as Bataille makes clear, that which is 
ascribed transcendent or absolute meaning. Bataille's concept of the sacred must be 
understood in this context. Any exclusionary practice is, then, necessarily 
incomplete, for two related reasons. Firstly, f( Bataille as for Durkheim, it is 
precisely those objects and events of ro it ess expenditure that represent the most 
or 
exalted, most passionately desired, and most quintessentially or inevitably human 
dimensions of individual and social existence. Bataille's examples include the 
pursuit of- 
... luxury, mourning, war, sacrificial cults, the construction of sumptuary 
monuments, games, spectacles, arts, perverse sexual activity (i. e. deflected 
from genital finality) - all these activities which, at least in primitive 
circumstances, have no end beyond themselves (Bataille 1985: 117). 
11 
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of a more direct concern with what Bataille termed 
"postsacred" society or'ý, modernity; the very stability and legitimacy of the political 
oMer depends on the channelling and manipulation of these forces by (re)configuring 
them as 'relative' means which may then serve the 'greater good' of political 
stability. Examples described by the College include the relationships of mutual 
dependence bet-ween outwardly secular and rationalist democracies and institutions 
like the church, the army and the monarchy. Such bodies offer an engagement with, 
in varying yet tightly connected ways, the heterogeneous materials of death, decay, 
war and destruction; those phenomena that utilitarian or productive societXjLcý th(ý__ 
_pýoqess 
and mana, ability to compKehepd, 0 ge. 
The College of Sociology came together in the Autumn of 1937 during a 
40 / 
time of increasing political upheaval in Western Europe. /, ýThe purpose of the 
College was to scrutinise, in the most rigorous manner yet unbounded by the limits 
of academic convention, the conditions arising from modem societies almost total 
absence of ritual, enchantment, myth and magic\ For Bataille this lack was 
concomitant with the inability of modem society to express, encompass or even 
comprehend the wholeness of human being (Thomme integral'). Modernity failed 
to offer human being an adequate means for the expression of its full diversity, of 
'excesses' beyond the yoke Of Utility. 41 For the College modem society had not 
closed-up or eradicated the space once occupied by the sacred through its secular 
morality and rational science. Rather it had proved unable to provide the 
communifying energy offered by the sacred and had left a knawing absence, a 
terrible incompleteness and moreover a whole field of human experience, desire and 
longing that was no longer comprehensible within the restricted economies of secular 
rationality. Where Roger Caillois, and in particular, Alexander Kojeve sought a 
properly scientific diagnoses of this social pathology, wishing to operate. along the 
theoretical and methodological axes established by Durkheim and Mauss, Bataille 
aimed to play 'scorcerces apprentice 42 in order to actively create new myths, new 
structures of community. 
Caillois presented the foundational principles of the College of Sociology, 
its first publication, in Nouvelle Revue Francais in July 1938.43 Firstly, the human 
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and social sciences were criticised for being locked, methodologically, within 
individualism and Idealism, for being 'timid and incomplete' in their choice of 
phenomena for investigation and for failing to modify its evolutionist and eurocentric 
assumptions despite recent anthropological studies, principally of Durkheim and 
Mauss. Secondly the College spoke of the importance of forging an open and inter- 
disciplinary academic collective or 'moral community', that is a community that 
might be bound in spirit to the diverse and extreme ('virulent') nature of the 
phenomena to be studied. Thirdly Caillois sketched out the manner in which the 
sacred would be addressed, the principle topics under consideration and the ultimate 
aims of the group. The project was termed 'sacred sociology', not the sociology of 
religion, whereby the conventional methods of social science are applied in a 
reductive, idealist and 'timid' way, for the College it was no longer adequate to 
approach those: 
... rare, fleeting, and violent moments of his intimate experience on which 
man places extreme value' [as] simply a matter of information and exegesis; 
it is necessary beyond that, to embrace the persons total activity (Bataille et 
al. in Hollier (ed. ) 1988: 11)'. 
Bataille's first lecture for the College Die Scorcerer's Apprentice was a 
characteristic intersection of Nietzschean sensibility, Marxist theory and French 
sociology. The Nietzschean desire for an elevated sense of the (trans)human 
represented by the 'overman' (ubermensch) is coupled with Marxist class economics 
in Bataille's assertion 'Perhaps the worst of all the ills afflicting human beings is the 
reduction of their existence to the condition of slavish instrument' (in Hollier 
1988: 13). For Bataille (as for Nietzsche), modem Sciences, both Human and 
Natural, far from occupying a neutral position that might diagnose or even correct 
this condition, are actually leading institutions in the continuing fragmentation and 
enslaving of human potentiality. In order that the totality of human experience might 
be addressed Bataille aimed to combine this already diverse theoretical matrix with a 
Kojevean-influenced reading of Hegel's phenomenology. Bataille sought 
deliberately to transgress the conceptual boundaries of each framework, however 
such explosive and paradoxical theoretical juxtapositions offered no obvious form of 
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methodological application. Bataille asserted that Lthe sacred or heterogeneous, that 
is ýx7c-ýs' are not and cannot become the object of, scientific discourse, _pý! qpLeýy 
, 
§p ing, -4ecause-such-a, -discourse. 
is 
I wholly -dependent on 
the prior reduction of 
_phenomena 
to homogeneity; to order, series and system. Where scientific method 
creates or encounters that which cannot be easily reduced to homogeneity, Bataille's 
examples here are infinity, absence and nothingness, it merely jettisons such 
problems to the disciplines of philosophy and theology where, traditionally at least, 
they could be more easily managed. For Bataille excess is encountered not as object 
but as affect. Affectivity tears open the structure of subjectivity, so the subject as 
such is unable to assemble a stable comprehension of the heterological as object 
since the very condition of existence of subjectivity is that it remains immersed in 
homogýn. qLity.. During the period when the College of Sociology was active Bataille 
aimed to chart the movements of human affectivity, emerging in French sociology, 
with the aid of the Hegelian phenomenology of desire and death. This was attempted 
largely by unbounding the principle of negativity from the possibility of dialectical 
(re)assimililation. Something of Bataille's stance toward the structures and concepts 
of rational thought is revealed in the following: 
Reason alone has the power to undo its work, to hurl down what it has built 
up ... Without the support of reason, we don't reach dark incandescence (Bataille, quoted in Boldt-Irons 1995: 6). 
The basic premise of the College was that historical and anthropological 
studies reveal archaic cultural engagements with the sacred were able to foster a far 
fuller sense of human experience, one that admitted, indeed insisted upon and so 
expressed excess beyond the calculation of utility. Caillois and Leiris. tended to 
regard contemporary manifestations of the sacred; Christian Churches, secret 
societies, recollections of childhood beliefs, as enervated vestigial remainders of 
what had been. However Bataille's approach would increasingly transgress such 
limitations of method and rationality, he appealed for the 'return to mankind's old 
dwelling' (in Hollier 1988: 23) and sought an active role in this process attempting to 
perform the ritual human sacrifice of a real (and willing) victim, in order to 
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consecrate new myths. Moreover Bataille used the College sessions to create a 
rigorous sociology of attraction and repulsion, drawing on Freud (and contemporary 
physics and biology), that was able to discern the operations of sacred processes 
ýersisting into modem life with a new vigour. For Bataille, as for Durkheim, the 
sacred had formed the very social nucleus, it had managed all human engagements 
with the threatening, terfifyipg and destructive: excess, eroticism, violence, horror 
and death. The sacred had been the principle of social gravitation, of meaning and 
order. In Bataille's reading this general exchange economy, of life and death, blood, 
semen, work and waste, became increasingly restricted as the forces of the sacred 
where fixed to a transcendent deity representing their limit-point. Within the notion 
of a single, omnipotent deity excess was contained, limited and finally allowed to 
wither away in favour of a secular utilitarian market economy. In a market economy, 
vestiges of a sacred or sYMbolic order, tyrannised by the forces of homogeneous 
rationality, appear as 'irrational', mystical and use-less. Similarly, the realm of 
eroticism is divided and re-drawn in terms of what can be utilised within market 
economies and what must be expelled as 'perversion' or 'sadism'. 
The College of Sociology was dissolved after two years due, largely, to 
internal divisions, its failure to perform a human sacrifice, and because of the onset 
of the second world war. 44 Bataille's interests had become increasingly mystical 
during the early 1940's, reflected by the publication of Inner Experience in 1943 and 
Guilty the following year. In these works, Richman (1982: 128,1988: 92) argues, 
Bataille aimed to draw the reader into the realm of sacrificial anguish, loss of self, 
and profitless expenditure, since the only modem space for the (legal) exploration of 
such themes is that of literary production; writing. As a result Bataille's specifically 
sociological focus was temporarily submerged. However, in 1949 Bataille 
completed his central theoretical work, the three-volume The Accursed Share. The 
first volume entitled 'Consumption' explicates the principles of Bataille's General 
economy, its scientific tone jars, in places, against Bataille's other work which is 
greatly critical of scientific method. This work, it seems, was intended to be highly 
systematic summary of Bataille's thought, in contrast to his more fragmentary pieces, 
indeed the adoption of different voices and styles within and between works is a 
fundamental aspect of Bataille's method. Bataille's later efforts to pursue this form of 
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analysis into contemporary life appear, at least in sociological terms, disappointing. 
He attempted to apply the theorem of the accursed share to Soviet industrialisation 
and the Marshall Plan (Bataille 1988: 147-190) but this work appears strained and 
distant from his earlier concerns, the belated embrace with Communism particularly 
incongruous. 
The College of Sociology has received little critical attention, particularly in 
Anglo-American sociological thought. Hollier (1992: 125) and Besnier (in Bailey- 
Gill 1995: 12-25) have noted how the historical and mythological proximity of the 
College to the Fascist movements of the period, and in particular its refusal to adopt 
the language of peace, has greatly damaged its credibility. Richman (1982,1988) 
attempted to unravel the merits of the College but in general even works dedicated to 
Bataille devote little space to the College of Sociology. A recently published 
collection of essays on Bataille however does include attempts to draw out the 
radical implications of Bataille's theoretical and methodological positions expounded 
within the College. Lionel Abel (in Boldt-Irons 1995: 52-59) suggests that given the 
ý ibility io s sý7 sian grasping the excessive Jas if it where an inert object in Carte 
fashion, -the. only-adequate,. methodological -on -exeqsive. ___approach 
is one of becý, 
Abel attempts to show how Bataille, particularly in later works -sought not to 
. 
'understand', or _'grqý§p'l 
Nietzsche. but rather to become Nietzsche. Similiarly in 
Bataille's attempts to stage ritual human sacrifice, we see Bataille becoming- 
sacrificial, becoming excessive. Only in such a manner could the affectivity of 
excess be rendered into human experience.. Yet according to Bataille all life on earth 
is in any case, as its condition of existence, in a state of excess, as such we all have 
intimate experience of becoming excessive, most particularly in our violent and 
erotic exertions. Given this premise ýR adequate methodological disposition towards 
the study of the excessive might involve, for example, the pursuit of a relationship, 
that could never be fully consunu-nated, between the excesses of the experiential N/ 
world and the excesses of human inner experience. Bataille undertook such a voyage 
and the results, fragmentary, elusive, and elliptical were largely inimicable to formal 
sociological knowledge, as is attested by the break-up of the College and by 
Bataille's repeated returns to more conventional forms of academic enquiry. 
However it should not be concluded that an exploration of excess within discursive 
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or scientific language must necessarily result in failure or meaninglessness. The 
notion of affectivity is central to the contemporary scientific terminology of 
complementarity and indeterminacy, which is, in turn being deployed across social 
ahd cultural analysis. The work of Baudrillard is one example of this. Further, for 
Bataille and the College the anthropological investigations of Durkheirn and Mauss 
demonstrated that, for archaic societies with a strong sense of ceremony and festival, 
the integration of depense within social meaning and practice had been 
accomplished. It is not the case that excess or depense must always remain the 
beyond or 'other' of human, 
-s, 
oc_iety. 
_. 
an. d culture, 
- 
rather-- it 
--is- -the-Pathology 
of 
-modernity 
that suc4 nýpgr A -creation of new _qýion no 
longer occurs. ForBataille he 
myths and communities was -crucial,,. 
however the- 
. 
(7qllegý. ýf ýqciology ultimately 
, 'failed 
to achieve this. I will conclude with an exploration offB IaI udril-I theories of 
excess in order to address the contemporary situation. Here the utilitarian impetus 
pf-modem-capitalisrrLhas, not-only destroyed many vestigial forms of symbolic ritual 
but has fully colonised and driven into excess a vast array of human possibilities, 
including those symbolic forms that do persist. Further these processes are crucial 
for a radical approach to contemporary death-events. 
BAUDRILLARD AND THE EXTREME PHENOMENA OF 
CONTEMPORARY CULTURE 
Since the world is on a delusional course, we must adopt a delusional standpoint towards 
the world. (Baudrillard 1990/1993: 1) 
Baudrillard's approach to the extreme phenomena of the contemporary age 
is, perhaps, best approached through the problematic of utility and excess. By 
relating Baudrillard's highly speculative fatal sociology to this problematicEw-ithin 
the context of subterranean channels of sociological thought, represented by 717 
Nietzsche, Bataille and certain of the work of Durkheim and Mauss, it is possible to 
avoid many of the misplaced criticisms levelled at Baudrillard's thewo His work 
will be situated, not, as is often the case within some vague category of 
'Postmodemism' where it can be subject to cursory dismissal '45 rather by reading 
Baudrillard both alongside, and against, Bataille in particular, we are better placed to 
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appreciate the explicitly social and material radicality of their respective bodies of 
work. This radicality is central to how contemporary death-events will be addressed 
below. Within the confines of this chapter it will be possible only to address the 
basic continuities between the theories of Bataille and Baudrillard, and then to show 
Baudrillard's development of certain of Bataille's notions. 
'Lastly -1 
will-. attempt to 
indicate how this lineagp_, of. thought opens onto a genuinely radical field of 
sociological enquiry, unavailable within the dominant sociological tradition, which 
can approach the horror of contemporary death-events. 
An interest in Mauss, Bataille and the notions of gift exchange and 
sacrificial expenditure are most evident in Baudrillard's work of the early to mid 
1970's and fully developed in Symbolic Exchange and Death (1976/1993 hereafter 
SED). In these studies Baudrillard shifts his focus from the neo-Marxist register of 
his early work on The System of Objects (1968/1996) and Consumer Society 
(1970/1997) to a concern with all forms of symbolic exchange dealing at some length 
with Mauss, Freud and Bataille. Hamilton-Grant (in Lyotard 1993: i) has described 
this work as one of the founding momentýýof Post-structuralism, alongside Derrida's 
Writing and Difference and Foucault's Yhe Order of Things. 46 It is clearly a crucial 
work that is yet to receive serious and detailed attention by English-speaking 
academics. 47 A consideration of Baudrillard's post-Marxist writings, from SED 
onwards reveals only scant and intermittent interest in the notion of 
Postmodemism`ý48 The crucial theoretical division in Baudrillard's thought is not 
between the orders of utility and economic (classical) exchange on the one hand, and 
the spiralling acceleration of sign value on the other, a misreading still made by a 
number of critics including Kellner (1989,1994: 1-23). 
/Rather 
it is between the 
Lý Lnýio! ýc or simulational orders iwhich, in different forms or phases, extend from the 
Renaissance to the present day, and (the _syffibolký'6r_d_e-is1 that dominated before this 
era. In modernity these have mutated and intemenetrated into ever more destructive 
49 and inhuman forins (the fatal, viral, terroristic and fractal). 
In SED a whole range of theoretical and conceptual intersections between 
the works of Baudrillard and Bataille become explicit. These range from shared 
methodological assumptions; a radical antipathy to the entire Western Enlightenment 
project, a rejection of Liberal, Utilitarian and individualist philosophies, and a deep- 
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felt conviction that all variants of dialectical reason, evolutionary or progressivist 
ideology and classical economy are fundamentally miStaken. There is a shared belief 
that the natural world. indeed the cosmological ord 
/- 
-exists in excess of, and hostile er5 3 
t6, 
'or_at_. 
The. yery, _l94§t, 
indifferent to, all Enlightenment attempts to order, secure, 
control and. progress. However in both the writings of Baudrillard and Bataille there 
is little of the joy, evident in Nietzsche, in observing the collapse or twilight of these 
Enlightenment institutions. -51 In addition to these broad similarities in method, style 
and content, the work of Bataille and Baudrillard is at times remarkably similar in its 
treatments of the specific manifestations or ramifications of excess. -Excess 
is 
located in the-realm of Bataille's sacred and of Baudrillard's symbolic, within the 
a onistic exchange of eroticism, sexuality and seduction and of the violence, cruelty -1- 
9 
-pd, 
death which. -break 
through the profane order of rationalised utility, calculation, 
_profit. 
and accumulation.. Baudrillard's thought is clearly and deeply influenced by 
Bataille, Caillois and The College of Sociology. This is especially evident in their 
ways of addressing the sacred; gift, potlatch, and the movements of attraction and 
repulsion within a generalised (economic) account of the social field, emphasising 
the rupture of the restricted precepts of classical economics and dominant social 
thought. However Baudrillard's theory cannot be seen as a simple continuation of 
Bataillean problematics, in fact Baudrillard's development of the notion of symbolic 
exchange involves a critique of Bataille's concept of General economy and supplants 
Bataille's emphasis on the sacred, divesting it of more explicitly religious and 
anthropological overtones. Further, Baudrillard has distanced himself, increasingly, 
from any reliance on Marxist economics and revolutionary theory which are 
prominent in Bataille's work of the 1930's, both prior to and within The College of 
Sociology and which continued until the late 1940's culminating with the publication 
of The Accursed Share. Baudrillard's re-reads Bataille's notion of General economy 
in terms of a General economy of the symbolic (Excess) opposed to a restricted 
economy of utility: 
... the logic of the commodity extends 
itself indifferently to men and things 
and makes men appear only as exchange value - thus the restricted finality 
of utility imposes itself on men as surely as on the world of objects. It is 
illogical and naive to hope that, through objects conceived in terms of 
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exchange value, that is, in his needs, man can fulfil himself otherwise than 
as use value (1972/1981: 136, emphasis in original). 
The importance and originality of Baudrillard's development of Bataille 
. resides 
in the analytical description and interpretation of the ways the order of utility 
and production multiply at such an exorbitant rate that through the (simulationqlý 
logic of exchange and sign values are driven into excess. No longer then, can utility 
and excess be treated as opposites, mutually exclusive and pitted against each other, 
rather they interpenetrate and fuse in the most per-verse and eccentric ways. 
BaudrUlard's 'The Order of Simulacra' (SED 1976/1993: 50-86), explicates the theory 
of three successive orders of simulacra. These extend from the Renaissance, through 
industrial society to the third order which, is governed by a code of generalised 
equivalence whereby value and meaning become signs fully exchangeable between 
themselves without direct reference to the'real'. The notion of excess, as it relates to 
the gift, sacrifice and death in Mauss, Freud and Bataille is radically problematized 
by Baudrillard since excess no longer can be seen as existing in a simple opposition 
t2 ut 1: 4e generalised exchange of sign-values in contemporary Capitalist 
, ýociety 
has broug4t about a condition where the location-of pure use-value or utility 
becomes imp2ssible. 52 
In SED (1976/1993: 125-194) Baudrillard engages specifically with Bataille 
and the notion of excess when he undertakes a genealogical investigation of the 
changing social meanings of death, from the 'primitive' distant past to modem 
consumer societies governed by the 'structural law of value' and the operations of the 
code. He argues that where death had once been socially exchanged and circulated 
of symbolic reciprocity with the living, iq M dem-societies iýjý no 
longer possible and death becomes an irreversible biological fact. However death 
when violent, sudden, or "undeserved" expresses excess that ruins the carefully 
managed restricted economies of utility and accumulation. Catastrophic death, ike 
-TI - 
sudden effusions of 'inexplicable' violence (e. g. Dunblane) cannot, when denuded of 
symbolic exchange rituals, have any meaning for modem societies. Further, for 
Baudrillard the continual erosion of symbolic exchange, which had provided social 
equilibrium by preventing accumulation of power and goods, allows the modem 
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order to accelerate into exorbitant (over)production and (over) accumulation in which 
even the principje of util4y_is eventually submerged: 
. rot--stantism, 
by individualising conscience before God and divesting 
pollective ceremonials, broughtý about the progress of the individual's 
_angpj§k_p_f_dpath, 
It also gave ris e to the intens e modem enterpr i se of 
staving off death; the ethics of accumulation and material production ... the labour of profit collectively called the "spirit of Capitalism" (1976/1993: 
145). 
However Baudrillard does not conceptualise death as the 'repressed 
meaning' or purpose of life, as in the Freudian death drive (SED 1976/1993: 148-154) 
and he is highly critical of Bataille's tendency to present death as the final and 
irreversible profitless expenditure of life within a naturalised cosmological system of 
General economy. Here Baudrillard claims to read Tataille against Bataille', 
privileging the latter's view of the reciprocal play of eroticism over that of his Bio- 
solar General economy: 
... this biological functionalism is annihilated in eroticism. To look for the 
secret of sacrifice, sacrificial destruction, pla and expenditure in the law of 
the species, is to reduce it all to a functionalism (1976/1993: 158). 
Baudrillard's critique of Bataille was further developed in a review article of 
La Part Maudite entitled 'When Bataille Attacked the Metaphysical Principal of 
Economy' (1976/1987). Here Bataille's General economy of expenditure is criticised 
as still too restricted, in particular unable to comprehend the contemporary structural 
law of value: 
... his (Bataille's) concept of expenditure would have permitted only a limited analysis; it is still too economic, too much the flip side of 
accumulation ... In an order which is no longer that of utility, but an aleato 
order of-value, pure, ýexpenditure is, no longer- sufficient-for' radical defiance 
(1987: 59). 
68 
Even Bataille is viewed, ultimately, as operating within the confines of the 
Western traditions appropriation of death, with Bataille it became the final, rending 
loss of individual existence. X_qt, ýcýoj! ýmg to Baudrillard, within the symbolic order 
death was not a finality, a biological termination; through the exchange of gift and 
counter-gift between. living andý-dqad all members of the community remainwitMn 
the social field. Bataille's reading of Mauss on the principle of gift exchange is 
faulted by Baudrillard for reifying the notions of destruction, expenditure and loss, 
into a cosmology, and for denying the principle of symbolic reciprocity, 'the 
unilateral gift does not exist' (ibid. ). The importance of Bataille and Baudrillard's 
theorisation of death is drawn out, in relation to contemporary death-events, in the 
following chapter. 
Further Baudrillard rejects the Marxist elements of Bataille's appro qpýýh. 
Marxist. critique. for. Baudrillard is merely the simulation of critique, generated by the 
Code underlying modernity. It is in fact useful to capital, the economic form which 
dominates m2deal Lty, since it creates an illusory sense of real difference, real choice, 
while actuall repeating the essential productivist and utilitarian assumptions of 
capital. For Baudrillard much the same applies to Freudianism, even as re- 
interpreted by Lacan, Lacanian feminism, Lyotard and Deleuze. These theoretical 
constructs share, at a fundamental level, the assumption of a real production of 
In eachýproduction forces, drives, energies, pleasures 
- 
urge their liberaiiý-nj 
serves as unquestioned reality principle, for Baudrillard the problem is not that such 
assumptions are simply false or mistaken, but that production was the 'reality 
principle' of the second, industrial, and now surpassed, order of simulacra: 
Up to this point we have considered production and labour as potential, as 
force and historical process, as a generic activity: an energetic-economic 
myth proper to modernity. We must ask ourselves whether production is 
not rather an intervention, a particular phase in the order of signs - whether 
it is basically only one episode in the line of simulacra, (Baudrillard 
1976/1993: 55). 
There is an important relation here between the work of McLuhan and that 
of Baudrillard. McLuhan's emphasis on the notion of a medium, 'the medium is the 
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message' is often cited by Baudrillard during his work of the 1970's and is a decisive 
influence on Baudrillard's critique of the 'reality' of production. For Baudrillard, as 
McLuhan, technology should be thought as medium, not as productive force. 
Technology qualitatively transforms the nature of modernity in a manner such that 
the production is rendered obsolete. 
1 
The influence of McLuhan and 
media technologies is fundamental to the distinctions in theoretical trajectory 
between Bataille and Baudrillard. -- 
The importance of differences between the 
theories of Bataille and Baudrillard will be emphasised throughout the following 
chapters. 
Baudrillard's next sustained engagement with the problematics of General 
economy and the accursed share is made in Yhe Transparency of Evil (1990/1993). 
In Bataille's later work, after the dissolution of the College of Sociology, evil was 
presented as a radical and instinctive force or pulsion expressed in passion, violence 
and cruelty. 53 Evil, for Bataille, is a complex notion and his emphasis is far more 
social and historical than an appeal to instinctive (cosmological) drives might 
suggest. Bataille's 77ieory of Religion (1973/1989) draws on the work of Durkheim 
and Mauss, and also Georges Dumezil, Simone Petrement 54 and others, to provide a 
greatly condensed account of the transformations in the meaning of sacred and 
profane from the prehistoric and symbolic orders through to pagan and Christian 
religions. Jn. order that the world of work, production and utility could be 
established, and endlessly expanded, the sacredlý comprising both malefic and 
benevolent characteristics had to be re-defined into a simplified dualism whereby the 
malefic elements where expelled from the sacred. This operation secured a stark and 
almost total opposition between good and evil. For Bataille this 'weakening' in the 
conception of the sacred brought about a slumber or 'sleep of Reason', an'inevitable 
sleep that ... reintroduces evil as a major force' (1973/1989: 79). Evil becomes 
sovereign, existing beyond the confines of the dominant order, drawing the seductive 
power of the forbidden from its exclusion: 
... the forces of evil never lost their divine value except within the limits of a developed reflection, and their apparently inferior status cannot prevent 
ordinary humanity from continuing to live under their power ... this involves 
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a weakening of the moral divine in favour of evil (Bataille 1973/1989: 79- 
81). 
Similarly fbTýBataille, violence becomes an inevitable and irre ressible force since it p 
_qlone 
is able to break through the order of utility and production and restore a sense, 
fleeting_ýýý, ySqý&i: noýý, 
-of-beings 
lost intimacy with nature, community and the 
-passage 
of life and death. Baudrillard (1990/1993) develops Bataille's emphasis on 
the accursed and evil in order to draw out the form it assumes in the modem 
technological world of which Bataille could not be aware. Baudrillard presents the 
'excess' of the contemporary order as the result of the 'cancerous' proliferation of 
notions of utility, functionality, and latterly, liberationisms: 55 
Ours is a society founded on proliferation, on growth which continues even 
though it cannot be measured against any clear goals ... where development is 
uncontrollable ... where the accumulation of effects goes hand in hand with 
the disappearance of causes. The upshot is gross systemic congestion and 
malfunction caused by... an excess of functional imperatives, by a sort of 
saturation (Baudrillard 1990/1993: 31). 
Excess has been, according to Baudrillard, absorbed or "co-opted" within 
the code of the dominant order and is manifest in the fractures, technological 
breakdowns, 'immuno-deficient' pathologies that haunt contemporary life. 
Symbolic principles characterised primarily, by the principal of 
reversibility, continue to circulate beyond the Western world and are deployed by 
Ayatollah Khomeini or Saddam Hussein to attack the weakened and 'whitewashed' 
West (1990/1993: 81-88). Indeed for the West such people come to be seen as the 
very embodiment of evil. In a specific engagement with Bataille's, Baudrillard's 
'Theorem of the Accursed Share' (1990/1993: 106-110), situates in a more fully 
socio-historical manner that which in Bataille had remained an awkward and 
unsatisfactory cosmological principle. For Baudrillard the project of modernity has 
unleashed too much energy; more objects, ideas, rights and demands than can ever be 
used, appropriated or satisfied. This excess of energy production within the system 
Js 
-uncontrollable and, 
'overtaken bv its own impetus, assumes the dimensions of a 
71 
,, _global catastrophe' 
(Daudrillard 1990/1993: 101). This 'impetus' is far beyond 
human subjective control, indeed the massive proliferation of productive energies 
both precede and exceed the realm of human control. The forces of technological 
perfection and operati, onality, rooted in utility but now far beyond their frame, 
attempt the 'whitewashing'. or 'purging' of the accursed share; defined, for Baudrillard 
a, nd-Bataille. as the. 'inseparability of Good and Evil' (1990/1993: 105). For both 
thinkers: 
Anything that purges the accursed share in itself signs its own death 
warrant ... [T]he energy of the accursed share, and its violence, are 
expressions of the principle of evil (Baudrillard 1990/1993: 106). 
In a recent interview (1995c) Baudrillard distances himself, increasingly, 
from both the anthropology of Durkheim and Mauss and the General economics of 
Bataille. In common with Derrida (1992) he appears to regard the focus upon 
symbolic, especially gift exchange as increasingly problematic, being tainted by 
Western eurocentric assumptions and in regard to general economy 'still too 
economic'. However while Baudrillard has been critical of Bataille's tendency to 
&naturalise' or make cosmological his principles of General economy it is by no 
means certain that Baudrillard himself does not resort to similar practices. 
Baudrillard's The Perfect Crime (1995/1996) does not shrink from making claims of 
a cosmological nature, 'Excess is the world's excess, not ours. It is the world that is 
excessive, the world that is sovereign' (1995/1996: 14). Rather than rejecting, out of 
hand, such assertions, I think it is important to ask how notions of excess and 
excessiveness are treated within the mainstream of social science in such an 
unsatisfactory way, and why it is widely assumed that sociological and philosophical 
thought are not, or are no longer, 56 able to deal with issues of this kind. Baudrillard 
does not treat symbolic as crealitv i)rinci be evaluated according to its truth- ple', to- 
value as a descriptive representation of non-westem society. Rather, he argues, the 
modem Westem.. 'reality principle' a, Bio-technological pseudo-materialism, only 
becomes possible as the symbolic and its excesses; death, cruelty, eroticism and 
violence are denied, effaced or re-channelled. Baudrillard's important collection The 
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Transparency of Evil (1990/1993) should be read in light of these earlier assertions, 
in this way the radical nature of Baudrillard's thought may be appreciated. His 
recent essay 'The Material Illusion' (1995/1996: 60-69) expands this line of thought. 
It draws together themes from scientific indeterminacy to argue that the whole field 
or 'mass' of phenomena classical thought perceived as 'reality' has always been 
'illusion' and this illusion itself is now under threat from the 'technical universe of 
information' (1995/1996: 62). However 'the perfect crime' that would forever 
shatter this illusion can never finally occur because of the radical, reversible energy 
of illusion, 
... made up of this magic portion, this accursed share which creates a kind of 
absolute surplus-value by subtraction of causes or by distortion of effects 
and causes (1995/1996: 68-9). 
In these latter works Baudrillard moves away from a Bataillean General economic, 
(base) materialist methodology, though this remains, clearly, one of his most 
important influences. Baudrillard's latest methodological gestures are complex and 
beyond the scope of this chapter, however Baudrillard, perhaps uniquely within the 
social sciences, appears willing to shift the register of his work between the poles of 
idealism and materialism, 57 remaining hostile to both. Baudrillard's refusal of the 
self-imposed restrictions of dominant sociological method deserves serious future 
attention. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
'In nature itself .. everything will remain vague, composite, and rich enough in its potential 
for different fonns to doom human intelligence to endless humiliation. ' (Bataille, in Hollier 1988: 78). 
'If the world is without reference and without ultimate reason, why do you expect thought 
to have these thingsT (Baudrillard 1995/1996: 69). 
have attempted to show how the notions of General economy and 
specifically excess, as they occur throughout certain of the texts of Nietzsche, 
Bataille and Baudrillard open up a potential field of Sociology that is not available 
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, within- -the.. 
limits. of the mainstream sociological traditions. The failure of modem 
sociology to think through excess and excessive phenomena in a sufficiently radical 
manner makes for sociological work that appears as 'timid and incomplete' today as 
it did when the College of Sociology was formed. However I do not pretend that the 
claims of this chapter are unproblematic. I do not mean to suggest that 'pure' excess, 
nor 'pure' utility are meaningful notions, despite Bataille's occasional willingness to 
speak in these terms. Similarly a 'General economy', as I have sketched it, could 
never be made fixed, total and present, indeed this point is central to the importance 
of the application of General economic thinking to sociological issues. Further it 
should not be assumed that the symbolic or excessive comes into conflictual relations 
with the order of utility exclusively within some form of historical framework of 
evolution. Rather, they must be thought together, in an immanently unstable form. 
The relationship is perhaps one of mutation, with excess clashing against utility, 
haunting its margins or being recuperated only to reappear along new fault-lines. 
Perhaps this occurs in any and all cultures and societies in various forms and modes, 
perhaps it is a distinctly Western concern, like much else this question must be left 
open. 
There are, of course, considerable differences in style, content and purpose 
between such important thinkers as Nietzsche, Bataille and Baudrillard; here the 
continuities have been emphasised at the possible expense of the differences. Where 
the terminology of Derrida, for example, avoid to a large extent, metaphysical and 
cosmological intonations, this cannot be. said of the lineage of thought dealt with 
here, constituting a range of difficulties, doubtless explaining in part why these 
thinkers remain marginal. Yet the consequences of exclu ding such thinkers from the 
canon of the social sciences are grave since then a whole range of phenomena, of 
Jncreasing contemporary prominence, -must then, also 
be excluded. Some of these 
phenomena I have termed contemporary death-events. They include terrorism, 
-genocidal destruction, catastrophic events and the proliferation of sudden 
'inexplicable' and deracinated forms of violence such as the Dunblane massacre and 
the murder of James Bulger. The failure of sociology and related disciplines to 
engage, in a sufficiently radical way, with such phenomena, can only have a 
catastrophic effect on the credibility of the social sciences. 
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What might a new sociology look like? The College of Sociology brought 
together a range of intellectuals from very different areas bound by a fascination with 
excess. Yet they where not 'interdisciplinary', they formed a community. They did 
not 'serve the cause' of a 'grand unification' of restricted explanatory accounts, a 
much-vaunted concern of the natural sciences and clearly marked in human and 
social science. Rather these thinkers sought a sovereign engagement with excess, the 
production and dissemination of knowledge that was not servile to any particular 
discipline or worldview, thought which was its own master. The College of 
Sociology ultimately failed, disbanding on the eve of the Second World War. The 
excessiveness of social and political events had 'potlatched' its own concerns, which 
were destined to remain forever theoretical. Yet it was the attempt to somehow 
bridge, methodologically, the void between theory and practice that made the 
College so distinctive. Would a College of Sociology be possible today and how 
might it operate? Apart iqý the utilitarian criteria of funding allocation and 
institutional research, gqidelines there. seems no pýinla facie intellectual reason why 
there cannot be a rigorous-s9ciology pf -the.. excessive. 
This chapter argues that the theory of Baudrillard opens sociological 
thought onto the plane of excessive contemporary phenomena, in part by re-working 
many of the concerns of the College of Sociology. However Baudrillard's texts are 
highly selective in their deployment of empirical material and, in general he appears 
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uninterested in working through a concrete analysis of excessive events. 
Consequently it is far from clear how Baudrillard might address those events 
specified here, for example the Dunblane massacre. Nevertheless the events of 
Dunblane could certainly be addressed from the viewpoint of potlatch and gift- 
exchange as they are radicalised by Bataille and Baudrillard. I will not offer an 
analysis of such events here; the purpose was to sketch out the possibility of 
alternative forms of interpretation, deriving from an awareness of the Durkheim, 
Mauss, Bataille and Baudrillard lineage of thought. However future work might, for 
example, approach events like Dunblane in terms of a fatal and irreversible 
exchange, in this particular case between childhood innocence and adult sexuality, 
exclusion and resentment. 59 
75 
In a society possessing only a residual sense of the sacred, that has displaced 
its myths of transcendence and fusion, there is no obvious mechanism that might 
offer a foundational social or communifying principle. Instrumental rationality, 
market economics and technological sophistication have proved to be incapable of 
fostering any sufficiently powerful sense of social cohesion since their operation is 
wholly dependent upon the expulsion of those forces, sacred and symbolic, that once 
bound the social order. For Durkheim, Mauss and later Bataille, the social nucleus 
was founded in blood, its bonds periodically revivified by violent ritual inscribing the 
excessive, repulsive and destructive within the social realm. The expenditure or 
depqpse-of. sacrificial death, divested of ceremonial meaning, of transcendental myth, 
of watchful deity becomes inexplicable, senseless murder, 'the kula and the potlatch 
, 
have disappeared but-not their principle' (Baudrillard 1972/1981: 30-1). Since 
modernity lacks ceremonial and ritual forms of the symbolic, the most fundamental 
human exchanges; of life and death, attraction and repulsion, eroticism and horror, 
can only be manifest as final, irreversible and fatal. Further a radical psycho- 
sociological account of lust, frenzy and rage, drawing from Bataille's work 771e 
Accursed Share and Eroticisni could greatly enhance sociological approaches to 
cruelty and violence. In contrast to the assumptions of some readers of Bataille, 
notably Richman (1982: 128 &1988: 92) and Boldt-Irons (in Bailey-Gill 1995: 91- 
104), 'writing or the space of literature cannot be asserted as the only realm of the 
expression of excess, of sacrificial violence and depense. Rather the corporeal or 
base materiality of excess is expressed, to catastrophic effect, in the contemporary 
world of 'unprovoked' and 'inexplicable' death-events. The crushing self- 
consciousness of death, for Bataille, forming the crux of human immersion in life, 
subjectivity and erotic and violent exchange must be affinned within the mainstream 
of sociological analysis. While the principle of evil, at once seductive and repulsive 
cannot continue to go unrecognised in contemporary society. The following chapters 
begin this difficult process. Academic theorising, seeking to operate in this terrain, 
would not, in the least, condone, celebrate or glamorise such excesses, in fact, as 
Bataille argued, it is from their exclusions and repression that evil and excess draw 
their seductive power. Excessive phenomena do indeed take us to the limit point of 
knowledge but this is a challenge that Bataille, the College of Sociology, and latterly, 
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Baudrillard have had the courage to face. The recent direction of Baudrillard's 
thought has been, increasingly, to deploy contemporary scientific notions throughout 
work of a (loosely) sociological kind. The resonance of indeterminacy and chaos are 
drawn within the cultural and sociological domain where they are unbound of the 
structures of natural science methodology and theorised within and against the most 
radical work available in social science. Such an approach is close indeed to that 
established by Bataille and the College of Sociology. It is here, within a rigorous 
sociology of the excessive, that we may encounter new realms of thought and 
experience, affirming sociological theory its place in the 21 st Century. 
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NOTES 
1) Quoted in Richman (1982: 59). 
2) Marx appeared to have entertained a considerable affinity with Darwinian 
evolutionism (see note 7 below) and while Durkheim was more critical, his 
numerous references to Darwin are ambiguous. At one point Durkheim's Division of 
Labour in Society rejects the Origin of Species, and the forms of individualist or 
'egoistic' theory to which it is related, as a-social, a-historical and highly dubious. 
Durkheim states, to show ... that there is in our past nothing to regret, they believe we 
ought to make it dreary and belittle it systematically. Nothing is less scientific than 
this prejudice' (1964: 197). This is an apposite criticism of an array of 'Modem' 
thought too vast to be specified here. In the same work however, Durkheim 
acknowledges Darwin as a model of successful science (1964: 266). For an 
(unsatisfactory) account of how the dominant sociological tradition has sought to 
'absolve' the founders of sociology from the charge of utilitarianism see Giddens 
(1971) and note 8 below. 
3) See Deleuze, G. (1984) Kant's Critical Philosophy - The Doctrine of the 
Faculties, in particular pp. 68-75. 
4) The Hegelian term Aq/hebung is notoriously difficult to translate and is 
often left in the original German, (the term 'Sublation' is sometimes used in 
English). It connotes a progressive raising or elevation in an idea, as it 
accommodates other, apparently contradictory ideas. Further no cancellation or loss 
is supposed to occur, rather a fully expanded new sense without contradiction. A 
concept of this kind can be seen as representing the far limits of humanist- 
progressivist utility thinking, since what is useful for human development, towards 
the state of absolute knowledge, is always accumulated and preserved X 
Aile 
what is 
contradictory, mistaken, countet-productive is absorbed, resolved. Such a concept 
NS 
occupies a paradoxical territory between General and restricted economy, between 
the limit and the limitless. For Bataille's own ambivalent attitude towards Hegel see 
Bataille, 'Hegel, Death and Sacrifice', (1990) Yale French Studies. 
5) Hardt, M. (1993) has described the manifold difficulties in any notion of an 
'escape' from Hegelianism since the Aufliebung possesses the ability to incorporate 
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an immense field of critical gestures, (see in particular pp. 2-10). Foucault also 
addressed the problem of an escape or overcoming of Hegelianism in 'Orders of 
Discourse' in Social Science Information 10 (1971): 28. Plotnitsky (1993: 3-61) 
situates Hegelian philosophy as a (potential) source of contemporary General 
economies - such as those of Bataille and Denida, while Hollier (1992: 3-13) views 
Hegelianism as an edifice that Bataille sought only to oppose. 
6) See Darwin (1968) The Origin of Species. It would be hard to over-estimate 
the importance of this work in forging the modem identity of the natural sciences. 
7) In addition to Nietzsche's challenge to Darwinian science (Nietzsche 
1990: 44-5, n. 14), see also Ansell-Pearson (1997: 85-122). Further, Bataille's 
colleague and fellow member of the College of Sociology, Roger Caillios published 
an important paper on these themes, see Caillois (1984). 
8) There are of course many intersections between Darwinian evolutionism, 
liberal Utilitarianism, Marxism, and 19th century sociological systems, such as that 
of Herbert Spencer, that came to be termed 'Social Darwinism'. Indeed it has been 
noted that the 1 lth edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, published in 1911, 
devoted half of the space allotted for 'Sociology' to the theories of Darwin as if the 
two could not reasonably be separated (See Darwin, The Origin of Species, Penguin 
(1968: 46); Editors Introduction). It is thought that Spencer arrived at the phrase 
'survival of the fittest' independently of Darwin, yet Darwin himself adopted this 
phrase in time, to the evident chagrin of the modem scientific community (ibid. ). 
Today Darwinianism. has a popular scientific champion in the person of Richard 
Dawkins whose publications provide a perfect resource for those in the human and 
social sciences who might wish to deconstruct the claims of the natural sciences, see 
Dawkins (1995). 
9) Giddens (1971: ppl-64, and 214-223) takes the view that Marx's critique of 
Bentham was sufficient to absolve him from any taint of utilitarianism, evidently 
Giddens is using this term in a very narrow sense. This should be contrasted with 
Baudrillard's reading of Marx which shows Marx to be bound within the logic of 
utility albeit in terms of (class) collectivity rather than individuality. Baudrillard's 
reading of Marx is most fully developed in The Mirror of Production and For a 
Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign. See also the essay 'The End of 
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Production' in Baudrillard (1976/1993) and on the relationship between Marx and 
Bataille specifically, see Baudrillard (1987/1988). 
10) See Marx (1867/1930: 47) Capital Vol. 1, also quoted in Giddens (1971: 5). 
1-1) See Durkheim, E. (1893/1964) The Division of Labour in Society, New 
York: The Free Press. 
12) See Weber, M. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 
particularly the emphasis on legal and rational bureaucracy. Weber did have a sense 
of the conflictual relations between rational bureaucracy and the 'symbolic' forms of 
magic, fate and destiny, and charisma that is largely absent in ýoth Marx and 
Durkheim, see for example, Weber (1905/1992: 323-359). 
13) It is a general contention of this chapter that a great deal of contemporary 
sociology can be shown to be operating restricted (explanatory) economies. Their 
accounts of modem phenomena erect conceptual and methodological boundaries and 
limitations which not only can be shown to be selective, partial and necessarily 
incomplete, ( uotý\ýo-re)senously', 'ýl/nvolve-, ', OstabYeý'ýoundiarrzon-eý's,. -_Nvhýicýh cwP, ý 
ýdu st 
ge fbbýr ýk even within the terms presented by that explanatory 
'e 
Týný ýd 
economy. The restricted economy of utility is, I will argue, one of the essential 
motifs of contemporary social life and thought. By utility I intend a far larger range 
of phenomena than that understood by 'rationality'; this might be seen as a sub- 
component of utility. Aý ýeýtýc! ý4 
_ýconomyjof 
utility operationalises any set of 
resources or conditions so long as they possess some utility, that is that they might 
, 
s, ervp. a particular purpSIse. (Lqnditioný__or possibilities that fail to yield obvious 
applications, or that threaten the validity, stability or viability of utilitarian 
considerations would be overlooked, marginalised or repressed. 
This is especially true of sociological accounts of phenomena that could be regarded 
as excessive, destructive, abhorrent or inhuman; mainstream sociology is not able to 
approach or deal with such phenomena adequately. The subjects of sexuality, 
intimacy and eroticism are one example; a work like Giddens, A. (1992) The 
Transformation ofIntitnacy or Weeks, J. (1985) Sexuality and its Discontents, appear 
domesticated and unconvincing. Reading such texts it is hard to comprehend that 
they purport to be dealing with matters that human beings prize as their most 
challenging, problematic, precious and exalted, that they frequently kill and die for. 
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For Bataille they mark the dissolution of being and self and the fleeting manifestation 
of a nature that all respectable culture has sought to deny (see in particular Bataille's 
entry'Mouth' in Encyclopedia Acephalica. Similarly recent sociological attempts to 
comprehend the enormity of genocidal slaughter have appeared rather pale and 
empty, unable to begin to deal with these phenomena on adequate terms, (see 
Bauman 1989; Galtung 1990). Most frequently however contemporary sociological 
accounts of human life treat the dangers of, for example, violent death, as an abstract 
form of risk calculation, analogous to the risks involved in taking a train or driving a 
car, for instance Beck (1992) and Giddens (1991). Note in particular Giddens 
account of the experience of walking through the streets of a city (1991: 35-69). 
There are notable examples of recent sociological work where the authors clearly 
intend to present a critique of the totalising and reductionist tendencies of the social 
sciences by referring to a broader more radical or dynamic range of phenomena. 
This is the case with Ann Game's Undoing the Social (199 1) and W. Connelly's Yhe 
Augustinian Imperative (1993). In such work the notion of excess is drawn upon to 
criticise other explana tory economies, to break through their conceptual limitations. 
However what occurs in both the above is a slippage in the manner that excess is 
approached from a materialist to a textualist register, this is presented as a radical 
gesture, however it is often concomitant with a containment, logicisation and 
utilisation of those excesses. 
Derrida has clearly been influenced by Bataille's General economy to a very 
considerable degree, the influence is most discernible in Derrida's essay ' From 
General to restricted economy: A Hegelianism without reserve' in Writing and 
Difference (1978), and in the essay 'Differance' in Mai-gins of Philosophy (1982). 
However there are very great differences in approach between Bataille and Derrida, 
most obviously concerning the role and nature of text in human experience. For a 
powerful account of how Bataille and Derrida must be regarded as very different, 
even opposed thinkers see Land, N. The Thirst for Annihilation - Georges Bataille 
and Vintlent Nihilism (1992: 1-26). The notion of restricted economy, in particular 
derived from Bataille, could provide a powerful and revealing point of entry for the 
analysis of many fields of contemporary life, from government policy decision- 
making processes to academic theorising. In the realm of social thought specifically 
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@ commonplac (Dto: pýerater , 
3a rrýstricte ', ýxplaiiýtýý, ec nomy)indeed it is 
practically impossible not to, particularly for a student, given the legitimated forms 
of social science methodology. There have, however, been some interesting recent 
attempts to offer very different sets of theoretical propositions in social thought. In 
addition to Baudrillard and Bataille, see in particular, Milbank (1990) whose 
emphasis is on the sacred and religion, and Taussig (1993) whose anthropological 
investigations undermine Structuralist orthodoxies in the social sciences. Taussig 
elucidates the 'mimetic faculty', the 'magical power of replication' (1993: 20) 
consisting of physiognomic, tactile and optical functions all of which play major 
roles in the perception of objects, symbolic, real and imaginary. 
14) Of particular importance here are Durkheim's Rides of Sociological Method 
(1895/1964: 1-46), Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1912/196 1) and Mauss's 
hugely influential Y7ie Gift - Yhe Form and Reason For Exchange in Archaic 
Societies (1990: 8-46). 
15) Note the difference between J. S. Mill (in Mill and Bentham 1987: 282) 'pain 
is always heterogeneous with pleasure', and Bataille's fictional works, the best known 
and most widely available being Story of the Eye, (available in Penguin paperbacks). 
For a theoretical approach to sadism and masochism, see Freud (1991a) 'Three 
Essays on the Theory of Sexuality' in On Sexuality, London: Penguin and Deleuze 
(1989) Sado-Masochism: An Interpretation of Coldness and Cnielty, New York: 
Zone. 
16) Mill and Bentham (1987) Utilitarianism and other Essays. See especially 
Chapter 2 of Mill's 'Utilitarianism' entitled'What Utilitarianism is' pp. 276-298. 
17) 1 am referring here, principally to the work of Jurgen Habermas, in 
particular see his deradicalised accounts of Nietzsche and Bataille in Habermas 
(1985/1987: 83-105 and 211-237). 
18) An account of the ahistorical tendencies of contemporary sociology is well 
beyond the scope of this paper but for example see Beck (1992: 21). This work is 
particularly weak on the nature of risk in pre-Modem societies, failing to address the 
concept of the soul and the risk of eternal damnation. Also Bauman (1993: 4) who, in 
a similar way, is very superficial in his consideration of the nature of morality and 
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ethics in pre-Modemity, as he is on the nature of pre-Modem violence in earlier work 
on the holocaust, Bauman (1989). 
19) 1 do not wish to equate rationality with utility and irrationality with excess, 
rdther in restricted economies of modernity excess is excluded, ignored or in some 
way related to the category 'irrationality'. An appeal to irrationality is already a 
domestication of excess since the phenomena it is configured to encompass are 
already defined as negatives or deficiencies of the privileged category 'rationality' in 
a binary relationship. The comprehension of excess in Bataille, centring around the 
notion of the sacred, and in Baudrillard's work the symbolic, must be distinguished 
sharply from the concept of irrationality as it was understood in the psychoanalytic 
and Surrealist traditions. Bataille regarded Surrealism as tainted by romanticism and 
idealism, (see Bataille 1994: 28-9). Baudrillard (1976/1993: 237-8) focuses on the 
-narrow 
and eurocentric nature of Freudian psychoanalysis arguing that the 
unconscious appears only when the general exchange economy of the symbolic is 
eroded by the utilitarian and instrumental demand of the state. On the inadequacies 
of Freudian and Lacanian theories of the unconscious see Deleuze and Guattari 
(1977 & 1988) Anti-Oedipus, and A Thousand Plateaus, New York: Athlone Press, 
in the latter see especially pp. 26-38. 
20) For examples of the former tendency see Dworkin (198 1) and more recently 
Sulieman, S. R. "Bataille in the Street: The search for virility in the 1930's" in 
Bailey-Gill Ed. (1995: 26-45). Sulieman operates in terms of rendering Bataille 
"useful" for the Feminist cause, and then faults him for possessing too little utility. 
For examples of the latter tendency in feminist thought, where an attempt is made to 
read excess, see Carter (1979), Gallop (1981) and Dean (1992). Similarly various 
sociologies of Postmodernism -struggle Ao -adapt Lyotard or Baudrillard to their 
'instrumental' pýR)osg. Such projects meet with various degrees of failure, often 
because of adherence to a form of neo-Kantian rational subjectivism and a related 
attempt to accumulate, order and profit from concepts which insist on profitless 
expenditure and that cannot be contained within the unstable restricted economies of 
rational utility. The absurdity of such projects is revealed when the inherent 
instabilities, or failures to reduce such thought to serviceable chunks, are, by the 
rhetoric of critique, then argued to be the very shortcomings, weaknesses and flaws 
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of radical theories of excess. David Harvey (1990) operates in this way, in an 
attempt to rejuvenate Marxist concepts and analyses. This is an abyss into which 
French Poststructuralist Feminism and Sociology are often able to avoid plunging 
because they do not insist on restricted economics of utility, accumulation profit and 
closure. In addition to the work of Bataille, Baudrillard and Derrida see also 
Irigaray, L. This Sex Which is not One, (1985) Ithaca: Cornell University Press and 
Marine Lover ofFriedrich Nietzsclze2 (1991) New York: Columbia. 
21) The Foucauldian canon is too vast to be reviewed here, however there do 
appear to be a number of fundamental shifts in his thought. One occurs from the 
publication of Madness and Civilisation (1961/1967) which strays close of a 'truth of 
madness/madness as truth' hypothesis, to his works of the 1970's and 1980's which 
do not make such claims. He seems to have taken Derrida's (1967) critique very 
seriously. 
22) See in particular 'On the Postulates of Linguistics' in Deleuze and Guattari 
(1988: 75-110) for a powerful account of the idealism implicit in many variants of 
linguistic, textual and discursive studies. 
23) See Bataille (1985: 45-52)'Pase Materialism and Gnosticism'. 
24) There are rare exceptions, for example celebrations of aristocratic idleness 
in Deleuze (1989) and similarly in the work of Bertrand Russell. 
25) See E. S. R. C. guidelines. There has recently been a debate in the natural 
Sciences concerning the relatively low level of funding for 'pure' research in 
comparison to that for 'applied' research, see Times Higher Educational Supplement, 
Feb. 1996. 
26) What became known as Structuralism provides a good example of a highly 
logical and reductive method, which however failed to grasp the drama, intensity and 
irreducibility to logic, reason and knowledge of 'excess'. Bataille, in particular 
stressed the importance of 'non-knowledge' and 'communication' over rational 
thought and knowledge, see Bataille (1967/1988: 93-98; 1992: 181). See also 
Baudrillard (1976/1993: 188) where he refers to the 'idealist misinterpretation of 
Levi-Strauss' and the tendency of Structuralism whereby 'the symbolic is reduced to 
the imaginary' (ibid. ). On Levi-Strauss and 'sociological' Structuralism in general 
see Merquior (1986). 
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27) See Foucault (1967) and also Boyne (1990) for a discussion of the debate 
over madness as excess between Foucault and Derrida. 
28) For an application of Nietzsche's thought to femininity and gender, see 
Derrida (1979) Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. On 
implications for theology, see Land (1992) and on political and ethical thought see 
Connelly (1993) and Strong (1975). 
29) See Nietzsche (1967) The Birth of TragedylThe Case of Magner, New 
York: Vintage Books. 
30) However Plotnitsky does little to draw sociological enquiry specifically into 
the realm of General economy, overlooking the College of Sociology in his reading 
of Bataille. See also Pefanis (1991) who makes many of these connections and to 
whom I am indebted. 
31) See Parsons who deals with this interpretation of Durkheim at some length 
(1937: 301-450). 
32) For example Caillois's lecture for the College of Sociology entitled 'The 
Winter Wind' delivered in March 1937, (in Hollier 1988: 32-42), clearly bears the 
stamp of Mauss's 'Seasonal Variations of the Eskimo' (1979). The correspondence 
between Caillois, Lciris and Bataille (in Hollier 1988: 353-359) attests to the growing 
divergence between the founders of The College of Sociology, particular the distance 
between Bataille's current of thought leading him to Inner Experience, Bataille 
(1988), and the methodological principles established by Durkheim and Mauss. 
33) This study first appeared in LAnnee Sociologique (1898: 29-138) as 'Essai 
sur la Nature et la Fonction du Sacrifice'. 
34) For an overview of the approach of a number of early anthropologists, 
including Robertson-Smith and Frazer, see Milbank (1995). Milbank reviewed a 
number of recent anthropological studies which cast doubt upon many of the key 
suppositions that Durkheim, Mauss and to some extent even Bataille and Baudrillard 
appear to be reliant on. Milbank describes recent studies by Detienne, de Heusch 
and others. who claim that in many societies including areas of Africa and ancient 
Greece did not practice a distinct form of sacrifice, centred around violence, 
destructiveness and excess. Rather Milbank argues, to the extent that it is possible to 
speak of a phenomena of 'sacrifice' as distinct 'from culture in general' (1995: 15) at 
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all, the practice should be seen in terms of its culinary purposes. Milbank then 
continues with a critique of several influential 'stories of sacrifice', including the 
study by Mauss and Hubert, drawing out their mistaken assumptions, the biases 
attendant upon their methodological approach and theoretical sources. Clearly 
Milbank makes a number of valid points in relation to a range of Anthropologists 
including Wethausen, Robertson Smith, Fraser and Girard. However he appears to 
misread Durkheirn and Mauss on a number of key issues while as far as he touches 
on Bataille and Baudrillard he seems unfamiliar with the range and trajectory of their 
work and his criticisms do not always apply in the manner he suggests. Concerning 
the basic criticism of separating the notion of sacrifice from the 'social whole' or 
culture, it should be apparent that the primary concern of Durkheim, Mauss and The 
College of Sociology was to think in terms of a social totality. That is they deal with 
'total social facts' and conceive of the social as a field of collective forces and 
energies, which resonate on and throughout the multiplicity of human experience. 
Rather than abstracting sacrificial events from the continuity of the social whole, as 
Milbank charges, Durkheirn and Mauss and later Bataille were concerned to 
demonstrate the continuity of the social totality. They emphasise communifying 
ritual and ceremony such as sacrifice, without which a society may not be able to 
express its wholeness. In my reading of this tradition the focus on sacrifice is made 
precisely in order that the importance of considering society and culture as collective 
may be appreciated. Milbank fails to address the social in this way, which at the 
very least shows many of his implicit criticisms of Mauss and Bataille are 
inappropriate. Milbank makes valid points on the generalising and evolutionist 
tendencies in the changing conceptions of the sacred but this becomes highly 
problematic when extended as a critique of Bataille and Baudrillard. The latter make 
no such assumptions concerning evolutionary humanism and in fact strive to oppose 
such reading rather more vigorously than Milbank. Baudrillard's work actually 
reveals that he does not regard the anthropological assumptions made by Durkheim, 
Mauss or Bataille to be adequate to elucidating contemporary life. Bataille, with The 
College of Sociology, and later Baudrillard draw out the possible effects of the loss 
of Sacred or Symbolic forces, at least at a level of sufficient potency to communify a 
social or cultural totality. 
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35) See Bataille's 'La notion du Depense' in La Critique Sociale , 
translated in Visions of Excess (Bataille: 1985) as 'The notion of Expenditure' pp. 
116-129. Most of Bataille's prolific output has now been translated into English and 
iý accompanied by an ever-increasing volume of secondary literature. The thought of 
Bataille covers a vast area; from Mediaeval studies through to politics, art history, 
social science and mysticism. In keeping with this diversity a range of quite different 
readings of Bataille have appeared in recent years. Libertson (1984) and Shaviro 
(1990) emphasise literary dimensions at the expense of the specifically sociological. 
Land's (1992) commentary focused on Bataille as 'atheologian;, stresses the 
importance of Nietzsche in the formation of Bataillean themes. Richardson (1994) 
relates to Bataille primarily through Surrealism. Dworkin (1979) dismisses Bataille 
as pornographer, reading his work through that of Sade, Gallop (1985) and Dean 
(1992) also approach Bataille through Sade though in a much more positive and 
rigorous manner. Sociological readings of Bataille are still rare, though they are 
beginning to appear (Pefanis, 1991; Richman in Bailey-Gill 1995). This paper is 
intended as a continuation of this latter tendency. 
36) Rene Girard theorises the relationship between the sacred and violence in a 
similar way, see Girard (1977). See also the discussion of Bataille's understanding of 
sacrifice by Annette Michelson 'Heterology and the Critique of Instrumental Reason' 
in October 36. (1985-6) pp. 111- 127. 
37) See Clastres (1977: 19-37) for an account of the cultural safeguards and 
political ramifications of the refusal of certain peoples to allow wealth to be 
accumulated and concentrated within a hierarchical power structure. 
38) The practice of potlatch is defined by Richman (1982: 17) as follows, 
'practiced among the American Indian tribes of the Pacific Northwest, potlatch 
ceremonies consist in the sacrifice of vast quantities of amassed goods, usually 
blankets and copper blazons, where one individual representing a clan or phratry 
must crush a rival by his superior ability to dispose of precious objects'. 
- ---------- - 
39) Bataille's notion of excess owes much more to French sociology and 
anthropology than to Surrealism or Psychoanalysis, which he found limited and 
unsatisfactory. The formation of the College of Sociology attests to this. Bataille 
viewed the manifestations of excess through a (base) materialist methodology, 
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demonstrating the impact of concrete historical and political factors. He was not 
content to represent the excessive as emanating from purely innate creative or 
destructive impjqjýý: s. Hollier (1992: 104-112) presents Bataille as engaged, in part, in 
;I base materialist radicalisation of psychoanalysis. Lechte (in Bailey-Gill 1995: 117- 
132) draws out something of the relationship between Bataille and Surrealism 
concerning the notion of the excessive, viewing the Surrealists as far more 
conservative than Bataille. 
40) The revolutionary movements inspired by Marxism and Communism were 
already appearing compromised to a wide range of dissident intellectuals. The 
(capitalist) system of Western Europe had been all but paralysed by the Great 
Depression yet still could not be unseated by the revolutionary movements forged in 
the 19th Century. RRýher, in Germany and Italy particularly it was Fascism not 
Conununism that. ýWas, orce capable of imbuing -proving 
to be the only political- f 
Capitalist 
-society- with 
the lost, sense of myth, collectivity and sacred meaning, 
thoughý_. at -a_. 
te; 7jbte _. post. 
Bataille addressed precisely this issue in his earlier 
sociological essay 'The Psychological Structure of Fascism, in Visions of Excess 
(Bataille 1985: 137-166). Simultaneously, he had set up the short-lived group 
'Contre-Attaque', dedicated to seizing the strategies and tactics of Fascism and 
turning them against it. Bataille was accused of being a Fascist himself and the 
group fell apart. It was succeeded by 'Acephale', a radically anti-statist, anti- 
hierarchical and anti-Fascist movement, and then by the College of Sociology. For a 
discussion of Bataille's relationship with political engagement and his stance towards 
Fascism see J. M. Besnier and S. R. Sulieman in Bailey-Gill (ed. ) (1995: 12-45). 
41) See Bataille (1985: 116-118). 
42) See Bataille's lecture 'The Scorcerers Apprentice' in Hollier (1988: 12-23). 
43) Caillois, R. 'Introduction' in Hollier (198 8: 9-11). 
44) See Hollier (1988: viii-xxix) for an account of the rise and fall of The 
College of Sociology. 
45) In particular see Callinicos, A. (1989) Against Postniodernisin. Many 
writers effect a cursory dismissal of Baudrillard, for example Giddens (1991: 26), 
Bauman (1992: 149-155). For a concise account of how many would-be critiques of 
Baudrillard are misjudged see, Gane (1995: 109-123). 
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46) There are, of course, considerable difficulties in sketching out what 
be taken as the founding moments of 'Post-Structuralism', however Hamilton-urani 
in Lyotard (1993: preface) draws together the following key texts; Derrida, Writing 
and Difference (orig. 1967); Foucault, Yhe Order of Yhings (orig. 1970); Deleuze 
and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (orig. 1972); Irigaray, This Sex which is not One (orig. 
1974) and Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange and Death (orig. 1976). For a discussion 
of Bataille's place in such typologies see Richman, M. "Post-structuralism before its 
Time" in Stanford French Review 12 (Spring 198 8), pp79-95). 
47) For exceptions see Gane 1991a, 1991b, 1993; Genosko 1994,1998 and 
Lash, S. (1995) "Dead Symbols" in Theory, Culture and Society Vol. 12, no. 4 pp. 
71-78. 
48) If Baudrillard has spelt out an opinion on Postmodernism it is one of 
hostility, and not merely when it is used as a label for his works. Baudrillard reveals 
a preference for Modernist art and cinema (Gane 1993: 21-35), and Rojek (in Rojek 
and Turner 1993: 107-123) concludes than in the field of politics Baudrillard should 
be seen as 'modernist'. More importantly, to claim that Baudrillard is a 
Postmodernist is to miss the central importance and operations of the notion of the 
symbolic. Baudrillard's writings actually refer to a series of other thinkers, none of 
whom could unproblematically be termed 'Postmodemist; Nietzsche, Saussure, 
Mauss, Freud, Bataille, Caillois, Jarry, Monod, Borges, Canetti. All of these 
theorised or created pathways or insights into hidden or submerged symbolic, 
agonistic o, r_ýnchanted worlds; their focus is on the ancient, primitive, prehistoric or 
timeless and on the reverberation of these forces upon the contemporary. 
49) See Baudrillard, (1990/1993) 'The Transparency of Evil', in particular the 
essays 'Prophylaxis and Virulence' and 'Operational Whitewash'. 
50) The whole issue of 'cosmology' is highly problematic, Bataille clearly felt 
able to make claims of a cosmological nature and founds his theory of General 
economics in this way (Bataille 1988a: 9-41), speaking in terms of the 'Laws of 
General Economy', however during his time with the College of Sociology, and 
during the 1940's, Bataille had worked closely with Nuclear Physicist, Georl., es 
Ambrosino, one of the original signatories of The College's opening declaration. In 
his notes to The Accursed Share Vol. 1, Bataille records 'this book is also in a large I 
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part the work of Ambrosino'(1988: 191). Baudrillard (1987) and Derrida (1978) take 
Bataille's laws of General economy literally, or rather materially, as does Land 
(1992). Other readers however have sought to treat Bataille's cosmology as 
metaphor-or-literary device (Libertson 1984; Habermas 1987: 211-237; Shaviro 
1990), 
, 
qý, 44yq. supprpssed.. its importance in order to 
_make 
the claim that Bataille 
created the, 'ur-text of dejconstruction' (Stoekl, in Dean 1992: 2). Bataille inten ded, 
clearly, that the principle of General Economy be taken as a scientific and 
sociological reality, though not of the same order as the 'realities' these disciplines 
are commonly given to describing. Baudrillard (1995/1996) reads Bataille's General 
economy in this way and constructs his critique accordingly, on a social and material 
plane, while Derrida tends to domesticate Bataille somewhat by his textual approach 
(Derrida 1978: 251-277). Bennington (1995: 46-57, in Bailey-Gill ed. ) detects logical 
and rational flaws in Bataille's General economy, but this misses the point of General 
economy and specifically of the emphasis on excess and'Non-Knowledge'. 
51) See in particular Nietzsche (1889/1990: 31-121) 'Twilight of the Idols or 
How to Philosophize with a Hammer'. 
52) Baudrillard (1976/1993) dýscribes the nature and genealogy of the 'Orders 
of Simulacra' pp. 50-86, and places particular emphasis on the contemporary 
'Structural Law of Value', also pp. 6-9. 'the structural law of value signifies the 
indeterminacy of every sphere in relation to every other, and to their proper 
content ... the passage from the determinant sphere of signs to the indeterminacy of the 
code'(p. 8). 
53) See Bataille (1973/1985) esp. pp. ix-xi, 15-31,105-129). Both Bataille and 
Baudrillard are fascinated by Evil and attempt to trace its changing nature as well as 
advocating the cultural importance of retaining Evil. They argue an understanding 
and acceptance of Evil strengthens and maintains the cultural system, see Bataille 
(1973/1985) and Baudrillard (1983/1990: 181-191; 1993: 81-88). The potential 
importance of this topic for the social sciences was opened up by Durkheim's 
Eleniewary Forms of the Religious Life. 
54) See Bataille (1973/1989: 117-127). 
55) See Baudrillard (1990/1993: 3-13). 
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56) Thought of a cosmological nature was, of course, very much the concern of 
Philosophy for many centuries, until perhaps, the inception of the industrial order. 
57) In my interpretation of Baudrillard here I am indebted to Mike Gane, see in 
particular Gane (1995) for a recent discussion of Baudrillard's methodology. 
58) The major exception here is Baudrillard's lengthy analysis of the Gulf War 
(1996, orig. 1992). In addition Fatal Strategies (1983/1990) offers an examination 
of the abduction of Italian politician Aldo Moro through the concepts of gift and 
counter-gift. Baudrillard has approached industrial action, pay claims and tourism 
through these concepts however his treatments tend to be polemical and are 
presented as examples or illustrations rather than as substantial analyses. 
59) The cycle of gift exchange and potlatch can be traced through the events at 
Dunblane. In addition to the extreme destructiveness of Hamilton's actions, the 
deluge of flowers and toys sent to the school by members of the public are examples 
of symbolic gift exchange, contained within a nominally Christian form. Here the 
gifts are circulated to those who have lost children in the massacre, in order than the 
deaths are not fixed as the final symbolic moment of the fatal exchange. . 
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CHAPTER THREE 
DEATH -CONTEMPORARY DEATH-EVENTS 
'But the life of Spirit is not the life that shrinks from death and keeps itself untouched by 
devastation, but rather the life that endures it and maintains itself in it. It wins its truth only when, in 
absolute dismemberment, it fmds itself. This tarrying with the negative is the magical power that 
converts it into being'(Hegel 1807/1931: 93). 
'All passion then takes refuge in violent death, which is the sole manifestation of something 
like the sacrifice, that is to say, like a real transmutation through the will of the group. And in this 
sense, it matters little whether death is accidental, criminal or catastrophic: from the moment it 
escapes 'natural' reason, and becomes a challenge to nature, it once again becomes the business of the 
group, demanding a collective and symbolic response ... it arouses the passion for the artificial, which 
is at the same time sacrificial passion' (Baudrillard 1976/1993: 165, emp. in original). 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will define and explore what I have termed contemporary 
death-events. The discussion will emphasise the importance of the concepts of 
negativity, the negative and negation as they appear in some strands of modem and 
contemporary theory. These themes are related to excess and extremity. Of 
particular concern here is the thought of Hegel, Kojeve, Bataille, and Baudrillard and 
the assumptions. -effects and. rqmi 
fications., of thqir, different strategies and approaches 
to the negative. I will develop a discussion of death as radical negativity, as threat to 
both the individual and society. Bataille's understanding of sacrifice, and his notions 
of expenditure and the sacred are argued to be the central themes of his thought 
which prevent or unden-nine the operations of negativity within the framework of 
Hegelian dialectics. Baudrillard's thinking on contemporary negativity is contrasted 
with Hegelian thought, but also diverges from Bataille's on the thinking of death and 
radical negativity. 
The "radical negativity" of death in Bataille's thought is addressed, and 
challenged, through a reading of Baudrillard's symbolic. I will argue that 
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Baudrillard's theory retains a sense of expenditure, of loss, incompletion and 
uncertainty but this is located within the orders of simulacra, in a fatal/gcnealogical 
reading. IlBaudrillard's _symbolic order expenditure occurs as cy 
lical, exchange not 
as irreversible loss. These fundamental distinctions between Bataille and Baudrillard 
are drawn out below. 
For Hegel the ontological nature of "living substance", the real or actual, is 
constituted by, is itself, "pure and simple negativity". Its operation is characterised, 
fundamentally, by its self-positing, self-mediation, its immanent transition "from one 
state or position to the opposite": 
... a process of splitting up what is simple and undifferentiated, a process of duplicating and setting factors in opposition, which [process] in turn is the 
negation of this indifferent diversity and of the oppositional factors it 
entails. True reality is merely this process of reinstating self-identity, of 
reflecting into its own self and from its other ... It is the process of its own becoming (Hegel 1807/1931: 80). 
The self then is a state of unrest, of constant division, opposition, conflict, 
synthesis and re-division. Two topics; the infamous master-slave dialectic as the 
socio-historic form of this unrest and the focus on the centrality of death and finitude, 
formed the basis of the mid-20th century renewal of interest in Hegel/. However for 
Hegel this unrest, even dismemben-nent, is always secondary to the fundamentally 
self-sufficient or self-contained nature of Spirit. '\The other of the self, and the 
otherness of self is always transcended, for Hegel, this process is immanent with 
Spirit. SpLnt has no outside as such, no excess that cannot be incorporated, managed 
and transcended, subject/Object, self/other, inside/outside are never outside their own 
fundamental unity. Both Bataille and Baudrillard, as well as other contemporary 
thinkers challenge this view, radically. EpT-ýBatail 
, 
le 'the subject' is excessive, 
ravaged by affect, drawn to extreme violence. For Baudrillard 'the subject' is not in 
qKpfpxqessJtjq, pqýplit ordivided, it is fragmentary, illusory, drained ofpassion or 
and in a state of dissolution. Both Bataille and Baudrillard challenge, in 
different ways, the basis of modem conceptions of rational subjectivity, of identity 
and unity, and of moral responsibility. These can only be partial fon-nations; 
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-to-define-and contain 
the limitsý qfý'Yeý e are always yt there 
excesses beyond these limits. For Bataille 'excess' is manifest primarily as excessive 
energy suffusing 'the subject'. The subject does not 'contain' excesses as 
psychoanalytic positions might argue, for Bataille "being" is excess, always in 
excess. 'Subjectivity' is a containment of being in accordance with the utilitarian 
and productivist criteria of modem society. ýHoweverfbr Baudrillard the thinking, of 
_Ln __M! 
ýýngful. On ological claims always concern a 'bei gý, __pntology -no rt 
Js JQ igq 
, rqal, - 
tme c ! jpb --'deeper', more 
'essential' 'something'. For or authentic_ --stance, a 
Baudrillard the 'subject' and 'being' are functional illusions. Subjective (rational) 
thought always assumed the inertia or passivity of the object while Baudrillard 
locates excess and extremity with the object, the event, the image. These challenges 
are crucial for a new thinking of extreme events and 'inexplicable', destructive 
actions. 
For the Hegelian-Marxist tradition negation was the mechanism whereby )y 
i d h i i i l i d dif 
] 
t que operate ntellectual cr on t y, rejuvenate or e soc a system n or er to mo Dr r 
revolutionise it dialectically. This was the project of left intellectuals both befor e 
and after the Second World War. Crucial to this process was speculation concerning 
the fate of capitalism and its supposed dialectical transformation into socialism. 
However by the mid-1950's significant numbers of intellectuals began to criticise 
both Soviet socialism and Western liberal capitalism as characterised by totalitarian 
and alienative structures. As Marxist theory was revised, hastily, in order better to 
deal with Western post-war prosperity it was still the critical 'negation' of social 
structures that was felt to be the engine of historical progress. Important here is the 
work of the Frankfurt School, and according to Marcuse, one of its leading members: 
... 
it was mind, reason, consciousness, "pure" thought that ... was supposed to 
constitute the autonomy of the subject, the essential freedom of man. Here 
was the sphere of negation, of contradiction to the established order, of 
protest, of dissociation, of criticism (Marcuse 1968: xii). 
While the historical forces of 'Protestantism and the bourgeois revolutions' (ibid. ) had 
introduced the freedom of thought to negate tradition, it was, for Marcuse and many 
others, now necessary to radicalise critique against a liberal capitalist order that itself 
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proclaimed the 'end of ideology'. Post-war consumer society was able to re-construct 
or'prestructure' the modem individual as a passive subject of consumer gratification, 
rather than the active agent of critique. The self of consumer society is pacified and 
contented but is no longer characterised by the "unity" or integrity of the Hegelian 
subject, it is no longer an agent of historical change. 
A common assertion of much contemporary theory then is that classical 
forms of the dialectic, represented by Hegelian idealism and Marxist materialism 
have broken down, are no longer meaningful, and fail to describe adequately 
historical, social or psychological events. For many thinkers, though certainly not 
all'2 the necessary causal linkage of thesis-antithesis-synthesiS, 3 or coupling of 
positivity with negativity, is no longer tenable. Catastrophic events of the 20th 
century have all but destroyed any sense of cumulative human progress. It is hard to 
imagine an event such as the holocaust serving any purpose in the development of 
humanity, even 'negatively' since it questions, radically, the meaning of the term 
'humanity' itself. The technological 'achievements' of the human race were put to the 
service of genocide and accelerated the capacity for destruction beyond 'human' 
imagination. 
More recently, with the collapse of communism and the triumph of quasi- 
global capitalism 'history' has been argued to have come to an end. 4 The productive 
energy of the negative, of dialectical negation seems to have been exhausted both in 
consumer society and in social theoretical reflection upon it. A largely homogenised 
and globalised system of Western market values has become established. 5 Capitalism 
appears as a system without alternatives, seeming to have no 'outsides'. 'Excesses' 
cease to be figured outside the system, where they might be drawn upon to transform 
or revolutionise it, rather 'excess' appears as internal to the system, as its growth or 
acceleration. 'Excess' then is no longer negative in the dialectical sense, no longer 
serving any 'productive' purpose. Yet the 'negative' certainly has not ceased to exist, 
giving way to a stable perfection. Rather the form of the 'negative' is altered, it 
looms ever larger, more threatening and unmanageable. The 'negative' exists 
&, c-o"upled from the positiv - in fonns apparently, both 'inhuman' (genocide, ethnic 
cleansing, serial murder) and also non- or trans-human, in the spectres of 
environmental collapse, viral contamination and genetic mutation. 
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VVbile Marcuse and others, notably Habermas, continued to hope for a more 
humane and rationally ordered society many contemporary theorists have understood 
reason, 'humanity' and the movement of dialectics, as a ffindamentally constitutive 
problem rather than the solution to social ills. Further, contemporary theory has 
mounted a thorough attack on notions of the rational autonomy and moral 
responsibility of the subject as constitutive of a distinctive human freedom. Freudian 
psychoanalysis has been central to the undermining of the Kantian moral subject by 
positing unconscious desires as the fundamental determinants of human subjectivity. 
The notion of the unconscious and of instinctual drives and desires is of importance 
in the present analysis, and Baudrillard's reading of "Freud against Freud" will be 
emphasised later. For the Poststructuralist movement, as it is generally understood, 
modem technological, bureaucratic and disciplinary regimes effectively foreclose 
any authentic freedoms by operating on the most fundamental levels of subjectivity, 
discourse and rationality. However Bataille and Baudrillard do not rest comfortably 
in the category 'Poststructuralism. Their original and idiosyncratic approaches to 
negativity and its relations to excessive events will form the basis of this chapter. 
This discussion of negativity and negative events will enable a more precise location 
of ways in which death, danger and catastrophe have been understood in various 
philosophical and sociological traditions. This reading contextualises and informs 
the discussion of contemporary death-events. These are argued to be irreducible to 
dialectical forms of negativity as they appear in Hegel and Kojeve. More 
specifically can what I have termed contemporary death-events be read as non- 
dialectical excess, and how might such forms be traced in contemporary life? 
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BATAILLE, DEATH AND SACRIFICE 
'No, man does not exhaust his negativity in action; no, he does not transform into power all 
the nothingness that he is. Perhaps he can reach the absolute by making himself equal to the whole 
and by becoming conscious of the whole. But then more extreme than this absolute is the passion of 
negative thought; for faced with this response, negative thought is still capable of introducing the 
question that suspends it, and, faced with the accomplishment of the whole, still capable of 
maintaining the other exigency that again raises the issue of the infinite in the form of contestation' 
(Blanchot, in Botting and Wilson, 1998b: 44). 
'There is no better way to know death than to link it with some licentious image (Sade, 
quoted by Bataille 1957/1986: 11). 
Bataille's reading of Hegelian negativity is most fully developed in the 1955 
essay Hegel, Death and Sacrijzice. Bataille, like Kojeve before him, understood 
Hegelianism as a 'philosophy of death'. Yet Bataille's reading probes, expands and 
radicalises the meaning of negativity, and of death, Jýeyond-the limit where it might 
be contained within Spiiýt, 
_gnity, pTqgýress, utility, 
the unfolding of human mastery 
over nature - in short Hegelian dialectics. For Bataille the essence of negativity is 
not the quotidian or biologically necessary, as in Kojeve's example of negation as 
eating; the conversion of organic material into calorific energy. Bataille emphasises 
that distinctively social action is "given in death" because 'death is essentially 
voluntary (resulting from risks assumed without necessity, without biological 
reasons' (Bataille 1990: 10). Here, already, death is expressed as pure expenditure, as 
radical negation beyond any recuperation by the positive, as luxury, as excess. 
For Bataille death is not the singular event of the negation of life, rather, 
radical negativity infuses all subjectivity, all experience, all 'positives' with 'death', 
with finitude. 'Death',. cannot be contained by abstract 'knowledge', but, for Bataille 
is the mark of an economY-, of excess energy, piaking all stability and closure, both 
social and theoretical, im ossible. Radical negativity cannot be 'set aside', resolved P----- - 
or exhausted in productive use. For Bataille death expresses radical negativity, 
erasing or unmasking all apparent 'positives', death 'reveals that the real order was 
lyina' (Bataille 1973/1989: 14). This is a fundamentally different conception of death 0 
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from that of either Kojeve or Hegel; it is closer to the Freudian death-drive except 
that Bataille, uniquely, insists upon the inevitably collective and sacred dimensions 
of human death, emphasising "luxury" over Freud's individualist pleasure/unpleasure 
dualism. 6 
Hegelian subjectivity is an interior nothingness, known only through the 
movements of desire whereby negativity is exteriorised, transforming nature, 
(7 
building culture. % Bataille however, strictly speaking, does not theorise 'desire' 
rather his concerns are negativity, death and the sacred. Where these fuse with 
sexuality Bataille's preferred term isý'er_o_ticiýý) The notion of eroticism, far more 
than 'desire' expresses the loss of individual identity, bodily boundary and subjective 
integrity. For Bataille eroticism always invokes violence and sacrifice, always 
. witnesses the-pp9fitIgss. 
destruction of energy, security and stability. 
According to Bataille both Hegel and Kojeve miss something crucial of the 
relation between human, nature and death; the centrality of expenditure or depense. 
Hegel's concern, according to Bataille, is ultimately with the subject's 
"Understanding" and the negativity immanent to it, while for Bataille the movement 
from the animal state to human 'knowledge' is far more problematic and is achieved 
only at great cost. Subjectivity is produced as always, already tom, not merely 
'limited' but rendered into the anguish and discontinuity of self-consciousness and 
forever imprisoned by the inadequacies of discursive representation. Subiectivit - --y 
does not 'cause' or experience a splitting or deformation as in much psychoanalytic 
and social thought. For Bataille 'subjectivity' is itself the tear or loss, and the loss of 
continuity with animal- nature never ceases to haunt and terrorise human subjectivity 
since it is _rooted 
in thq prisciousness of death's inescapability. This notion of 
subjectivity is not merely ontological but also phylogenetic, in fact the theorem of 
the accursed share makes death a cosmological event. Death as radical negation, as 
terrifying foreboding and pure expenditure, as total loss, are the source of the sacred 
and the movements of interdiction and transgression inherent in all sacrificial 
religion. 
For Bataille the sacred is the fundamental dimension of human existence 
and it is not erased, surpassed or overcome in the emergent democratic states that for 
Hegel mark the end of history. In fact the codes and regulations of democratic 
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society Rulher restrict the legitimate expression of Bataillean negativity, that is 
human action where death is fundamentally at stake. Indeed it is the practice of 
democratic modernity to restrict, to 'normalise', in the tenninology of Foucault, and 
to ensure the 'security' of its citizens. This is, in itself, a process that necessarily 
involves the use of violence and its ideological or discursive legitimisation. In an 
important sense then there is a displacement of violence; a transformation or re- 
ordering of meanings attached to the radical negativity of death. Industrial 
democracy demands work but claims to minimise risk and danger; except where it is 
structured as legitimate, for example in imperialist or nationalist conflict. Violent 
desires, such as the annihilation of the enemy may well be said to be discursively 
produced and maintained through state ideological machinery, however such 
violence is not created ex nihilo it is a cultural deployment of an always existing and 
fundamental condition, the relation of subjectivity and death. 
According to Bataille then, the essential interior core of negativity has no 
place in industrial modernity, it is without use or employment. The crux of Bataille's 
disagreement with Kojeve is expressed on a number of occasions where Bataille 
sketches the "impossible" project of re-engaging the force of negativity through a 
planned and deliberate mysticism centred on sacrifice and death. It is important to 
emphasise that Bataille did not envisage the 'utilisation' of a forgotten or repressed 
dimension of human existence. Radical negativity, fused with the sacred, cannot be 
_put 
to a higher_pqrp9pe, 
_. ýaanriqt 
be transposed into the presence of being by a 
mystical re-integration. Rather this radical negativity is sought out, actively pursued, 
in order that the human being can be aware of its fundamental ambiguity, 
maintaining it in a state of "absolute dismemberment" (Hegel 1807/1931: 93) where 
death and life are affirmed together. This state is beyond reason and language, 0 
beyond the regulatory fictions of 'discontinuous' being and subjectivity. However 
what Bataille describes is emphatically not a re-captured unity or a state of higher 
transcendence. There is no resolution, dialectical or otherwise and though there are 
clear parallels with the meditative practices of Hinduism and Buddhism, Bataille's 
refusal of-the-idealising-heliefs. -in-iýq-i. pt-egrpLtipq. qý usion express 
his 
_ýenevolent 
f 
distance from these religions. 8 
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The fundamental distance behveen the Hegelian understanding of death and 
Bataille's notion of it is developed through a discussion of sacrifice. For Bataille 
sacrifice is the instance, par excellence, were 'subjectivity' encounters "absolute 
dismemberment", where the individual becomes, most spectacularly, "death which 
lives a human life" (Hegel). Further, the "practically universal" existence of 
sacrifice, before its regulation by state religion, demonstrates, for Bataille, the 
J- universal apprehension of the radical negativity, ýv! - ýe or reE-uperatio-fil of 
human death. Death alone cannot fulfil the dialectical purpose assigned it by Hegel. 
Individual corporeal death reveals nothing to the human since, when the body dies, 
all conscious awareness ceases. This is why the Master-Slave contest must not result 
in death. The dialectical process leaves radical negativity unresolved. For Bataille 
the practice of human sacrifice, before'history' is at the heart of this impasse since: 
In order for Man to reveal himself ultimately to himself, he would have to 
die, but he would have to do it while living - watching himself cease to be. 
In other words, death itself would have to become (self-) consciousness at 
the very moment that it annihilates the conscious being ... [I]n the sacrifice, the sacrificer identifies himself with the animal that is struck down dead. 
And so he dies in seeing himself die, and even, in a certain way, by his own 
will, one in spirit with the sacrificial weapon (Bataille 1990: 19). 
The intensely, essentially 'human' problem of apprehending death, sensing 
its odour, distinguishes 'humanity' and necessitates a "subterfuge" -a play of 
spectacle, ritual, myth and tragedy, 'to seize what death both gave and took away' 
(Bataille 1990: 21). Bataille specifies the differences between the Hegelian 
anthropology of death and his own as follows. Hegel's concern was discursive 
knowledge, Bataille's "sensuous experience". The practice of sacrifice both precedes 
and exceeds the limitations of discursive knowledge, it invokes: 
... sacred horror: the richest and the most agonising experience, which does 
not limit itself to dismemberment but which, on the contrary, opens itself, 
like a theatre curtain, onto a realm, beyond this world, where the rising light 
of day transfigures all things and destroys their literal meaning (ibid. ). 
V 
I 
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Hegel identified sacrifice with naive, "under-developed" religious 
sentiment, in contrast to the maturity of discursive reasoning, yet according to 
Bataille, Hegel did not see 'that sacrifice in itself bore witness to the entire movement 
of death(Bataille 1990: 21). Similarly, for Bataille, Kojeve's reading over-privileges 
desire for recognition at the expense of the experience of 'absolute dismemberment, 
failing to explore the fusion of attraction, repulsion and violent death expressed in 
the sacrifice. For Bataille there is a fundamental disjunction between the 
Aran5 iyý, qxpqnqqce d the order of discourse, language and reason: Zrq§ýsl 
Man's intelligence, his discursive thought, developed as functions of servile 
labour. Only sacred, poetic words, limited to the level of impotent beauty, 
have retained the power to manifest fall sovereignty. Sacrifice, 
consequently, is a sovereign, autonomous manner of being only to the extent 
that it is uninformed by meaningful discourse (Bataille 1990: 25). 
The experience of sovereign autonomy-- cannot-_ be achieved within 
"meaningful discourse" which is necessarily pragmatic, servile and utilitarian. 
Scientific studies are for Bataille "vulgar" and "self-serving". Hegel's accounts of the 
history of religion, which attempt to raise discursive knowledge to the absolute, must 
always fail since the conscious deployment of discursive knowledge is restricted by 
serving certain external ends. For Bataille the truth of human sovereignty can only 
be sensed through the rupture of discourse, yet the rupture itself is not 'sovereign'. 
Consciousness is already ruptured and discontinuous. Sovereign awareness is 
impossible since in the state of 'animality' (immanence with nature) consciousness of 
life/death has not been attained yet the attainment of this awareness is the very 
condition of the rupture from immanence, the denial of animality and the 
development of the discontinuous human. However without consciousness of 
mortality, 'sovereign' existence is meaningless. Death cannot be conceived without 
discursive or representational thought, yet thought cannot capture it. At best thought 
can reach towards its object and suspend itself at the brink of death, as Bataille put it 
'without reason we cannot attain dark incandescence' (Bataille in Boldt-Irons 
1995: 6). The sacred, and the sacrificial in particular mark the suspension of 
discontinuity, invoking in vicarious form the slide from 'animality' to 'humanity', 
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from continuity to discontinuity, creating a realm where these are immanently 
reversible. The use of such dualisms signals Bataille's Hegelianism and he does not 
attempt to mask this. Rataille emphasises the impossibility of Hegelianism, the 
-failure of syAterq: ý tq transcend themselves without 
losses, excesses, blindspots 
_@! 
ýaille 1985: 105-129). This is the affirmation of depense, of profitless 
---------- 
expenditure. 
Bataille did, in fact, produce a study of extreme violence, of a killer whose 
actions are 'inexplicable' to the progressive mind. Yhe Trial of 13illes de Rais 
(Bataille 1965/1991) is a collection of documents relating to the trial and execution 
of a French aristocrat in 1440, for the torture and murder of as many as 200 children, 
mostly male. Bataille's discussion of the life of de Rais immediately draws upon the 
notion of the sacred and its relation to violence and death. Bataille refers to de Rais 
as a "sacred monster", whose life was representative of the 'tragic' nature of nobility 
or sovereignty that could not be subsumed within the Hegelian dialectic. De Rais 
'sacrificed' these children to summon satanic forces that might bring him power. 9 
Despite documentary evidence (Bataille 1965/1991: 14) of sexual 
molestation Bataille stresses de Rais' actions were not motivated, primarily by sexual 
gratification but rather by a fascination with death. For De Rais sexual gratification 
came at the moment of witnessing the death of his victims, of watching death's work 
being done. Here, again there is a sense of the radical negativity of death, of the 
experiencing and witnessing of the horror of death - of the sacrifice, that is 
irreducible to the Hegelian dialectic. 10 
The Hegplian-systern-purports to offer completion, the surpassing of all 
limits - the absolute. however it cannot incorporate those excesses which were 
Bataille's obsession, 
-it-ý-Q-cýs-no. 
t-hav. e-a-place. for chance, paradox, ecstasy, laughter, 
sacrifice. Further for Bataille the only sense of the sacred in this system is the 
compromised God of reason and language, since this God is used to both embody 
and absorb, safely, the limits of the universe of rational utility, however, 'God isn't 
humanity's limit-point, though humanity's limit-point is divine. Or put it this way - 
humanity is divine when experiencing limits' (Bataille 1988: 105). 
Here we encounter the limit of subjectivity, of 'humanity' when God no 
longer contains it. The limit is unknowable and without meaning, it is stark and 
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unyielding, dangerous and paradoxical, yet de-sacralised. Bataille's 1937 letter to 
Kojeve, re-printed in Guilty, develops the theme of an excess of negativity, unusable 
negativity. Bataille questions what happens to negativity when it has no object, no 
prescribed purpose, and no outlet. If it is no longer depýloyed in meaningful action, in 
political or historical transformations, what becomes of subjectivity? In framing his 
inquiry in these terms Bataille is certainly close to a Freudian or at least 
psychoanalytic position, but in no sense does he present an orthodox Freudian 
account of the subject. The subject, as Bataille has describes it, labours under the 
'excess of death', driven by negativity that cannot be satisfied. Yet in modem society 
there is no longer even the 'subterfuge' of the spectacle of sacrifice to sacred forces, 
there is no longer the widespread risking of death in political upheaval. " Further 
contemporary consumer culture operates precisely through the deployment of desire, 
the incorporation and structured manipulation of what had seemed to an earlier age to 
be dark, repressed libidinal impulses with no place in respectable everyday life. 
What are the ramifications of the new mass technologies of information and 
entertainment? In an age where global capital operates beyond 'good and evil' what 
excesses can be argued to be 'outside' the system and 'unusable'? In a culture of 
instant gratification and.. perm4nent. amnesia, what becomes of negativity without 
-emp-loy,. negativity-be, yond 
deathsworký, deaths utility9. 
_ 
CONTEMPORARY DEATH-EVENTS 
Bataille's thoughts on death, sacrifice and the movements of negativity are, 
of course, exceptionally suggestive in relation to contemporary death-events. Bataille 
specifies precisely what is so crucial about sacrifice. It is not merely that sacrificial 
conununity represents the only alternative to the economic management of society, 
though this is important. Sacrifice is crucial because death is. crucial, 'for_Man 
-to 
reveal himself ultimately to himselfhe would-have to die but he would have to do it 
while living-- watching himself cease to be' (B-ataille 1990: 19). 
For Bataille the truth of being is only attained in "utter dismemberment" ('in' 
or facing death) yet utter dismemberment is impossible in life (Bataille 1990: 18). 
Sacrifice then is the archetypal subterfuge, the stage, whereby the experience of utter 
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dismemberment is, fleetingly, materialised. Yet this is achieved, for Bataille, only 
within the mythic or sacred community where 'the sacrifier identifies himself with 
the animal that is struck down. And so he dies in seeing himself die, and even, in a 
certain way, by his own will, one in spirit with the sacrificial weapon' (Bataille 
1990: 19). Such 'fusion' or total identification is meaningful only within a mythic, 
sacred system. Where myths of transcendence, of totality and community become 
untenable in modernity, replaced by very different myths (complete scientific 
knowledge, technological mastery) this most fundamental experience, of the 
realisation of 'being' through death is no longer available. 
Yet death, the ultimate negation of life, remains decisive, indeed why would 
it be otherwise? jn fqqtI death becomes_ all the more decisive in a culture unknowing 
of transcendence. The horror of death is magnified immeasurably by the absence of 
affirmatory myth. What becomes of 'being', of experience at its limits, choked by the 
somnambulism and banality of everyday life? 
/Death, terror, and madness shatter this 
fragile 'reality' since its order is based on their expulsion and erasure, making 
'reality' exceptionally vulnerable to dissolution\ For Bataille, 'being' is expressed 
fully only in death, in grasping death, feeling death, watching death; in watching the 
self dying, in death and having ceased to be. The absence, in modernity, of a sacred 
or mythic foundation enabling a collective encounter with death througlý sacrificial 
ritual would, then, appear to have the most serious ramifications for modem society. 
Being, in this sense can no longer be expressed, no longer experienced in entirety; 
the nature of 'being' must alter or be displaced. Subjectivity, in the modem sense, is 
forged as the isolate, rational ego. This entails the individualisation or even 
technologicalisation of 'being', and here there is a partial convergence between 
Bataille and the philosophy of Heidegger. 12 The destruction of sacred and mythic 
forms by the emergence of profane, utilitarian and individualised life was traced in 
chapter two. Here I want to draw out the ramifications of this deep cultural 
transformation in relation to death and contemporary death-events-ý 
With the breaking down of the mythic by scientific rationality and the 
restriction of the sacred by the holy, and then the secular, the abstract and 
deracinated modem sense of 'self appears (Bataille 1957/1986: 117-128). The 
'subject' here stands in stark opposition to the 'lifeworld', in a relation characterised 
104 
by Cartesian dualist philosophy. Where the Cartesian subject retained a sense of 
certainty, made possible ultimately through a slippage from reason back to God, the 
subjectivity of Hegelianism seeks an absolute self-sufficiency which can never be 
aitained. As the self is uprooted from any sense of community; individualised and 
absqaýqtie. d -the 
self s eýcpý. e__of death is drained of mythic expression and 
collective meaning (Aries 1974/1976: 8571_07). Yet death retains, and even magnifies 
its power of fascination since it expresses the now 'absolute' limit point of individual 
existence (Bataille 1957/1986: 89-93). Personal mortality becomes increasingly 
traumatic. Reciprocally, the death of others, other individuals, becomes the locus of 
increased fascination, of speculation, even eroticisation. Death radiates a profound 
and fatal fascination that grows as sacred and religious myth fade. Further as new 
mythologies emerge, fantasies of security and technological mastery, the meaning of 
the other and the experience of the death of the other are transformed. As Foucault 
argued, in modernity, the 'other' is conceived as a site of potential danger, a threat to 
individual safety and social order. The 'dangerous individual' emerges in the 18th 
century (Foucault 1988). This point is important, providing a sense of cultural and 
epistemological context, but it is crucial to go further than Foucault allows. To probe 
life/death, violence and danger as symbolic operations is one possible means of 
attempting this. 
The act of murder, particularly the class of 'pre-meditated, serialised or 
'inexplicable' killing that is the concern here, represents an excessive fascination with 
death, an attraction that has been disarticulated from any reciprocal (symbolic) sense 
of repulsion. This disarticulation expresses the excess, or excessiveness of some 
contemporary death-events. With the emerge-nce, of the 'myth' of the individual the 
'repulsion' of death is fixed to the self-consciousness of mortality as ultimate threat to 
individual security. The fear of death devolves, almost exclusively, onto the self; this 
renders the death of the other 'fascinating' but not repulsive as such. Baudrillard 
emphasises this breaking of symbolic relations but perhaps does not draw out the 
impact on subjectivity and individuality sufficiently. A fascination with the spectacle 
of death, in desacralised form, has new characteristics. The 'bio-mechanics' of 
life/death, the meaning/lessness of death in modernity transform this fascination. 
ContemporýEy d6a! h: --eýents-ma-y-be-read. --as-radicallY... 
individualised-., forrns,. of- 
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. 
)yýtching death-. and of ceasing to b e, a desacralised 'identification' with death, as 
'sacrifice' after the sacred. Here is a fascination with death that fascinates since death 
ought, because it is the fundamental limit-experience of life, to have meaning, yet it 
does not. Here is a fascination with absence, with loss, with the disappearance of 
life. The brute biological 'fact' of death suspends reality and reveals the absence, or 
voiding of 'human' subjectivity into silence (Bataille 1973/1989). 
Death's profound seduction is not limited to the death of the 'other', in 
certain cases self-injury, suicide and death may become a sourcp of profound 
personal pleasure. 13 Drawing on the theories of Bataille and Baudrillard, I want to 
suggest the energy of the repulsion of death has, with the emergence of deracinated 
individuality, been radically destabilised and tends to devolve, irreversibly, onto the 
individual's self-concept. The death of the other is banalised by cinema, TV and 
news programmes. Indeed the distinctions between 'real' mediated death and 
'fictional' mediated death are blurred in the recent emergence of the 'docu-soap', 
'info-tainment and extended news reporting of 'humanitarian disasters' from around 
the world (Seltzer 1998). 
The death of the other is left, unprotected, bleached like the bones of a 
skeleton. The body of the other, the victim, carries no socially generated sense of the 
sacred, no ultimate value, except perhaps that which it promises to reveal in death. 
The body becomes a desacralised, corporeal, mechanical tool for the individualised 
pleasures of the irradiated, weightless, subject (Foucault 1963/1977). This has not, 
as yet, become the general condition of society, this condition has not 'taken place', 
this 'cultural condition' is not realised, nor 'realisable' except perhaps in those still 
rare cases cited here. 
In modernity the murder of a human being is far more tolerable where it can 
14 be said to involve no individual, social or religious 'meaning' or satisfaction. At 
one extreme, in armed combat or warfare human death signifies no more than the 
abstract calculation of efficiency and strategic deployment. Death caused by 
accident, particularly on roads and motorways are regarded as of minimal 
importance, a small disturbance to busy working lives (see also Baudrillard 
1976/1993: 166). In such cases the trauma of death is contained, in part, by its 
'neutrality', its lack of explicit meaning. At the level of the inter-personal relations 
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murder in the form of crime passionel, though highly personalised in motive and 
meaning, is contained within a notion of temporary 'unreason, a unpremeditated and 
passionate response to a situation that can be said to be (rationally) intolerable. Here 
tlýte categories of reason/unreason act in unison, fon-ning a more or less coherent but 
unstable 'whole'. Deaths resulting from fights or brawls, particularly amongst 
antagonists of approximately equal size, strength or age, while usually pursued by 
the forces of law and order are generally regarded as readily explicable (concerning 
alcohol and rivalry) and tend not to trouble the public imagination unduly (Newburn. 
and Stanko 1994). Only deaths neither accidental, rationally motivated, nor the 
result of tempor 'irrationaliV -scale public outrage. _pjqvqk0arge . 
The death of James Bulger was certainly one such event. The sheer fact of 
death is clearly crucial. Had the victim merely been injured; even seriously, the case 
would not have attracted anything approaching the same notoriety. Death fascinates; 
it attracts and repels in a paradoxical relation. For Bataille the apprehension of 
mortality compels violence, transgression and eroticism; not death's work but death's 
luxury (Bataille 1957/1986). Death has been expelled from the community, hidden 
from view since it now represents the hideous absence of meaning, the termination of 
the 'real' order (Bataille 1973/1989). Hospitalised death is not only hidden from 
family and community but as far as possible from the dying subject as well. As a 
result 'Being' can only encounter death in abreactive, displaced,. disproportionate 
form. Here then is an alternative means of thinking -contemporary 
death-events. 
What then of the two children who killed James Bulger? In this act were 
they suffused by a fascination with violence and death? Accounts of the event (see 
appendix) suggest a sudden acceleration into extreme violence after the slow 
procession of kidnapping. It has been suggested (Smith 1994, Morrison 1997) that 
the boys simply wanted to 'get rid' of the toddler who had become a nuisance. 
However the sustained violence of the murder, the sheer number of separate injuries 
inflicted, far exceed any recognisable form of 'rational' 'goal-directed' action. 
James Bulger could simply have been abandoned or knocked unconscious allowing 
the boys to 'escape'. After the murder a 'ritualistic' burial seemed to have taken 
place (see appendix). A fascination with violence and death seem to be the most 
salient features of this case, a fact that has not drawn comment from other 
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commentators. Of course this 'fascination' with life/death would not, in this reading, 
distinguish these boys from any others, nor from adults. We may supplement this 
point by arguing; as does Sereny (1994) and Morrison (1997) that the crucial fact 
iýas these were children not adults. They did not possess an adult worldview or 
sense of right and wrong, life and death. Indeed in a fascinating comment, one of the 
convicted boys inquired of the police, 'have they put the baby back together again' 
(quoted in Smith 1994: 87-135). Perhaps the boys did not understand 'death' as final 
termination; perhaps they did not possess the 'correct' adult view of death. What 
must be emphasised is the difference or excess of childhood, its resistance to adult 
rationality. Both Sereny and Morrison refer to a distinctiveness of childhood but 
term this 'innocence' or 'natural goodness'. They tend to think the child/adult 
relationship as a privative/substantive one, denying childhood any sense of 
substantive difference or 'otherness'. 
The case of Michael Ryan in 1987 also provoked widespread interest 
because as well as murderous, his acts seemed to be unprovoked, random and 
brought Ryan no possible benefits or gains. Here is another crime that can properly_ 
be called excessive in the sense of extremity linked to non-utility. The non-utility of 
these events must be emphasised here, since many extreme, dangerous or even 
murderous acts may serve some utility, some rational purpose being regarded as 
morally and legally defensible, as necessary and possibly even rewarded. Many 
examples could be cited here, from military campaigns to political upheavals, the 
pursuit of scientific or medical knowledge and of profit in capital ventures. No such 
'rational' end was served in the case of Michael Ryan and in similar cases of 'going 
berserk' or'running amok'. Much the same can be said of the Dunblane massacre, 
except here the events were rendered more shocking by the attack being directed at a 
primary school and the victims being young children. The limited amount of 
academic study devoted to such events reveals severe or intractable difficulties in 
applying rational categories of thought in a diagnostic manner (Staub 1985, Prins 
1987). Prins (1987) readily admits these difficulties and suspends accepted forms of 
medical, psychiatric and psychological discourse, though is unable to provide an 
alternative. These two particular cases, chosen for their public notoriety as well as 
specific nature, also present severe difficulties for those who favour sociological or 
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cultural accounts of the nature of (male) sexuality or masculinity as explanatory 
mechanisms. Cameron and Fraser's (1987) feminist study culminates with an 
account of male serial killers, in particular the 'Yorkshire Ripper'. However in the 
cases of both Michael Ryan and Thomas Hamilton there is little to suggest any form 
of sexual or misogynistic motive, the victims were by no means only female (even if 
they were this would not be 'proof of a sexual motive). Eyewitness accounts tend to 
suggest a blankness or absence in the expression of the perpetrators, not frenzy or 
excitement but a'void'of subjectivity (Scott & Watson-Brown 1997/8, Seltzer 1998). 
The spectacle of violent death forms the crux of a great deal of 
entertainment and leisure products, not merely the staple of adult video 'nasties' but a 
commonplace of terrestrial evening television, obligatory in any 'serious' or 'hard- 
hitting' drama. Yet what occurs here is not the 'liberation' from repressive or 
outdated conventions where death was 'tabooed'. Such televisual spectacles, while 
submerged in the depiction of criminality, violence and the techniques of police 
detection, systematically exclude any thinking of death other than as an effect, 
caused by criminality, in a simple plot device. In fact the excessiveness of death, its 
horror beyond meaning is effaced, death is domesticated and controlled beyond any 
p vious level in the banality of the 'whodunit' and the 'shoot-em-up'. Just 
as society does not 'repress' but rather positively encourages pornography so long as 
it does not involve serious enquiry into the meanings and limits of human eroticism, 
so too serious thinking about death is obliterated in the empty routines of television 
drama, video game and cinematic thriller. . The cases of torture and murder which I 
have evoked may be seen as the ascent or descent; the movement toward the limit- 
experience of contemporary (de-racinated, de-socialised) individual gratification. 
Cases such as those of Michael Ryan in 1987 and Thomas Hamilton in 1996 seemed 
to involve a definitive rejection of the community to the extreme extent of being 
murderous assaults upon it. In this sense they-, --vMere- 
highly individualised acts, 
running 'amok' yet without myth or meaning. Where Bataille sought a sacrificial 
community, Ryan and Hamilton enacted sacrifices without employment, beyond use 
or meaning, theX, ýLnlike de Kai ýyere no longer sacred monsters, merely 'monsters'. Li §I 
This feature is profoundly expressive of the contemporary nature of these events. 
While in taking their own lives they too became the final sacrificial objects, 
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paradoxically serving to re-bind their communities in a communion of pain, suffering 
and mourning. Ryan and Hamilton died beyond the limit, or in experiencing the 
impossible limit, lost forever beyond the grasp of discursive reason, in actions 
therefore inexplicable. 
Recent studies of serial killing encounter similar intractability, irreducibility 
to conventional explanatory categories such as environment, subculture or sexuality. 
Research into the case of Jeffrey Dahmer of Milwaukee, 15 USA, who killed and 
cannibalised a number of young men, has focused on his conception of the body as 
mechanical system. Rather than being fuelled by lust or 'perverted' desire Dahmer, 
according to Seltzer (1998) was motivated by a fascination with the internal 
workings of bodies (and other objects, clocks, toys etc. ) which he would take apart in 
order to "understand". A number of survivors of his attacks report that he would 
listen to their stomachs for blood and internal organ sounds. When asked to explain 
his atrocities Dahmer replied, 'I wanted to see what someone looked like inside ... I 
like to see how things work' (in Seltzer 1998: 191). Some victims were physically 
abused but not sexually violated. Dahmer seemed to understand the body as bio- 
chemical 'real', reducible to rational principles such as chemical constitution, bio- 
mechanical function, as quanta of energy and productive resource. In fact the 
conception of the body in modem science and economics, the body radically 
desacralised, stripped of all enchantment and seduction. 
According to Bataille such events expr6sý ýkr6d-Edffi6i"J and so are 
indeed, in a sense, 'inexplicable' to modem, secular, rational thought (Bataille 
1965/1991). Sacred horror is the horror of dying, death, blood and putrefaction, 
those things that cannot be 'thought' but in relation to the sacred (Bataille 
1949/1991: 79-86). 
, 
T4ese things can be hidden, repressed, ignored by modernity, but 
--------- - I'll -- "\ 
ý 
cannot be 'thought' by it. Sacred horror represents a negativity so radical that it 
cannot be thought in rational ten-ns, that always opens onto something which can 
only be called 'archaic', 
. 
Primitive' or 'sacred'. But what happens to such horrors 
when sacred values, myths and rituals have all but disappeared? In the contemporary 
acre perhaps death alone invokes a sense of the sacred but without the binding myths 
of sacrificial fusion, of transcendence, trans-substanciation or salvation, this is 
certainly suggested by Bataille (1965/1991: 13-66). The cultural. -m. e-ans whereby 
the. 
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potentially des! Luctive, fatal effects of the sacred could be warded off, guaranteeing 
propitious results for the community, have been eroded. 
-; /For the modem, secular mind it is of great benefit for society to be able to 
view death in a detached, 'rational' way, devoid of mythology and superstition. 
Rather than resorting to the outmoded language of sacred and profane, of sacrifice 
and evil the modem mind can create balanced and rational accounts of such Jý, 
phenomena that would only be clouded by unscientific ideas\Medical science offers 
therapeutic and counselling procedures for bereavement, presenting death as natural 
process, popular science going so far as to argue that religious and superstitious 
notions surrounding death have submerged a sense of the naturalness of death, 
creating undue anguish (De Hennezel 1997). However it might, more plausibly, be 
argued that medical science has stripped death of meaning, has uprooted it from its 
place in the family and community and has assumed control over it within the 
confines of the hospital. Death is confined, hidden and limited in modemity, 
subjected to scientific discipline yet the moment of (the patient's) death is regarded 
as the failure of medico-scientific control or perhaps its temporary interruption 
before the corpse is processed (Kearl 1989). Peath iý_§. eparated or abstracted from 
life, it is 'liberated' from sacred and myt ic principles and in this modem situation the 
watching, the witnessing of the moments of death become a restricted, specialised 
and professionalised__, 4ý1ýjty. Any sense of community surrounding death, a 
community of death is severely curtailed by modem medical-legal practices (De 
Hennezel 1997, Aries 1974/1976). Yet the fundamental intuition of both Bataille 
and Baudrillard is that radical negativity cannot be. separ4ted out, _neutralised 
and 
ga ýN 
__Ind , 
ýontrolled in this way. Rather their attempted separation 
Ejjje: ýs the ýnegýTyý 
4ý_ 
since it is disarticulated from any principle of the positive or good, only serves to 
enhance the power of negativity beyond limits. Though neither Bataille nor 
Baudrillard make this point explicitly, it is surely the case that, in late modemity, the 
watching, the living of death, if real rather than virtual, is no longer sacrificial but 
appears as'evil', as'sadism', murder, 'inexplicable' depravity. 
If 'inexplicable' death-events can be seen as negativity without use, 
destruction without meaning, sacrifice after the sacred, irreversible negativity, it is 
important to build upon Bataille's approach, to examine the contemporary order, 
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dominated as it is by mass technologies. The subject is not merely left alone to 
ponder the absence of limit-experiences, of meaningful events, for 'global' capital 
aims to suffuse subjectivity with fantasies of desire and gratification. Here the 
nýeaning of desire and its relation to subjectivities shifts significantly. We encounter 
the mass-individual, identities and lifestyles constructed and guarded jealously yet 
based on no more than differential regimes of consumption, themselves drawn from 
the pre-existing codes of mass-marketing. Baudrillard's reading of contemporary 
culture examines precisely this 'excessiveness' of mass-technologies while remaining 
focused on the fundamental importance of death, desire and negativity. 
BAUDRILLARD - NEGATIVITY, TECHNOLOGY AND DEATH 
'Slow or violent, immediate or deferred, the scansion of death is decisive: it is what radically 
distinguishes two types of organisation, the economic and the sacrificial' (Baudrillard 1976/1993: 114). 
'-for death is perhaps the only thing that has no use-value, which can never be referred back to need 
[it is] rupture, contagious dissolution and negation' (Baudrillard 1976/1993: 176) 
Baudrillard's engagement with these themes is particularly acute and far- 
reaching for a number of related reasons. Firstly Synibolic Exchange and Death 
(1976/1993) makes death, the excessiveness of death beyond cultural inscription, the 
. foundation of his genealogical project, specifying the exclusion of death as a cultural 
gesture more fundamental and wide-ranging than the confinement of madness or the 
deployment of sexuality. Baudrillard is perhaps the contemporary theorist par 
excellence of the depletion of meaning, of the disappearance of 'the real' in both its 
enlightenment mode (the Hegelian equation of the real and the rational) and in post- 
enlightenment thought. In the latter the 'real' appears as a deep resource of 'base' 
realities, libidinal drives, and desires (Lyotard 1974/1993, Deleuze & Guattari 
1972/1984, Land 1992). Theories asserting a 'more real' or deeper real level of 
instinctual or libidinal desire here are seen to make a last appeal to truth or 
authenticity that is empty and desperate. These are attempts to rejuvenate a lost 
'reality principle' now as inadequate as the Hegelian dialectic, or Kantian morality. 16 
Rather than the 'real' Baudrillard theorises t-the '-hyp'er-r-ea ,)a homogenised 
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technological culture based on simulation and virtual technologies. Baudrillard's 
later work engages specifically with time, technology and the 'end of history' thesis, 
postulating the disappearance of the human race in the theoretical figures of the void, 
the mass and singularity (Baudrillard 1978/1983,1997/1998). These concepts are 
central, I will argue, to an alternative approach to contemporary death-events. 
S. E. D. and the important collection of essays Sitnulations and Simulacra, 
offer systematic accounts of the successive stages of the simulacra and their relation 
to 'the real'. Baudrillard's orders of simulacra, are less histories of the subject than 
of the object or sign. 
In feudal or archaic caste societies, in cruel societies, signs are limited in 
number and their circulation is restricted. Each retains its full value as a 
prohibition, and each carries with it a reciprocal obligation between castes, 
clans or persons, so signs are not arbitrary. -The-arbitrariness of the sign 
,. 
býgins when instead of ýqjioing two persons in an inescapable reciprocity, 
. 
14q_ §ignjfier st ' arts '' 
to refer to the disenchanted universe of the signified 
(Baudrillard 1976/1993: 50). 
In Baudrillard's "third order" of simulacra, these disenchanted, arbitrary 
signs reproduce, replicate and expand without contradiction or limitation in what 
Baudrillard refers to as an "orgy" of "promiscuity" (Baudrillard 1990/1993: 3-13). 
SigTjý_ýaý_ simulations become the dominant form of social organisation and 
simulation operates through and is governed by "the Code"I The Code does not 
control or restrict signs rather it is the very principle of their infinite reproducibility, 
the source of their radical acceleration. For Baudrillard 'the Code' is modernity itself, 
its "generative core" which aims at "political and mental hegemony" (1976/1993: 53). 
In the third order the crucial distinctions, oppositions and structures that constitute 
the 'reality principle' of the second or industrial order are absorbed into simulational 
form. That is, where they continue to operate it is as simulation, generated through- \L 
ýigns and exchanged against and meaningful only in relation to other signs, no longer 
against anything which. could convincingly be termed'the real'.. 
Within the third order of simulacra, the era of limitless reproduction and 
circulation of signs in accordance with the generative core of the code, the.. negative, 
,, prDegativitv ceases 
to oýýrýtý dialectically (Baudrillard 1976/199ý: 50- 6). Rather 
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the simulational field generated by the Code thrives upon the re-absorption, re- 
cycling and re-presentation of the negative as a fundamental feature of its operation. 
This is not the assimilation, raising and resolution of the Hegelian dialectic, 
negativity as the motor of linear history, 
-but 
thq 
_qjTqularity__ or regressivity of a 
perpetual present, the abandonment of the future, the erasure of linearity and the 
'reality' of history. 17 This in turn has a radical impact on the nature of culture, 
subjectivity and the ability of theory to reflect upon them. 
After the loss of sacred and symbolic principles a fundamentally different 
regime of signs is generated. In terms of subjectivity Baudrillard posits not the 
'splitting' of the subject as in psychoanalytic theory but a transmutation in the nature 
of 'reality', in the way signs constitute reality. Baudrillard resists any 
phenomenological discourse on subjectivity through a mapping of the sign, the 
object. 
T. Klu jectiýviý ivert-e ed =dor ýun=denm=inbbyý 
=the 
vlýe 
ýnt =bl isýa=i object =or eA Hyperreality 
occurs as modem or industrial conceptions of 'reality' are undermined from within, 
that is from within the logic of the sign (See Genosko 1994).. Salbjectivity is reduced 
to the level of the copy or clone, or a terminal on a network (Baudrillard 1990/1993: 
51-59). It will be necessary then to dwell further on the question of subjectivity for 
the purposes of this analysis. Hyperreality, for Baudrillard, is a generalised 
phenomenon; it dominates not only social institutions such as the media, but also 
contemporary theoretical and philosophical reflection. Theory itself is no longer able 
to draw upon the negative as a useful resource of critique and evaluation. 
Baudrillard identifies the beginning of dialectics with the sevenng of 
symbolic reversibility_ýýL4qgoverning pliqqiple of social organisation. (13 audril lard 
1976/1993: 50-8.6). / baudrillard declares that the whole notion of Hegelian Master 
slave dialectics is a principle belonging to the second order of simulacra, and which 
has no purchase or meaning either before the industrial period or after it\ In the third 
order of simulacra, governed by the code of generalised equivalence, capital becomes 
a complete, unchallenged system eliminating the possibility of sovereignty, 
producing a generalised system of slavery based on deferred death. '8 This system 
though is haunted by the possibility of sudden, violent, excessive or sacrificial death, 
of which the system can only dream, 'it is because we are living with slow death that 
we dream of a violent death. Even this dream is unbearable to power' (1976/1993: 
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43). Affluent, post-dialectical society breeds, according to Baudrillard, a particular 
kind of extreme or anomalous violence, which seeks to breakthrough the 'artificial 
paradise' of an overly 'secure' social order (Baudrillard 1970/1998). 
As we observed in the work of Bataille, here in Baudrillard's thought there 
is repeated a fundamental concern with a sense of death which has no place within 
the modem syýteM, ySt_ýyhich continues to challenge it. Again violent, sacrificial or 
excessive death is argued to be crucial to cultural organisation, and there is an 
intuition that violent death becomes, even more compelling, more haunting, and 
more essential in modernity (Baudrillard 1976/1993: 125-194). The analysis here 
will again suggest that contemporary death-events can be thought as the unleashing 
of 
Caradcal negativity' that serves no useful purpose, no cause or meaning, that 
transgress some of the most basic and widely accepted expectations of modem life. 
The violent spectacle, the artifice of signs of death can appear only in 
'abberational' form; as "automobile death" or in the acts of what Baudrillard calls 
"great murderers" in deaths that are "totally undeserved" (Baudrillard 
1976/1993: 173-175). Such events, Baudrillard argues, confront us with the 
symbolic, revealing its latent presence or provoking its sudden return. / The 
'effraction' of the symbolic into the contemporary order is a fundamental challenge 
to the system. 
\The 
symbolic challenge of contemporary death-events occurs through 
the radical disablement of rational thought and its systems for managing violence and 
death. Baudrillard continues with the example of death-events which, for modems, 
causes a particular repulsion, the historical practice of the trial and execution of 
animals for 'crimes' committed against humans. Such execution is obscene not 
merely because it is cruel or barbaric but because it represents, 'the application of a 
symbolic ritual to a situation which prohibits the possibility of a symbolic response' 
(1976/1993: 167). Here then Baudrillard insists on the centrality of symbolic 
processes in all death, all death-events, 'primitive' and contemporary. 
Baudrillard's idiosyncratic approach to the theme of the passing of the 
dialectic and 'useful' or "rational" negativity is developed in his later work. In The 
Transparency of Evil (1990/1993) draws directly on Bataille's notions of the sacred 
and qnemployed negativity-, -; in order to develop an analysis of the positions of 
positive and negative in the contemporary world: 
115 
The uninterrupted production of positivity has a terrifying consequence. 
Whereas negativity engenders crisis and critique, hyperbolic 
positivity ... engenders catastrophe, for it is incapable of distilling crisis and 
criticism in homeopathic doses. 
_, 
6. ny ructuTqýj 4t. 4q ýst down, eXpels or 
exorcises its ne ative elements- risks-, a ,, catastrophe. cau. se. 
d-. 
_-by thoroughgoing backlash ... it is threatened by a voracious positivity of it own 
cells', Viral the rospect of being devoured by its'own - y- _ 
p_ 
now unemployed - antibodies (1990/1993: iO6j. 
Bataille's "unemployed negativity" leads, according to Baudrillard, to the 
condition of viral hyper-positivity infecting and ravaging the corpse of the social. 
Baudrillard had developed this theme in the important essay In the Shado1v of the 
Silew Majorities (1978/1983) where the 'death' of the social and its categories for 
self-understanding is theorised as the emergence of the 'mass'. The 'mass' is an 
impenetrable 'object' that absorbs the energy of the social without any dialectical 
movements, resulting in a "black hole" without direction or 'rational' purpose. The 
masses reftise-the-social-not -for any political reasoning, not 
by drawing on some 
useful negAtiytty that might serve as critique and re-assimilation, but through hyper- 
confonnity. apathy-and -inertia. 
in the face of all social and political manoeuvres to 
incorporate, 'socialise' or entertain them. The trajectory of Baudrillard's thought here 
addresses violence in a way that departs from Bataille's approach: 
How is such barbarity possible in the late twentieth century? This is a false 
question. There is no atavistic resurgence of some archaic type of violence. 
The violence of old was both more enthusiastic and more sacrificial than 
ours. Today's violence, the violence produced by our hypermodemity, is 
terror. A simulacrum of violence, emerging less from passion than from the 
screen: a violence in the nature of the image. Violence exists potentially in 
the emptiness of the screen, in a hole the screen opens in the mental 
universe (Baudrillard 1990/1993: 75). 
The irradiation of self-identity through hyper-positivity, hyper-conformity 
and the mass media of screens and networks are of particular importance here 
because it maps onto Seltzer's (1998) definition of the serial killer in contemporary 
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America. Seltzer's work draws upon Baudrillard's early thoughts on fetishism and 
sign-value but fails to appreciate the wider relevance and development of his position 
through the principle of the symbolic and theorisation of the mass, seduction and the 
object. Seltzer defines the contemporary serial killer as the "mass-in-person", the 
"devoid"', the "abnormally normal" (1998: 18-19), terms which mirror Baudrillard's 
formulations of the mass and hyper-conformity. qere then the expulsion of 
negativity creates the 'artificial' system of hyper-positivity, the system of globalised 
capital that has, or rather admits of, no outsides, no alternatives, and no means of 
dialectical transfiguration. Hyper-positivity encompasses both generalised cultural 
condition and, more particulýpIX,. Fthe viral irradiatio - filof self-identity and moral 
responsibility (Baudrillard 1978/1983,1997/1998: 65-69; Seltzer 1998). 
Here is a potential means of thinking contemporary death-events from a new 
perspective, serial killers are not a-nomalies, but rather hyper-nomalies, the more- 
normal-than-the-normal, the mass. ifthe 'mass-in-person' is transparent in the sense 
that they merely mirror or mimic the codes of mediatized/technologised culture, 
offering no 'resistance' or 'depth' through a 'pre-existing' identity, but suffused by 
mass media culture. 
ýThey 
seem to be, according to Seltzer, "depthless" figures, pure 
mimetic surfaces, the transparent self as an object irradiated of all depth, all symbolic 
exchange, all seduction, an unknowable condition the "statistical person" (Seltzer , 
1998: 4). Such people may mimic not only ultra-violent televisual spectacles, which 
are a commonplace, but the codes and typologies of the serial killer as defined in 
medical, psychiatric, criminological and popular literature, understanding such codes 
as the core of their identities. Seltzer, in particular, emphasises this process (Seltzer 
1998: 48-52) but in fact Baudrillard goes further in specifying something of the 
manner in which such events may occur or be practised, through the principles of 
symbolic exchange and seduction, while Seltzer is content to sketch out what might 
be termed 'enabling conditions'. These themes will be examined and developed 
further in the next chapter. 
For Baudrillard the dialectic dissolves, in this stage, into multiple and 
undecidable ironic effects. 9/ýýere the negative was alive in the Eastern countries, 
containing 'excesses' such as Stalinism and the denial of human rights, the West had 
long since passed beyond all dialectical negativity into a state of virtual (not 'real') 
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k 
perfection\jjowýver since this drive for perfection can never complete its pr( 
will, according to Baudrillard, always be ravaged by a viral form of nega 
'unemployable', chaotic, undecidable and catastrophic (Baudrillard 1990/199. ): oO- 
70). It was only the interlinkage of positive_and negative, of good and evil that 
, seemed to guarantee the progress of humanity, where they are disengaged it can only 
be, for Baudrillard, to the advantage of a negative -pr-chaotic-. 
beyond-the-scopq of 
dialectical re-assimilation. 
Baudrillard's position on the relationship between collective and individual, 
and subject and object is developed considerably in this work of the mid-1990's. The 
revenge of the crystalline, impenetrable object erodes the position of the subject, 
which becomes peripheral, governing itself according to the principles of 'the good; 
democracy, universalisation, human rights, political correctness (Baudrillard 
1990/1993: 44-50). ýýntqmpprary gative, even as it __qýýIture 
4ttempts to deny the ne 4: 2 
was understood in 
-the,. 
Hegqlian 
-dialectic, 
it, attempts a universalisation of the positive 
in the form of global markets and liberal democracies. Yet for Baudrillard, uniquely, 
this expulsion actually results in the negative becoming raised to a higher power, to 
accelerate its effects in a virulent and dispyoportionate form while the 'whitewashed' 
. positive 
too becomes destEuctive and catastrophic by being disarticulated from any 
. _! 
Ie&ative (Baudrillard 1990/1993: 63,1997/1998: 75-6). 
Baudrillard's most recent writings collected in Art andArtefact (1997) and 
interviews in Paroxysm (1997/1998) develop these themes and culminate in the 
delineation of an important new theoretical term -'t-si-ngu-Ia-ri-t-y--. 
7 4, Singularity for 
Baudrillard refers to cultural forms, events and practices that do not conform to the 
dominant order of positivity, transparency and plurality. It expresses another 
"game", a different set of rules, "another, antagonistic world" 
\ 
A singularity ... is no longer individual, nor the doing of a determinate 
subject, but the product of an irruption, an effraction. It can come from a 
person, _p, _gwup, _an_accident_ 
in-the -system -its elf-It 
is an anomaly which 
u-d-rill-a-rd-444- aquires force within the LndistLnct ensemble gfj]4(ý y em (Ba ýLn 
1997/1998: 51). 
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Singularity is related to other crucial terms in Baudrillard's theoretical 
vocabulary, in particular destiny and reversibility. The term singularity then is 
bound up with a notion of time, history and the end. In astronomy singularity refers 
t6 a point in space-time at which matter or mass is compressed to the extent that its 
density is infinite. It is a point of strangeness, uncertainty, and -incalculability, 
sometimes referred to as a black hole. It represents then a limit point of scientific or 
rational understanding. Infinity, like God, is a term that is invoked when meaning 
fails, or reaches its limit, when calculation is no longer, strictly, possible. Beyond 
this limit is the absence of meaning so the limit or boundary points must be erected 
to safeguard meaning and knowledge and prevent them sliding into meaninglessness 
(Bataille in Hollier 1974/1992: 94-98.1 
Baudrillard's use of the term singularity is sociological, anthropological and 
cosmological. Singularities are events so strange,. alien or unique that they defy 
t rational explanation, as rationality is commonly understood. Chapter two no ed ho 
modem forms of rationaland scientific thought are limited by pragmatic, utilitarian 
and ideological considerations and are less representative of reason as such, than of 
what might_bqAermed instrumental rationality. Singularities then are not necessarily 
beyond the scope of all forms of thinking, beyond all logic or patterning but they do 
require a willingness to 9-Cr ankpus)hat the limits of what might be thought 
'rational'. /It is crucial, methodologically, to speculate without closure or 
subordination made in deference to instrumental thought or utilitarian calculation\ 
Singularities, in this sense defy or undermine classical sociological explanations 
made in terms of social structure or social action. Indeed Baudrillard argues that the 
emergence of the 'mass'; the black whole of the masses marked the passing of 'the 
social', properly speaking (1978/1983). The mass is a paradoxical body that exists 
beyond the bounds of sociological reason, yet it possesses its own immanent logic; of 
silence, apathy, disengagement. 
EThe 
notion of the singularity provides a way of thinking the 'excess' event, 
thinking the contemporary death-event, beyond the determinist mode of specifying 
certain cultural conditions in which such events are 'likely' to occur] Baudrillard's 
s-in. gularities defy all such sociological categorisations, including Baudrillard's early 
formulation of symbýolic exchange (Baudrillard 1_997119M-ý. I, 0-6). While these do 
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provide crucial ways of thinking such events in an alternative manner, the notion of 
singularity insists on the radical incompletion and uncertainty of all truth claims, all 
discourse, all modes of understanding. In this sense singularity expresses something 
of Bataille's notion of depqnse, the inescapable expenditure, loss without profit or 
possibility of re-investment, a fundamental principle of incompletion, disaggregation, 
chaos. 
Baudrillard's singularities are events that are infinitely dense in the sense 
they reflect no light, or allow no light to escape, (Baudrillard 1978/1983: 1-12) and 
are events which undermine the possibility of 'enlightenment', of rational explication 
by theory (theoria meaning 'to see' implying 'light' or illumination) 
A ingularities 
erupt as breakages or anomalies in the contemporary global networks of media, 
communications, scientific and entertainment technologies; ruptures in the systems 
of transparency, instantaneity, virtuality. 
\ More precisely, singularities are not 
'caused' by technological systems, by some fault, flaw or malfunction that may be 
corrected. Nor does a relation of repression, whereby the repressed may be liberated 
and re-incorporated into the system, govern singularity/Rather for Baudrillard there 
is a sense of an original or primeval principle of disobedience, antagonism, 
irreconcilability, which in one form or another has always haunted and threatened 
social units from the earliest times to the contemporary age (Baudrillard 
1983/1990: 181-191)\ This principle has, in modernity, been under attack from the 
strategies of the subject; by morality, rationality, dialectics and technological 
mastery. Yet such systems are always unstable, never complete,. and, the more energy 
I 
they expend in-attempting-the-final-master -- ---- 
y. of. the world the more vulnerable they 
become (, Baudril-lard. 
-U29/1993: 
60-70,1995/1996). The excessive, exorbitant 
energy of technological systems becomes increasingly unstable, and prone to 
paradoxical effects of reversal, involution, objective irony; evil. These two orders or 
77 
principles however are not fully distinct or separable they are conjoined in a double 
. spiral, 
immanent to each other. In this sense B audri Hard no. _1oP 
ger- seeks -to. represent_ 
excess as 'subversive region' or bounded territory, and so is no longer susceptible to 
Lyotard's critique. of the Symbolic-(Lyotard 1974/1993: 95-154). 
The theoretical and methodological notions of singularity, viral negativity 
and evil are surely very suggestive for approaching that particular class of extreme 
120 
phenomena that occupy us here. The torture and murder of children or young 
women are 'singularities', anomalies of the worst kind, radical negatives that are 
disarticulated from any 'positive'. Such events appear beyond subjective or 
communicative rationality. There is no adequate 'explanation'. Yet at the same time 
there is something very straightforward, brutally obvious about such cases. 
Baudrillard's conceptual methodology has the great advantage that it situates 
extreme events beyond subjectivity, historicity and rationality; beyond enlightenment 
thinking, beyond even the 'limit-experience' notion of Bataillean subjectivity. 
A 
nlightennient categories of thought generate 'irrationality' as a fixed and unthought ý/A- 
waste product or remainder of rationality so that disturbing and excessive behaviours 1" 
can be dumped, marginalised and contained without being seriously thought about. 
Rationality can only think its outsides, its excesses, through the inverse category 
'irrationality', which is the privation or absence of full rationality (Foucault 
1961/1967)\ All that cannot be comprehended is marginalised. Media, journalistic 
and popular opinion, when confronted with extreme events must conjure the images 
of demons or monsters, figures that can be housed within the category 'unreason'. 
Even where 'reason' is interrogated critically, these studies never go far enough, they 
remain bound to reason as the sole reality principle, they draw attention to some of 
the problems associated with the reason/unreason disjunction or may even attempt to 
re-draw its boundaries but this is done to re-juvenate reason against that which 
threatens it, to maintain a re-fortified or re-doubled reason. For Baudrillard reason 
has already, through this process of re-doubling and infinite extension, accelerated 
beyond the boundaries of meaning and reference, and this process itself is central to 
such abberations or singularities (Baudrillard 1997/1998: 65-76). 
Reason, as Bataille, Baudrillard and others have shown is a cultural 
construct, an historical conjunction, a functional illusion. There is a before and after 
of reason, where this goes unrecognised contemporary death-events, horror, 
singularity can only appear 'inexplicable'. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This section has addressed contemporary death-events as the fate of 
tiegativity. Negativity is fated al týXs tý_jpj n orm, or pear, always to be ma ifest in one f 
another-, it cannot be eliminated. The archetypal form of negativity is death, 
destruction, and dissolution. Death; individual, tribal, civilisational has always 
ravaged the social group, but it has been understood in very different ways. I have 
argued that death in the contemporary world has become more terrifying; obscene in 
its absence of meaning and collective mythic inscription. Here then the negative is 
magnified, accelerated by the collapse of religion and the failure of rational 
technologies to achieve the total mastery that has always been their raison detre. 
The form of social organisation currently in ascendance, a quasi-global 
liberal democracy, has been hailed by some as the completion of history and 
therefore the final rational incorporation of all useful negation into the positive 
(Fukuyama 1992). However, drawing on material from Bataille and IJaudrifKaý-d--tfii-s---' 
chapter has shown that from the very beginnings of liberal democracy, the emergent 
system has been prone to sudden reversal, to the eruption of anomaly and aberration, 
suspending its principles and leaving it helpless. The sudden appearance of 
negatives which cannot be assimilated, incorporated, negatives which do not 'work', 
ývhich.. pqý_§ess no utility,. 
_which 
destroy the subjectivity of rationalism, whose 
essence was said to be work and productivity. Death cannot be assigned a 
progressive, dialectical purpose and for. Bataille it returns us the core of "sacred 
horror". It is only here, within the realm of the sacred, that the actions of a Gilles de 
Rais are anything other than inexplicable, without meaning, a total void in the 
rational system. 
Baudrillard's discussion of death develops a position, through the notion of 
the symbolic, which is distinct from Bataille. For Baudrillard death is not a bio- 
materialist absolute, but a shifting culturally constituted notion, which is central to 
power relations in western history. 
/Following Baudrillard it might be said that 
contemporary liberal democracy is indeed'the life that shrinks from death and keeps 
itself untouched by devastation' (Hegel 1807/1931: 93), but this project can only fail, 
death cannot be denied and radical negativity is fated to return. \ 
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Negativity, according to this approach then, is inexhaustible, uneradicable, 
existing in excess of reason, order and progress. For Baudrillard it is of the order of 
fate and destiny. Negativity did become bound up with the dialectics of progression, 
but only for a time. In Baudrillard's terms negativity 'played' at being dialectic, 
progressive, while always, secretly, exceeding it (Baudrillard 1997/1998: 66-71). The 
negative has always held the possibility of reversible, paradoxical or singular events. 
The actions of Gilles de Rais at the beginning of the so-called dialectic of 
enlightem-nent or of Frederick and Rosemary West, after its 'end', can be read as 
such singularities. These are actions which admit of no illumination, no explanation, 
terrible and catastrophic events whereby, in Baudrillard's terms, the energy of the 
(hyper)-positive is suddenly reversed into the (hyper)-negative. 20 
In the contemporary period useful, productive, critical negativity appears to 
be at an end, its energy exhausted, its reality depleted. What remains is excessive, 
unutilisable, unemployed, viral and catastrophic negativity; negativity ýadicalised by 
.. the exces. sive accumulation of the positive, as it becomes involuted and increasingly 
vulnerable to reversal. This is negativity in a post-dialectical, post-modem space, in 
which, as Baudrillard puts it, th e-negative- can -no Aongerý 4ppear 
in "homeopathic 
doses" (Baudrillard 1990/1993: 60-70). Negativity is displaced and fragmented 
across the serniotic, technological and virtual systems. 
The fate of negativity then was to be separated out from the positive and 
made to serve it, no longer its equal, and to be distilled into a resource of 
progression, through the mechanisms of dialectical negation and critical reflexivity. 
Yet the negative has always exceeded the real and the rational, has never been 
subordinate to it and now, according to Baudrillard, resurfaces in non-human, 
inhuman, viral, and fatal forms (Baudrillard 1983/1990,1990/1993). These are 
forms of the negative unhinged from reason and predictability, beyond the 
competence of subjective control. ISuch contemporary eruptions of radical negativity 
are, it is suggested by Baudrillard, now beyond the reversibility of good and evil, 
they are neither si s of hope and deliverance, nor are they pure malevolence to be 
either reviled or celebrated according to moral criteria. For Baudrillard 'the 
catastrophic development in question is neither beneficial nor malignant: it is simply 
catastrophic' (Baudrillard 1990/1993: 100). If such events were either beneficial or 
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malevolent, they would still be, in principle, of the order of meaning, of moral 
choice, but Baudrillard stresses, these are events beyond the limits of rationality, of 
subjectivity. Afier the travail du negatif, the excess of the radically negative; after 
& positive, the excess of the hyper-positive. 
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NOTES 
1) According to Hegel, 'Spirit is alone Reality. It is the inner being of the 
world, that which essentially is, and is per se; it assumes objective, determinate form, 
and enters into relations with itself-it is externality (otherness), and exists for self; 
yet, in this determination, and in its otherness, it is still one with itself-it is self- 
contained and self-complete, in itself and for itself at once' (Hegel 1807/1931: 86). In 
Kojeve's reading of Hegel the importance of the sacred, revolving around self- 
consciousness of death is not developed. Kojeve tends to reproduce the 
enlightenment impetus of Hegelian thought which situates such beliefs as backward 
and inferior. 
2) Perhaps the most influential of these is the work of German philosopher 
Jurgen Habermas. FukuYama (1992) has also presented a liberal, humanist reading 
of the theme of the end of history where a more or less complete dialectical 
resolution or synthesis is argued to have been attained in contemporary liberal 
democracy and globalised capital. In enlightenment and dialectical thought the 
specificity of the negative, certainly the possibility of its becoming autonomous or 
independent tends to be denied or reected as nonsense or superstition. Either the 
whole genus of negative phenomena, negative events detached from or independent 
of positive phenomena; is said to be meaningless and unworthy of philosophical 
investigation (this attitude is expressed in the Macmillan Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy; 8 vols. London: Macmillan) or, as with the Kantian and Hegelian 
anthropology the specificity of the negative or evil event is argued to exist only 
within the naivet6 of 'primitive' superstition. Negation is the motive force of Hegel's 
enlightenment subject where meaning is forged through the movement of 
assimilation. Of course the negative is always harnessed to the productive and 
progressive, to historical development. Particular individuals and institutions die, but 
the dialectic guarantees that all movement is ultimately positive and progressive. 
This process then always contains the negative within the positive. 
3) This is usually taken as the definition of the dialectic in its most simple 
form, see for example Beiser (1993: 1-25). Zizek (1993: 9-45) has questioned the 
importance of this formulation arguing that it was rarely used by Hegel himself. 
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4) Fukuyama's (1992) reading of Hegel, Kcjeve, and the theme of 'recognition' 
seriously underplays the importance of death, of fear and ambivalence and the 
closely related failure of dialectical resolution to operate. 
5) The question of precisely how global contemporary 'global' capitalism really 
is, is an important one and has been addressed by a number of recent studies, see for 
example Lash and Urry (1994). 
6) In fact Bataille invokes Freud suprisingly rarely given that they were near 
contemporaries, and when he does refer to him it is generally in the context of 
Freud's work on the tabdo. Human subjectivity need not be said to harbour 
universally repressed instincts beneath its established codes of reason. Though there 
is a certain sense of analogy with Freud, for Bataille reason is already a discursive 
phenomenon, not a naturalistic or biologistic one. Further human subjectivity can 
never re-capture, order or manage its removal from nature, rendering it into a 
comprehensible lived presence, a scientific hypothesis or a 'talking cure'. The 
conventions of modem civilisation do not so much necessitate a repression of 
instincts for Bataille, as they 'exclude' access to a sense of sovereignty in the face of 
death that still resonated in the Mediaeval period. Bataille does not theorise 
crepression' or psychical 'control' so the intensely problematic distinction between 
normal and pathological is largely avoided. Rather the distinction for Bataille is 
between 'normal' meaning narrow, utilitarian; and sovereign implying full or 
'unbounded' existence. See Bataille 1957/1986: 164-196. 
7) This line of thought is developed particularly by Lacan and more recently 
by Zizek in a series of recent works; see Zizek (1991,1993,1994). Zizek expresses 
a condition he terms'the void called subject'(Zizek 1993: 9-90). This is the condition 
in which consumerism flourishes as the ever-deferred satisfaction of the void of self, 
through the mechanism of desire. However Foucault (1976/1979) has challenged 
many of the assumptions guiding the work of Lacan (and by implication Zizek) 
strongly. The ways in which Bataille and Baudrillard differ from the psychoanalytic 
approach is developed below. 
8) Milbank (1992) has challenged the assumption of the ontological centrality 
of death and violence. This is not the place to review the intricacies of Milbank's 
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work but it is worth pointing out that his arguments depend, fundamentally, on the 
writer's Christian faith. 
9) De Rais did actually return to the Christian fold during his trial and 
6onfession. The 'result' of these events then was in no sense the 'progressive' 
outcome of Hegelian dialectics, rather they were infused with the atavistic, sacred 
and religious, throughout, ultimately a conflict between Christianity and Satanism. 
Foucault also discusses the case of De Rais, see Foucault (1961/1967). 
10) Bataille's use of the category 'sacred' is again fundamental to his divergence 
from Hegel. For rather than the condition of Lordship encountering 'contradictions' 
by being unable to solicit the 'recognition' of an equal, de Rais was impelled towards 
the sacred as the domain proper to one of nobility. This strategy was then 'positive' 
not 'negative' in the Hegelian sense. The 'contradictions' of de Rais' social position 
did not drive historical progress, but fuelled an obsession with the atavistic and 
archaic, with Satanism and sorcery. While the world of bondage and slavery, of 
work and utility could not, as Hegel's position suggests, provide the master with 
recognition, the Mediaeval period, as Bataille argues, still included a powerful sense 
of the maleficence of the sacre4or Hegel and Kojeve production or work were the 
essence of humanity and the fundamental motor of human history, sweeping aside 
superstition and inequality. For Bataille it is the relationship of humanity to the 
sacred that is fundamental. 
ýThe 
sentiments, beliefs and terrors that are involved in 
the apprehension of the sacred are not mere historical by-products that may be neatly 
superseded by the progress of production. Bataille states that, by the mid-15th 
century the age of the great sovereign lord, the ferocious uncalculating warrior, those 
such as Gilles de Rais, was already passing. Nobles, by this time, had to learn the 
arts of political manoeuvre and compromise in order to secure their position of 
privilege. /While other lords were engaged, however unconsciously, in a process that 
might, from a certain viewpoint, be seen as one of Hegelian historical progression, 
the paradoxical and 'inhuman' effects of this 'progress' were to impel de Rais to a 
diabolic exploration of sacred horrorNDe Rais hired the services of sorcerers and 
alchemists, and after appeals to God to restore his for-tunes had failed, he turned to 
black magic to gain the favour of Satan, orchestrating the sacrifice of children in 
order to summon the presence of devilish forces. De Rais and his family had ruled 
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by 'divine right', they were the 'gods' of their particular region, so the realm of the 
sacred was proper to nobility, that class which refused work and sought only 
splendour. This relationship of sovereignty to the sacred provides a condition 
Nýhereby the Hegelian dialectic cannot be played out as progressive movenient. 
/Only 
with the erosion of a sense of the radical negativity of the sacred and its unstable 
containment within an entirely beneficent, positive yet far less powerful category 'the 
holy' could work, production and utility become the governing principles of social 
organisation\ 
11) Of course events of this kind do occur in many areas of the world, recent 
examples being events in China, Indonesia and South Africa. Nor are they entirely 
absent from Western democracies. However the important point here is that political 
violence and upheaval, in the West, no longer seem to be politically 'meaningful' 
events. That is they cannot be read withinihe-conKentional ternis. of, political dissent 
, ý_nd aot 9ý. 
For example the recent events of June 18 th 1999, and May 1" 2000 in the 
city of London where easily managed and dismissed by the authorities, political 
parties and mass media as 'anarchist trouble-makers', serious debate about the nature 
of global capital did not occur. In the latter event_the or radical political , -_ __ 
challenge was effectively Equ Lra isýd Cliprchill, 
_ýy 
images of the defac. eq. -statue 
The easp-of contaimn! ýn. t. -Apd. peptKalipti-on 
deplete such events, of meaning. These 
cesses occur, increasingly, in the mass mediation of events around the world. 
12) Bataille was fully aware of this convergence but it should not be over- 
emphasised. On the relation between Bataille and Heidegger and Bataille's own 
views of Heidegger's philosophy see Comay, R. in Stoekl (ed) 1990: 66-89. 
13) See in particular the novel Crash by J. G. Ballard (1973/1995). This 
influential novel is also discussed by Baudrillard (1981/1994) and by Seltzer (1998). 
14) The sacrifice of an animal for religious purposes is regarded, by 
contemporary 'liberal-global' culture as a disgusting and pointless anomaly, while 
the secular-industrial destruction of animal's en mass, whose only purpose in 
existence is death, dismemberment and devoural, is a global industry employing 
millions. This situation can be seen as a reversal of the practices of so called 
4primitive' religion where all death, include the sacrifice of animals for food, was 
imbued with symbolic and mythic meaning. See Durkheim (1912/1961) and Clastres 
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(1974/1977). Yet the importance of these themes is not confined to anthropological 
study, in addition to the thought of Bataille and Baudrillard, the theme of the sacred 
is beginning to re-emerge in the social sciences. For example a recent study of 
c. onsumerism and religion by Taussig (1997) takes up Bataille's notion of the sacred. 
Derrida has written on the importance of death and gift exchange in recent years, see 
Derrida (1992; 1992/1995). In addition Caillios"sacred sociology' is beginning to be 
acknowledged, see Grosz (1995), Seltzer (1998). Before the inception of the 
dialectic, that is before the beginnings of Baudrillard's second order of simulacra, the 
negative; that which threatened a community or social group, such as 'natural' 
disaster or the death of an important member of the group, would be managed 
through the rituals of the symbolic. Here, as Mauss argues, no death or disaster is 
considered merely natural but is treated as the result of magic, further such magic 
does indeed have the power to bring about death through what might be termed 
'collective suggestion' (Mauss, 1950/1979: 35-47). In such a system signs are strictly 
governed and bound by ceremonial or religious demands. In the event of a 
catastrophe such as the sudden death of the tribal leader or sacred personage, a range 
of ritual forms would be invoked in order that this potentially destructive and 
contagious rupture in the social fabric is managed. Durkheim's Elenzentaryfornis of 
the religious life (1912/1961) describes in detail such piacular rites, as does the 
anthropology of Marcel Mauss, in particular his influential study of magic (Mauss 
1950/1972) which provides ethnographic support for many of Baudrillard's 
assertions regarding symbolic ritual and gift exchange. In this system the sudden 
death of a member is inherently a matter of the sacred, since the cycle of birth and 
death is inscribed, exclusively, within the sacred. The sacred is an ambivalent force, 
beneficent and malefic, highly dangerous and contagious, it must be managed 
carefully in order to deliver beneficial results for the community. If these ritual 
codes are not observed or if for some reason they are deemed to have been 
unsuccessful, then the energy generated by the event and channelled through the 
sacred may become focused at its negative, malefic or evil pole. This Bataille, 
Caillois and others sometimes referred to as the 'left' pole of the sacred. Here then 
there is a principle of reversibility within the sacred between good and evil, or more 
properly the beneficent and the malefic. If the communal energies reverse to the 
129 
malefic pole of the sacred, evil contagion may be unleashed bringing about 
generalised havoc and destruction. The ethnographic data supporting these 
assumptions can, of course, be questioned, though while Stucturalist ethnography has 
q. uestioned such notions recent Poststructural studies have again embraced the notion 
of the sacred and the radically other. 
15) Dahmer is often understood as the archetypal serial killer; white, male, a 
loner, apparently devoid of personality and of anonymous or chameleon-like 
appearance. However Seltzer's study notes how this very 'transparency' to dominant 
sociological and psychoanalytic explanation was not only constituted through the 
particular discursive conditions developed by these disciplines but further were taken 
up by Dahmer as self-explanation, becoming tautologically true through a complex 
process of mediated involution and feedback. Here Seltzer covers very similar 
territory to Baudrillard's in the discussion of media, technology and 'transparency'. 
16) Some interpretations of Bataille and of Deleuze seem close to what 
Baudrillard specifies here, see for example Land (1992) on Bataille and (in 
Featherstone and Burrows 1995) on Deleuze. See also Goodchild (1996) on 
Deleuze. 
17) This waning sense of the historical, is defined by Baudrillard as, 'a 
succession of non-meaningless facts, each engendering the other by cause and effect, 
but doing so without any absolute necessity and all standing open to the future, 
unevenly poised' (Baudrillard 1992/1994: 7). 
18) Baudrillard engages Hegelian and Marxist dialectical thought by developing 
an account of the transition of slavery into labour, showing the primacy of the 
symbolic stake of death in this process. For Baudrillard the system of labour in 
modem production is the imposition of a slow, deferred death, in place of the 
immediate or sacrificial (spectacular) death that was always a possibility in the 
system of slavery. In the sacrificial system death was still reversible, consequently 
power was reversible, unstable, subject to transformation and replacement. Death 
could challenge the system of political power and actual material violence permeated 
the culture. In the modem economic order the 'workers' or masses can no longer be 
put to death by the masters, yet equally they are no longer able to use their death as a 
challenge to the system. Nevertheless sudden, catastrophic or sacrificial death 
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continues to haunt the modem system, since it is built on this very expulsion, 'The 
end of the spectacle brings with it the collapse of reality into hyperrealism, the 
meticulous reduplication of the real ... (T)hrough reproduction from one medium to 
ahother the real becomes volatile, it becomes the allegory of death, but it also draws 
strength from its own destruction, becoming the real for its own sake, a fetishism of 
the lost object which is no longer the object of representation, but the ecstasy of 
denegation and its own ritual extermination; the hyperreal'(Baudrillard 1993: 71-72). 
19) Baudrillard's central argument in The Illusion of the End (1992/1994) is that 
the West cannot reach 'the end of history'; that recurrent motif of modem thought 
from Hegel, through Koj eve, to the influential sociological 'end of ideology' theses of 
Lipset and Bell, and the recent assertions by Fukuyama/For Baudrillard the notion 
of reaching 'the end' of history is an illusion generated by the modem faith in linear 
temporality, 'the whole travail du negatif disappears on the horizon of the media, 
exactly as work disappears on the horizon of Capital ... [T]his disruption of cause and 
effect is not now the work of the critical consciousness, but that of objective irony 
alone ... [events] no longer have a negative (progressive, critical or revolutionary) 
potency since their only negativity is in the fact of their not taking place' 
(1992/1994: 16-7). 
\ 
20) For example while the dialectic of enlightenment in the West was a 
condition limited according to Baudrillard to the second order of simulacra, the 
situation in the former Soviet Union though different in important respects, is also 
governed by a perverse and ironic destiny. According to Baudrillard here the 
dialectic; of progress, liberty, and of the balance of good and evil was frozen during 
the seventy years of the communist era. However the collapse of conu-nunism or 
'thawing of the East' did not bring about the end of history in a positive resolution, a 
New World order of universal capitalism and human rights. Rather, for Baudrillard, 
history, as it cannot come to an end shifts into a mode of perpetual recycling, 'all the 
left overs - the church, communism, ethnic groups, conflicts, ideologies ... nothing one 
thought surpassed by history has really disappeared (1994: 27). In a further ironic 
twist the West has no real, authentic, "liberty to offer the East, since any sense of 
living democracy long ago passed into simulation, mass-marketing and sound-bites. 
Rather East/West exchange, according to Baudrillard, consists of an exchange of the 
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lowest common cultural denominators, the West, 'bartering itself off in a binge of 
cars and electrical goods ... mind-bending drugs and pornography' (1994: 29) while the 
former'Soviet Union floods the Western terrorist market with ex-cold war military 
hardware. Yet beyond Baudrillard's deep pessimism concerning the 'compatibility' 
of different cultures is a powerful indictment of the vacuous and exhausted nature of 
Western values. He makes the point that the East's real demand; fervour and energy 
for authentic liberty, is not only absent in the Western democracies, but that such a 
surge of real energies directed at the West can have a catastrophic destabilising effect 
on the'very fragile metabolism'of Western culture. It may upset the delicate balance 
of simulation and deterrence, revealing the West as the weaker partner and, 
ironically, causing it to shatter. The 'real' or dialectical negativity of the East 
threatens the virtuality of the West since it is no longer able to deal with or even 
'think'the real, there is then, for Baudrillard a viral cross-contamination between East 
and West that destroys the contemporary myth of a dynamic, pluralistic new world 
order. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
SEDUCTION - THE SIMULACRUM OF SEX: DESIRE, EROTICISM, AND 
SEDUCTION. 
INTRODUCTION 
'We need ... a genealogy of sexual Reason similar to Nietzsche's genealogy of good and evil, 
for it is our new morality' (Baudrillard 1979/1990: 37). 
This chapter continues to elaborate the theoretical proximity and distance 
between the theory of Bataille and Baudrillard in relation to excess. Chapter two 
established the ways in which each adopt and explore theoretical positions of, and on, 
excess. Yet the relations between utility and excess are complex and shifting as that 
discussion showed. The present chapter will consider extreme violence as excess in 
relation to the field of sexuality. There is a long-standing tradition of thought that links 
sexuality with violence; with uncontrollable drives and urges (Freud 1991a, Bristow 
1997: 62-115). Such 'drives' were argued to be rooted in biological or genetic 
disposition, they are interpreted as a feature of male sexuality, whether this sexuality is 
comprehend as biologically given, culturally constructed or a combination of both. 
Both Bataille and Baudrillard address the sexual or erotic sphere in some detail 
(Bataille 1957/1986, Baudrillard 1979/1990). Both situate these important themes of 
their work at, or beyond, the limits of established theoretical reflection; which they 
argue to be compromised by a restricted, domesticated or utilitarian nature. Yet it 
becomes increasingly apparent that they differ in their readings of the excessive in 
many crucial respects and this is particularly evident in their theories of sexuality. The 
preceding chapters attempted to draw out the multiple and ambiguous connections of 
Bataille and Baudrillard's thought in relation to the negative and catastrophic, against 
the context of other modem and contemporary thinkers. This insistenccý on fte negýqive 
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defines much_ýof the-distinction between this lineage of thought and that of other Post- 
. 
strý4qttTqljstjhinkeps.. such as Lyotard, Foucault and Deleuze. Bataille and Baudrillard's 
focus on radical negativity and its effects persist in their treatments of sexuality. Just as 
notions of negativity and evil are, in various ways, expressive of that which falls 
outside utilitarian calculation and rational explanation, in related yet distinct ways the 
sexual or erotic can be seen to express something similarly excessive. Generally 
speaking both Bataille and Baudrillard approach sexuality as 'excessive' in some sense 
though both draw sharp distinctions between their approaches and other, more 
established, views of sexuality as 'excess'. 
The sexual is often presented as the ultimate source of human pleasure, as the 
key to self-understanding and contentment. Much popular thinking assumes that our 
sexual 'nature' is the most 'true' or fundamental aspect of 'self or 'personality', that the 
sexual is the fundamental 'reality', the basis or stake 'behind' most if not all human 
actions, endeavours, relations. Such opinion may draw, very loosely, upon intellectual 
sources such as Freudian psychoanalysis, feminist theory, or theorists of 'desire' as 
'liberation' (Bristow 1997, Wilson & Seaman 1983,1992). Similarly sexuality has been 
understood as 'breaking through' the conventions of everyday life and offering an 
elusive 'something'; a meaning or goal to human existence, a fleeting experience of 
wholeness, completion or ecstasy. Sexuality is often held both in social theory, literary 
expression and popular opinion in contrast to the banalities of productive, working life; 
as contrary as day and night (Freud 1991 a, Marcuse 1956, Bataille 1957/1986). 
These assumptions are both explored and challenged in the theories of Bataille 
and Baudrillard. Baudrillard, through his notion of seduction, is able to move beyond 
the terrain of other theorists such as Freud, Bataille and Foucault. ' Baudrillard's 
emphasis on contemporary extremity and violence linked to an alternative reading of 
sexuality enables a reading of the 'excess' of contemporary death-events not available 
through the terms of other thinkers. 
The deployment of sexuality is clearly a key component of contemporary 
lifestyle politics and global capitalist economics. The use of sexualised imagery is 
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crucial to the functioning of consumer culture. As well as forming the principal 
dynamic of global marketing and promotional culture, the sexual is also the major site 
of political or ideological contestation. An array of sub-cultural and 'oppositional' 
groups stake claims concerning their 'sexual nature', tastes or 'rights'. Yet there is no 
clear-cut division or separation between the operations of consumerism and the 'deeper 
realities' of political contestation. Rather they fuse in the most complex; even 
undecideable ways since they draw upon shared themes of individualism, freedom and 
progress, and shared techniques of mass-media promotional culture. Gay and lesbian 
lifestyles are marketed as an 'escape' from patriarchal sexual structures, as liberation, or 
as supplement to 'straight' relationships. A politics of celibacy has even appeared 
across the tabloid press, presenting the 'truth' of personal fulfilment in abstinence. Each 
new lifestyle choice appears as a supplement to existing choices, like a new brand of 
shampoo. Any 'radical' political charge intended by such groups tends to be 
incorporated within standardised market and mass media routines. 'Serious' political 
issues cannot be separated from banal or quotidian mass media output. Each choice 
appears more or less equal, as homogenised, something to `buy into' as if from a pre- 
coded range of possibilities. ' For these reasons, Baudrillard argues, sexuality must be 
seen as our 'reality principle', we live in the age of sexual reason. Further, for 
Baudrillard this 'rationality' threatens to bring about 'the end of the sexual illusion'. 
These claims are addressed below through a reading of extreme violence. 
This chapter enquires into the relationship between sexuality and violence, 
particularly extreme violence and physical destruction. Can 'sexual reason' establish 
the nature of these relationships, can it prescribe remedies, or does sexual violence 
reveal something of the limits or failures of sexual reason. More specifically, can any 
of the contemporary death-events specified in the earlier chapters be comprehended in 
terms of the functioning of sexuality, either normal or pathological? How does the 
'excessiveness' of sexuality map onto the 'excessiveness' of violence? 
The following section will evaluate and challenge the matrix of assumptions 
that define sexuality as the 'truth' of human nature, as its fundamental 'reality'. It will 
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probe the commonplace and academic arguments presenting readings of sexuality as 
the 'explanation' of human, especially male or masculine violence. Existing accounts of 
the nature of sexuality do little to enhance understanding of contemporary death-events. 
Indeed reference to a meta-category such as 'Sexuality' may serve to contain or restrict z_ ___ __ Z7 awareness of the diversity, singularity or indeterminacy of these cases. Such cases are 
so disturbing precisely because they make recourse to 'sexual reason' to notions of 
sexuality-as-cause or rationale, appear deeply inadequate. It is -precisely such 
inadequacy that compels us to seek alternative modes or styles of thought. 
In this chapter it is necessary to address, briefly, the work of Foucault, both in 
its similarities and differences to both Bataille and Baudrillard. The models of 
sexuality central to Freudian and other psychoanalytic traditions will also be appraised 
briefly. The second section will explore Bataille's notion of eroticism, drawing on both 
his theoretical and fictional works. Eroticism, for Bataille, - is distinguished from the 
category 'sexuality', and is shown to be rooted in complex and shifting cultural matrices 
of taboo or interdiction and their ritual transgression. In this sense eroticism exists in 
excess of mere sexuality. Bataille's emphasises the intimate proximity of death, 
violence and religious sacrifice to the realm of the erotic. Of course Bataille's major 
theoretical works on this subject can hardly be presented as complete analyses of the 
contemporary era without serious re-evaluations regarding recent social and cultural 
change. 
The final section will present a detailed exposition on Baudrillard's notion of 
Seduction. This is a controversial and poorly understood aspect of his work, which is 
nevertheless crucial to his later theory. I will consider the ways in which such a 
reading of Bataille and Baudrillard affords an approach to crucial issues of the 
'excessive', and extreme violence in particular, which appear to be beyond the scope of 
mainstream social scientific thought. 
The provocative and unsettling dimensions of Bataille's writings on eroticism 
and particularly his erotic fictions, have led some critics, especially certain feminist 
writers, to perceive his work as pornographic, masculinist and thereby redundant? 
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Other writers, including feminists, have welcomed Bataille's de-stabilisation of 
subjective rationality and its implications for theorisation of sexuality and intimacy. 
This latter view is perhaps now the more dominant, although Bataille's utilisation for 
the feminist cause is never unproblematic and has been overstated recently! 
Interestingly Baudrillard has suffered a similar fate since the publication of Seduction 
in 1979. The tide of opinion is still firmly against Baudrillard however and though 
much critique remains superficial and over-hasty, more considered and -valuable pieces 
are now appearing. ' The principal aim here is not to defend Bataille or Baudrillard 
against feminist charges, some of which are well made as I will indicate. Rather the 
discussion will emphasise some shared concerns and attempt to move beyond simplistic 
critique and counter-critique towards an engagement with the extremities of sexuality 
and violence. 
What is of primary interest is the often asserted, but seldom interrogated, 
linkage of sexuality with extreme violence, with torture and murder, with 
uncontrollable 'impulses'. ýurpjjsingly little academic work has been published on the 
connections between sexjj4li! y_ýad extr9mL violence. Such a connection has been 
explored in art and literature throughout the modem period of Western culture, notably 
in the Romantic and Gothic traditions and these themes have filtered into academic 
discourse on sexuality from the early 19th Century. Yet such a linkage is rarely 
,., -ýo rLnt Pýf p, ýd sociologically as such. 
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FREUD, PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE REALITY OF SEX 
,... we cannot escape from the fact that people whose behaviour is in other respects normal 
can, under the domination of the most unruly of all the instincts, put themselves in the category of sick 
persons in the single sphere of sexual life. On the other hand, manifest abnormality in the other relations 
of life can invariably be shown to have a background of abnormal sexual conduct ... The highest and the 
lowest are always closest to each other in the sphere of sexuality (Freud 1991 a: 75) 
A number of cultural-historical studies have documented the emergence of 
'sexuality' as a fundamental category of scientific enquiry and of systematic knowledge. 
Perhaps the most influential of these is Foucault's three volume History of Sexuality. 
According to Foucault the modem period has witnessed a spectacular proliferation of 
discourse on sexuality, indeed an "incitement" to discourse ranging from the Christian 
confessional to modem sexology. Further what Foucault terms the classical period 
(17th & 18th centuries) marks a new episteme whereby nature replaces God as the 
fundamental object of knowledge, the fundamental source of meaning (Foucault 
1966/1970; MaJor-Poetzl 1982). Knowledge during this period is constructed by 
grounds its claims in the natural order; nature and the natural become the indelible 
marks of truth. By the 19th century the new category "Man", and its unfolding through 
"History" become crucial yet knowledge continues to be guided by appeals to nature 
and the natural state. At this stage, according to Foucault, the human sciences such as 
psychology, sociology and biology are bom while the category sexuality emerges as a 
central object of enquiry for these new disciplines. Sexuality is figured as the 
fundamental or 'true nature' of "Man" as generic type, and specific ally as individual 
being composed of needs and desires. 
Laquer's (1990) historical investigations claim to reveal a fundamental re- 
ordering of sexuality occurring in the late 18th century. According to Laquer 
understandings of sexual difference shifted such that, 'An anatomy and physiology of 
incommensurability replaced a metaphysics of hierarchy in the representation of 
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women in relation to man' (1990: 4). Men and woman were henceforth regarded as 
fundamentally different; this difference was fixed in biological nature, in the physical 
facts of anatomy. For Laquer this represented a shift from a "one-sex" model, where 
women were conceptualised as physically inverted or inferior versions of men, to a 
"two-sex" model of fundamental 'natural' incommensurability. What needs to be 
emphasised here is the appeal to the 'facts' of nature as final and ftindamental truth. 
Sexuality becomes fixed as the truth of human nature, with males and females 
possessing distinct and different truths in their 'bodily reality'. Also at this time 
sexuality generally was conceived as operating, in some sense, in opposition to, or in 
conflict with, the demands of culture, that isthe nature/culture dualism became crucial. 
As a result the 19th century saw a proliferation of new scientific discourses on the 
nature and vicissitudes of human sexuality, one of the most influential being 
6 psychoanalysis. Before drawing out the implications of Bataille or Baudrillard's 
approach to the erotic, it is necessary to consider Freudian theories of sexuality. Of 
particular importance is the number of ways in which Freud connects sexuality, 
especially male sexuality, with violence. 
Freudian psychoanalysis attempted to formalise, scientifically, the notion of 
deep-seated, natural; intense sexual drives which conflict with the demands of modem 
fýs7pecffiqble society. In addition Freud posited a fundamentally conflictual, 
contradictory or ambivalent nature to the individual's psychic structure. Conflict and 
ambivalence are said to exist at many levels; between the pleasure principle and the 
reality principle, within the Oedipal and castration complexes, (which function 
differently for males and females) and between the emergent subject and a range of 
objects, persons and processes into which it comes into contact. In short there are 
many possible sites of conflict, aggression and violence, many ways in which 'non-nal' 
development may be thwarted or perverted, many senses in which a fusion of sexuality 
7 with violence, hatred or death could be established. A wide variety of thinkers have 
deployed or exploited readings of Freud in order to establish why, (usually) male 
sexuality is prone towards extreme violence! 
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Many popular and academic accounts of violence, of notorious murderers, 
'sadists' and mass or serial killers draw upon a Freudian framework to a greater or lesser 
extent. Since such offenders are almost exclusively male explanatory frameworks tend 
to focus on the difficulties faced by the male as it passes through the Oedipus and 
castration complexes. For example the masculine disposition toward sadism may be 
said to represent a psychical defence mechanism against the guilt and anxiety provoked 
by the castration complex. Here the 'inadequate' male may feel unable to achieve full 
masculinity through identifying with a father figure. Further if the Oedipal 'death wish' 
against this figure is not transformed into a rejection of the mother and successful 
identification with the father the resulting psychological 'disorder' may be anything 
from slight 'effeminacy', to homosexuality, to serial killing. These speculations are of 
course very simplistic and highly unsatisfactory, all assume sexual drives to be the 
fundamental reality of human experience, the 'core' of subjectivity. They are, 
nevertheless. extremely-influential. 
Many academics have sought to develop, 'correct', or extend these Freudian 
I 
notions. Perhaps most influential here is the work of Lacan, Lacanian feminism and 
more recently) Zizek. In these traditions the notion of fantasy becomes highly 
significant, and though the dualist distinction between fantasy and reality, between 
interior states and external action is problematized here it tends to remain in place in 
some form. Zizek, drawing on Freud and Lacan has argued recently, 'We are [all] 
murderers in the unconscious of our desire' (1991: 59). Here the assumption is not only 
of a universal or trans-cultural 'We' but also a sense of 'our' desire, our desires being 
contained within the unconscious, a sense of possession, if not 'self-possession' as 
such. The unconscious here is figured as a private, hidden interior, -a grqgresource of 
'real', basc- drives and instincts. In the reading of Bataille and Baudrillard that follows I 
_IXJIII emphasise their dep. ýqures Lo! a Fr5Md, and their re-workings of what Freud terms 
. 
'the unconscious'. In particular I will suggest that both Bataille and Baudrillard 
conceive the relation of subjectivity and 'excess' in a fundamentally different manner 
from Freud. Bataille's sacred and Baudrillard's symbolic are both emphatically social, 
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their source is material not phantasmal, thev are manifest not hidden, they. express 
complete cultural practices not repressed instinctual residuum. Further, Baudrillard 
emphasises the social and material effects of semiological and technological 
transformations of the contemporary period. Here, Baudrillard suggests forms of 
human subjectivity are reorganised and relocated around simulation and technology 
such that human desires are constituted only through relations to the technological or 
mediated environment. Eox--Iýaudrillard there is no interior or private core of 
, 
ýtýýganise or a.. subjectivity that might t least 'contain' particular desires or tasies. it 
may well be then that what has appeared as unconscious or instinctual in 
-PS 
choanalytic theory is in fact the, result of- cultural and technological transformation s, 
which themselves radically volatilise the fundamental distinctions made in 
psychoanalytic theory. 
An influential feminist study of sexual violence by Cameron and Fraser (1987) 
exposes many of the limitations inherent in popular and scientific accounts. According 
to Cameron and Fraser nearly all, fail to acknowledge that sexual murder is 
fundamentally something which men do to women. Such theories, they argue, are 
riddled with patriarchal prejudice and essentialist assumptions. Nevertheless, in their 
own explanation of sexual murder, they draw upon many elements of Freudian 
psychoanalysis, while insisting on the fundamental misogyny of male sexuality. They 
explain sexual murder as an intrinsic part of the male quest for mastery and 
transcendence, as extreme aspects of 'normal' male sexuality: 
It is relatively easy to see killing as male violence taken to its logical extreme, 
where humiliation becomes annihilation. Death is the ultimate negation of 
autonomy, and the kind of death inflicted by many serial killers - the ripped 
breasts and genitals, the womb torn out - is the ultimate violation of the female 
sex and body (Cameron & Fraser 1987: 165). 
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Though the authors rightly emphasise the intensity of violence; the assault on 
the female body as object, the programmatic nature of their study leads to an overly 
narrow focus. More theoretical work needed to be done establish the movement from 
"humiliation" to "annihilation" which appear to be fundamentally different. Further the 
authors do little to account for the difference between murder through sudden lust or 
rage and the phenomena of serial killing. It needs to be asked whether 'sex killing' and 
'serial killing' are similar or fundamentally different phenomena. Locating such 
violence exclusively within the relations between men and women, that is in terms of 
male heterosexuality, may obscure further questioning of identity, sexuality and 
violence that may not be structured by heterosexual male misogyny. Paradoxically, 
Cameron and Fraser domesticate the horror of extreme violence by interpreting, in this 
way, all such phenomena as existing somewhere on the continuum of normal male 
sexuality. It may be that extreme phenomena, such as serial killing, is neither normal, 
gmale' or sexual. We must ask whether 
_appeals 
to the vicissitudes of sexuality as meta- 
explanatory principle, as ultimate grounding ontology, actually elucidate or in fact 
obscure something of such events. 
BATAILLE'S EROTICISM 
'[the sexual act] in time is what the tiger is in space' (Bataille 1967/1988: 35). 
Bataille's earliest published writings were literary-fictional engagements with 
eroticism. His best-known fiction 77ie Story of the Eye was first published in 1928 only 
ten years after his first publication, the still conventionally pious Notre-Dame de Reims 
written in 1918. ' The Story of the §)ýe, ILhe Little One and W. C (the unpublished 
manuscript was destroyed by Bataille) evince a fascination with the scatological, 
coprophilic and gepgyajjy_ýytýh violence qpd obscenity. Yet already there is a 
fundamental interest in the sacred, religion and death, which fuse with the sexual into 
what Bataille terms Eroticism. Bataille's erotic fiction is highly distinctive and makes 
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for a very different experience from reading Sade, for example, though the two are 
often conflated in critical treatments. 10 Such secondary literature has added momentum 
to the claim that these works are 'pornographic' and Bataille is perhaps still best known 
as a pornographer rather than serious thinker. However as Mayne (1993) argues, to 
label these works pornographic is to misinterpret them. " 
Bataille's notion of eroticism emphasises its excessiveness, its ability to 
undermine moral and institutional structures, to ruin utilitarian calculation and 
epistemological certainty, opening the reader into a domain beyond subjective agency, 
rationality and morality. Bataille's approach to eroticism is far more conceptually 
sophisticated and nuanced than it appears in the representations of many secondary 
sources. His theoretical approach is historical and sociological, depending, 
fundamentally on the binding structures of taboo and the process of their transgression. 
Bataille's Eroticism (1957/1986) situates the Maussian sociology of the "total 
social fact" as a significant move in this direction (1957/1986: 257) and credits Mauss 
with specifying the cultural importance of the logic of transgression in his work on 
sacrifice. For Bataille the notion o6ý0 is of the greatest conceptual importance since 
it marks the inauguration of a system defining the distinction between animal sexuality 
and human eroticism. Taboo is not a_straightforward interdicti-Qn, farless 4. repression 
in the modem sense. Taboo-encodes -or- symbolises, the. sense- of 
horror, and, -. 
loathing,. 
with which so! ýial organisations hold death. Where animals strive endlessly to avoid 
death they do so without any conceptual self-awareness of mortality. Though pain and 
terror are doubtless experienced by animals they are not perceived as mortal threats to 
discursive self-presence. The anguish caused by the foreboding of death is for Bataille, 
uniquely, quintessentially human, yet this is not to claim that humans 'know' or 
'understand' death and it is, in fact, this very im ossibility that demands the notion of p 
the sacred. 
A taboo then is not a restricting social convention that may be 'QyqrcomeLf4_r 
, the sake of greater 
human freedom; it is rather the very condition of being 'human. Yet 
what- B atai Ile-affirmsis_nat only the, centrality of taboo but also the crucial importance 
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of its! ritual transgressio7n In the Aztec sacrifice the taboo on murder is transgressed, 
spectacularly, only to be re-affirmed after the completion of the ceremony (Bataille 
1967/1988: 45-61). Similarly the piacular rites described by Durkheim involve the 
expression of behaviour forbidden in normal circumstances, but demanded when the 
community has suffered the devastation of sudden death (Durkheim 1912/1961). 
For Bataille, once the rudiments of conscious awareness are achieved, that is 
once 'humans' begin to distinguish themselves from animals, the ýta oo/transgression 
pairing emerges. Taboo/transgession is the essence of the religious, according to 
Bataille; it constitutes the sacred, beyond not only profane and utilitarian calculation, 
but equally removed from the brute blindness of animal nature. That is the 
taboo/trangression pairing creates the possibility of the human experiencing of 'excess, 
where for animals (and perhaps children) the conscious choice to transgress is not 
possible, hence they may act in an apparently brutal or cruel manner, but not, strictly, in 
a 'transgressive' one. Transgressive rituals once held to be crucial to the sacred would 
in later history be condemned as sin and more recently pathologised-as -'sickness'. 
'Excess' then should not be interpreted as the return of animality. 'Eroticism' is not 
'natural' for Bataille; it derives from fso-ciial of taboo/transgression. Even the 
most savagely. LransgLessive actjs_, a cpýtural one., 
The privileged terms of Bataille's theory of excess; continuity, sovereignty, 
ecstasy - the mystical and erotic, 
k, -ýqr(ý, -i-afe-djby`-the- m-o-y'em , ent Is. of tabo&/ffiaiiýgiFý-si&ii. 
Such experiences are never a simple return to animality, a return of the repressed but 
affects beyond the scope of animal nature, yet somehow expressive of the impossible 
desire to return to "intimacy" with nature. Here Bataille's thought departs, markedly, 
from the simplistic reading of the erotic or sexual as 'deep' fundamental nature, as 
somehow expressing untamed 'natural' animality. For Bataille then eroticism is neither 
freality principle' nor 'pleasure plincipip', I easiq CiRle ut as -certainly'beyondjjqp as rep 
_ceremonial 
form not biological 'reality'. 
Erotic couplings transgress the (now weakened) taboos on nudity and bodily 
proximity, the cultural boundaries that separate sexed bodies, which protect 
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"discontinuous" existence. Eroticism represents a convulsive fusion beyond subjective 
identity, beyond sexual or gender difference. Eroticism is a transgression of order, 
calculation, reason and meaning. For Bataille eroticism borders on death in a number 
of crucial interrelated ways. Death is a fundamental condition of all sexual 
reproduction. Where asexual reproduction occurs without 'death' through cellular 
division, death is implied at the moment of copulation in sexual reproduction (Bataille 
ý11 
1967/1988: 33-35). ý'According to Bataille the intimate relation between eroticism and 
death is expressed through its proximity to sacrifice; the ritual character of undressing 
or stripping, the violation of denuding. The violence of penetration, the destruction of 
dignity, integrity, separateness, the dissolution of individuality and rational awareness, 
all express its sacrificial nature. \ýThere is the actual physical violence of eroticism; 
biting, scratching, pulling, crushing, deforming. The obscene, fascinating and repulsive 
genital organs are the marks of sexual being, the marks of the inevitability of death in 
sexual reproduction (Bataille 1957/1986). Eroticism represents a vast expenditure of 
energy far beyond that which could be summoned for any other purpose, an experience 
beyond the calculation or even awareness of time and space. 
For Bataille the violence and excessiveness of eroticism are not the result of 
individual developmental malfunction, but inevitable consequence of bio-chemical 
excess channelled by ritual taboo/transgression. The demands of extreme violence 
ravage 'human' being and are fused with its sexual cravings. There is an awkward 
tension in Bataille's thought here. /His discussion of taboo/transgression as social 
constructions is underpinned by cosmological assertions of bio-chemical excess, which 
can appear essentialist\ As we saw in chapter two, Baudrillard rejects the latter aspect 
of Bataille's thought while affin-ning the reciprocal 'play' of eroticism which he 
theorises as seduction. Yet Bataille's theory is distinctly social and historical; 
transformations in the nature of social beingfrom. a sacrificial to an economic basis 
have dismantled the taboo/transuession pairing. Eroticism is also a reciprocal relation, 
a relation of mutual self-sacrifice and expenditure. All calculation. or 'profit' is 
rendered impossible, according to Bataille, hence eroticism flourishes in non- 
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roductive sexual activity. In erotic abandon neither 'partner' gain mastery over the 
other, both are irredeemably lost, sadism and masochism then, in this sense, are alien to 
eroticism. The withering of taboo, and the sacred in generally, results, for Bataille, in 
the 'curse' of accumulated energies that cannot be expended in ritualistic form, in the 
accruing of profits, in control, mastery and exploitatio 'In modernity transgression is 
individualised, radically, disarticulated from any moorings in taboo or the sacred. 
Transgressions are de-socialised and become indecipherable or 'inexplicable', except 
perhaps as individual 'pathology'. 
BAUDRILLARD'S SEDUCTION 
'To seduce is to die as reality and reconstitute oneself as illusion' (Baudrillard 1979/1990: 69). 
Seduction (1979/1990) is probably Baudrillard's most controversial work, 
much reviled as an affront to the feminist movement. It is certainly a difficult and at 
times obscure work and it challenges the enlightenment, rationalist and democratic 
foundations of modem thought, on which much feminism depends to a greater or lesser 
extent. Nor has Baudrillard's work been received as an important contribution to 'a 
genealogy of sexual reason' (Baudrillard 1979/1990: 37). A Nietzschean influence is 
present, though it is indirect rather than formative. Further Baudrillard's position is, in 
this area, distinctly removed from that of Bataille's Eroticism; in fact it shares far more 
with Foucault's influential History ofSexuality. 
Baudrillard's Seduction is not, in the first instance, directly related to sexual or 
gender relations still less to claims concerning the innate nature or 'proper' role of the 
human female. (ý Cedui=ctionis introLducecdLýLsphenomeýa of "aalLdiction", closely related 
to evil and therefore intolerable not only to religious or moral thinking but uniquely 
according to Baudrillard, also despised by modem secular, 'liberated' thinking. 
Baudrillard's position here, though polemical and hostile to any notion of 'rights' does 
open up the possibility of alternative readings of 'sexual reason' and its relation to the 
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'excessive'. Baudrillard, contrary to the claims of some critics, does not deny or close 
off all possibility of resistance or destabilisation, 
_2nly 
those forms structured by 
dialectical reason. 12 
Seduction then, unlike 'perversion' and fetishism has not been 'restored' or re- 
affirmed by the sexual revolution of the 1960's and after. Seduction remains marginal, 
even vehemently denounced, according to Baudrillard, precisely where free sexual 
expression is celebrated and insisted upon as fundamental right of the individual. This 
assertion leads Baudrillard, rather indiscriminately, to reject the whole impetus of the 
4sexual revolution', which he interprets as an attack on "sexual illusion" - the 
fundamental relation of reciprocal otherness between the sexes. Baudrillard, it has been 
argued, upholds traditional gender roles. Certainly Baudrillard is incautious here, yet 
his theory, I will argue has much to offer that is neither traditional nor 'patriarchal'. 
Seduction is still laden with a "diabolic" aura; it suggests not brutal sexual 
exploitation, but rather subtle manipulation. To seduce suggests the wilful diversion of 
another's sense of responsibility, autonomy and self-control. It is to solicit behaviour in 
another, which is, perhaps, against their'better jud ement', a turning of the will of the 
other, and a stealing of their self-hood. Here lies seduction's "immoral" nature, it is a 
strategy that undermines the most fundamental,, taken-for-grantpd _'tolth" of 
contemporary culture: the rights of individual autonomy and choice. Seduction is a 
strategic assault on individual choice, on the freedom to decide, to pursue ones own 
Baudrillard. assigns seduction an immanently reversible (symbolic) nature and 
locates it within his alternative theory of power. Here the seducer becomes the 
seduced; the power relations reverse as the seducer (archetypally masculine for 
Baudrillard) is absorbed by the enchantment of the other. Indeed phallocratic or 
patriarchal 'power' here is not only reversed but also, according to Baudrillard, 
abolished by the play of seduction: 
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The crucial stake of sexuality is never the sexual difference, it is the illusion 
that shows through the real, the absence that shows through the presence, the 
feminine that shows through the characteristics of the artificial ideal-type that 
one has fabricated for it (Baudrillard. Lafin: 1). 
Baudrillard's work is developed into a polemical assault on Foucault's position 
regarding the relationship between power, knowledge and sexuality. 13 Baudrillard 
though shares much of Foucault's position on sexuality, aiming to turn it upside down 
while "still accepting its central hypothesis". Both reject the assumptions of 
Freudianism at a fundamental level, for Foucault: 
Sexuality must not be described as a stubborn drive, by nature alien and of 
necessity disobedient to a power which exhausts itself trying to subdue it and 
often fails to control it entirely. It appears rather as an especially dense 
Aransfer point for relations of pg, ýver .. [S]exuality is not the most intractable 
element in power relations, but rather one of those endowed with the greatest 
instrumentality ... the most varied strategies (Foucault 1976/1979: 103). 
Baudrillard is clearly influenced by Foucault in the following assertion: 
... the unconscious, the "adventure" of the unconscious, appears as the last, large-scale attempt to re-establish secrecy in a society without secrets. The 
unconscious appears as our secret, our personal mystery in a confessional and 
transparent society ... the unconscious was created at the same time as 
psychoanalysis, -that-is-at-thet-ýýa-uLe-time. -as-the-p-rQQedures-fQL: tts-assimilation, 
and the techniques for the retraction of the secrets lodged in its deep structures 
(Baudrillard 1979/1990: 80). 
Both Foucault and Baudrillard are engaged in alternative cultural histories or I 
genealogies of modernity. For Baudrillard a sense of ritual seduction, fundamental to 
symbolic cultures, still resonated in the 18th century before suffering a more 
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thoroughgoing exclusion. While for Foucault the same period involved a fundamental 
cultural shift in the deployment of sexuality from that dominated by a confessional- 
pedagogic form to that of a positivist-scientific one. Both offer variants of a 
disenchantment thesis, though this is more pronounced in Baudrillard's work. 
Methodologically Foucault's vision tends towards the language of complexity, 
multiplicity, networks of inter-relation, while Baudrillard seems to favour simplicity or 
better post-complexity. The notion of seduction and its reversible form, according to 
Baudrillard, radically undermine Foucault's analytics of power. For Baudrillard 
production and seduction do not oppose each other dialectically, rather production 
expands and accelerates its domain through the mechanisms of 'power' and desire while 
ever vulnerable to seduction, which operates through inversion, reversal, and 
annulment: 
'Foucault sees only the production of sex as discourse. He is fascinated by the 
irreversible deployment and interstitial saturation of a field of speech, which is 
at the same time the institution of a field of power, culminating in a field of 
knowledge that reflects (or invents) it. But from whence does power derive its 
fco I this irresistible vocation to saturate space? If 
neither sociality nor sexuality exists unless reclaimed and staged by power, 
perhaps power too does not exist unless reclaimed and staged by knowledge 
(theory). In which case, the entire ensemble should be placed in simulation' 
(1979/1990: 47-8). 
This is an important passage which draws attention to key weaknesses in 
Foucault's theory. For Foucault the 'reality' of sex is always already discursive; it is 
always a process of production, more or less smooth and orderly. Further the multiple 
networks of relations between discourse, power, knowledge and sexuality tend to result 
in a circularity of argument, a systematic and ordered vision which minimises the 
violence of these phenomena and the violence of their ordering into discursive or 
epistemic regimes. Foucault's work denies their mystery, their intractability, what 
Baudrillard terms their "secret". Foucault's is a functional and overational vision 
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rogted, _: in 
the Metaphori. c_of production. Forces, relations, objects and phenomena 
appear, as Baudrillard argues somnambulistic, inert, as if asleep. " 
Further Baudrillard is convinced of a pervasive enervation in the 'reality' of the 
sexual, what he calls 'the end of the sexual illusion'. Here the influence of Nietzsche is 
decisive. 'Reality' does not exist as deep, final principle, nature or truth. Just as the 
universe is not, in ultimate nature moral, nor is it predictable or ordered, its ultimate 
form is not an anthropomorphic God, but nor is it molecular structure, bio-chemical 
energy or libidinal drive. " 
For Baudrillard seduction, the enchantment of the object, beauty, the 
perfection of the surface, is deadly dangerous, in a word, fatal. According to 
Baudrillard the seduction radiated by beauty -of. a. gift;., a, gift that _oper4tqs., 4s. 
the giving 
can never by returned or repaid. A challenge without answers, a potlatch. The 
impulses of desire or the bio-mechanics of sex cannot answer the seductiveness of 
beauty; it is radically incommensurate to these. As in the potlatch, seduction has the 
effect of raising the stakes to the ultimate level, that of violence, sacrifice and death. 
The negotiations of desire and sexual pleasure represent only compromise, pragmatism 
and vulgarity. Seduction and 'perversion' then are closely related for Baudrillard. 
However the difference is crucial and is as follows, 'Perversion is a frozen challenge; 
seduction a living challenge. Seduction is shifting and ephemeral; perversion 
monotonous and interminable. Perversion is theatrical and complicit; seduction, secret 
and reversible' (1979/1990: 128). 
Perversion then appears as a contemporary 'pathologised' residue of 
seduction. Baudrillard's discussion of the seduction, the rule and play is developed into 
a critique of the assumptions founding the modem preoccupation with sex-violence, 
with sex as violence, with male desire as murderous lust: 
Their violence is ceremonial - and by no means instinctual; only the rite is 
violent, only the rules of the game are violent, because they put an end to the 
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system formed by reality. This is true cruelty, and has nothing to do with 
bloodlust (1979/1990: 125). 
Here Baudrillard echoes Bataille's emphasis on the sacrificial form as the destruction of 
profane 'everyday' reality. The ceremony is cruel, as demanded by its form or "rule", 
but the violence is not instinctual or psychical in origin, not 'bloodlust. Symbolic 
sacrificial rites did not require 'real' suffering or death but could'occur through 
symbolic substitutions. Baudrillard does not celebrate ritual 'murder' but opposes the 
real and material through seduction and illusion. 'Instinctual violence' is possible onl 
where the symbolic order is broken, such that the 'real', 'rational' and 'natural' can be 
_ppsited- 
These are the. conditions of. the emergence of modem sexual violence, or 
loosely speaking, 'patriarchal sexual violence'. Baudrillard project is to rediscover the 
"radical otherness" of seduction, the symbolic form that is marginalised by both 
_patriarchy, and, 
Baudrillard argues, by modem feminism. 
Psychoanalysis, which deals in the 'instinctual', concerns itself, not with the 
rule, play and game, but with law, repression and even transgression. Baudrillard 
moves against Freud, Lacan and Lacanian feminism and also against the celebration of 
transgression by Sade and in Bataille's important coupling of taboo and transgression. 
All of the above must maintain the centrality of the law, 'all transgressions are possible, 
but not an infraction of the rule' (1979/1990: 126): 
Because the Law - whether that of the signifier, castration, or a social 
interdiction - claims to be the discursive sign of the legal instance and the 
hidden truth, it results in repression and prohibitions, and thus the division into 
latent and manifest discourse. Given that the rule is conventional and 
arbitrary, and has no hidden truth, it knows neither repression nor the 
distinction between the manifest and the latent ... fT]he endless, reversible cycle 
týýhe 
_ljineýT, 
finalisqd. pýqgression of the LaNv 
(1979/1990: 132). 
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Games and play are not 'free' but are governed by ritual and reciprocal 
obligation. In the enchantment of the game, the psychoanalytic distinctions between 
reality principle and pleasure principle, between conscious and unconscious, between 
interdiction and transgression no longer hold. Here a crucial difference of approach 
between Bataille and Baudrillard emerges. For Baudrillard the Law is, or has become, 
-------- ---- --- 
the generalised form, encompassing both exterior socio-political and interior 
'psychical-sexual' space such that this very distinction breaks down. j7he value then of 
the ritual, the ceremonial, the rule, is precisely that they are restricted, proscribed 
exchanges.. T py meat-such-ýLltures n and in Lh( -prql --ftom., 4-ttai 
ing a total, transparent, 
............. 
Baudrillard's terms, "obscene" nature through unrestricted unmanageable exchange. 
This would not be a General economy in the Bataillean sense, as Goux for example has 
argued (Goux in Stockl Ed. 1990: 206-224); though the resemblance is considerable. 
According to Baudrillard, 'the symbolic sphere of these cultures knows no remains. In 
games too, unlike the real, there is nothing left over' (1979/1990: 1350. Here then there 
is no remainder, no excess, yet no utility either. Further: 
... it makes no difference whether they be the rules of the game of the universe itself. there is no metaphysics looming on the horizon of the game's 
indefinitely reversible cycle - and certainly not the metaphysics of desire, 
which is still dependent on the world's natural order, or natural disorder 
(Baudrillard 1979/1990: 147). 
Here it is clear that Baudrillard finds little of value in Deleuze's discussions of the 
rhizome, of micro-relations of force and desire. These conceptual tools seek to 
accurately describe the 'real' nature of the universe, expressing an ontology of what 
Baudrillard terms "natural disordet". At may well be that Deleuzian philosophy offers 
the most plausible, most adequate metaphysics that has been developed in Western 
philosophy but this is of little interest to Baudrillard, 'Desire may well be the Law of 
the universe, but the eternal return is its Rule' (Baudrillard 1979/1990: 147)\ 
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Baudrillard, again sometimes close to Foucault's position, contends that the 
sexual, beyond its apparent liberation and proliferation has, in fact, become radically 
uncertain and indeterminate. This uncertainty is, in general, not enabling, according to 
Baudrillard; it does not open the way to authentic freedoms but rather is a condition of 
the hyperrealisation of the sexual. An authentic, true or'real'nature of human sexuality 
can no longer be located, though such a 'truth' is indeed still sought by the majority of 
those who aim to free sexuality from repression. Baudrillard does not-mourn the loss 
of the real in some nostalgic fashion, as has been charged, rather he attempts to chart 
the effects of this manic attempt to 'free' the sexual, to realise Jhe truth of self through 
desire, to cast off all restrictions in the quest for sexual reality. In Nietzschean terms 
then the contemporary quest for the unfettered truth of sex is but the latest 
manifestation of the nihilist spirit. A will-to-knowledge that is moralistic, resentful, that 
seeks to fabricate a new reality, a promised land, as a substitute for the spiritual 
emptiness of which it is but a manifestation. However in Baudrillard's reading this 
'stage of nihilism' has achieved the form of a generalised system, rooted in global 
capital, untrammelled commodification, the consumer culture of 'individual' desires, 
pleasures and gratification. This is "generalised simulation": 
... erotic polyvalence, the infinite potentiality of desire, different connections, diffractions, libidinal intensities - all multiple variants of a liberatory 
alternative coming from the frontiers of a psychoanalysis free of Freud, or 
from the frontiers of desire free of psychoanalysis (Baudrillard 1979/1990: 6). 16 
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SEDUCTION AND EXTREME VIOLENCE 
'If seduction is a passion or destiny, it is usually the opposite passion that prevails - that of not 
being seduced. We struggle to confirm ourselves in our truth: we fight against that which seeks to 
seduce us' (Baudrillard 1979/1990: 119). 
'-seduction belongs to the cultures of cruelty, and it is the only ceremonial form of the latter 
left to u, s-. It is what draws our attention to death, not in its organic and accidental form, but as 
something necessary and rigorous, the inevitable consequence of the game's rules' (Baudrillard 
1979/1990: 124). 
It has been made clear throughout this thesis that Baudrillard does not, 
specifically, address the phenomena of 'inexplicable' violence, of sexual or serial 
killing. However in a section of Seduction entitled 'The fear of being seduced' 
Baudrillard comes remarkably close to such an analysis. He addresses the gamut of 
contemporary psychopathological 'conditions' such as hysteria, anorexia, fetishism and 
impotence as strategies for the avoidance of seduction. Hysteria, for Baudrillard, 
represents the blocking of the immanent reversibility of seduction; while anorexia is the 
effacement of seduction through the self-disenchantment of body/image, which he 
argues is also central to the problem of impotence. Baudrillard does not define any of 
the above as specifically masculine or feminine 'disorders' but as generalised 
conditions that can afflict all in contemporary culture. Psychoanalysis and indeed the 
whole pop-psychology/therapy industry are for Baudrillard, the tools by which 
seduction is systematically effaced or rather 'imprison[ed] within the dilemma of sex'. 
However Baudrillard's analysis of fetishism, first addressed in The System of Objects 
(1968/1996) does probe the connection of'sexuality' and extreme violence. According 
to Baudrillard the fetishist fears and detests not only the seduction radiated by the 
object but also any seduction emanating from him or herself. The discussion hinges on 
a fictional character that kidnaps, imprisons and abuses a young woman in an attempt 
to achieve total control over the processes of seduction, love and intimacy. The 
fetishist also collects butterflies: 
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He prefers the monotonous fascination of the collection, the fascination with 
dead differences, this obsession with the same, over the seduction of the 
other ... she will die, not because he is a dangerous madman, but because he is 
. 
L, ZI K IgLcýl njo qtqdby_an. irre_yersible. --- 
logic. 
-, 
To seduce without being seduced - 
without reversibility (LBaudrillard 1979/1990: 123). 
These logical games of collection, the "monotonous fascinations" with "dead 
differences" or with "the same" are crucial in that they facilitate an alternative reading 
of conteniporary death-events, particularly serial killing. Baudrillard's fictional 
character plays 
_logýý4ý 
g4Mes ý: ýQýý broken the rule of reversibility. The 'game' is of 
his own design, it is individual. His victim is only part of his game and has no value 
beyond it. This is the cruelty and e7qTsion. of, hi§ _gapje,., ýý94 
is quite 'real'. The 
collector seeks power, control over his own failure, the failure to be seduced. He seeks 
total domination. This is achieved through collections, through control over parts, 
components, dead and inert objects. , 
It has already been noted that Jeffrey Dahmer and many other serial killers 
have been distinguished by their tendencies to collect objects related to their killings. 
Fred West, for example, was a voracious collector, fascinated precisely with the 'dead 
differences' of women's bodies, buried, or rather stored around his house, garden and 
other territories he regarded as his own. Wansell's (1996) detailed study of the West's 
makes only scant reference to academic studies of violence, yet emphasises, repeatedly, 
Fred West's obsessions with collections. The varieties of 'collections' are almost 
innumerable in this case. Firstly the burial sites of victims, the corpses themselves, 
stored not according to criteria based on the likelihood of discovery but rather in 
locations laden with symbolic meaning for West. More particularly West usually 
extracted certain Tavourite' bones from these bodies; fingers, ribs and kneecaps; 
sometimes these were labelled and stored away. West also collected the sperm of the 
men who visited his wife as she worked as a prostitute. West would collect his wife's 
stained underwear, partially bum it, then date and label each item before storing them 
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individually in glass jars. Other collections were perhaps less idiosyncratic, including 
pornography, sex toys and torture devices. Clearly West's actions followed a set ritual 
or logic and were carefully carried out. However West's perverse logic operated far 
beyond the moorings of 'rationality' in any legitimated form. West was an 
accomplished liar and as Wansell argues, remarkably adept at eluding police attention. 
However the sheer volume or 'excess' of West's macabre collections finally made it 
impossible for him to remain undetected. West played cruel but 'real' games of 
collection, following a strict logic of his own making. He tried to eliminate the 
reciprocal form of seduction in order to maintain. a mastery. pr control. Survivors of 
the West's crimes stress that Frederick himself rarely participated sexually but rather 
controlled the events from a 'safe' distance. Their abuse and murder of young women 
can be seen as a vicious attempt to destroy, more precisely to disenchant the bodies of 
the victims, eliminating their seduction. 
The established explanatory schemes of sociology, criminology and 
psychology are woefully inadequate faced with these events. A Freudian account of 
fetishism and sadism may provide something of a starting point but no more since any 
typology of universalised instincts and developmental stages is unable to approach the 
distinctiveness of this case. Certainly neither Fred or Rose West had a 'normal' 
childhood, both were involved in long-term incestuous relationships with their opposite 
sex parents. Freudian accounts of the Oedipus and castration complexes are scarcely 
adequate here. " N or did Fred West seem to correspond to any culturally sanctioned 
form of masculinity; to claim he represented 'normal' masculinity is highly 
problematic. While aggression certainly is a key component of modem masculinity the 
ritual destruction of women's bodies is not. Variants of the'crisis of masculinity' thesis 
then appear to have little purchase. " West was described at length by a number of 
those around him. None regarded him as either excessively masculine or 'macho', nor 
as 'weak' or 'effeminate'. He was felt to be a good talker, the sort of person who would 
always avoid a physical fight, who would talk his way out of trouble. In general he was 
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a popular man and seemed to find it easy to attract company, especially that of women. 
Perhaps then West was seductive. 
Further neither Fred nor Rose West seems to correspond in anyway to Seltzer's 
(1998) description of the serial killer. Seltzer describes the serial killer as "statistical 
person", the "mass-in-person" the "devoid" (Seltzer 1998: 1-25). By these terms Seltzer 
refers to ways in which contemporary identity may be 'swamped' even 'erased' by 
mass-technologies of media and simulation. Subjectivity is reduced to standardised 
themes or codes drawn from the mass media, the serial killer seems to lack any 
personality or distinctiveness, they merely reflect the established discourses about their 
nature and reflect or fulfil the roles that criminologists and the media assign them. 
Though dealing specifically with American serial killers Seltzer does refer to Fred West 
in passing but does not draw out the distinctiveness of this case. Rather than being in 
any way "abnormally-normal", as Seltzer would suggest, both the West's seemed 
highly distinctive, far from 'fading into the background' they were well known in their 
community. Neither affluent nor poor, they seemed a little old-fashioned, provincial in 
outlook, and not at all the technologised, post-subjective "mass-in-person" that Seltzer 
describes. Something of the distinctiveness of the West's case resides in the fact that it 
was understood by the media as 'individual' (or inter-indivi dual) criminality, located in 
the 'acts' of the principal actors. This is in contrast to the 'event' of Hungerford in 
1987, and the 'event' of Dunblane in 1996, which were not understood in terms of 
individual actions but as 'Event', as if the actors involved where indeed 'devoid' of 
identity and motivation, 'irradiated' by their 'environment', the space of the event. 
Michael Ryan and Thomas Hamilton then do seem to correspond, in part, to Seltzer's 
suggestions, lacking in 'self-hood', deficient, mimicking a particular variant of 
contemporary 'survivalist' culture in order to maintain 'inadequate' or absent identities. 
However the West's seemed to retain, stubbornly, highly idiosyncratic personal 
identities. Perhaps these cases are fundamentally different, the West's being serial 
killers, Ryan and Hamilton spree-killers. Paradoxically though Seltzer's 
characterisation of the serial killer seems able to grasp something of the cases of Ryan 
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and Hamilton, who were not serial killers, while it is ineffective in t 
West's who, arguably, were. 
Baudrillard's later work has theorised the appearance of! singtkaritjT41 within 
mass culture. This provides a way of thinking beyond Seltzer's formulations while 
retaining what is of importance in his work. Baudrillard (1978/1983) posits the 
collapse of 'the social' as referent and meaning, into the 'mass' a silent, inert and 
paradoxical post-social form. The mass or masses absorb meaning (the media, 
information) more rapidly than meaning can be produced. This represents "the death of 
the social" and the failure of the social sciences, which attempt to 'capture meaning', 
'That the silent majority (or the masses) is an imaginary referent does not mean they 
don't exist. It means that their representation is no longer possible, '(Baudrillard 
1978/1983: 20). Masses and the singularities within them are of the dimension of 
simulation not representation. Baudrillard speaks of a transition from the 'rational' 
violence of political power to an 'irrational' violence of post-political forms; his 
privileged example is terrorism. My contention is that contemporary death-events and 
the phenomena of 'serial killing' are even more characteristic of the contemporary 
order Baudrillard seeks to describe. In these also 'meaning is absent, it is an irrational 
violence without purpose as such' (ibid. ). This is violence beyond utilitarian purpose, 
beyond any 'gain', perhaps even in terms of 'pleasure'. Yet these cases reflect the 
'violence' of contemporary culture; individual gratification is prized beyond any ethical 
relation. The serialised and compulsive production of horror mimics the serialised 
production of commodities and consumers; the serialisation of desire. Seltzer argues 
serial killing is inextricably bound up with modem techniques of serialisation, 
recording and transmitting, it is a thoroughly media-tised phenomenon from the 
construction of F. B. I. profiles to 'copy-cat' simulations of the media, cinema and 
literature (Seltzer 1998: 125-158). 
For Baudrillard such. events-are- notthe revolt of disorder nainst, qrder,. ýyt thý 
mutant acceleration of order into horror and obscenity, "a hyperreal conformity". Yet 
Baudrillard rejects the suggestion that contemporary culture or media 'produces' such 
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violence. Reason, he argues, cannot extend this far; in fact it attempts to "neutralise" 
such events by assigning them 'meaning' without actually 'thinking' them. Beyond 
meaning, according to Baudrillard, is pure fascination, thought can only affirm the 
"simultaneity" and "violent implosion7 of these events. In a certain sense they are 
indeed 'inexplicable', 'elsewhere', "mythical perhaps, simulacrum undoubtedly ... a 
strange mixture of the symbolic and the spectacular, of the challenge and 
simulation"(Baudrillard 1978/1983: 54). Within the, mass, where any 'identity' exists 
only in simulation, in the network not the individual, sudden singularities emerge. Such 
44anomalies" acquire force or intensity "within the indistinct ensemble of the system" 
(Baudrillard 1997/1998: 76) but are catastrophic to it because they are "explosions" in 
an "imploding" system. 
However is it not the case that sexuality, desire and lust were the central 
components of the West's crimes? It cannot, plausibly, be argued that sexuality played 
no part in these events, but equally sexuality should not be asserted as the 'real 
foundation' or ultimate 'cause' of such activities. The notion of power is perhaps more 
crucial here and Baudrillard's reading of seduction involves a significant relocation of 
the role played by power in violent activities. The fear and avoidance of the reciprocity 
of seduction, Baudrillard sti gests, actualises a dangerous and highly unstable form of 9- 
-- ý, - --- -, -----.. -., __- _: 1-1 
power relation between subject and'object'. Such a system remains at the mercy of the 
principle of seduction through sudden reversal and is only maintained by 
_the 
subject 
raising the stakes to an impossible degree, to a matter of life and death, a radically 
disenchanted 'sacrifice'. " 
Finally it is necessary to return to perhaps the most harrowing recent example 
of the death-event; the murder of James Bulger. I return to this case because here any 
residue of 'sexual rationality' seems to be absent. In fact events of this case suggest the 
deliberate fabrication of the sexual as motive, reason or 'cause' of behaviour. This 
feature suggests a new reading of sexuality as a mode of fabrication or simulation is 
necessary. 
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The Bulger case seems to be unique in many ways. Despite the existence of a 
number of documented cases of children killing children during the post-war period, 
boih in Britain and elsewhere, this case seemed to signal, for many, an event of 
fundamental importance. According to Morrison (1997): 
Some deaths are emblematic, tipping the scales, and little James's 
death ... seemed like the murder of hope: the unthinkable thought of, the 
undoable done. If child-killings are the worst killings, then a child child- 
killing must be worse than worst, a new superlative in horror. In that spring of 
fear, it was as if there'd been a breach in nature. [T]hose nameless boys had 
killed not just a child but the idea of childhood, all it happy first 
associations... [T]en year olds were looked at with a new suspicion, and 
toddlers kept on tight reins (Morrison 1997: 21). 
A further apparently unique characteristic of the case was the existence of 
security video-footage of the abduction taking place: cameras in the shopping centre 
had recorded the event for all to see. , Again this accelerated the horror; the viewer was 
situated within the event, yet powerless to intervene, implicated in horror yet only able 
to watch. This was a hyperreal event. The trial of James Bulger's killers was also 
unique, though the defendants were only ten years old their trial was public and carried 
out in an adult court and under intense media scrutiny. This event, it seemed, was too 
momentous; too shocking to be handled in the manner usually reserved for juveniles. 
The global media descended demanding to know 'why' this event occurred. What must 
be emphasised here is that despite the intense scrutiny, this will-to-knowledge, no 
convincing 'account' of why the death occurred has ever emerged. The court 
proceedings certainly did not provide Us and for important reasons examined below. 
The event seemed to disable all forms of explanation and comprehension. The media, 
the police and others circulated many 'explanatory' factors. These ranged from the 
social and environmental; for the 'left' high unemployment, " social deprivation, 
poverty, for the 'right' breakdown in family and school discipline, and falling moral and 
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religious standards. Both left and right supplemented these claims with appeals to the 
effects of violent video 'nasties'. The trial judge, Sir Michael Morland even referred to 
viýeo 'nasties' in his sentencing despite the fact they had not been mentioned during the 
trial. 
The inadequacies of these 'explanatory' devices are obvious. They can offer 
no more than 'background', in the crudest sense, to this event. For example the media 
discovered and circulated a list of the 50 video films that the father of one of the 
accused boys had hired, and so may have been watched by his son, in the six months 
before the murder. Not only was the number of videos rented very low, less than one 
per week, but the films themselves were all mainstream and universally available. 
Only one of the fifty could be regarded as 'top shelf, involving nudity but no violence. 
There was nothing, except media hypocrisy, to indicate that the boy's father was a 
'pom-freak'or'horror-buff, or any evidence that his son watched any of the films. 
Further neither of the boys came from particularly deprived backgrounds. 
Some signs of behavioural disturbance at school emerged retrospectively but these 
were insufficient to warrant attention from schoolteachers or other professionals at the 
time. There was never any suggestion that either had suffered any form of child abuse, 
sexual or otherwise. 21 One of the boys was from a 'poorer' area, and his family were 
known as petty offenders by the local police, on this basis alone the media claimed, 
widely, that he was the 'ring-leadee, persuading the boy from the 'better' family to join 
him, 'egging him on'. This is pure conjecture of the most stereotypical and uninformed 
variety present the qomfoqjIIg iillusilQi off LxR! Ination. 
In his sentencing the trial judge offered the following: 
The killing of James Bulger was an act of unparalleled evil and barbarity ... it is 
not for me to pass judgement on their upbringing, but I suspect that exposure 
to violent video films may in part be an explanation (reproduced in Morrison 
1997: 228-9). 
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The language of'evil', of innate human evil, reappears here, as if it is the final 
resort when all 'rational' explanation fails. The Ian uage of evil is deploved to name 
the 'un-nameable', the beyond or excess of humanity and reason. This event had 
redefined, re-articulated evil, it had re-located excess, the limit and its beyond. This 
event was beyond the limits of reason, suggesting not Kant's radical evil but something 
else, something from 'elsewhere'. The response of the then Prime Minister John Major 
revealed, clearly, the flight from reason, in order that a simplistic condemnation could 
be made, 'We must condemn a little more, and understand a little less' (ibid). T4ýý is a 
truly ridiculous fon-nula but one that reveals the catastrophic failure of reason when 
confronted by kqMqr, 
_ýy 
excess. 
Morrison and Sereny are highly critical of the court proceedings, the use of 
psychologists and other 'experts' to establish the grounds for guilt. The court, Morrison 
argues, restricted itself to the 'how' of the event, excluding the 'why'. Morrison 
speculates that the two boys did not "yet" understand the distinction between right and 
wrong, as adults do, and blames psychologists for suggesting they did. He also takes 
issue with the Judge over the i1se of the term 'evil'. Morrison suggests a more 'rational', 
legal system, involving more women in positions of power, would have been more 
sensitive to the trauma faced by the accused boys. This, he argues, may have allowed 
the'Why'of the events to speak and to be heard. Morrison emphasises the unforgivable 
"repression" of the 'Why'but what his appeal to a reconstituted reason fails to address is 
that the 'repression' of the 'Why' is fundamental to the operation of Reason. This 
'repression' itself enables and safeguards a space that allows reason, in both 'left' and 
'right-wing' variants to function. Without this space reason itself collapses. What had 
to be held in place was at least some functioning of reason. Though reason fails to 
secure a stable or fixed 'explanation' of such events, it interprets this incompletion by 
setting up sidual space, positing a limit that safeguards rationality this side of the 
limit. Further the beyond of this limit, since it is beyond reason and thereby 
unfathomable can be claimed as a supplement or even transcendent source of reason. 
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This limited space is where John Major effects condemnation while it also enables 
Morrison, Sereny and others to effect compassion. These then are political/discursive 
supplements or deferrals of the operation of reason, reason can never complete itself, 
yet so long as it can create some form, some account, it can actually thrive on these 
limited, restricted and useful instabilities. What this event threatened was to rip apart, 
to short-circuit the recuperative and supplementary operations of reason. Indeed as 
Bataille argued it is the instability, danger and impossibility of forging a stable 
rationality that creates spaces for zones of transcendence in a 'beyond', which can be 
claimed as God, Pure reason or any other transcendent principle (Bataille in Shaviro 
1990: 10). 
More specifically structures of 'sexual reason' were disabled by this event. 
Police interrogations searched for a sexual motivation in vain. In fact it seemed the 
boys had interfered with the body in order to simulate the appearance of a sexual crime, 
probably in order to create the impression that an adult was responsible for the death. 
This is the conclusion reached by Smith (1994) and suggested by Morrison (1997). 
This feature of the case is crucial in a number of respects. Firstly it indicates the 
'logical' character of the boys actions. They did not merely 'Jose their tempers' or 
'lapse' into spontaneous violence. This aspect of the case shows, to chilling effect, 
something of the interpenetration of logic and horror, of reason and excess. To 
simulate the appearance of adult sex crime suggests rational calculation accompanied 
by an act which can only be 'thought' in terms of 'unreason'. Reason and excess (in 
modernity labelled 'unreason) cannot be separated, they cannot be disarticulated, and 
this case demonstrates their interconnection in the most brutal fashion. This is a stark 
example of the symbolic relations of connection and reciprocity between 'good' and 
'evil', between positive and negative, between reason and excess that Baudrillard 
insists upon. 
A second aspect, which must be emphasised here, again relates directly to 
Baudrillard's thought. It concerns the phenomena of simulation and the simulacra. 
Sexual reason, as any branch of reason, cannot complete itself, cannot ground itself 
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convincingly in any principle or cause. Reason then is always a mode of fabrication or 
simulation. This is not to say that reason is thereby false, mistaken or a 'lie', rather as 
Ba udrillard argues to simulate is 'to feign to possess what one does not possess' 
(Baudrillard 1981/1994: 3). Any 'rational' account of an event or process, particular 
events as threatening and 'inexplicable' as those cited here, must depend on the 
weaving of signs, images, appearances, connections; pýq! ýýdures- that-are not 'given' in 
the events-, but are structures of thou&kt, 
_ff_reason. 
In this way they 'feign' an 
explanation. Thought can either acknowledge ineffable limits to its operation or it can 
denv or attempt to efface them. Sociological thought, in general, fails to admit of these 
conditions, interpreting its 
--- 
limits as 
-something 
to be minimise4 or controlled, or as an Ll 
'enabling' condition that stimulates greater efforts. Baudrillard suggests a different 
strategy, 'Since the world is on a delusional course, we must adopt a delusional 
standpoint towards the world' (1990/1993: 1). This expresses Baudrillard's remarkable 
project; to think a world that eludes the categories of reason. However this world is not 
merely 'irrational' or even 'indifferent', for Baudrillard it contains the possibilities of 
maleficence and evil. 
CONCLUDING RENURKS 
This chapter has explored Bataille's notion of eroticism and Baudrillard's 
principle of seduction. I have shown that these notions are distinct from dominant 
thinking on sexuality, which posit either sex instincts or the construction of masculine 
sexuality as the foundation, cause and explanation of extreme violence. These modes 
of thought fail; in particular to grasp the class of violence I have termed contemporary 
death-events. 
Bataille's approach to eroticism and violence is important and suggestive but 
contains tensions and problems, particularly concerning the bio-chemical 'need' for 
violence. Baudrillard's notion of seduction is related in some respects but ultimately 
departs sharply, form Bataille's influence. As well as rejecting Bataille's bio-chernical 
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base materialism, Baudrillard's idiosyncratic, even perverse, rejection of feminist 
theory and the 'sexual revolution' en masse accounts for much of what is distinctive 
ana difficult in the latter's thought. 
I have emphasised the importance of Bataille's eroticism and Baudrillard's 
seduction as reciprocal and reversible forms that undermine the possibility of 
masculinity as control and mastery and are antagonistic to all contemporary notions of 
individualism. Where such reciprocal forms are broken or marginalised, mastery, 
control and the accumulation of power over the 'Other' come to the fore. Here 
cmastery' may take the form of collections; such activities can be interpreted as 
radically individualised, 'psychologised' fon-ns of ritual behaviour, contemporary 
rituals devoid of socially legitimated meaning but invested with personalised 
'signatures'. Rather than the "return" of subjective agency in a world of insecurity and 
"powerlessness" (Masters 1996, Wilson & Wilson 1998) -a reading which naturalises 
individual subjective agency, Baudrillard approaches such events in terms of ritual. In 
this reading subjectivity is always an illusory, impossible project because the 
ftindamental stakes of the symbolic; ritual, illusion and reversibility disable or abolish 
the basis of subjective agency. Baudrillard reads contemporary 'psycho-pathologies' in 
this way but fails to make clear that reason, even 'patriarchy', breaks the symbolic 
relation long before feminism or the 'sexual revolution' emerged, though certain 
features of the latter do indeed repeat the destructive gestures of enlightenment reason. 
This chapter has drawn, selectively, on the themes of eroticism, seduction, and 
latterly Baudrillard's notion of the mass and the singularity as contributions to an 
alternative reading of contemporary- forms of extreme violence. To develop this 
reading further it is crucial to consider the meaning and status of 'evil' in contemporary 
culture. To what extent can extreme violence be thought in terms of 'evil' and what 
forms would such 'evil' take? 
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NOTES 
1) These assumptions are also challenged in feminist theory. Much feminism 
however is locked into the sexuality as 'deep' reality paradigm, particularly popular 
feminist writing. This can be the case in both 'constuctivist' and 'essentialist' 
feminism. Of course some feminist thinkers do not fall into this category and have 
made important contributions to problematising such assumptions. Perhaps most 
notable here is Judith Butler whose focus on iteration and citationary techniques of 
gender construction is, at times, close to the approach I seek through a reading of 
Baudrillard. See Butler (1993). As Foucault (1976/1979) argued, it is increasingly 
meaningless, though often politically or rhetorically expedient, to speak of sexual 
frepression' per se. This is not to claim that a paradise of sexual freedoms has now 
been achieved, though such a notion, scarcely even meaningful, structures much 
popular reflection, either as goal to be attained, or condition to be enjoyed. 
2) Of course it is still, generally speaking, the case that heterosexual lifestyles 
are more vigorously marketed than gay or lesbian ones. However it is difficult to 
maintain the claim that these groups are simply 'repressed'. To some extent, the 
feminine has been situated as 'other' in that it is comprehended both privatively, as 
the absence of male or masculine characteristics, and as containing the possibility of 
a substantive, threatening form that is unknown and does not correspond to 
recognised forms of rational subjectivity. In this sense there is clearly a connection 
between the notions of negativity, evil and femininity as locations or sites of excess 
in the Western tradition. Each of these have occupied an unstable and dangerous 
position in Western thought, with conceptualisation veering from the strictly 
privative, to claim that they represent no essential otherness or difference, or indeed 
do not exist as such, to claims of a substantiveness, an autonomy or a radical 
otherness, an excess. Tseelon (1995) has begun to examine these themes. 
3) This attitude has been expressed most powerfully in the work of Andrea 
Dworkin (198 1). 
4) See for example essays by Suleiman, S. and Boldt-Irons, L. in Bailey-Gill 
(1995). 
5) For example see The Baudrillard Reader, Kellner Ed. (1994). 
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6) For an excellent summary of these themes see Bristow (1997), other 
important studies here include Havelock Ellis (1897&1933) and Kinsey et al. 
(1948&1953). 
7) In Freud's tripartite scheme the earliest sexual pleasures are oral, centred on 
breast-feeding and sucking. The second stage is anal, and pleasure is still autocrotic, 
revolving around defecation and learning to control this process in accordance with 
adult wishes. Both oral and anal stages are, according to Freud, characterised by 
tendencies toward cruelty or sadism. Biting in particular is a sadistic form of oral 
pleasure, while for Freud the anal stage marks the emergence of the experiences of 
activity and passivity, of sadism and masochism. It should be noted here however 
that since instinctual drives are blind and impersonal, they are not manageable 
through the subject's conscious mind or'choice'. For this reason childhood is often 
said to be a domain of innocence, since apparently cruel acts are in fact only trial and 
error attempts to gain mastery over unruly objects. The connections between sexual 
instincts and violence or aggression are treated in detail in Freud's Three Essays on 
the 27wory of Sexuality (1905 in Freud 1991a), in particular the first essay 'The 
Sexual Aberrations' which deals with sadism. 
8) For example see the popular accounts of violence by Masters (1997) and 
Wilson (1982,1995). 
9) See Hollier (1992: 14-23). 
10) See again Dworkin (198 1) and also Gallop (198 1). 
11) Pornography is rooted in rational calculation,,, certaint (of outcome) and 
utility (titillation, masturbation). It is frequently dull and repetitious even in its most 
extreme forms, for example Sade's novels. Mayne contends, rightly, that social 
definitions of pornography and obscenity actually serve to forestall any serious 
thinking into what constitutes obscenity. According to Mayne censorship is not 
geared to the repression of pornography, indeed the sex industries are allowed to 
diversify and flourish, rather what is intolerable is actually eroticism, that is the 
serious and direct reflection on human se. xual. natures in-thewidest ible sense. 
See Mayne (1993). 
12) Though there have been many criticisms directed at Baudrillard's work 
Seduction few of them really engage Baudrillard effectively. An exception is Gallop 
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(1989) who charges Baudrillard, rightly, with refusing to follow through the 
implications of seduction and counter-seduction (i. e. reversibility) in his attacks on 
the feminist movement. As she argues, Baudrillard remains stubbornly unseduced 
and indiscriminate in his rejection of it. 
13) See in particular Baudrillard's Forget Foucault (1977/1987). 
14) This was not the case with Foucault's earlier studies, such as his work on 
madness (1961/1967). 
15) Each of these is an anthropomorphic or at least 'morphic' gesture, weaving 
meanings from unfathomable flux. For Baudrillard, as for Nietzsche, some human 
cultures achieved a relation to the beyond that is based on the affirmation of 
enchantment, ritual and play, which have engaged in a mutual exchange of seduction 
and counter-seduction, of gift and counter-gift. These relations, of course, are 
mythic yet that does not indicate that they are somehow 'false', mistaken or naive. 
This is the prejudice of Western scientific procedures, which seek to unveil, to 
correct, to finalise and to contain. The scientific myths necessary to achieve these 
operations are often highly effective and long-lived yet they never attain, despite 
frequent claims to the contrary, fixity or completion. What is important about this 
lack of completion is not the suggestion, or indeed the hope, that there will remain 
stubborn vestiges of the unknown at the perimeters of scientific knowledge. Rather 
it is that scientific method itself interprets this lack of completion as failure, as 
obstacle to be eliminated in the quest for final, total ftinctional transparency. It is 
then fascinating that the scientific community still claims to be on the verge of the 
final solution, the completion of its project. Yet, even in its own terms, science fails 
to arrive at this point. It is this restrictive, calculative nature; the drive to unveil, 
reduce and dissolve that makes scientific myths banal, utilitarian, disenchanting. It 
may have been possible for scientific mythology to become affirmative, enchanting, 
life enhancing, as Nietzsche hoped, but this has never happened and as scientific 
exploration is narrowed into technological and military application the possibility 
becomes increasingly remote. Baudrillard's terminology for these systems of myth 
and metaphor, the weaving of meaning and 'reality' from cultural imperatives is the 
shnulacruin, the modes of the appearance of 'reality', the codes, models and matrices 
of simulation. For Baudrillard, Foucault's work situates production and functionality 
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as reality principle that is as the ultimate grounding of reality, as meta-principle. 
Baudrillard's Seduction however is not merely substituted for production as new 
reality principle, though an incautious reading of Baudrillard's work could give this 
impression, rather seduction is a term for the radical absence of the real, the 
impossibility of any deep or final grounding principle. Seduction then is the play of 
appearance, of artifice, of surfaces. It is opposed to everything that is supposedly 
deep and essential, fixed and real. 
16) Baudrillard's target here seems to be Deleuze, and those who have followed 
him in the celebration of libidinal desire as the ultimate form of materialist thought; 
the multiple, rhizomatic connections of a post-Freudian libidinal economy of 
liberated desire. Indeed Baudrillard develops a rather disjointed but suprisingly 
persistent critique of Deleuze in Seduction, 'New diagonals of meaning, new 
sequences can be engendered from the untamed flood tides of desire ... the molecular 
or intensive philosophies ... claim to undermine meaning by diffraction, hook-ups and 
the Brownian movements of desire. One does not escape meaning by dissociation, 
disconnection or deterritorialization. One escapes meaning by replacing it with a 
more radical simulacrum, a still more conventional order ... [I]ndeterminacy, 
dissociation or proliferation in the form of a star or rhizome only generalise 
meaning's sphere of influence to the entire sphere of non-sense. That is, they merely 
generalise meaning's pure form, an abstract finality with neither a detenninate end 
nor contents. Only rituals abolish meaning. (1979/1990: 138). 
17) According to Wansell (1996) Rosemary West's father continued to have 
incestuous relations with his daughter throughout her marriage to Fred West, who 
would encourage and sometimes observe these occurrences. Wansell also reports 
that Frederick, at the age of 14, had been initiated into bestiality by his father and, 
shortly after, incest by his mother. A Freudian framework of 'normal' sexual 
development is surely disabled by these events. These events were not 'repressed 
childhood trauma' since they were consciously recognised, talked about and in the 
case of incest frequently repeated. Even more i mportantly neither Fred nor 
Rosemary West exhibited any signs of recognisable 4mental disorder' in adult life 
according to psychiatric accounts. Like Thomas Hamilton and the killers of James 
Bulger the West's were not mentally ill. Recent psychiatric research, such as Jenkins 
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(1988) and Stone (1994) suggests that as many as half of all documented serial 
killers suffered no physical or sexual abuse nor physical or emotional deprivation in 
childhood. In many other cases levels of abuse or deprivation are insufficiently 
serious to function even as 'contextual factors' according to these researchers. 
18) Recent studies of the relation between masculinity and violent crime have 
been unable to confront these issues convincingly. See for example Newburn and 
Stanko (Eds. ) (1994). 
19) Baudrillard's analysis here clearly owes much to Freud, though Baudrillard 
claims, rather problematically, to have 'turned Freud against Freud' and to have 
broken out of psychoanalytic orthodoxy. Genosko (1998) has 'begun to probe 
Baudrillard's writings on the symbolic and illusion more effectively than most 
secondary sources. This work questions Baudrillard's reading of Freud; see Genosko 
(1998: 12-47). 
20) The national average in 1992-3 was I I% approx. while in Liverpool it was 
considerably higher at 15.2%. In fact 30% of all 18-24 year-olds were unemployed. 
See Morrison (1997). 
21) Sereny (1995) repeats the common assumption that children who have been 
sexually abused go on to be abusers. In fact she makes this point the centrepiece of 
her account of the Bulger case despite admitting there was no suggestion that either 
of the boys convicted of killing James Bulger were sexually abused. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
EVIL: SOCIAL THEORY AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 
INTRODUCTION 
'The admirable beauty of the Universe is composed of all things; there even what is called 
evil is well-balanced and in its place, serves to enhance the good' (St. Augustine 1953: 10). 1 
'Nature herself, I fear, implants in men some instinct towards inhumanity' (Montaigne 195 8 
2: 11). 
'under what conditions did man invent the value judgements good and evil? and what value 
do they themselves haveT (Nietzsche 1994: 5). 
The preceding chapters explored contemporary death-events through a 
reading of excess, negativity and the relation between extreme violence and 
sexuality. The discourse of 'evil' ýappeared, repeatedly, in these discussions. For 
some thinkers 'evil' is the only term which adequately expresses the horror and 
intensity of these events. For others, however, the terminology of 'evil' is totally 
mistaken and must be avoided at all costs if such events are to be properly 
'understood'. 'Evil' seems to be somehow central to perceptions of contemporary 
death-events. The language of evil cannot be ignored or obliterated, it persists and 
must be confronted. The following chapters address 'evil' in detail. The present 
chapter is concerned with the conceptualisation of evil in Christian, enlightenment 
and modem social thought. 
Evil occupies a crucial yet exceptionally ambiguous position within Western 
religious, moral and social thought. The meanings assigned to evil, and reflections 
upon it, are usually constrained by the rubric of the 'problem of evil' and its possible 
solutions. Evil is so problematic because its existence or manifestation, still worse 
its expansion or acceleration, seems radically destructive of faith, not only in a 
benevolent god but also of a meaningful universe, rational humanity and progressive 
society. Recently the'problem of evil'has been called theAchilles heel'of Christian 
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theology and declared to have no satisfactory solution within either religious or 
secular thought. 2 However in modem and contemporary social theory new and 
different approaches to evil have emerged which are not structured by the logic of 'a 
solution to a problem'. Some of these approaches insist on the existence of evil, 
others reject, deny, displace or re-articulate it. The purpose, over these two chapters, 
is to explore these theories, against the context of theological and enlightenment 
sources and to question how satisfactorily they approach contemporary experiences 
of 'evil', of 'random' destruction and 'inexplicable' violence. 
The etymology of the term 'evil' is not especially revealing, ýut does yield a 
wide range of meaning. Evil connotes, the "wicked, bad, mischievous", also the 
"unfortunate"; harm, illness, disease, curse and sin 3 and finally is associated with 
"the devil" or Satan. The term encompasses the most "depraved or repulsive" as 
well as the merely "disagreeable" (ibid. ); simultaneously applicable to both human 
and divine agency, and seems able to signify at once, the quintessentially human, the 
inhuman and the supernatural. It has been suggested 4 that today the term 'evil' has 
lost its stronger metaphysical overtones and merely connotes the 'bad'. Such an 
evaluation is hasty and far more readily applicable to the term 'wicked', the notion of 
'evil', it will be argued, retains an immensely powerful charge, a fierce grip on the 
human imagination. 
This chapter claims that evil forms A-prucial. and apparently- ineradicable 
dimension of human experience, marking the perhaps unrepresentable limit-point of 
cultural meaning; 'evil' seems to operate at the boundaries of the knowable and 
explicable within any cultural system. In this sense evil plays a crucial, yet often 
unspecified symbolic role in determining how any cultural system understands and 
orders itself in relation to that which threatens it. The term 'evil' is invoked in 
situations-where order. Dredictability and proporti on are broken, lost or tom apart. 
Further I argue that 'evil' in contemporary experience possesses a new 
specificity. While 'evil' remains a fundamental axis of cultural experience 
symbolising the excessive and terrifying, recent culturally traumatic events have 
seemed to signal new, different or intensified forms of 'evil'. This can be termed 
jde-racimi6dlorl&ýfr6dfured 'evil"'/ The global news industry displays atrocities and 
'humanitarian disasters' from all over the world structured by divisions between 
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ethnic, religious or political groups. However recent events, contemporary death- 
evens, seem to be new and culturally 'indecipherable'. This apparent inexplicability, 
though significant, can serve to foreclose further enquiry and make 'evil' actions and 
'inexplicable' actions somehow synonymous. Some 'evil' actions are in fact all too 
comprehensible, not 'inexplicable' at all. These complex issues of responsibility, 
cevil or illness' are explored below. 
Many 'notions of evil' abound in contemporary literary, juridical, scientific, 
media and popular thought. The term 'evil' is deployed in commonplace and 
journalistic accounts persistently, even where the mode of enquiry is otherwise 
secular, agnostic, or atheist. Both juridical and media accounts of culturally traumatic 
events, such as the murder of James Bulger, the activities of Frederick and Rosemary 
West and the Dunblane massacre, resort to the language of inherent or innate human 
evil. While such phraseology may appear incautious, archaic or 'counter- 
productive'; 5 liberal-progressive and medical-psychiatric discourse seeking to 
uncover social, psychological or environmental factors such as childhood 
mistreatment to account for the 'lapse from full humanity', are often deeply 
unconvincing. Such accounts aim. to minimise or eliminate the possibility of an 
action bein g defined 'evil' by deploying a symptomology of illness or malfunction. 
However as Connolly (1991) has argued jiý si! Rply substitute 'illness' for the terni 
Gevil' is still to-q-, 6pýql ýýq contain threatening possibilities without confronting them. 
In short, they_ offer . 
restricted economies. Such discourse repeats many assumptions 
of Christian, moral and enlightenment thought, often in unacknowledged ways, 
paying little attention to the distinctiveness of such bodies of thought. Distinct or 
contradictory terms are conflated, particularly in popular discourse where phrases 
such as 'evil madman' are common despite the fact dominant rationality depends on a 
clear distinction between criminal responsibility and 'insanity'. 6 Such discourses 
lose their explanatory moorings by being unable to engage with the material and 
cultural horror of such events with anything like commensurate terminology. 
Academic accounts of evil as extreme violence, for example Staub (1989) try to link 
social and ideological 'enabling' factors to psychological 'triggering mechanisms' 
such as stress and fear. Such studies go some way towards thinking violence 
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structured by ethnic, religious or political intolerance but fail when faced with events 
lacking these features. 
The contemporary natural sciences are far from immune to hypothesising on 
the apparently archaic notion of evil. Within the context of post-Darwinian 
biological and genetic theory a new scientific 'myth' of evil has appeared. Here the 
social implications of Darwinian theory are said to be evil, 'the selfish gene' as 
unchangeable biological 'given' has been argued to impact upon the human world as 
levil'. 7 
In much popular, media and juridical discourse that utilises the notion of 
evil, the term appears, not in its strictly Christian sense, as a privation or perversion 
of the inherent goodness of the universe, but rather akin to a Manichean or Zorastrian 
dualist sense of the term. Evil, as it appears in such systems, is presented as a radical 
af and substantive-foroe undamental,, ineradicable affliction, equal and opposite to 
the Good.., This. dualist sense of evil, where the mindibody disjunction is even more 7), 
pronounced than in Christianity, has haunted the Western imagination for centuries 
having an enormous impact on social theory as well as the popular imagination. The 
tensions, instabilities and slippages between privative and substantive notions of evil 
are central to the history of this concept in the Western tradition. Many accounts, 
especially populist ones conflate the privative and substantive or straddle, 
unknowingly, the two. This occurs, it will be argued, because these terms are 
inherently unstable and unsatisfactory. 
A substantive force of evil, the assumption goes, may either be positively 
chosen by the morally debased for excitement or 'kicks', or it may engulf the 
mentally weak or impressionable. Here the theorisation of evil is both privative and 
substantive, since evil as a substantive force can only, or is likely only to be chosen 
where their is a pre-existing privation in the individual, group or culture. In this 
situation evil, conceived simultaneously as privative and substantive becomes locked 
in perpetual conflict with moral goodness. Further and crucially, evil, in some 
largely unspecified sense explored below, is often presented as more powerful, 
exciting and seductive than moral goodness. Such an interpretation or intuition is 
more closely aligned with Manichean than the mainstream Judaeo-Christian views of 
evil, though these sources are not fully separable. 
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Such contradictions and ambiguities concerning the nature of 'evil'persist in 
modem social theory. The remarkable endurance of such a sense of evil exposes 
something of the inherent weakness of modem rationalism, in particular its il e -to ur 
complete its progressive project, and the unending resistance of the human 
imagination to its claims. 
No conclusive definition of 'evil' can be given, but by tracing its forms, 
manifestations and inscription across a variety of cultural settings it should be 
possible to facilitate a keener sense of what constitutes 'evil'. In the following 
chapter the theorisation of evil in Bataille and Baudrillard will be addiessed in detail, 
vis a vis other important strands of Post-structuralist thinking on excess. The 
distinctiveness of Bataille and Baudrillard will be emphasised in order to 
demonstrate their irreducibility to this imprecise term. These w riters are concerned 
with evil asprinciple, not asproblem, fihe aisiiýction is_ýiiiýlia-17 The purpose will be 
to evaluate and develop their thinking, and specifically to situate the linked 
phenomena of transgression, cruelty, and seduction in relation to the principle of evil. 
Their treatment of evil is as excess, not as substantive form, but neither as 'lack', 
privation or non-existence. This understanding of the notion of evil is argued to be 
central to an appreciation of their distinctiveness and importance, and to offer a 
potential approach to recent cultural traumas that remain beyond the grasp or 
competence of other, more mainstream, forms of social thought. 
The discussion here will, necessarily, draw upon a wide range of imprecise 
or apparently archaic terminology; evil, the malefic, the sacred, and emotions or 
affects such as lust and rage. These are overlapping yet far from synonymous terms 
and phenomena. 
To dwell on the meaning of evil is commonly regarded as highly suspect 
and for many can be dismissed as the return of bizarre superstitious or irrational fears 
t a at t] 
dd. s 
t the very moment when freedom and liberation should be on the agenda. Yet this 
iscussion will argue that the process of-rationalisation-itself-facilitates-conditions 
where. various -forms of -'evi-P-may emerge oraccelerate. 
The contemporary imagination, when confronted with the extremes and 
excesses of human experience, events such as the murder of James Bulger or the 
Dunblane massacre, finds it exceptionally difficult not to employ the language of 
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&evil'. In this respect techno-scientific rationality is a no more successful bulwark 
against violent 'excess' than was monotheistic theology, indeed a case has been made 
that theology is better able to come to terms with such phenomena than is 
conventional scientific rationality. 8 
The aim here is to begin to establish a radical approach to the various 
meanings gathered around the notion of evil, particularly where manifest as the 
'problem' of evil in the major traditions of Western thought. What form does evil 
take in these systems? How has 'evil' changed or mutated? What is evil for 
contemporary culture? Such a task is only coherent if something of the richness, 
intensity and lasting influence of sacred and religious thought is appreciated and 
retained. Of major concern here are the representations of the notion of evil within 
so-called 'primitive' and archaic religions, in Christian and Enlightenment traditions 
and the manner in which these feed into contemporary philosophical and sociological 
material. 
The Western tradition has undergone many shifts in the symbolisation of 
evil, from the earliest beliefs in impersonal, (social) forces, towards beliefs 
concerning personalised, individual, and moral 'deficiencies' in archaic Greek and 
Christian thought. 9 With the erosion of Christianity in the modem period the term 
'evil' may have been expected to become obsolete, however Enlightenment reason 
was unable to avoid an encounter with it, in fact it was Kant, the champion of 
modem progressivism who coined the term 'radical evil' in 1793.10 Hegel's 
phenomenology attempted to re-absorb the 'excesses' liberated by Kant, through the 
system of dialectics, yet Hegelian thought appears entirely outmoded by the events of 
the 20th century. Nor has the term'evil'been forgotten or superseded in modem and 
contemporary society; following mass 'death-events' such as the Nazi holocaust and 
more recent occurrences in Bosnia and Rwanda 'evil' is frequently evoked as an 
explanation of the 'inexplicable'. While traumatic events such as the murder of 
James Bplger or the Dunblane massacre, lack even ethnic, nationalist or political 
lines of division and are all the more resistant to rationalising explanation. Further, 
in contemporary culture themes of excessive violence and evil form the staple of 
popular literary, cinematic and televisual entertainment, while academic philosophy 
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and theology still struggle to create satisfactory and coherent accounts of evil, 
arguably with little success. " 
However theories of evil have recently returned as a central theme in some 
branches of contemporary social theory, including psychoanalysis, various strands of 
Post-structuralism and of particular concern here, the relatively marginal work of 
Bataille and Baudrillard. Before exploring the form these engagements take, it is 
necessary to establish the religious, metaphysical and enlightenment approaches to 
evil and their continuing, sometimes indirect, influence on modem thought. In 
particular the aim is to show how such systems have operated in the constitution of 
the contemporary experience of 'inexplicable' evil. 
CONTEXTUALISING CHRISTIAN AND THEOLOGliýAL CONCEPTIONS 
OF EVIL 
'the sovereign good is the cause of the whole of being. There just cannot be a contrasting principle 
which is the cause of evils ... there is nothing that can be evil by essence ... every being is good and evil 
does not exist save as seated in a good'(Aquinas 1967: 129). 
Evil plays a pivotal yet ambiguous role in many Western (and Eastern 12) 
mythologies, perhaps the most influential the account of creation in the book of 
Genesis. 13 The'problern of evil', within Christian and Humanist thought, lays at the 
core of the Judaeo-Christian tradition and is central to Westem modes of thought, 
belief and social organisation. The fundamental problem of the existence of evil 
within the Western theological tradition is a terrifying paradox that all believers must 
face; on the one hand the belief in a benevolent and all-powerful deity and on the 
other the continuing existence of evil in the human world. 
In many Eastern religious traditions, this 'problem' does not arise in that evil 
and the associated vicissitudes of the material world are asserted to be merely 
appearance, and so superficial while the principles of goodness or love are 
interpreted as deep and essential. This is often termed the monist approach in the 
sense that only goodness is essentially real. The major Western religious systems, in 
particular the dominant Jewish-Christian-Islamic lineage, operate an ethical dualism 
yet by positing one supreme God (cosmological monism) are confronted by the 
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'problem'of evil. An ethical dualism, combined with a cosmological monism creates 
the problem of evil, in its most general form. 14 
St. Augustine completed his best-known theological treatise Civitas Dei or 
City of God, around 426 AD. 15 This 'city' could not be built on Gnostic or 
Manichean foundations, a thriving, wealthy and moral social order must. neutrajisp or 
expel threatening groups and ideas, and the notion that evil is a fixed, autonomous 
and even dominant principle in the human realm was intolerable. This aspect of 
Manichean teaching also severely limited the notion of human responsibility for evil 
that is crucial to the Christian understanding of evil. Much of Augustine's work 
takes the form of a refutation of Manicheanism, a sect that actually enjoyed his 
youthful adherence. In fact Augustine's Confessions reveal his early experiences of 
sensual pleasure and in particular his keen appreciation of the pleasures of sin, 
transgression, of doing evil. 16 Only after his rejection of Manicheanism Augustine 
began to develop his privative conception of evil. For Augustine, after his 
conversion, God, as entirely good, cannot be the cause of evil. Evil then, can only 
emanate from rational human Will. 17 This basic contention concerning the cause of 
evil remained largely unaltered throughout Augustine's career. Satan chose evil, as 
did Adam, both were 'free' to make this choice. Adam's choosing of evil brought 
about the 'fall' of the human race and the introduction of death, pain and endless toil 
as God's punishments. Yet, since evil is privative or 'nothing' Adam, and Satan 
before him, had no positive evil to choose and partake of. Their sin is actually one of 
disobedience, after stepping beyond God's edict, they become prey to confusion, 
immoderation, the negations and distortions of the good on which evil depends for its 
(non)existencc. However, according to Augustine, God retains complete control 
over Satan and all fallen angels and humans and is even able to use them for his own 
ends. Numerous examples of this situation are available in the Old Testament, 
though largely absent from the New. ' 8 
What, in particular, needs to be emphasised about this theological system is 
the all-encompassing nature of God. Since God is said to be omnipotent and entirely 
benevolent, evil cannot be allowed substantive existence and is conceptualised as 
privative in nature. Evil does exist but only as a contingent and fleeting phenomena. 
All evil, even Satan himself serves, ultimately, as an agent of God's greater good. 
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Evil is argued to be the result of human freewill, of choice. This is the doctrine of 
culpability, and while devils, fallen angels or evil spirits may act in assistance, for 
example offering temptations, their actions remain ultimately within God's control. 
This factor allows, simultaneously, Augustine's doctrine ofpre-destination. There is 
a delicate balance at work here, one that is highly unstable, and particularly prone to 
the emergence, and re-emergence, of dualist 'heresies' whereby God and Satan 
become autonomous, opposing forces. 
A second, and related, distinguishing feature of this system is that the 
boundaries of human freewill, of human subjectivity, are containýd within God. 
Here, strictly speaking, there is no limit point to human subjectivity, and no true 
subject-object relation, since God is infinite. Human actions are then, always 
rational, explicable, or they are inexplicable only to the extent that God is 
inexplicable, beyond the reach of human knowledge. The possibility of human 
irrationality, 'unreason', or excess is not developed. It is 'evil' but quite rational for 
the human being to break God's command for personal gain or pleasure, but for 
Christianity no evil must be allowed to reflect back onto God. Evil then is contained 
- - - in personal choice, which again is contained in God, yet evil 'contaminates' oqly t h e 
individual subject and its desires. tlere ýKedraw close-to-the 'Achilles heel' of the 
Christian approach and its inherent tendency to lapse back--into dualism -Human 
, 
beings cannot bear full responsibility for evil if God__is all-powerful. This unstable 
relation between human and God is fundamental to the meaning of evil in Western 
culture. 
Towards the end of the Mediaeval period St. Thomas Aquinas devoted 
much energy to resolving, once and for all, the 'problem' of evil in his Sunlina 
Theolgiae completed in 1273. His argument, more technical than Augustine's 
reinforces the privative conception of evil. The argument hinges on the logic of 
opposition, that is the meanings of negation or negativity. For Aquinas good and evil 
are not strict opposites, where, for example, property A cannot co-exist in the same 
object, in the same way at the same time as property B. Rather, for Aquinas, 
developing Augustine's theology, the logic of opposition in the case of good and evil 
is one of privation. Evil is declared to be, the mere t ull properties of Rriya ion of the f 
the good, what is evil, though real, only becomes thus because it lacks some property 
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that it. sho. uld ordiriarily, Rg, ssess/For example, the perpetrator of an act of cruelty 
would not be said to be fuelled by an evil force, but to be suffering from a temporal 
and contingent privation of conscience, pity or compassion, normally in the 
possession of all human beings. Such a view continues to be influential in 
contemporary liberal-humanist thinking, in some human rights discourse and in 
assumptions concerning the 'progress' of humankind through education or moral 
guidance. 
\ 
Aquinas insists evil is not a pure, impersonal, autonomous force arising 
either within the logic of strict opposition, a position close to Manichean dualism, 
nor within the relationship of positive contraries, such as between, for example, blue 
and red. In answering the question 'is evil some sort of realityT Aquinas replies, 
&evil cannot signify a certain existing being, nor a real shaping or positive kind of 
thing ... it signifies a certain absence of the good'. (Aquinas 1967: 109). 
For Aquinas, as Augustine before him, the privative conception of evil holds 
for both moral evil, sinftil acts by human beings, and natural evil, earthquakes and 
other 'acts of God'-which-are- divine punishments, for sin. It remained necessary 
within the orthodox Christian tradition to maintain a strong sense, or presence, of 
evil. The ontological status of evil had to be affirmed in one form or another to 
ensure the doctrines of original sin, human culpability and divine punishment were 
preserved and remained meaningful. This conundrum seems to lead Aquinas to posit 
a ftindamental inseparability of good and evil: 
Hence many goods would disappear were He (God) to pen-nit no evil. For 
example no fire would be kindled were no air spent, the lion would not 
survive were the ass not killed, and there would be no vindication of justice 
nor patient endurance to be praised were there no wickedness (Aquinas 
1967: 117). 
This is a fascinating assertion, since it seems to present good and evil almost as 
complimentary partners, operating in a reciprocal relation. Here the notion offelix 
culpa or 'happy fault' becomes apparent; a term often applied to the Christian 
interpretation of the crucifixion. 
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Volume nine of the Summa Theologiae, deals with the sin of angels and the 
resulting punishment of Satan by God. Aquinas asserts, not only that angels have 
real, material existence, further that they are able to turn towards evil voluntarily, by 
an act of will. Of course Aquinas is unwilling to entertain the Manichean 'heresy', 
that is that some angels may be evil by nature, though he offers only tautological 
reasons as to why this cannot be. As with the fall of Adam and Eve again it is 
rational, discursive knowledge or the 'intellectual capacity' which enables the choice 
of evil over good. The creation of the devil comes about as Satan, the highest angel 
deviates from the path of God's grace. In this view Satan and evil come into 
existence as an acceleration of the desire to experience bliss, a property of God, and 
not a definitive turning against, transgression or subversion of it. It is rather the 
rejection of what might be termed 'divine guidance'; nothing more excessive, since 
Satan does not assert a contradictory or opposed set of goals, at least not until after 
his expulsion by God. Aquinas refers to the authority of St. Anselm's De Casit 
Diaboli in the assertion 'the devil desired that to which he would eventually have 
come had he curbed his desire' (in Aquinas 1967: 259). 
Once more, on what can be read as a metaphoric level, the horror of 
autonomous, substantive evil is denied, or suppressed but cannot be obliterated. 
Dualist thinking, structured by the mind/matter dualism, where matter is equated, 
however indirectly with evil, tends to re-surface in the cultural imagination, though it 
is resisted, partially, by systems of both Augustine and Aquinas. Both insist matter is 
not, and cannot be, intrinsically evil, as the Manicheans had supposed. Rather it is 
the rational, discursive o eration of moral choice and immoral desire that led to the 
dLsp ýrýpýqion, confusion and discord that is_ evil, The orthodox Christian 
understanding of evil is not of autonomous demonic or satanic forces nor even of the 
inherent corruption of the flesh, but of human choice rebelling against God. Human 
choice is the third term, preventing the full reduction to dualism and this allows the 
modem free-will defence of the existence of evil. 19 This remains a highly unstable 
conception, readily lapsing or reversing into Manichean, Pelagian or Satanist 
heresies. That is human culpability can easily be argued to reverse onto God, not to 
exist at all, or be affirmed, celebrated and worshipped. The Christian tradition is 
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unable to construct a stable account of the relation between God and human 
responsibility for evil. 
Though the hegemonic power of theological metaphysics has long been 
shattered, Christian theology continues to struggle with the 'problem' of evil, 
addressing the events of the holocaust in particular . 
20 However this discussion will 
now turn to explorations of good and evil not contained or defined within theological 
systems yet that appear equally if not more unstable and unsatisfactory. 
RADICAL EVIL, RADICAL ENLIGHTENMENT 
'Men are wicked, as sad and repeated experience demonstrates. And yet, Mankind is 
naturally good. What, then, could have brought him to such a point of depravity, unless it be the 
changes in his constitution, the progress he has made, and the Knowledge he has acquired ... There is 
absolutely no fundamental perversity in the human heare (Rousseau 199 1: 11). 
Here Rousseau expresses the fundamental enlightenment faith in human 
nature; evil, cruelty and perversion are argued to be the result of malign social 
conditions. If society could be ordered more rationally, more fairly and equally, evil 
would disappear along with other religious terms, superstitions and illusions. By the 
age of enlightenment, social, political and moral theory had become progressively 
less dependent on overtly theological postulates. The political and philosophical 
systems of Machiavelli, Hobbes, Descartes and Kant did not require the active 
participation of God in order to function. However none of the above explicitly 
denied the existence of God and Descartes and Kant in particular, did require God as 
'passive' presence to secure their philosophical systems. It was, by contrast, the 
scientific and technological successes of the age that finally made a sense of the 
sacred, religious and otherworldly strictly unnecessary and increasingly 
unconvincing. This was the age of reason. 
In his important essay 'What is Enlightenment' Kant demonstrated the 
reflexive questioning of human individuality and history that was to become a 
dominant theme of modem thought. Kant defines enlightenment as, 'man's 
emergence from his self-imposed immaturity' (Kant 1983: 41), it describes the new- 
found confidence of the individual to determine its 'own understanding ... without 
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guidance from another'. Enlightenment, for Kant, is constituted by the very 
reflexivity that characterises his own work, to this extent Kant is read as the 
embodiment of enlightenment. Kant's term 'immaturity' [Unmundigkeit] clearly 
refers to the delusions, apathy and fatalism that were supposed to define 'primitive' 
communal life, which, so the orthodoxy goes, suppressed individualism and 
imprisoned its people in a child-like state. 21 
With the marginalisation of the sacred and of God the emergent human is 
dependent on reason alone. Kant's transcendental subject was grounded in a pure yet 
necessarily limited principle of reason. Following Kant, Hegel was to understand the 
Christian God as the highest aspect of the principle of 'mind' or spirit, ultimately 
human subjective reason. In enlightenment thought reason tries to claim a universal 
applicability and the destiny to complete itself However reason in this form must 
always encounter unreason or the beyond of its limits. This is evident in Kant's 
metaphor of childhood and his (related) view of non-Western cultures, which are 
argued to labour under similar delusions and immaturities. 22 Reason itself generates 
the residual category, or waste product, unreason, irrationality, inhumanity, a terrain 
is created where reason, by it own definitions, has no-c. ompetence., Kant promises 
liberation; individual autonomy is presented as the realisation of maturity. 23 Freed 
from dogma and superstition the mature, enlightened individual can stand aloft. Of 
couýse such a characterisation of enlightened modemity is highly problematic, 
particularly in its individualism and formalism which can be read as a blueprint for 
the bourgeois capitalist and techno-bureaucratic systems of modem discipline and 
control. This thesis has been developed particularly by Weber and, more recently 
Foucault. 24 In the following discussion it is crucial to bear in mind this Kantian 
conception of individual autonomy__ And its -. - philosophical 
foundation the 
transcendental ego. Of fundamental importance is the connection between Kant's 
notion of radical enlighteru-nent and that of radical evil; a connection implied, 
entailed or even necessitated by his unique understanding of enlightenment. 
25 It is frequently noted that Kantian philosophy, and specifically his writings 
on morality represent a thorough 'emptying out' or voiding of the content of fonner 
philosophical understandings of community, morality or social contract. Kant's 
moral system confines the Christian God to the outer-most, unfathomable reaches of 
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the universe, it breaks with Platonic and Aristotelian ethics, and it does not depend 
on a Rousseauean social contract; so dispensing with notions of community and 
collectivity. Kant's focus is on the individual and its duty to itself as rational being. 
His highest moral principle or categorical imperative is as follows 'Act only on that 
maxim (or principle. of conduct) whereby, thou canst at the same time will that it 
should become a universal law'. 26 
The ramifications of such an individualised understanding of moral duty, 
coupled with large-scale bureaucratic systems and modem juridico-legal structures 
have been explored by a number of writers. Arendt (1964/1994) has related these 
phenomena to the genocidal destruction of the Nazi death-camps. More recently, 
Zizek (1991,1993) and others have explored Kantian individualism from a 
psychoanalytic viewpoint drawing out the implications for modernity of Kant's 
radical evil. These, important lines of thought will be contrasted and explored 
below. 
Kant had addressed the notion of human evil in his third critique, Vie 
Critique of Practical Reason in 1788, where it already appeared as rooted, in some 
sense, within human freewill. In 1793 Kant returned to the problem of evil with 
Religion within the Limits of Reason . 4lone, a work which was met with 
consternation and even horror by those of a secular humanist disposition. 27 For Kant 
the problem of evil: 
... is radical because it corrupts the ground of all maxims; it is, moreover, as 
a natural propensity, inextirpable by human powers, since extirpation could 
occur only through good maxims, and cannot take place when the ultimate 
subjective ground of all maxims is postulated as corrupt (Kant 
1793/1960: 32). 
Kant's approach to evil is complex, technical and even contradictory; 
nevertheless he clearly postulates a radical evil rooted within human freewill, a "foul 
taint" which, at least potentially, corrupts all human choice and action. Kantian 
evil is not a'lack' or privation but a positive, 'chooseable' reality, reached through the 
process of corrupted maxim making. The choice of an evil course does not however 
destroy the fundamental nature of freedom, if it were to do so then human 
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responsibility for evil actions would also disappear, a logical objection that 
Augustine too was forced to confront. With this assertion Kant opposes the most 
general thrust of Enlightenment philosophy, represented_by_lýqusýeauý4nq Diderot, of 
an innate goodness and perfectibility in 'human being'. For them any corruption can 
only be a result of malign social factors, such as the persistence of illusion and 
superstit, iop, _ipMbiting-humzp. _, 
ggpdnqss. Evil actions are explained by 'ignorance' 
and injustice, not 'natural impulses. By contrast Kant proposes absolute limits to 
human autonomy, progress and goodness. For Kant rational freewill has a 'natural' 
not pathological, 'propensity' to turn against 'duty' and 'virtue', against its security and 
self-interest and to seize evil, sensuousness, and excess. Such a formulation 
anticipates the Freudian conception of the death drive as psychoanalytic thinkers 
have stressed. Further Kant insists radical evil cannot be expelled, or transcended, 
by any degree of human effort or action, since all human principles and decision- 
making processes can, at any point, favour evil over good. In fact the Kantian 
system is left with recourse only to Christian scriptural authority, and ultimately to 
God, in order to provide the possibility of moral regeneration, the triumph of good 
over evil. 
These manoeuvres demonstrate how close Kant's radical evil is to the Christian 
notion of original sin. Yet it expresses an important cultural difference; it offers no 
simplistic subsumption of evil within the terms made available by its own 
explanatory system. Kant defines a-system,, crucial-t-o enlightened modernity, which 
intellectually affirms the existence of radical evil, but cannot, in intellectual terms, 
provide any commensurate solution to this piýqýlem. Christianity, by contrast, is not 
solely dependent on rational discourse and had been able to offer, at least in its own 
terms, a 'solution'. Here is a new situation. The 'enlightened' individual can, 
according to Kant, choose rationally to pursue evil ends. An evil maxim can be 
constructed and followed in a rational manner just as can a 'good' maxim. Though 
human beings bear the burden of moral responsibility for choosing evil; this in no 
way eliminates the possibility of evil choices being made. In fact evil choices 
possess a new seductiveness. They represent freedom, liberation of the individual 
from custom and superstition. This conceptualisation has led to some thinkers, 
notably Lacan (1963/1989) to propose that the writings of Sade represent, in a sense, 
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the truth of Kant's moral philosophy, that Kantian morality implies sadism. 28 The 
existence of an innate freedom favours the falling into evil, as much as, and 
somehow more than, the difficult process of constantly resisting evil temptations. 
Here Kant encounters something of the notion of transgression. Transgression, since 
it possesses only an individualist and irreversible register in the Kantian system can 
only favour evil and do nothing to bond the collective or communal group as it had 
in pre-Christian understandings of the sacred -A fact the 'morally' evil actions of an 
individual rip through what remains of a sense of community with a devastatingly 
destructive force. Individual freedom, as the centrepiece of the Kantian system 'lets 
loose human possibilities that will not submit to conceptual control' (Michalson 
1990: 28)\ 
Kant's evil is indeed more radical than the moral evil of the Christian 
tradition, for with. the Kan-tian system evil is radicalised by reason. Reason sets up 
fundamental and intractable limits to its own operation, yet evil cannot even be 
banished to the depths of unreason and confined there. As Kant shows there is no 
ultimate reason why evil should not be pursued rationally. In fact evil has, 
throughout the modem period, been conceived as an unstable force, simultaneously 
at the limit of, and beyond reason. For example sexual murder can be seen as the 
rational and premeditated pursuit of what are 'irrational' or 'abnormal' desires. In 
modernity then, the conditions exist whereby the individual is able to pursue 
rationally, a course of action that to the majority is highly unpleasant. The individual 
may choose to become 'inexplicable', to express a certain desire, pursue a certain 
lifestyle or merely to gain notoriety. Such a situation was not strictly possible within 
the theological worldview since the Christian God embodied a principle of 
completeness and perfection without any limit points. For any human violence, God 
possessed the greater destructive power, the destruction of the human soul. Reason, 
which replaces God, is always limited, at the limits of reason new evils emerge. 
Aith 
Kant the possibility of a dialectical resolution of the problem of evil 
encounters its impossible limit. In this sense both the collapse of the Christian 
worldview and the expansion of enlightenment rationality can be seen as actuating a 
cultural decoding or more figuratively, unleashing, of evil; an evil now 'radicalised' 
by Kant\. An active evil but a passive God, evil without God, evil that is inherent in 
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human reason yet is beyond control, evil that can only destroy since it serves no 
higher purpose. Evil, in this conception, is more powerful and dangerous then it ever 
was in the Christian worldview. 29 
With Kant, as with Augustine, there is a tendency for the theoretical system 
to lapse back into dualism, despite the greatest efforts to produce stable explanatory 
economies, which resolve, domesticate or sublimate evil. The fundamental latent 
dualism of the mindibody or spirit/matter distinction provides a fertile ground for a 
good/evil distinction, suggesting part of humanity, the 'baser part' is evil and in 
conflict with mind/spirit which are good. It seems the Manichean dualist position, 
though simplistic, possesses a charge that is alone commensurate with cultural 
perceptions of evil. It has this because it denies complete, rational, human 
responsibility for evil and retains a sense of the unknowable, inexplicable, fatal. 
THE NIETZSCHEAN REVOLUTION: EVIL AS MORAL EVALUATION 
The philosophy of Nietzsche signals, for social theory, the end of 
enlightenment it its radical and immensely influential demolition of the postulates of 
rational, subjective and moral thought. The enduring importance of Nietzsche for 
contemporary theory supports the view that his philosophy represents a radical break, 
or discontinuity at a theoretical level. 
Nietzsche was fascinated by the notion of evil, and, in particular the 
possibility of the surpassing of the values 'good' and 'evil' . 
30 Nietzsche's interest in 
moral values or evaluations date back to his earliest published works. By the late 
1870s Human, All Too Human (orig. 1878-80) presented what he termed a 'Twofold 
pre-history of good and evil', declaring: 
Good and bad is for a long time the same thing as noble and base, master 
and slave ... one does not regard the enemy as evil: he can requite. In Homer 
the Trojan and the Greek are both good. It is not he who does us harm but 
he who is contemptible who counts as bad (Nietzsche 1878-80; translated in 
Nietzsche 1994: 131). 
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Here Nietzsche elaborates his position of strict moral relativism. If a 
member of the noble class should act in an ignoble or 'unworthy' way, this fault 
would, in Greek antiquity, be attributed to a god who had afflicted them. Later, in 
the Platonic-Christian era, the fault orexcuse'would be sought, not externally in the 
whims of capricious gods, but rather internally 'in the soul of the subjected, the 
powerless' (ibid. ). Pýs is a fundamental shift in the relationship -between 
human and 
god, the divine no longer absorbs human f4Ult, rather it finds the human guilty, a 
theme ParticularIv characteristic of Judaism and Christianity. For Nietzsche what 
ljýjd beMrýgajL4eqy I _Tpling class, as noble, strong an . 
ý.. dignified, comes to seem 
cruel, violent and evil, as the 'subjected' and their moral o. rherd' values come to form 
the dominant culture of western society. 
In his works of the late 1880's Nietzsche does not hesitate to sketch out a 
relatively crude historical or genealogical scheme. Beyond Good and Evil 
(1886/1990: 63-4) offers a tripartite notion of human moral history. This begins with 
the pre-moral stage where the moral evaluation of an action, whether it is thought 
good or evil, was decided purely by its Then, in the moral stage 
humankind experiences what is simultaneously a "refinement" and "a fateful new 
superstition, a peculiar narrowness of interpretation". Here the value of an action is 
decided by the intention said. to. exist undamental _4qýAind 
it, as its origin. This is af 
shift creating a new sense of internal or psychological responsibility or guilt. Yet 
Nietzsche also foresees a new age, the gx1ra-_moral in which the psychologistic notion 
of consciousness would be revealed as a mere "surface and skin" a "sign and 
symptom" requiring further interpretation. Nietzsche does not advocate the 
wholesale abandonment of all criteria of right and wrong, but a progressive 'self- 
overcoming of morality'. Such further interpretation may, for example, reveal that 
the tyrant, seeking unlimited power is characterised by weakness not strength. 
Indeed Nietzsche proposes, very sketchily, that in modernity a certain type of 
tyranny comes to the fore, not that of the overman, but that of the weak, a 
pathological form. This thesis becomes apparent in book one of Tile Gay Science . 
31 
Nietzsche retains the idea that what is frequently called 'evil' is functionally 
necessary to enhance the human species, to guide it and move it forward: 
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The strongest and most evil spirits have so far done the most to advance 
humanity: again and again they relumed the passions that were going to 
sleep ... [W]hat is new, however, is always evil, being that which wants to 
conquer and overthrow the old boundary markers and the old pieties; and 
only what is old is good (Nietzsche 1882/1974: 79). 
Nietzsche completely rejects the (Manichean) dualist conception of good 
and evil and therefore cannot be accused of merely reversing these values in order to 
celebrate evil. Nevertheless Nietzsche's historical assumptions remain crude and 
simplistic and reveal a fundamental reliance on individualism: 
Lofty spiritual independence, the will to stand alone, great intelligence even, 
are felt to be dangerous; everything that raises the individual above the herd 
and makes his neighbour quail is henceforth called evil; the fair, modest, 
obedient self-effacing disposition, the mean and average in desires, aquires 
moral names and honours (1886/1990: 123). 
This distinction between the individual and "the herd" was to become a pronounced 
feature of Nietzsche's philosophy. It is highly problematic and cannot go 
uncontested. It becomes apparent, increasingly, as his investigations into the origins 
of moral evaluation progress, that Nietzsche conceptualises nobility and strength in 
almost entirely individualist tenns. What had been, for Nietzsche, originally the 
property of the ruling elite becomes the striving of the individualist warrior- 
philosopher, such that collectivity, community, custom are viewed as merely 
restrictive tradition, stock or 'herd' wisdom. In fact, even where Nietzsche 
distinguishes clearly between a sense of community that is 'effervescent' or 
affirmatory rather than moralistic, both senses of community are assimilated by the 
derogatory term 'herd'. The crucial, and presumably socio-historical, movement 
from an affirmatory or orgiastic community to a moralistic one is never properly 
shown. Rather brief schernatizations are offered allowing Nietzsche to move from 
the one assumption to the other with great case. However it must not be assumed 
that Nietzsche's individualist assumptions are analogous to those of the utilitarian 
tradition of Bentham and Mill. Nietzsche opposed utilitarian thinking with great, 
p rhaps unrivall-e-d-passion, -never-redqping_ýhe 
individ4l to 4 rational, -s -cert-ain elf 
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ego. Nevertheless Nietzsche's basic unit of analysis in his explorations of good and 
evil is the isolate individual, choked and restricted by community, ritual, tradition 
and legality. 32 
Moreover in book three of The Gay Science Nietzsche's madman proclaims 
the death of God: 
We have killed him - you and I. All of us are his murderers ... Mhat were 
we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither is it moving 
now? Whither are we moving? Away from all suns? Are wiý not plunging 
continually? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there still 
any up or down? Are we not straying as through an infinite nothing? Do we 
not feel the breath of empty space? (Nietzsche 18 82/1974: 18 1). 
The enlighteriment thought of Kant and Hegel had marked the retreat or 
abdication of God (as limitlessness) and sought to establish the limits of reason and 
subjectivity. Yet Nietzsche proclaims not only the death of God but also the death of 
'Man' as universal, rational, knowing subject . 
33 Here Nietzsche open up terrain that 
will be explored by Freud; that of the unconscious, hidden desires, apparently 
inexplicable forces that do not correspond to any notion of morality. The 
psychoanalytic tradition emerges which posits desire as expressive of the finitude, 
limit or lack characteristic of human nature and relations. 
For Nietzsche these new conditions though profoundly unsettling are also 
fundamentally enabling. The death of God and of the transcendental subject imply 
that the constraining moral evaluations 'good' and 'evil' can be overthrown, 
surpassed. Beyond good and evil a new. humanity can reveal these values as the 
superficial "signs and symptoms" of the more fundamental will-to-power. While 
previous understandings of nature and the cosmos, both theological and scientific can 
be swept away by the "de-deification" of nature. For Nietzsche 'Man' must be 
reintegrated into nature in order to affirm life. Importantly though these new 
conditions of life "might include error". That is the new conditions will not be 
lobj gQtiye' tniths-but-vital-illusion, -myths of affirmation that nourish the 
ýylaan spinit. 
34 
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With Nietzsche the Christian 'problem' of evil, evil as privative in nature is 
completely abandoned. The human being is liberated from moral responsibility 
before God, left not to pursue evil but to surpass moral judgements. Nietzsche 
attempts to contain evil within the prejudices and activities of the morally minded. 
'Evil' is the result of a distorted interpretation of a non-moral universe and like good 
must be surpassed in order to advance the 'human' spirit. Milbank (1990) argues 
Nietzsche's approach to morality is in fact dialectical, which is a serious problem for 
Nietzschean thought. Nietzschean thought does, in part, succeed in its 'surpassing' 
of moral evil, of the 'problem' of evil but is disabled by the persl: Stence of new 
experiences of evil which cannot be managed within its framework. When 
confronted by the 'evil' of contemporary death-events Nietzsche's approach is 
rendered inadequate. His approach simply cannot 'absorb' such events into the 
category of 'evil' as moralistic prejudice. Connelly. (1991) argues Nietzsche's 
thinking allows a shift from "the, first prpblem. of evil", (Augustine), to "the second 
_11roblem 
of eýýirl", ý4ere evil results from the prejudices of self against other, but evil 
is no longer contained in either the first or second orders Connelly specifies. It is 
now necessary- to -think a-third order-of evil. - 
What must be emphasised in this brief discussion of enlightenment and 
post-enlighteriment thought are the conditions of emergence of contemporary 
individualism. This is the individual uprooted from traditional and collective 
existence; the individual characterised by a fundamental limit, divided against itself 
by the demands of modem civilisation. Here is the emergence of the individual 
whose 'deepest truth' is said to be the nature of their desires and sexuality. These 
cultural and epistemological conditions define Nietzsche's 'warrior-philosopher', 
Marx's alienated worker, and Freud's divided subject. These are the relations 
through which 'evil' is located and expressed in the contemporary period, where 
human responsibility for evil can never be secured or identified because subjectivity 
is said to be fundamentally divided. 'Evil' is no longer configured within theological 
or moral principles, nor is it confined by the structural relations existing between one 
ethnic/political/sectional group and another. 'Evil' is allowed to flourish in the 
absence of omnipotent god or universal reason. 'Evil' in the contemporary order is 
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rooted in individual desires, within the functioning and dysfunctioning of the divided 
self, yet it is always in excess of these, somehow 'inexplicable'. 
The following chapter will explore Bataille's reading of Nietzsche and the 
divergence that is often overlooked, between them. Bataille's focus, to a far greater 
extent than his precursor, is the disabling nature of the death of God and the collapse 
of enlightenment reason. Bataille's reading of the principle of evil could hardly be 
more removed from Nietzsche's. Indeed the simplistic individualist analysis Bataille 
called the weakest and most unsatisfactory element of Nietzsche's work. This 
divergence is frequently overlooked and is crucial to an apprebiation of the 
distinctiveness of Bataille's approach, specifically to evil and eroticism. The latter 
does not follow from Nietzschean philosophy and is approached, more fruitfully, 
from the viewpoint of the French sociological tradition. 
Before turning to distinctive approaches to evil in contemporary theory, it is 
necessary to examine, briefly, other recent engagements with this concept. Firstly 
anthropological material which looks at evil in non-Westem cultural settings. This 
may enable us to challenge the individualist and eurocentric bias of much of the 
thought reviewed so far. In addition this material plays an important role in the 
theoretical developments made by Bataille and Baudrillard. In particular the work of 
Durkheim and Mauss will be shown to be of decisive importance in shaping the 
theory of Bataille, and to some extent Baudrillard, enabling reflection on their 
divergence from, as well as proximity to, the Nietzschean tradition. Finally it may 
enhance an appreciation of the relation between evil and rationality, the extent to 
which they remain opposed or fuse together. 
SOCIOLOGICAL ENGAGEMENTS WITH EVIL 
Before the impact of Durkheim, functionalist sociology, such as the system 
of Herbert Spencer, had approached evil as sentiments that a social unit may develop 
to those outside the group, such as competing tribes. This form of analysis, 
developed in Ybe Principles of Ethics (orig. 1892) defines the notion of evil as a 
structural feature of the relations between group and non-group. However it does 
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little to examine the movements of evil within a social group and it is here that 
occurrences of evil seem most shocking, intense and 'inexplicable'. 
Durkheim's theoretical approach to the meaning of religious sentiment rests 
on his general sociological proposition that each and every human community or 
society, will, and must as a necessary precondition of its existence, establish 
collective representations or collective conscience. A number of central dimensions 
of Durkheim's approach to religion are important here. Firstly, the nature of the 
sacred; as malefic as well as beneficent excess; secondly, the transformation of the 
meanings of the sacred in modem society; and finally, the social As a prior, 
collective, and constraining field of material forces. In each of these theoretical 
axioms Durkheim's approach is collectivist or anti-individualist. This feature sets the 
Durkheimian system apart from other, more dominant modes of social thought 
particularly the Weberian. 35 
Durkheim's Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1912) made a 
fundamental distinction between sacred and profane and sketched out a typology of 
'primitive' religious rites. 
0 
Durkheim's work on religion focuses, to a far greater 
extent than Weber's and other sociologies of religion, on the negative, dangerous, 
threatening, impure and evil aspects of religious systems. Such an approach militates 
against the crude but widespread tendency to view religion (often all religion) as a 
system of thought that deals in cosy and comforting sham; illusion in the most 
pejorative sense. Durkheim was to show, in a compelling fashion without resorting 
to mysticism, that such convenient assertions are entirely inaccurate empirically and 
untenable epistemologically. The ambivalent, reversible trajectories of the beneficent 
and malefic, or good and evil aspects of the sacred are sketched out by Durkheim 
here and in more detail in Annee Sociologique. 37 This understanding of the sacred 
reappears in Bataille's deployment of the term and in Baudrillard's emphasis on the 
reversibility of good and evil as we shall explore below. 
Durkheim, perhaps more markedly than any other classical sociologist, 
guarded against the implicit or explicit, denigration of so-called primitive or archaic 
religious systems. Unlike both Marx and Weber he gave primacy to the notion of the 
sacred, over ritual, belief, church or (Weber's) 'promise', even over the idea of 
'religion' itself. He had derived the concept of the sacred and in particular the sacred- 
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profane dichotomy from the emerging disciplines of anthropology and ethnology, 
indeed his introduction to such empirical data prompted a significant transformation 
in the direction of Durkheim's thought. His major work on the religion relied almost 
entirely on existing, and already slightly dated ethnographic material, especially 
concerning 'totemism', this led to a range of criticisms by the sociological 
mainstream, for example Evans-Pritchard (1962). Where Weber was to focus on the 
'well-developed' or rationalised 'world religions', Durkheim sought, like B ataille and 
Caillois after hirn, to probe the earliest human engagements with the sacred and evil. 
In Durkheim's system piacular 38 rites were associated witý death, decay, 
mourning and terror. Piacular rites were magical communal or tribal gatherings 
designed to ward off, protect against or compensate for threatening events or 
occurrences. Here malefic, dangerous, terrifying, but not strictly speaking evil forces 
menace the group. The term 'evil' requires for its meaning, a sense of personal, 
individual and moral sensibility, without this the term malefic is more appropriate. 
Moral evil specifically, this view suggests, emerges only with notions of 
individualism and 'self. For Durkheim 'evil', as malefic force, is that which is 
interpreted as harming or threatening the social. This view inverts the assumptions 
of both Kant and Nietzsche both of whom situate evil within the 'psychological' 
tendencies of the individual. The nature of evil after the 'death of the social' then is 
of particular importance and is approached through a reading of Bataille and 
Baudrillard below. Ricoeur's (1961/1967) typology of evil is also instructive here. 
He specifies three stages in the history of evil. Firstly evil as "defilement", 
characteristic of polytheist religion, secondly evil as "sin" which emerges with 
Hebraic monotheism, and finally evil as "guilt" which characterises the Christian 
tradition. Here the earliest stage, "defilement" is akin to Durkheim's conception of 
malefic evil. The emergence of monotheism destroys beliefs in evil gods, and 
tends to fix percqpqqns of evil within the individual, as desire, sin and transgression. 
These themes are developed, through a reading of Bataille, in the following chapter. 
Structuralist ethnographic studies, dating from the influential work of Levi- 
Strauss since the late 1940's and early 1950's, have questioned the validity of many 
of the assumptions and extrapolations of earlier sociological and anthropological 
material. 39 What is perhaps most remarkable about more recent studies, such as De 
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Heusch's (1985) is its use of terms such as energy'debt' and 'share', terminology that 
invites comparison with Bataille's notion of General economy and its Durkheirnian 
underpinnings. In fact De Heusch references Bataille's work on several occasions 
and though he resists generalising the term 'sacred' he does refer to sacrifice and 
transgression as "the core of myth" (1985: 125). Further he offers a detailed 
examination of the phenomena of "sacred kingship" (1985: pp 98-124), developing 
Durkheim's suggestive remarks on reversibility and providing ethnographic support 
for Baudrillard's assertion of the inherent reversibility of status/power in the sacrifice 
of the king. 40 The fundamental opposition at work in De Heusch's study is not the 
sacred and profane nor good and evil, it is rather life-death, specifically the symbolic 
debt that life owes death. 
Other Structuralist accounts of 'evil', such as Vernant's study of archaic 
(sacrificial) Greek religion (in Detienne and Vernant 1989) show how the notions of 
good and evil ceased to be conceived as impersonal forces, either beneficent or 
malefic. In Greek antiquity they came to be thought as personalised and gendered 
properties, though of course cosmological in foundation. Verriant describes how, in 
Homeric and Hesiodic myth, Zeus creates woman as both gift and fatal punishment 
for the Promethian transgression of the stealing of divine fire. The original woman, 
Pandora, is described as a kind of divine potlatch, a gift of "beautiful evil" capable of 
bringing both great happiness and intense misery to man. 41 For Vernant Greek 
sacrifice was a means of bridging the void, however vicariously or ephemerally, 
between the human and the divine, which since the primal transgression had been 
separate. His approach to sacrifice, though diverging from Mauss ends on a point of 
general agreement with Bataille's approach to sacrifice and sacred 'mediation'. It is, 
according to Bataille, the mediatory role of the Christian God (between the human 
and the supernatural) that causes the principle of the good to weaken in relation to 
the 'sovereignty' of evil. 
Both De Heusch and Vemant's studies conclude then, on a note of 
considerable congruence with the problematic suggested by Bataille and Baudrillard, 
which is perhaps surprising given the marginal status of the latter thinkers. The 
General economic paradigm of life and death, accumulation and destruction, good 
and evil, underpinned by the reciprocal, mimetic (inter)play of the cosmological and 
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the social/cultural is central to these Structuralist ethnographic studies and to the 
theory of Bataille and Baudrillard, 'the sacrificial debt is entirely based on the 
cosmogonic order upon which, in the last resort, social order depends' (de Heusch 
1.985: 213). 
These mythic, sacred and symbolic relations and their connections with the 
notion of evil in the theory of Bataille and Baudrillard will be explored in the 
following chapter. The following points drawn from this discussion of ethnographic 
data need to be emphasised. If there are said to be evil spirits or gods active in the 
life of the community, as for example in the 'primitive' religiong described by 
Durkheim, or more recently the Structuralist anthropology of Douglas (1966) and de 
Heusch (1985), then such evils are symbolised, inscribed and defined within the 
religious system. 4s thpy gq i within these systems, ritual and ceremonial 
practices can be invoked to reverse, appease or combat the forces of evil. For 
example if evil forces are said to influence or govern certain times, days or periods a 
number of sacred rites can be performed to protect society. Of course these may or 
may not be successful. lfprther 
there is no. distinction between moral-evil and natural 
evil since individualism on which morality depends is not developed. In the later 
monotheistic religions particularly Christianity, the. forces of evil tend to be occluded, 
without. -a _(collectively sanctioned) 
face or. fibrin. Pure evil, rather than human 
imperfection, tends to be symbolically banished, excluded, the most notable example 
being the expulsion of the fallen angel Satan from Heaven in the Judaeo-Christian 
tradition. Here the personification of evil is marginalised but the syInbolisation of 
evil remains, though in nebulous and unstable forins since an expulsion is also, in a 
sense, a freeing. The principle of evil then gains power, mystery, stealth and the 
force of seduction. In the Western tradition any possible ritual protections against 
evil become increasingly ill defined or evoked so rarely as to be of little value, as is 
the case with exorcism. 42 The possibility of conflict between good and evil is, in the 
Western tradition, either left to God, or else, as is particularly the case in modernity 
the conflict is moralised, internalised, psychologised. The site of conflict remains 
dualistically conceived, between the 'baser' human 'instincts' and the 'higher' moral 
principles. 
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Once again the symbolisation of 'evil', in the course of socio-historic 
change, seems to gain in strength and power. It is expelled and freed, its scope is 
radicalised or extended by the 'progress' of rationalism and it becomes increasingly 
focused within the individual, its passions and desires. The remainder of this 
discussion, and the following chapter will further interrogate these relations, and the 
theoretical assumptions that lay behind them in order to enable a more precise 
reflection on the contemporary fonns taken by'evil'. 
EVIL AND THE MODERN STATE 
Contemporary theoretical reflections on the nature of evil have taken a 
number of distinct forms. In functionalist-oriented sociology evil is approached as a 
necessary, hence functional, aspect of certain authoritarian forms of social 
organisation, such as the totalitarian state manifest in Fascism or Communism. Yet 
clearly the capitalist system also deploys violence, terror and murder when faced 
with perceived threats to its internal and international security. Further it is difficult 
if not impossible to claim that instances of excessive violence, or 'evil', are a 
necessary rather than contingent or unpredictable feature of a particular form of 
social organisation. Moreover, where 'violence' can be related to the functioning of 
the nation-state in genera143 symbolisations of evil are a far more difficult and 
elusive, more frequently evoked as a description of a particular individual behaviour. 
The Second World War and the Nazi genocide have cast a bleak shadow 
over post-war social thought, though often in an indistinct and unacknowledged way. 
Generally speaking, contemporary theory, philosophy, sociology and psychology, 
has attempted to engage, in various ways, with the category 'violence' rather than that 
of 'evil'. Yet where accounts of violence encounter conceptual difficulties, for 
example where the violence has a particularly abhorrent character or seems to serve 
no rational purpose (that is 'self-interest), the term 'evil' often makes a furtive re- 
appearance as supplement to restricted economies. 
The terminology of evil is often invoked in reflections on the Nazi 
holocaust, some aspects of which seem to fulfil this category. Indeed the event is 
often taken as the principal example of modem evil. Yet the genocide also involved 
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much that was, apparently, paradigmatically rational. The highly efficient 
bureaucratic machine devoted, ultimately, to annihilation is perhaps the best 
example. Once again this suggests, strongly, that the principle of rationality and the 
pursuit of 'evil' are far from mutually exclusive. Indeed the events of the holocaust 
utterly undermine Hegelian assertions of inevitable human progress through reason. 
Rationality was put in the service of 'evil' without causing any serious 
'contradictions'. In fact rationality greatly accelerated the human potential for 
destructive actions. 
However in many studies of the holocaust 'evil' has tended to remain 
focused here, as if these events were both unprecedented and totally unique. Where 
the scale of bureaucratic organisation devoted to destruction was unprecedented the 
actual instances of cruelty, violence and 'evil' certainly were not. Evil in modernity 
then appears, at once, fused with rationality yet always already in excess of it, ahead 
of it, certainly irreducible to it. 
Of the many studies of the Nazi period Arendt's (1964/1994) is perhaps the 
most influential. This study, dealing with the trial and execution of Adolf Eichmann 
is sub-titled 'a report on the banality of evil'. It argues that 'evil' was actuated not 
through the diabolic personality of Eichmann, but rather through the bureaucratic 
processes common to twentieth century society in which he was enmeshed. 
Eichmann was charged with 'war crimes', 'crimes against the Jewish people' and, 
most significantly 'crimes against humanity'. 
Arendt emphasises the extent to which Eichmann simply did his 'duty', 
obeying, to the letter, both the orders of superiors and the law as established by 
Hitler. In fact Eichmann cited Kant's categorical imperative in his defence. 
Eichmann, Arendt argues, was neither a sadist nor a racist fanatic, nor was he 
dominated by blind obedience. Eichmann's actions then cannot be explained in 
individualist, still less, for Arendt, psychoanalytic terms. According to Arendt, 
Eichmann had merely vulgarised Kant's moral principle, substituting 'general law or 
principle' for'the will of the Fuhrer'. Yet this was entirely in keeping with the state 
and legal structure of Germany at the time. Arendt asserts that Hitler's rule 
represented a 'period of crimes legalised by the state' (Arendt 1964/1994: 136). 
While the abhorrent nature of the genocide may tempt us to agree, it is surely the 
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case that crimes legalised by the state, strictly speaking, are no longer 'crimes. A 
similar point was made by Eichmann's defence, and what ensured his conviction, as 
Arendt notes, was rather that he pursued his 'duty' so diligently, disallowing 
exceptions or favouritism even where personal financial gain had to be sacrificed. 
Eichmann could have saved lives and made himself rich, as many leading Nazi's did 
simply by being less diligent. For Arendt: 
... this was proof that he had always acted against his "inclinations", whether 
they were sentimental or inspired by interest, that he had always done his 
"duty" (Arendt 1964/1994: 137). 
Further any inclinations towards cruelty or malice seemed to be absent; indeed any 
sense of desire; lust or passion played no part in Eichmann's behaviour. Here Arendt 
indicates that a new kind of evil was a work, a highly efficient bureaucratic and 
technical machine put to the service of 'criminal' principles as easily as they may 
serve a liberal democracy. The modem bureaucratic system contained no internal 
structures, codes or methods to resist such an ideology. Such a system can never 
possess more than an 'outward appearance' of legality, of legitimacy. Accordingly 
for Arendt the manifestation of evil undergoes a crucial qualitative transformation in 
modernity: 
Evil in the Third Reich had lost the quality by which most people recognise 
it - the quality of temptation. Many Germans and many Nazis, probably an 
overwhelming majority of them, must have been tempted not to 
murder ... (B]ut, God knows, they had learned how to resist temptation (Arendt 1964/1994: 150). 
This is a fundamental transformation, one that constitutes for Arendt the 'banality of 
evil'. With this thesis Arendt specifies new and distinctive cultural conditions which 
undermine moral responsibility and enable a new form of evil. There are parallels 
with Baudrillard's transparency of evil; the key difference is that for Arendt the 
innately moral disposition, of -human consciousness was submerged 
by impersonal 
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-and 
inhuman bureaucratic procedures. Yet can a'moral disposition'be innate? This 
seems unlikely and in any case is not shown in Arendt's work. The terminology, 
which she offers in this respect, such as "animal pity", is awkward and unconvincing. 
In addition, although Arendt is convincing in her account of Eichmann as bureaucrat 
rather than 'monstee other leading Nazi's, particularly Hitler himself, haunt her text. 
At no point does she suggest that Hitler too was a mere bureaucrat, indeed she 
suggest that he and others such as Goebel's were far closer to the 'personification' of 
evil. This allows her account to hover between what should be two distinct 
formulations. On the one hand the understanding of evil as substantive, positive, as 
individual choice or duty (as the temporary suspension of choice), and on the other as 
privative, systemic effect of techno-bureacratic culture. Yet reason cannot provide a 
stable separation of these two formulations, it can only function by_, Tprgi. ng them, 
allowin _one 
to supplement the other. 
Bauman's (1989) study of the holocaust shares much with Arendt. 
Bauman's account emphasises how the Nazi bureaucratic machine disabled, diverted 
or re-articulated the "innate" moral disposition of the personnel who carried out the 
genocide. For Bauman evil is unambiguously privative since it resulted from the 
socially based disablement of natural goodness. Similar bureaucratic technologies 
are, of course, endemic to modem life not unique feature of German society in the 
early 20th century. To support his case Bauman cites the well-known psychological 
experiments of Milgram (1974) on the relationship between obedience to authority 
and the willingness to inflict serious physical pain. Studies of these kinds are 
important and revealing however they leave much unquestioned and have little 
purchase when confronted by contemporary forms of 'inexplicable evil' which are of 
particular interest to this inquiry. These events cannot be 'explained' by reference to 
modem structures of bureaucracy and authority. In fact such factors are notably 
absent from the cases cited in the appendices. 'Moral responsibility' can be non- 
operational without the intervention of bureaucratic 'distance'. This suggests, 
strongly, that the privative approach to evil is misleading and inadequate. The 
A 
existence of 'innate' moral responsibility cannot be assumed. Psychoanalytic and 
Post-structuralist thought challenges these assumptions and tends to view 'moral 
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sentiments' are constitutive of evil actions, not as a safeguard against them. These 
approaches are evaluated, briefly, below. 
Contemporary death-events suggest that the experience or manifestation of 
evil'has shifted again. Contemporary evil can no longer be thought, successfully, as 
I 
LI 
residing in the conflict between innate human goodness and techno-bureaucratic 
, 
'badness'. Such as comfortable separation can no longer be made. Contemporary 
horrors are not merely structured by national, ethnic or political or religious 
difference, nor fuelled by per-verse ideological machinery. Douýtless extreme 
horrors occur in these situations but are in no way confined to them. Contemporary 
death-events cannot be comprehended through the effects of bureaucratic and 
authority structures, they call into doubt the whole explanatory orthodoxy of'the self 
persecuting 'the other. Further, as I stressed in the previous chapter, there appear to 
be no convincing medical, psychological or psychiatric 'pathologies', or explanatory 
resources available to manage such cases. 
PSYCHOANALYTIC AND POST-STRUCTURALIST THEORIES OF'EVIL' 
The previous chapter reviewed the Freudian attempt to 'explain' extreme 
behaviours such as sexual violence. Freudian psychoanalysis was criticised in a 
number of respects, particularly for its positivistic assumption of deep, 'real' 
impulses as explanation of social behaviour and cultural experience. Yet the 
Freudian tradition does break with the 'problem' of evil, the conceptualisation of evil 
as privative in nature. In Freud the polarities of Christian thought are reversed, 
aggressive impulses are the 'substantive' 
-cause 
of evil while civilisation and morality 
attempt the control, limitation or privation of aggressive instincts. Moral 
responsibility is then always split, divided or fractured by the instincts, which do not 
recognise morality. This section will review contemporary attempts to apply Freud's 
thinking to evil. 
A classical Freudian approach suggests that individuals who commit 'evil' 
acts are somehow locked within an immature, infantile stage of the sadistic 
expression of libido. With the removal of Freud's evolutionary framework we reach 
the position that all individuals, at all stages of life, and may experience the most 
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sadistic impulses, which however they ordinarily express only in domesticated, 
vicarious or phantasmal form. Where such desires are pursued in more material form 
then apparently 'inexplicable evil' may occur. Such an approach is crude but 
ýreudian concepts, primarily of a libidinal economy of desires that operate without 
regard for moral categories, have been taken up, modified and developed by a 
number of important contemporary theorists. Differing understandings of what 
Freud termed 'the unconscious' and libidinal psychic economies are developed by 
Lacan in the Post-structuralist theory of Deleuze, Lyotard and Zizek. The term Post- 
structuralist, of course, comprises many different strands of theory, developed at 
different times and in different contexts. Despite a general concern with limits and 
what lay in excess of limits in Post-structuralist thought, direct theoretical 
engagements with evil remain rare. For example, Foucault examined madness, 
violence and transgression in detail but offered only asides on $evil, . 
44 Lyotard 
(1992) developed a new 'politicised' notion of paganism but does not deal with 'evil' 
as such despite referring to his early work Libidinal Econoiny (1974/1993) as an 
"evil book". Deleuze refers to the devil and diabolic in his explorations of excess 
entitled 'becoming-animal"5 and discusses cruelty, sadism and masochism but'evil' is 
not a primary concern. Recently Derrida has published lengthy meditations on the 
gift, which involve brief considerations of evil in relation to the legacies of Kant and 
Nietzsche. More recently still, working within a Freudian/Lacanian psychoanalytical 
tradition, Zizek (1993,1997) has examined Kant's radical evil and presented a 
typology of evil, in terms of the Freudian categories ego, superego and id. Clearly 
evil, the diabolic, the excessive, and related areas have re-emerged to exert a 
profound fascination for contemporary thinkers. 
Each of the above offer complex and distinctive methods for thinking about 
evil, and excessive phenomena in general. Much contemporary theory involves re- 
evaluations of the established figures of structuralist thought, pre-eminently Marx 
and Freud. This is true of Bataille, Baudrillard, Foucault and Deleuze. For such 
writers 'excess', conceived in different ways, has become a recurrent theme. In order 
to think excess the socio-political and socio-psychical revolutions of Marx and Freud 
are regarded as crucial yet flawed and inadequate conceptual tools. Perhaps the 
most fully developed critique of the Freudo-Marxist tradition is that of Deleuze and 
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Guattari's Capitalism and Schizophrenia. In common with Lyotard (1974/1993) they 
e that the central concepts of Freudo-Marxism limit and imprison, within 
structural categories (ego, id, consciousness, labour, class) and dialectical 
movements (revolution, emancipation, resolution) the general libidinal economy of 
untrammelled drives, desires, pleasures and creativity. For Deleuze, deeply 
influenced by Nietzsche, the terms 'good' and 'evil' are merely resentfid moral 
evaluations, which should be overcome. Further Deleuze develops a notion of 
'positive ontology, 46 which militates against the consideration of. any so-called 
negative phenomena of which evil might be a class. Again a Deleuzian approach 
might be to examine the 'deeper' relations of desire, of which moral evaluations are 
'signs and symptoms'. This is not the place to challenge the Deleuzian ontology 
except to suggest that such an 'overcoming' may be impossible, and perhaps 
increasingly naive. In the next chapter I will argue that Bataille's thought attempts to 
force through some of the more radical implications of the Freudian approach to evil 
which are erased in other strands of Post-structural theory. 
A number of thinkers drawn from psychoanalytic and literary backgrounds 
have recently addressed the topic - of evil. Doubtless these writers offer many 
important insights but their approaches are often so individualist and ahistorical as to 
be highly suspect. Perhaps foremost amongst these is Slavoj Zizek. Zizek's 
(1994: 70) Freudian typology of evil restricts the phenomena to the 'ideological' 
plane, that structured by the regularities of 'self' against 'other'. Ego-evil is defined 
in terms of selfishness, super-ego evil as 'fanatical devotion to some ideological 
ideal' (ibid. ). Finally id-evil, a far more problematic notion, is described in terms of 
the 'skinhead beating up foreigners'. Although Zizek argues that this form of evil is 
characterised by neither selfish nor simplistically ideological behaviour (in other 
words there is no clear rationalisation of it) he approaches it as: 
... structured and motivated by the most elementary 
imbalance in the 
relationship between the Ich [I] and jouissance ... the primordially missing 
object-cause of desire (Zizek 1994: 71). 
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There is a considerable awkwardness both in the psychoanalytic terms 
themselves and their deployment alongside examples and illustrations which, far 
from capturing any sense of the "primordial", actually are borrowed from noticeably 
contemporary cultural products, effects and processes such as 'ethnic cleansing' and 
modem cinema and rock music. Exploring contemporary psychoanalytic accounts of 
'radical evil' entails plunging into a universe of technical terminology, some of which 
we may not be inclined to accept. Even such apparently basic terms as the 
unconscious and 'the small object of desire' need to'be contested. It is precisely this 
problematic conception of the id and the unconscious, which are supposed to be 
somehow universal or "primordial" that are re-evaluated, though in different ways, 
by Bataille, Baudrillard and in a different ways Lyotard and Deleuze. The possibility 
of a general aqftT libidinal economy. is. mos, t fully red-by-jhesq writeKs and jo SXP 
increasingly, is the concern of Post-structuralist feminism. 47 
I will make the case for the superiority of a General (social) economic 
approach to those of a restricted psychological or psychoanalytical nature. In 
developing a reading of Bataille and Baudrillard's engagement with evil their 
respective challenges to both Freud and his successors will become apparent. The 
theories of Bataille and particularly Baudrillard involve a direct challenge to the 
ychoanalytic notion of drives and desires, which are argued to remain within a 
roductivist paradigm. Further they allow us to re-consider the position of sexuality 
and eroticism as distinct from desire and its relation to evils which seem to be 
unbounded from moral and structural categories. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter has offered a necessarily brief consideration of various 
conceptualisations of evil in the western traditions of social thought. It does not 
claim to be either exhaustive or evenly representative of established modes of 
thought in this area. Nor does it claim to present the 'truth' of evil, even where such 
an assertion is implicit in some of the sources that have been drawn upon. Clearly 
what has been offered is a selective, partial and condensed reflection on a number of 
thinkers who have presented powerful, persuasive and in some cases historically 
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influential approaches to evil. This chapter has shown something of the intractability 
of 'evil', how this notion eludes definition or comprehension, how it changes and 
_mutqtýs. representing a point of severe 
danger and instability in any system. 
The contemporary order when confronted with traumatic or catastrophic 
events, whether defining itself in religious, moral or techno-scientific terms, is tom 
apart, immobilised and left grasping at the apparently archaic terminology of 'evil'. 
Yet such events do not, at least for the majority, mark a return to, or sheltering within 
theological systems, it seems the language of evil cannot be exptýnged, rather it 
separates from systematic religion and never ceases to hold a certain power over the 
human imagination, ýFaced with such 'evil' the inadequacies of dominant or state 
theological systems, the aporias of modem techno-scientific culture, and the 
weaknesses of 'liberal-pluralist-(post)-modem' thought, are revealed with devastating 
clarity. For all these systems the positive flourishing of an autonomous and 
excessive, not merely privative/substantive notion of evil is, strictly, impossibility, a 
non-sense, a horror that should not even be contemplat4., 
Modem thought, upon encountering 'evil' is paralysed and powerless, unable 
either to locate moral responsibility successfully, or to dispense with notions of 
responsibility. It is left grasping at two, equally unsatisfactory, possibilities. , (One 
declares evil is inexplicable in rational terms because human beings possess an 
ineradicable kernel of irrationalism which may render them temporarily or 
permanently 'ill' and so not responsible for any acts which may seem 'evil'. This is 
a position shared by psychoanalytic, psychiatric and bio-genetic accounts of 
48 violence. Sociological and social psychological accounts of 'privations' in 
environment or other adverse contextual influences follow a similar pattern as 
Connolly (1991) stresses. týýecýýndlj modem thought offers rationalisations of evil 
that are simply incommensurate with the traumatic and catastrophic phenomena 
involved in such events. These positions overlap and encompass both liberal- 
humanist prescriptions for greater educational guidance, and some anti-humanist and 
Post-structuralist positions which attempt to contain evil within the 'moral 
evaluations' of the resentful, or latterly in the moral panics of the mass media. All of 
these positions avoid a full engagement with such events, either containing evil 
within the moral, 'irrational', the pathological or the textual. 
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Privative conceptions of evil appear ndve while theories which assert a 
real' substance of -evil, such as untamed 
instincts or impulses,, encounter severe 
problems in locating, plausibly, the nature of this 'substance'. Further both privative 
and substantive conceptions of evil are unsatisfactory because they attempt to(contiifiij 
_ 
evil within particular forms which contemporary evil eludes or refuses. This is why 
a new approach must be sought. 
The deployment of the term 'evil' seems to require a number of conditions. 
Firstly evil must be excessive, disproportionate, devoid of notions like pity and 
compassion, it must be 'inhuman' in intensity. Secondly, the term'evil'is invoked in 
cases of intentional, deliberate and calculating action. This expresses the extreme 
intractability of evil. It suggests, at once, both purposeful, calculating action and the 
suspension, erasure or destruction of all 'human' responsibility, all reason and 
meaning. The paradoxical nature of evil is that it encompasses both. 
In modem thought evil is often defined in ten-ns of the excessive pursuit of 
some higher cause or principle, that is as embodying a moral claim or principle. This 
assertion leads to a general critique of morality, it is argued that morality itself, at 
least in its moral-Christian form directly or indirectly leads to intolerance, 
persecution and ultimately 'evil'. Here evil is no longer conceptualised as divine 
punishment for sin but as structural effect of moralistic culture; the persecution of the 
'other'. Some 'evils' can be read in this way, the 'witchhunts' of 17th century Europe 
being a favoured example. 48 Yet these seem distinct from the 'inexplicable' class of 
contemporary 'evil' which I am most interested in here. Evil, where structured by 
ethnic, racial or gender-based hatred is perhaps all too explicable, all too human, 
based on fear and attempts to control a perceived 'other. Investigation of these forins 
of behaviour is important and many existing accounts are clearly inadequate. 50 
However to argue that evil is always structured in this way, serving a spurious moral 
'greater good' which can by critique be shown to be defective is in my opinion a 
domestication and artificial containment of the meaning of 'evil' and of the limits of 
human behaviour. 
It may be that new terrain is emerging, that contemporary death-events 
represent a new regime of 'evil'. Drawing on Ricoeur's (1961/1967) notion of the 
'symbolisation' of evil it is perhaps now necessary to trace the movements of evil 
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beyond the metaphysics of self and other, b 
ýqnd_ 
persecution, beyond its articulation with any polar opposite of the 'good'. Violence 
structured along ethnic or nationalistic lines, even were it is most extreme, is always 
accompanied by ready-made apparatus for its deciphering and comprehension. The 
historical and political context of hatred between Serb and Muslim, Arab and Jew, 
Hutu and Tutsi is relatively easy to trace and functions as a rationalising or 
domesticating tool. While these mechanisms of rationalisation are unable to 'think' 
the intensity of hatred and violence, their constant presence, relay5d through the 
global news media, serves to ward off the invocation of 'evil'. Similarly the violence 
of men inflicted on women is comprehended through stereotyped mechanisms, again 
ftielled by the media. Too often the usage of notions such as 'patriarchy', 'misogyny', 
'sadism' 'perversion' comprises a popular remedy Lqý_ý4ýnking away unpleasant and 
sickening events, however inadequate they may be. Such events then come to seem 
commonplaces, unable to provoke much general interest. They certainly do not 
radiate the profound fascination of the 'inexplicable', the 'incomprehensible' atrocity, 
the contemporary death-event. 
Those death-events specified above seem to refute all rationalising 
procedures, and here 'evil' reappears. 'Evil' as the symbolisation of excesses, of 
negatives, beyond rational comprehension. Indeed it is the necessarily limited and 
partial, relative and perspectival nature of reason that, paradoxically, guarantees 'evil' 
a place in the contemporary landscape. 'Evil' will exist then as long as thinking, 
reflection, reason continue, and perhaps long after their demise. 
Perhaps, as Baudrillard suggests the dualist 'universe of meaning' is 
collapsing, good and evil no longer meet, their 'rapport' is broken, they cannot be 
either brought together, as Bataille urged, nor can they be surpassed as Nietzsche 
hoped. Perhaps we are experiencing the final disarticulation of 'good' and 'evil'. 
Who, today, would even attempt to define these tenns? Meaning is contained within 
their functioning as polar opposites; neither can be isolated and remain meaningful. 
Yet these terms do not suffer the same fate, the'good' loses its moorings, its force, by 
being culturally generalised, normalised, reduced to the level of lowest common 
denominator, amounting to no more than that residue of politeness necessary for 
consumer-driven culture. Evil, however, retains its aura of seduction, its thrill of 
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transgression, its force of fascination. 'Evil' exists beyond conceptual containment, at 
the limits of understanding and meaning, its seductive elusiveness only magnified by 
a contemporary culture that seeks to forget or deny it. 
The following chapter will examine, in detail, the related approaches of 
Bataille and Baudrillard to 'evil. The thinking of limits and excesses will continue to 
be of central importance. For them the notion of evil is not merely archaic or 
embarrassing, it is not theorised in specifically Christian or enlightenment terms, yet 
nor do their approaches correspond to other figures in the Post-structuralist canon. 
Here I will seek an alternative thinking of 'evil', one which is better equipped to 
approach contemporary horrors. 
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NOTES 
1) Quoted in Michalson (1990). 
2 See Times Higher Educational Supplement April 25th 1997: 26-7. 
3) Taken from the Chambers Dictionary (1995). 
4) See Oxford English Dictionary (1996). 
5) An argument made by Masters, B. (1996: 27). 
6) On the responsibility/insanity issue see Reznek (1997). 
7) See Dawkins (1976). 
8) See Surin (1986) and also Milbank (1990,1995), contemporary science and 
religion fuse in many popular works such as Davies, P. God and the New Physics 
(1983) London, Penguin. 
9) These changing forms have been traced in a number of anthropological 
studies. For example Durkheim (1912/1961), also see Detienne and Vernant (1989) 
and De Heush (1985). In addition such shifts are a crucial component of Nietzsche's 
reading of Western history, see especially Nietzsche (18 87/1994). 
10) From Kant, I. Religion Within the Limits ofReason Alone (1793/1960). 
11) This is certainly the view expressed by Paul Barry Clarke in Times Higher 
Educational Supplement, April 25th 1997. 
12) See Boyd (1975) for a consideration of the parallels in the conceptualisation 
of evil between western and eastern religious thought. 
13) There is an array of conflicting. versions of the creation within the Judeo- 
Christian tradition. The canonical book of Genesis disregards a number of other 
accounts, myths and fragments of the Christian faith. There are many Coptic, Greek, 
Manichean and Gnostic writings pertaining to the creation which at various points in 
the history of the Christian church have been rejected, excluded or amended. Some 
of these are collected in The Nag Hammadi Library (1977) Ed. James M. Robinson. 
See also Ricoeur (1961/1967: 232-279). 
14) In Zoroastrian, Manichean and Gnostic dualisms there are said to be good 
and evil gods constantly at war with each other. This assertion entails that these gods 
are plural and finite. This system constitutes both a cosmological and an ethical 
dualism and involves. a. princip e of pvil but not the problem of evil as such. In this 
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regard it is more logically stable than the Christian system. In Manichean 
metaphysics, which has a certain influence on the theory of both Bataille and 
Baudrillard, the evil gods are posited as the more powerful at least during the time 
6ame occupied by humanity. This temporal ascendancy of the evil gods is held to 
account for the inherent tragedy and fatality of the human condition. In the Gnostic 
version Yahweh, the God of the Old Testament is said to be a false deity, mean and 
vengeful who created the world and the human creature in error. The human being is 
a part of this false god or demiurge, a fact explaining human imperfections such as 
cruelty, violence and 'evil'. In this tradition the true God is unknown, beyond 
rational or discursive thought, alien or entirely other and thereby uncontaminated by 
the vicissitudes of the human world. However by the notion of a false creator, 
Gnosticism imputes an irremediably evil dimension to all humankind, while the 
entire world is said to be an error, and so human suffering is both inevitable and 
senseless. Yet the Gnostic system, emphasising the power of a principle of evil 
endemic in the human world, was for many early Christians a more plausible 
position that that which would be established by St Augustine as Christian 
orthodoxy. 1 
15) This work was provoked, in part, by the sack of Rome in 410 by Alaric and 
the Goths. The Roman empire had been, at this time, only recently Christianised 
and the fall of the great city was widely attributed to the recent erosion of faith in the 
more war-like pagan gods whose cults had been suppressed by the Christian 
emperors Gratian and Theodosius. The City of God was Augustine's response both to 
the collapse of the Christian(ised) empire and the specific charge that the pagan gods 
had been more powerful, virile, and offered greater protection. In 428 the Vandals 
invaded North Africa, where Augustine himself was Bishop of Hippo, Augustine 
died during the siege of that city. 
16) The best known example is the young Augustine's pleasure in the stealing of 
a pear. See The Confessions (1982). 
17) Augustine argued that evil originates in the volition of the human being 
(Adam), thereby establishing the fundamental Christian doctrine of human 
culpability and the complete goodness, and so blamelessness of God. However in 
attempting to establish these points with consistency Augustine is forced to suppress 
210 
many potential implications, interpretations and objections; most seriously that if evil 
is nothing why strive to avoid it or repent for it, and perhaps more fundamental still 
the position of an omniscient God in the causation of evil, suffering and severe 
p unishment. For more on this area see Connelly's (1991; 1993) interesting 
discussions. 
18) See discussion by Stanford (1996). 
19) The so-called 'Free-will' defence of the existence of evil (in a universe 
dominated by an omnipotent and benevolent God) has become increasingly popular 
over recent decades. It argues, broadly speaking, liliYt must-existlin order that 
human beings are able to 'choose' either good or evil, and are hence culpable for 
those choices. 
20) See for example Surin (1986). 
21) It is interesting that Kant should rely upon a metaphoric of child/adult, since 
childhood can be seen as both the time before maturity and access to self- 
determination is reached, and also as an enchanted realm. This is a realm of radical 
freedom and of a certain 'innocent' eroticism and excessiveness yet these elements 
are absent from the Kantian account. Bataille (1954/1988) refers to the excessive 
and exuberant nature of childhood and its superiority over the restricted and 
domesticated nature of adult life. See also Leiris (1984) for a fascinating account of 
childhood. 
22) See the excellent discussion by Owen (1994). Kant is occasionally very 
simplistic in his treatment of the newly emergent discipline of anthropology, see for 
example Kant (1793/1960: 28). 
23) Nietzsche's critique of Kant's view of autonomy, morality and reason is 
somewhat fragmentary but is particularly evident in the second essay of Oil the 
Genealogy of Morality (Nietzsche 1994). For Kant the true essence of religion did 
not reside within the community and its sacred or symbolic investments, but rather 
within individual consciousness striving for autonomy. Here religion finally 
becomes fully rational and individualistic; civic, but not collective in the 
Durkheimian sense. According to Bataille's 77ieory of Religion, the General 
economy of the sacred is increasingly narrowed, domesticated and rationalised, 
becoming an unstable restricted economy. The sacred is diminished and lo. '., icised 
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N 
into a single God, and with Kant, God is finally rendered subordinate to reason and a 
metaphysic of proportionality. Where Kant really differs from the Augustinian 
reading of original sin, and the Manichean dualist 'heresy', is by erecting his system 
of individualist maxim making. Kant's avoids falling into a simple dualism of good 
and evil by arguing that rather than good maxims opposing evil maxims, the 
foundation of maxim-making is human freewill, that can equally choose good or evil. 
Kant's understanding of the content of evil is, again, closely related to the Platonic 
and Augustinian denigration but not outright condemnation of the body. For Kant, as 
for Augustine, the sensuous nature of the body is not evil in itself, yet freewill does 
often choose to pursue bodily lusts and subordinate the higher mental and spiritual 
faculties to them. Again it is fundamentally a question not of repression but of 
proportion and since the embodied nature of human consciousness is a universal 
'given' then so, for Kant, is the propensity for evil. 
24) See Weber in Gerth & Wright-Mills (1948: 196-264), and Foucault 
(1975/1977). 
25) See for example Owen (1994), Foucault (1970), Beiser (1993), CopJec (Ed. ) 
(1996). 
26) See Kant (1793/1960: liii&148). 
27) Notably Goethe, see discussions in Michalson (1990) and CopJec (1996). 
28) See Lacan's influential article 'Kant with Sade' in October no. 51, Winter 
1989. 
29) However an enervated sense of the divine remains crucial to the Kantian 
system. Human moral goodness is not traced to cultural factors alone but depends on 
'an infinitely distant nournenal realm, with no practical bearing upon our present 
circumstance' (Michalson 1990: 4) and a whole matrix of Christian and especially 
biblical teachings. A moral, meaningful universe can only be secured against the 
chaos and destruction of evil by a 'human-divine partnership' (ibid. ) and it is 
precisely this mediatory role of the divine that according to Bataille, as we shall see, 
further weakens the good and, reciprocally strengthens the force of evil. 
30) In the preface to On the Genealogy of Morality (1887/1994), Nietzsche 
rejects the search 'for the origin of evil beyond the world', that has been characteristic 
of religious and metaphysical thought. Yet Nietzsche does not seem to distinguish 
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adequately between religion and metaphysics. A religion need not necessarily 
depend on transcendent or otherworldly conceptions, as a metaphysic must, below 
we will examine anthropological and ethnographic data that will support this claim. 
keligion, particularly that often termed 'primitive' orarchaic', is concerned with the 
cultural and material efficacy of its communal rites and need not be, strictly 
speaking, 'otherworldly'. 
31) See in particular Nietzsche, Beyond GoodandEvil (1886/1990a) sections 38 
and 39, and also Nietzsche, The Gay Science, note 79. 
32) Volume two of Human, All Too Human, (18 80) deals with the origin of such 
Icustom'. 
33) This is the thesis made, famously, by Foucault towards the conclusion of 
The Order of Things (1970/1974). 
34) Nietzsche's philosophy, despite its frequent and unsatisfactory equation of 
religion and the otherworldly, also exhibits a powerful and repeated concern with the 
efficacy of illusion, myth and aesthetics. Megill (1987) explores this neglected 
aspect of Nietzsche, which conflicts with a number of recent interpretations of his 
thought. According to Megill, Nietzsche ascribes aesthetics an ontogenetic of 
"world-making significance" (1987: 31). Peality is woven as a web of illusion, with 
no deeper, more essential real in some way 'hidden' behind the illusion\The world, 
for Nietzsche, gives birth to itself as illusion. Megill situates Nietzsche as 'the 
founder of what became the aesthetic metacritique of "truth", wherein "the work of 
art", or "the text", or "language" is seen as establishing the grounds for truth's 
possibility' (1987: 33). Nietzsche's later writings returned to the nature and centrality 
of myth that had been present in his earliest work. In an attack on the Romantic 
Movement, Nietzsche declared art, not the privileged mode of access to "truth", but 
rather as the highest mode of illusion. Nietzsche's final writings collected as The 
Will-to-Power declare 'We have art lest we perish of the truth' (Nietzsche 1964: 
no. 822). There is then a profound anti-materialist and anti-realist dimension to 
Nietzsche's thought, 
'what is 'reality'... That mountain there! That cloud there! What is 'real' in 
that? Subtract the phantasm and every human contribution from it ... if you can ... There 
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is no 'reality' for us - nor for you either, my sober friends' (Nietzsche 
1882/1974: 121). 
The notions of myth and illusion are then all-encompassing for Nietzsche. Myth is 
the foundation of culture and society, it attained its most profound and expressive 
form, according to Nietzsche, in Greek tragedy, later expressed through religion, art 
and literature, and then through the successes and transformative power of 
supposedly a-mythological science and technology. /However it is the weakness, 
effacement or lack of binding force of myth in modem society that has lead to the 
impoverishment of human culture and the expansion of nihilisM\ This reading of 
Nietzsche, I will argue, plays a crucial role in situating the recent work of Baudrillard 
on illusion. It is precisely this symbolic relation, (not real but in Nietzsche's terms 
mythic, illusory) that is affirmed and insisted upon in the marginal sociology of 
Bataille, the College and more recently Baudrillard and that is denied or obscured in 
dominant or orthodox sociological thought as it attempts to approach 'excessive' 
phenomena in western societies. It is apparently felt or assumed that such an 
approach could only be valid as an explanation of 'primitive' thinking long surpassed 
in the developed 
ýWestern 
world. Here, there is clearly a deep and often 
unacknowledged complex of enlightenment assumption guiding contemporary 
sociological thought concerning the unquestioned desirability of notions such as 
individualism, autonomy, progress and utilitABataille and Baudrillard, in turn, 
utterly reject such evolutionist assumption concerning the efficacy of Western 
rationalism and while much structuralist thought has attempted to show that 
'primitive' thought is equally, though divergently, as logical and systematic as 
Western modernity, Bataille and Bau drillard are more interested in showing the 
ýeversc hypothesis, that Western modernity is as irrational, as dependent on illusion 
and myth as 'primitive' thought. 
35) Weber rema__rRs-o-nL-IH_ePF6blern of evil in the essay 'Politics as a Vocation' 
in Gerth & Wright-Mills (Eds. ) (1948: 77-128). For his general approach to Western 
religion see (1948: 267-359). 
36) Durkheim's fascination with religious thought and life; and specifically the 
notions of sacred and profane, can be traced to the influence wielded by Fustel de 
Coulanges' The Ancient City, first published in 1864 and Robertson-Smith's 0 
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anthropological study Lectures on the Religion of the Semites, first published in 
1889. In addition many of the central axioms of Durkheim's later sociology of 
religion had already been worked out in earlier works, his Professional Ethics and 
dvic Morals (1957) contains the notion of the sacred, presents God as hypostatised 
social forces and contains the important idea that the individual self forms the quasi- 
sacred cult of modem life. Durkheim's extremely ambitious project; attempting to 
probe the most basic and essential attributes of social and religious life and to show 
the epistemological rootedness of modem secular thought in religious and sacred 
principles, has received a great deal of critical attention, much of it hostile. Central 
to many critical accounts are Durkheim's supposed over-generalisations, even 
universalisation of the concept of toternism generally, and the categories of sacred 
and profane specifically. Durkheim, though agnostic in personal belief, raised the 
importance of suspension of disbelief and deep empathy with sacred principles to a 
fundamental methodological axiom. Simultaneously, he never doubted the total and 
exclusive ability of scientific reason to establish the truth. In this sense he was a 
strict positivist and forerunner of structural-functionalism in the social sciences. 
Pickering (1984) has provided a detailed examination of Durkheim's sociology of 
religion, and a close reading of his sacred-profane dichotomy. Pickering argues, 
rightly, that Durkheim's notion of the sacred incorporates both the-, positive and the 
negative, that is both the socially useful or beneficent and the socially destructive or 
malefic. The Latin sacer, the French 'sacre' and to a lesser extent even the English 
'sacred' connote botbJth. at_mhich_is_holy, -consecrated' and that which is cursed, 
damned, destructive, evil. The latter meanings are now rare in English, but is still 
clear in French and central to the Latin root. The term profane is also complex. The 
Latin profanus means, literally, outside the temple. It is that which is not sacred, or 
not consecrated and connotes the unholy though largely in the sense of 
commonplace, everyday, mundane. In French the verb 'Profaner' means, in 
addition, to profane or desecrate something sacred, a church, temple, altar or grave. 
While the most comi-non meaning of the adjective profane is secular, meaning 
commonplace, it also confers the ungodly or irreverent. The meaning is very similar 
in modem English. 
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37) See Bataille (1947)Du rapport entre le divin et la mal'in Critique. Seealso 
Durkheim (1902) Annee Sociologique, 5,82 'Sur le totemisme'. 
38) Durkheini discusses piacular rites at length, see Durkheirn (1912/1961: 196). 
j9) It is not possible here to assess the relative merits of the 'structuralist 
revolution', nor to evaluate, in any detail, its contribution. Rather I will attempt to 
situate the problematic established by both Durkheim and Mauss in relation to recent 
structuralist ethnographic studies and latterly within the movement loosely known as 
post-structuralism. For example De Heusch's (1985) study of Aftican religion 
describes how, when a social transgression occurs it is often a third, or unrelated, 
party upon whom the symbolic 'curse' or 'debt' is visited. The ontological 
assumptions of individual self divided by the mind/body and good/evil dualisms do 
not seem to be present, nor are the epistemological dualisms of cause and effect, 
innocence and guilt. Sacrificial rites are deployed in order to 'restore the normal 
physical condition of man - his health, or his status - which has been compromised 
by some event' (1985: 5). Such ethnographic data helps us to think through the 
limitations of the Eurocentric obsession with the individual; its rights, liberation and 
desires. The movements of sacralisation and desacralisation, central to the accounts 
by Durkheim and Mauss, do not take place in such cases and the notion of the sacred 
does not appear to be the central to such processes. Drawing on the work of 
Benveniste (1969) De Heusch argues that the Durkheimian tradition conflates the 
Latin sancta and sanctum, that is sanction or prohibition, with the sacer or sacred 
thereby creating an enlarged 'umbrella' concept of the sacred in a similar way to 
anthropological treatments of 'totemism' before Levi-Strauss' influential critique. 
Despite a number of well-made criticisms the point remains that Durkheimian and 
Maussian remain relevant for a consideration of Western cultures, so long as they are 
not assumed to be the end-point of some great evolutionary process. Douglas (1966) 
has argued that prohibition should not be confused with 'pollution'; connoting that 
which is felt to be filth, dirt, decay and the 'unclean', and that these notions were 
separate until the rise of Christianity which compounded them in the concept of sin. 
With the rise of Western state and authority structures, which for centuries organised 
themselves in at least nominally Christian terms, the dualist conceptions of 
mind/body and good/evil were able to take on a greater fixity, becoming entrenched 
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within Western cultural experience, and manifest in many institutions and processes. 
Prior to this, in Greco-Roman religion, and to some extent in the Affican religious 
thought described by De Heusch (1985), the sacred tended to be identified with 
pollution, but not with prohibition as such. Individual guilt, 'sin', or personal 
responsibility is not a salient feature of such belief. This absence of a sense of 
individualism and moral responsibility is crucial for an approach to contemporary 
forms of 'inexplicable' evil. 
40) See, in particular Baudrillard (1976/1993: 125-194). 
41) In Detienne and Verriant (1989: 21-86). 
42) According to Masters (1996: 112-138) exorcisms are still surprisingly 
frequent occurrences, particularly where 'the disturbed' do not respond to orthodox 
psychiatric treatment. 
43) See for example Giddens (1985) 77ze Nation-State and Violence, and 
Bauman (1989) Modernity and the Holocaust. 
44) There are interesting though brief and scattered references to evil in 
Foucault's study of madness, see Foucault (1967/1971: 199-220). 
45) See Deleuze and Guattari (1988: 232-309). 
46) See for example Deleuze (1970/1988) on Spinoza and the problem of evil, 
also Goodchild (1996). 
47) For example Butler, J. (1990,1993) and Grosz, E. (1995). 
48) See for example Spallone (1999) 'The New Biology of Violence: New 
Geneticisms for Old? ' in Body and Society Vol.: 4, pp47-65. 
49) Stanford (1996) discusses this in terms of self persecuting other. 
50) Evil of this kind has been approached in Nietzschean terms with some 
success, specifically as the result of resentful, condemnatory moralities. Similar 
definitions of evil have been used to explain 'humanitarian disasters' in South 
American countries for example. However such an account is far less readily 
applicable to the Nazi holocaust where the followers of a supposedly vengeful 
religion were themselves destroyed by a regime that did not justify or express itself 
in moral terms, but through economic, racial and finally bureaucratic and 
organisational terminology. Nor does it offer a convincing approach to 
contemporary examples of 'inexplicable' evil. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
EVIL: THE PRINCIPLE OF EVIL IN BATAILLE AND BAUDRILLARD 
INTRODUCTION 
'the modem forms of Evil know no bounds ... Evil has metamorphosed into all the viral and 
terroristic forms that obsess us' (Baudrillard 1990/1993: 81). 
The purpose here is to explore, in detail, the related yet distinct approaches 
to 'evil' in the theories of Bataille and Baudrillard. For these thinker's 'evil' is a 
fundamental axis of cultural experience, a principle, not a moral problem that may or 
may not have a 'solution'. Further this principle is, they, cpntend, an active and 
radical force, increasingly disarticulated from any reciprocal or dual relationship 
-to 
anything that-could, convincingly, be termed the 'good'. Bataille and Baudrillard 
claim new and distinctive forms or manifestations of evil that cannot be contained-in 
u jective or structural thought and are somehow 'inevitable'. Further their 
approaches are argued to be crucial for an enhanced reading of extreme violence, 
'inexplicable evil' or contemporary death-events. 
The first section of this chapter is concerned with the context and trajectory 
of Bataille's thinking on evil, and the related themes of the sacred and transgression. 
Bataille's thought is situated in terms of Christian, Gnostic and mystical sources as 
well as the Hegelian 'enlightenment' project and its Nietzschean critique. Bataille's 
divergence from Nietzsche on the theme of evil is emphasised. Bataille's thinking on 
evil is fundamentally social in conception, and the themes of expenditure and base 
materialism offer a thinking that leads away from conceptions of evil in moral, 
individual and privative/substantive terms. Most of all Bataille seeks to 'confront' 
evil, to 'measure up' to the limits of experience. 
The second section turns to Baudrillard's engagement with evil. His thought 
is contextualised through the philosophy of Nietzsche and Bataille but is shown 
never to be reducible to these influences. It will be argued that Baudrillard has 
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moved ftirther and further from these influences, as the principle of evil becomes a 
more important dimension of his thought. Baudrillard's important but neglected 
Fatal Strategies (1983/1990) is discussed in detail and a reading of the fatal and 
ironic forms of the object, in relation to 'evil' and notions of subjectivity and moral 
responsibility is developed. The implications of Baudrillard's thinking on evil are 
drawn out in order to offer a reading of contemporary death events as a distinctive 
regime of evil. 
For Bataille the 'human' condition is always one of limits, "discontinuous" 
(individual) existence the result of a temporary and unstable restriction of bio- 
material energy excess. Thp. sacrificial rituals of 'pre-monotheist' religion offered a 
hallucinatory, unreal(isable) opening of the human spirit onto "immanence" Or 
"continuity". However Bataille's reading of Aztec sacrifice suggests that some sense 
of the accursed share has been incorporated into certain cultural systems, rendering 
them unintelligible to Western moralism. Consequently it is inadequate to read 
Bataille exclusively on a literary/poetic level, and equally important; as with reading 
Baudrillard, to resist too great an assimilation to the philosophy of Nietzsche. With 
Bataille the Nietzschean 'Overman' is replaced by the wounded, anguished being-in- 
excess. The Bataillean General economy is one of expenditure, irremediable loss 
and disablement, not enabling, overcoming and transvaluation. Bataille's notion of 
evil is radically different from that presented in Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morality. 
Evil, for Bataille, is no mere moralistic value judgement, created by slaves' moral 
resentment, rather evil. symbolises exCess, the intolerable and indecipherable. In the 
age of modernity, the instinctive sexual and aggressive drives are locked away in the 
'basement' of modem 'being'. There is similarity with Freud here, however 
Bataille's concern is less with instinctual drives and biological functioning than with 
the social and cultural effects of the Accursed share, that is with luxury not 
functionality. 
For Bataille 'luxury' occurs precisely were necessity, utility and instincts and 
drives are set aside through the existence of abundance. This may be the abundance 
of material wealth, of social power and prestige (as in the case of the Potlatch) or a 
superabundance of physical or mental energy, devoted to athletic or military 
competition, artistic creativity or erotic expression for example. These are activities 
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that in no sense can be deduced from biological drives, instincts or functions. Here 
then are important distinctions between Bataille and Freud that impacts on Bataille's 
reading of evil. 
According to Bataille evil is both expelled and freed in modernity, existing 
in an unknown or unbounded dimension where it may strike at society with stealth, 
terror and incomprehensibility since it represents the 'outside, or 'beyond' of the 
limit. Evil is now sovereign, without 
-master 
(God) since God exiled it beyond the 
limits of the known, before being, himself exiled into obscurity. The radical power 
of evil, as it appears in the writings of Bataille and Baudrillard, does not derive from 
a mystical or metaphysical source, nor is it based on moral claims, rather it emerges 
from concrete and material cultural conditions emergent in Western modernity. Evil 
symbolises excesses and remainders, processes that cannot be comprehended but 
mnot be ign2red. Yet Baudrillard's divergence from Bataillean themes must be 
emphasised. Baudrillard is dismissive of any notion of subject-as-excess. For him 
'the subject' is a construct of reason and morality which, then sets limits to the 
subject. These dividing lines are shifted and redrawn to enable reason to function. 
Baudrillard's project is to displace radical thought from the thinking of the subject 
onto the object. For Baudrillard the object is always in excess of the subject. The 
excessiveness of the object is, for Baudrillard, the new principle of evil. 
BATAILLE'S PRINCIPLE OF EVIL 
'WE ARE FEROCIOUSLY RELIGIOUS' (Bataille et al, Acephale 1937). 
Bataille's principle of evil first appears in his earliest articles written for the 
dissident Surrealist journal Documents in the late 1920's and early 1930's. 'The Big 
Toe' (orig. 1929) attacks human Idealism, particularly as manifest in Enlightenment 
philosophy. The article revels in the thorough rootedness of 'human' being in the 
baseness of matter, of the human feet forced into contact with mud and dirt, as the 
very condition of its elevation above the level of the primates by standing upright. 
Throughout these early articles and into his full-length studies Bataille operates a 
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fundamental dualism, evident in this early article, between the base, low, materialist 
and the elevated, high and idealist. It is precisely this dualism that is restricted, yet 
not entirely eliminated by privative accounts of evil whether Christian, 
e nlightenment, modem or contemporary. 
This dualism operates as both a cosmological (rather than 'ontological') 
principle and a socio-historical 'reality' and it is crucial to keep these two 
interlocking phases in mind in order to resist the more simplistic or reductive 
accounts of Bataille's thought. Bataille makes clear that his dualist tlýnking owes as 
much Gnostic and Manichean religion as Nietzschean philosophy, French sociology 
and Marxist economics. The principle of darkness, base matter and filth, the pole 
associated with evil, is held by Bataille, as by the Gnostics and Manicheans, to be 
dominant or more powerful than the forces of light, form and elevation. A similar 
dualism is drawn upon Baudrillard yet both Bataille and Baudrillard are primarily 
concerned to trace manifestations of evil in cultural (material) contexts, in addition to 
any cosmological speculations. 
Bataille's attack on latent and manifest forms of Idealism draws upon the 
"psychological facts" of Freud and the "social facts" of Durkheim (Bataille 1985: 15- 
16). In these early articles, both Marx and Nietzsche, though clearly important 
influences, are presented as crucial yet flawed materialisms. Bataille reads a 
radicalised Marx (moral/ethical as well as economic revolution) against both 
Nietzsche and the Surrealists, whose revolutionisms were inherently idealist, 
revealing a 'basic predilection for values above (italics in original) "the world of 
facts" with such banal formulas as "revolt of the spirit" etc. ' (Bataille 1985: 33). 
Conversely Bataille reads Nietzsche against Marx, taking the principle of Dionysian 
orgiastic excess as' a fundamental critique of Marxist utilitarianism and 
productionism. 
In Bataille's article The "Old Mole" and the Prefix Stir (written 1929-30, 
first pub. 1968) 1 the extent of Marx's influence is apparent, yet where Bataille 
speaks of 'the submerged masses dedicated to measureless agitation' (1985: 36) the 
limitations of Marxist economic rationalism for Bataille's purposes become clear. 
Bataille turns to Nietzsche for a mode of social revolt that is neither proletarian or 
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utilitarian, that is not related to human productivity, however Bataille cannot allow 
Nietzsche's individualist elitism, a "morality of the master ... : 
But for a sick individual, isolated from his class and any social activity, 
what could the result finally be of these value substitutions? It is evident that 
a man like Nietzsche, wanting to assert the human splendour of a people 
who really had exercised a domination -a splendour detennined by social 
forms that had disappeared - could only become aware, in the first place, of 
his ineptitude for current social forms, and, in the last, of the excessively 
derisive and even imbecilic character of his mental activity -'brilliant or not 
(Bataille 1985: 38). 
To move beyond this Marx/Nietzsche theoretical impasse Bataille 
elaborates his conception of base materialism, drawing as we have noted on Gnostic 
religion. The Gnostics, originating in ancient Egypt, privileged, according to 
Bataille, base material over ideal form. Their sacred iconography reveals an affinity 
for the monstrous and acephalic. The Gnostics, in contrast to the mainstream 
Hellenic-Christian thought, affirmed and incorporaýýd_base Matter, filth, monstrosity 
and in particular the autonomous creative power o ýf evil, _within 
their cosmology. 
Evil was affirmed as the dominant principle of the human order since it was created 
by the false god 'lao', (usually identified with the Jewish Jehovah). The Gnostics 
pursued a radical denial or refusal of this world since they held it to be pen-nanently 
and irremediably characterised by the active principle of evil. The Gnostics sought 
the immediate, not deferred, return of the true God and the construction of a new 
social order. Unlike the mainstream Christian church which was willing to 
compromise with existing social institutions, in particular the Roman Empire, the 
Gnostics refusal was sufficiently radical to ensure they could never assume the role 
of official state religion. 
According to Bataille the Gnostics had faced up to that most terrifying 
prospect, denied by all rational or'legitimate' systems of thought, 'It is possible in all 
freedom to be a plaything of evil, if evil does not have to answer before God' 
(Bataille 1985: 49). This statement reveals important distance between Bataille and 
Nietzsche. For Nietzsche the "death of God" is enabling, a profit, an advancement to 
the state of (post) human elevation. For Bataille the 'death of God' is profound, as it 
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was when enacted within ancient religious ceremony, but the result is no simple 
'elevation of spirit'. Bataille refutes the possibility of pure accumulation, without 
loss. The death of God then cannot be a pure profit for 'human' development. The 
result disables, as well as enables, and for Bataille 'liberation' from religion is 
neither possible nor desirable. Evil and religion generally, for Bataille, are not mere 
illusions that will melt away, or be re-incorporated in rejuvenated form for the trans- 
valued (post) human individual. For Bataille, as for Baudrillard, the collective 
dimension of existence is crucial and cannot be eliminated. The prirlCiple of evil is 
rooted in collective energies and sentiments, fears and terrors. This condition creates 
a kind of autonomy and resilience in the principle of evil, a radically seductive force 
that escapes human cultural re-assimilation even of the kind Nietzsche proposed. It 
always exceeds or eludes; yet it is somehow at the core of collective social 
expression or symbolisation. Further the principle of evil accelerates with the 
decline in any binding sense of 'the good', and hence is not dependent on a fixed 
dualism. For Nietzsche the uplifted, elevated overman could attain a final surpassing 
of both good and evil, that is, evil could be mastered within the trans-valued subject. 
His philosophy was perhaps the last refuge of 'heroic' subjectivity (see Strong 1975, 
White 1990). Bataille denies the possibility of such a re-incorporation, his early 
articles in Documents jpp1, oaq_4, A,, number of phenomena, freaks, deformities, 
madness, sacrifice and automutilation from the perspective of a radical materialist 
dualism, where such phenomena characterised the dark and base side of this dualism. 
Nietzsche, by contrast, appealed to pre-Socratic religion, seeking a state of unity 
prior to the historical 'lapse' into dualisms and so finds no appeal in Manicheanism. 
These early articles refine the basis of Bataille's sociology; the 
attraction/repulsion pairing building on the already established conceptual 
oppositions of sacred and profane, homogeneity and heterogeneity, appropriation and 
excretion, horizontality and verticality. Bataille's dualist materialism enables him to 
explore the negative; monstrous, obscene and catastrophic, forces, objects and events 
that radiate a "profound seductiveness". The "primitive" practice of sacrifice 
continued to exercise an intense fascination for Bataille during this period. The 
College of Sociology explored the sacred "core" of society, or social being, but it 
produced little concerned with the notion of evil as distinct from the larger category 
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of the sacred. 2 The sacred, for the College, comprised both beneficent and malefic 
forces, both equally distinct from the profane, the cultural notions or materials from 
which the category 'evil' would later be drawn. 
Bataille's three volume study The Accursed Share systernatises his earlier 
insights into the sacred, General economy and depense, yet like his College of 
Sociology material, it is not concerned explicitly with the notion of evil. What 
Bataille does make clear is that his theory of the accursed share possesses serious 
socio-political rainifications for contemporary society since "our time" is the 
"accursed time par excellence": 
If we do not make consum. tion the sover *.. le of activity we P, eign prmcip I ýan-not h'elp bu-t-su-ccumb to those monstrous disorders without which we do 
not know how'-t-o--c'on*surqe the energy I we have at our disposal (Bataille 
1976/1991: 16). 
The "monstrous disorders" to which Bataille refers, include pre-eminently 
the two world wars and the rise 'of Fascism. These events are interpreted as 
aberrations or pathological forms, distortions and re-channelling of the energy 
economy where excess is not collectively affirmed and expended by ritual but is 
narrowed, divided and re-directed in order to serve ideological purposes. 3 For 
Bataille then, some form of violent or sacrificial expenditure, some manifestation of 
cevil' remains an inevitability. It is precisely in modernity, where the amounts of 
energy "at our disposal" have accelerated at an incredible and unprecedented rate, 
that the principle of evil takes on a new and radical form, one that is theorised, or 
rather speculated on, by Baudrillard. Indeed Baudrillard's work focuses precisely on 
such "monstrous disorders" implied by Bataille. 
Bataille's late works, Eroticisni (1957/1986) and Theory of Religion 
(completed 1961, first pub. 1973/1989) attempted to locate the "strengthening" of 
evil actuated within monotheist religion by the Christian rejection of the religious 
force of transgression. The twin notions of good and evil appeared, according to 
Bataille as the sacred and profane dichotomy was historically reconfigured. The 
malefic portion of the sacred was expelled, leaving. pnly, a residual and weakened 
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conception of the 'good' in fixed, absolute but impotent opposition to the active and 
seductive. forpeof exiled 'evil'. This condition Bataille terms "the sleep of Reason", 
bound inevitably to (re)produce monsters. Bataille inverts the enlightenment doctrine 
with reason becoming the state of slumber and the inevitable re-emergence of 
excesses its sudden awakening. 
In the modem period the once all-encompassing sacred/profane dichotomy 
is domesticated and put to the service of state religion. Finall , in the contemporary 
age the sacred all but disappears, a residual sense of the 'positive' is folded within 
th_e__. contemporary production/consumption pairing where nothing is sacred but 
conspicuous consumption is valued positively. The malefic or negative dimensions 
of the sacred have no 'place' in modemity, but are not entirely destroyed or 
eliminated, still converging around death. 
As an increasingly secular technological order erodes both the sacred and 
the specifically Christian 'holy', the principle of evil is transformed. This historical 
condition is the focus of Bataille's influential study Literature and Evil (1957/1985), 
his most detailed examination of evil. Bataille's thesis is frequently expressed in 
cosmological or meta-historical terms, however his analyses of a number of 
important writers, Emily Bronte, Baudelaire, Blake, Sade and others, make explicit 
how rooted in socio-historical transformation his approach to evil actually is. 
Bataille paints a vivid and multiple portrait of human evil, characterising it 
as; untamed erotic passion, the wild innocence of childhood, the reckless pursuit of 
glory, as the instinctual 'need' for sacrificial destruction. Ultimately, for Bataille, evil 
expresses the condition of radical human freedom without God, and is the "true" 
energy of the cosmos. Bataille does not distil a representational coherence from his 
chosen sources, but pursues each to the limits of their thinking. Nevertheless a 
central focus of his approach to evil does emerge. He insists, repeatedly, that evil 
can only be thought in relation to good, not as it's_oppqýjyj ary _4ut as 
its necess 
condition. The principle of evil cannot be pursued or made present unless the force 
of 'good', "the law" is held to be meaningful and (ordinarily) binding. -Evil. 
then, 
according to Bataille, is fundamentally transgressive, neither privative, nor strictly 
speaking, substantive. Transgression is the crucial third term operating between the 
privative-substantive opposition. Evil is conceived, not an amoral or anti-moral 
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quality but is in Bataille's terminology "hypermoral" (Bataille 1947: 229). If the law; 
moral, rational and 'good' is not understood or held to be meaningful then a 
transgressive act is merely 'insane' or 'inexplicable' and is contained in these 
categories. For this reason the acts of an animal or an infant, cannot, readily, be 
termed 'evil'. According to Durkheim (1912/1961), and also Mauss (195011990), 
'primitive' or 'sacred' societies invoked the transgression of their laws in order that 
they might re-assert or re-enact their binding force with renewed vigour. Here 
transgression is collective, communal, and not individual. Individual transgressions 
threaten but do not revivify the community, at least not until a collective ritual or 
process can be invoked. This notion of individualised transgression, possessing no 
social purpose or meaning (anti-social) is highly suggestive when related to 
contemporary events of extreme violence. It suggests a new or alternative approach 
to such acts as radically individualised transgression, transgressions after the social. 
These are the very events that are frequently termed 'inexplicable evil': 
Transgression in pre-Christian religions was relatively lawful; piety 
demanded it. Against transgression stood taboo, but it could always be 
suspended as long as limits were observed. In the Christian world the taboo 
was absolute. Transgression would have made clear what Christianity 
concealed, that the sacred and the forbidden are one, that the sacred can be 
reached through the violence of a broken taboo (1957/1986: 126). 
For Bataille the relations between social group and the sacred demand 
transgression. In Christianity evil is denied a sacred characterisation, as far as 
possible it is identified with the realm of the profane, the lowly, base and material, 
jet evil retains an aura that cannot be contained there. According to Bataille the 
Drofane realm is not subject to the restraints and controls which affect the sacred, 
therefore 'evil' is both freed and rendered more am uous, less well-defined. While 
the pious condemned evil, others could choose evil and its sensual pleasures became 
"the reward of the guilty" (ibid. ). Only through evil could the vertiginous nature of 
transgression still be affirmed, 'Pleasure plunged deep into evil ... transgression, 
transcending horror, and the greater the horror the deeper the joy' (Bataille 
1957/1986: 127). Here, 
_for 
Bataille an abyss of., evil. is opýýned, the historical 
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conditions for sadism and holocaust are established by the very religion that sought 
to rid the world of ritualised slaughter. 
Bataille does not 'celebrate' this shift, indeed at times his text suggest a 
traditional approach to the importance of social discipline and control. In modernity 
transgression assumes a different character again, the law does not claim to be 
sacred, merely rational, moreover human subjectivity in the contemporary order is 
conceived in overwhelmingly individualist terms. Transgression, were it still occurs 
is interpreted as the individual acts of the 'irrational', 'incomprehensible', such as in 
the 'inexplicable' transgressions of Frederick West or Thomas Hamilton. Such acts 
are said to be 'inexplicable' because they transgress basic cultural expectations in the 
most extreme ways. Any benevolent (social) effects of transgression as far as 'the 
good' or the law is concerned can now only occur as 'meta-rational', in the sense of 
breaking the law for 'the greater good. While this may still occur it is not 
transgression in the sense in which Bataille theorises it. Further the notion of'greater 
good' itself becomes increasingly tenuous in contemporary life because any notion of 
the sacred, as the highest expression of the social group, is lost (see also Baudrillard 
1997/1998: 1-4). In this way Bataille offers a distinctive historico-cultural thesis 
concerning the 'worsening' or 'unleashing' of evil in modemity. This thinking applies 
directly to the 'inexplicable' transgressions of contemporary death-events. Bataille 
specifies the cultural and theological conditions of emergence of radically 
individualised transgression. However it must be asked whether, given changing 
cultural conditions it is still possible to speak of a fundamental 'need' for 
transgression. Do individuals such as Fred West or Thomas Hamilton 'answer' the 
fundamental need of bio-chemical energy excess or do they rather 'choose' to pursue 
a destructive, transgressive course of action. Baudrillard rejects the metaphysics of 
need and compulsion without asserting a simplistic modality of subjective 
responsibility, agency or identity through a consideration -of 'ritual' forms. 
_Iater Bataille's position on the meaning of evil emphasises the profound 
complicity or "rapport" between good and evil, their ultimate unity. 4 Bataille's 
position on evil can be read in the following way. As the archaic religious and 
'ý&u_1_tu_ra__1_uni'ty of th-e-bene-ficent and. niafcýFiJj the sacred and profane, is broken and 
reconfigured by both socio-economic as well as theological imperatives, evil 
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becomes increasingly separated, or disarticulated firoin 'good'. Such a process was, 
according to Bataille, at work in pre-Christian antiquity, but received powerful and 
systematic expression in Christian theology and continued in enlightenment 
p4iilosophy. In the culture of modernity evil gains a seductive autonomy, as an 
apparently pure or absolute quality beyond all limit and containment. Evil seems to 
ýýpjýsent a pLoKqjiqteq: se n4, yq lue 4an good. This is its seductiveness. In 
modernity evil is figured as an active and dynamic force one which inevitably shears 
through the fragile limits and constraints of the moral orders, restorirýg a submerged 
dualism. Yet, according to Bataille, evil is never fully substantive and autonomous, 
it is dependent on its transgressive relation to the good. The impossible, riveting and 
inevitable excess of evil defines the human condition. 
Of course the meaning of transgression is transforined, radically, in 
modernity. It has lost its social and sacred force, possessing scarcely any meaning in 
the contemporary world. To the extent that it remains it has been subsumed within 
(capitalist) structures of individual sexual desire and gratification. What are the 
consequences of this fundamental displacement or dislocation of evil, its 
disarticulation from any sense of the 'good' validated through the social or 
collective? Does 'evil' disappear? - the answer is an unequivocal 'no'. Baudrillard 
develops Bataille's speculations on the intensity of evil, providing ways of thinking 
evil, excess and their seductiveness, in contemporary culture. 
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BAUDRILLARD - FATAL THEORY AND THE PRINCIPLE OF EVIL 
'We need to reawaken the principle of Evil active in Manicheism and all the great 
mythologies in order to afflum, against the principle of the Good, not exactly the supremacy of Evil, 
but the fundamental duplicity that demands that any order exists only to be disobeyed, attacked, 
exceeded and dismantled' (Baudrillard. 1983/1990: 77). 
'Against the perfection of the system, hatred is a last vital reac! ion' (Baudrillard 
1995/1996: 169). 
In Symbolic Exchange and Death (1976/1993), the crucial turning point in 
Baudrillard's oeuvre, the apparently metaphysical distinction between good and evil 
first came to the fore in a discussion of political economy and death. Baudrillard, 
like Bataille before him, is concerned with the tension between Manichean or 
Gnostic 'heresies' and the mainstream Christian church, between a problematic 
dualism and the unstable strategies to deny the evil or negative 'pole' proper 
recognition. Baudrillard notes, just, as Bataille had done in Theory of Religion, the 
powerful grip over the human imagination exerted by the notion of evil: 
This very powerful vision comes from the ancient cults where the basic 
intuition of the specificity of evil and death was still strong. This was 
unbearable to the church, who will take centuries to exterminate it and 
impose the pre-eminent principle of the Good (God) Leducing ýj 
to a negative principle, dialectically subordinate-to the. other (thq_peviD. 
But there is always the nightmare of Lucifer's autonomy, the Archangel of 
Evil (Baudrillard 1976/1993: 149). 
Here Baudrillard is not seeking to re-establish an outmoded and simplistic 
Good/Evil dualism, rather he offers an idiosyncratic and perverse reading of the 
malefic, the malevolent, the mischievous and duplicitous. jSymbqIic-ritual... 
haq- 
e! jsured deathand-the closely-.. related-principle... of evil, where inscribed and 
exchanged within the life of the community. Yet evil, according to Baudrillard, 
supported by a number of ethnographic accounts, always threatened, exceeded or 
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"disobeyed" symbolic ritual and could in certain dire conditions strike at the 
community unimpeded. The principle of evil then, for Baudrillard, exceeds the 
functional rituals of even the most 'symbolic' societies. Baudrillard developed his 
notion of the principle of evil in a number of works and it has become a crucial term 
of his later theory. Important here is his controversial work Seduction (1979/1990), a 
genealogical exploration of that term which, Baudrillard argues, has within Western 
metaphysics, been interpreted as: 
... a strategy of the devil, whether in the guise of witchcraft or love. It is 
always the seduction of evil - or of the world. It is the very artifice of the 
world (1979/1990: 1). 
The relationship of seduction to evil is most fully developed in the 
important though neglected work Fatal Strategies (1983/1990). According to 
Baudrillard the world is, and always has been, 'swom to extremes, not to equilibrium, 
swom to radical antagonism, not to reconciliation or synthesis' (1983/1990: 7). These 
conditions of human life or rules of the game had been appreciated and affirmed in 
symbolic cultures. For Baudrillard, as for Nietzsche, only modem sentimentality and 
idealism could take seriously notions like rationality, explicability, equality; forms of 
'knowledge', belief and social organisation that are characterised by the reproduction 
of the sign. In the contemporary landscape, since the collapse of enlightenment 
certitude, these notions appear increasingly untenable. For Baudrillard the 
cosmology of extremity and antagonism constitutes the principle of evil. This is not, 
strictly speaking, a dualist understanding but a cosmo/sociological assertion, which 
claims antagonism, extremity, disobedience and reversibility as the fundamental 
"rule" of the world. 
Baudrillard describes 'human experience' without drawing upon Freudian 
typologies or philosophies of consciousness. At times close to Foucault, Baudrillard 
installs the principles of the symbolic, of seduction and evil, at a more fundamental 
level than-that of bio-power. Baudrillard must be read within the wider movement of 
Post-structuralism; the radical critique of Freud, Marx and their syntheses yet his 
theory remains highly idiosyncratic. 5 The contemporary salience of the principle of 
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evil, for Baudrillard, derives not only from the expulsion and repression of evil, as 
for Bataille, but also the recent erosion or depletion of (human) subjective rationality, 
that is, from new scientific and cultural awareness of the limits of subjective 
knowledge. This has resulted in the radical critique even abandonment of the sense 
of human advancement, technological perfectibility and liberation by much Post- 
structuralist thought. 
According to Baudrillard the object, not the subject, dominates the crucial 
stakes of the contemporary world. Objects or "things" elude subjective control and 
assimilation' and, for Baudrillard exude an "evil radiance", an "evil genie", and an 
ecstatic or excessive form draining 'meaning' and 'reality' from the subject and 
condemning it to a subordinate role. Here evil operates at the level of generalised 
cultural insecurity, but also at a level of a post-Freudian reading of the human psyche 
emphasising evil and symbolic relations, rather than desire and the unconscious. 
For Baudrillard objects mutate, re-double, ascend to limits then surpass 
them, not as the 'return of the repressed'; a fixed or static fonn of 'otherness' but as a 
dynamic, ex-centric power that takes a malicious delight in confounding the efforts 
of the knowing subject. Indeed, the obiect seems-to grp)y TqýTq disobedient the more 
the ýýbjýLct_4lLteMpls.. m-ast!: ýry. -pyer 
it. The '., 1world. "- has-not always. been (experienced 
, as) .. 
delusion. al, the-obiect 
-has 
not, - 
alway§. ýbpen. ecstatic. 
"Things" have become 
exorbitant because of the strategies of the subject, because of the drive of 
enlightenment reason, the erosion of the sacred/symbolic, the disproportionate 
acceleration of the semiotic/technological/virtual sphere. The subject's drive for 
mastery has over-reached itself, over-stepping the rules of the game and the object 
become dominant, taking its revenge on the subject. This process occurs through an 
ecstatic disarticulation; a surpassing of limits, objective evil radiates beyond 
subjective comprehension. 
Baudrillard speculates on cultural trends and conditions in a methodological 
form close to contemporary epistemological critique. However in addition, he 
clearly draws upon other sources including the metaphysical or perhaps better 'anti- 
metaphysical'. In fact far from being locked in a'hopeless relativism' as some critics 
(Kellner 1989, Sokal 1998) have suggested, Baudrillard's later theory makes strong 
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claims of a (anti)-metaphysical nature that cannot be made from within the confines 
of epistemological critique, based on a paradigm of cultural relativism. 6 
For Baudrillard the subject has expunged all but the most enervated sense of 
illusion, of the symbolic, and through the destructive march of Western metaphysics 
finally caused the real to coincide, fully, with the rational, but only by accelerating 
that 'real' into a hyperreal, an obscene 'over-exposure' of the real. The hyperreal 
depletes even those 'necessary illusions' that create the modem sense of materialism 
and 'reality'. The result is the 'real' deprived of illusion no longer has meaning or 
weight, it no longer convinces or inspires, it becomes inerti empty, meaningless - like 
the results of an opinion poll. These, Baudrillard terms the "final principle of 
reconciliation" but haunting and terrorising this inertia is the radical opposition of the 
"infinite principle of Evil and Seduction" (1983/1990: 72): 
... beyond the final principle of the subject there stands the fatal reversibility 
of the object, pure object, pure event (the fatal) mass-object (silence) fetish- 
object, femininity-object (seduction) ... after centuries of triumphant 
subjectivity, j4qJrqny_qf, the, object lies in_wait for us, an objective irony 
readable at the very-heart of information and science, at. the very heart o_fthe 
system- _and,, 
its., Jaýys, 
__at,. 
the very heart of -desire_-and of. a. 
11 psychology 
(1983/1990: 72). 
The object is both the subjects' fate or destiny, and implies its death, 
fatality. The strategies of the subject are rationality, assimilation, production and 
accumulation, the strategies of the object, according to Baudrillard, are 
unpredictability, inassimilability, seduction and catastrophe., Such qualities entail for 
the 'subject' the principle of evil. Baudrillard traces the operations of this "evil 
genie" through the cultural system, in the intractability of the scientific object, and in 
the realm of passion, sexuality and eroticism. 
In Fatal Strategies Baudrillard moves away from his earlier reliance on the 
principle of the symbolic as a historico -anthropological 'state', and is increasingly 
concerned with the fatal, ironic and banal strategies of the contemporary era which 
are haunted by the symbolic but are -not reducible to it. The symbolic, too 
fundamental to be annihilated, divides into those reduced, enervated and vestigial 
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forms which Capitalism still finds useful (Christmas, Easter) and those radical. 
inassimilable forms that Baudrillard traces with the terms fatal and ironic strategies. 
Baudrillard's fatal strategies express ways in which the object (of analysis, 
r6presentation, knowledge) eludes, confounds yet fascinates the subject while 
displacing the it to a subordinate role where it is at the mercy of the object, reducing 
the human subject to a peripheral status. Subjective choices, action and 
responsibility are outmoded and at the mercy of catastrophic objective conditions. 
An example, favoured by Baudrillard, is the Chernobyl disaster where 'human' 
7 decision-making was eclipsed and events driven by objective relations. The 
symbolic, such as Baudrillard continues to theorise it, is displaced but continues to be 
manifest in disproportionate, exorbitant forin. These effects occur through the fatal 
and ironic modes of the object, reversibility, seduction and evil. 
Baudrillard's writing style and method are, at times, somewhat incautious. 
However he does not claim that objects are autonomous, somehow separate from 
subjects/Clearly the changing modes of the subjects engagement with the object are 
at issue here. The shift from a mythic, symbolic relation to a scientific, technological 
one provokes transmutations in the status of the objec 
1ý 
ecently Baudrillard has 
clarified his notion of fatal strategies: 
The fatal strategy is often understood as the catastrophic development 
internal to the system. For me, it meant precisely the opposite ... finding a form of play and destiny which precisely thwarted that implacable 
development of the system. For that development isn't fatal at all, but 
banal. The fatal strategy was the reinvention of a thought which explodes 
not the truth of the system, but its logic (Baudrillard 1997/1998: 47). 
/ý 
audrillard's fatal and ironic strategies represent a considerable departure 
from Bataille's thought. Fatal and ironic strategies mark a contemporary effusion of 
symbolic principles; "play and Destiny", reversibility, seduction, cruel enchantment, 
in a global world order that is no longer culturally equipped to understand, allow or 
affirm these principles., \ With these notions Baudrillard traces contemporary 
excesses, 'inexplicabilites' and these inform new readings of excessive violence and 
contemporary 'evil': 
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, 
(what is inescapable is We confuse the fatal with the return of the repressed 
desire), 
_ýut 
the order of fatality is antithetical to that repression. What is 
inescapabl-e---is 'not des-ire, but the ironic presence of . the object, its 
indifference and indifferent connections, its challenge, its seduction, and its 
disobedience to the symbolic order (and therefore also of the subject's 
unconscious, if it had one). What is inescapable, in a word, is the principle 
of Evil (1983/1990: 182). 
There is some similarity with Arendt's banality of evil here since the 
'objective' and transformative effects of new technology and new media provoke 
new modes of evil for both Arendt and Baudrillard. However Baudrillard's approach 
is more radical; it displaces the opposition between subject (moral) responsibility and 
'dangerous instincts', impulses or effects. For Baudrillard both these assumptions 
are characteristic of subjective, rational thought, 'irrational impulses' being the 
remainder created by subjective reason. According to Baudrillard objective, or 
'objectal' relations haunt the limited or fragmentary subject. Evil actions or 
contemporary death-events, from Baudrillard's perspective, are not caused by 
uncontrolled instincts or desires. Rather the challenge and seduction of the object are 
central to these events. This is the principle of evil; objects seduce, divert, disinvest 
subjectivity. 
Applying this reading to specific events is a difficult and uncomfortable 
process. It suggests, for example, that Thomas Hamilton was 'seduced' by the object 
(schoolchildren), just as James Bulger or the victims of Frederick West 'seduced' 
their killers. It must be emphasised that Baudrillard does not theorise 'seduction' in 
moral, subjective or intentionalist terms. These victims were not, in any way, to 
'blame' for what was done to them. Seductiveness, for Baudrillard, is a fact of 
'objectness', it radiates irrespective of the subject's actions, intentions or beliefs, and 
this is its "diabolical" nature. We are all objects as well as subjects. 
Nor is seduction, according to Baudrillard, specifically sexual, it is confused 
with sexuality but is never reducible to it. The 'subject' cannot reply to the challenge 
P 
-on. 
1y,. by. 'b., ec, omin, 97. object' can the strategy of counter-seduction, 
reversibility, be effected. The subject -however, unwitlillg o 
be seduced and 
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threatened by dissolution erects the defences of rationality. seeks to control, 
master, dominate and destroy the radical otherness, the fatal threat of seduction. 
/These 
strategies of control, where they result in the destruction of the object and its 
sleduction, are where banal (subjective) strategies suddenly accelerate into fatality, 
into new and virulent "singularities" beyond the ritualistic forms of seduction, 
beyond subjective comprehension. \, 
Baudrillard's approach here is certainly suggestive but it cannot be taken as 
the final or complete 'explanation' of such events. It functions as a powerful critique 
of moral and psychoanalytic assumptions and if read carefully and sympathetically it 
cannot be rejected as a crude affront to serious thought. However with these 
assertions Baudrillard is, at times, dangerously close to committing the error Lyotard 
specifies. Baudrillard dismantles structuralist thought (Marx, Freud) but then inserts 
an alternative in place of the "vanquished theory". This alternative inevitably repeats 
at least some of the operations of the former theory. In this case it is not clear how 
significantly Baudrillard departs from psychoanalytic thought. His emphasis on 
seduction contrasts with Freud but the structure of argument remains close to that 
which could be made from within psychoanalysis. Baudrillard does emphasise that 
the notion of the symbolic takes the place of the unconscious in his thought. Further 
the principle of evil introduces the theme of fundamental "disobedience" to the 
symbolic/unconscious. Though 'disobedience' does suggest kinship with the 
psychoanalysis of 'uncontrollable' impulses, a crucial difference remains. 
ýsyShoanýly! ýic thýýught begins with the subject and its drives whereas Baudrillard 
attempts to think from the side-of the object. This is fatal theory, an eccentric and 
, pp. radoxical-manoeuvre 
but one which should not be discounted for these reasons. 
Baudrillard does not attempt to 'escape' the subject, to think 'otherwise than 
subjectivity' as in the ontological thought of Levinas for example; rather he attempts 
the diabolical reversal of the priorities of rational thought. -For 
Baudrillard reversal 
is a far more radical gesture than 'escape', liberation or overcoming. The latter 
acquire their meaning only within the ensemble of modem capitalism and so reflect 
its values, the former, for Baudrillard is 'other' to the modem system and so threats it 
far more intensely. 
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According to Baudrillard the subject and its banal theories (metaphysics) try 
to separate or "distil" Good and Evil. Fatal theory takes as fundamental their 
inseparability; the object radiates with evil because unlike the subject it is transparent 
to evil, evil can shine through it unimpeded, the object does not freeze, limit, 
categorise, _ Poralise, 
idealise, separating good and evil as the subject does. 
Baudrillard insists his principle of evil is not mystical nor transcendent, it is 
presented as a displacement or mutation in what was, in the past, exchanged, though 
still in unstable form, within the symbolic economy. The object is disobedient to 
cultural encoding; it is fundamentally excessive, particularly as ceremonial forms are 
enervated in favour utilitarianism and productivism. 
0 
Evil is 'a hide-out for the symbolic order - as the theft, the rape, the 
receiving of stolen goods and the ironic embezzlement of the symbolic order' (ibid. ). 
Symbolic ritual involved the sense of a mirroring or doubling of the world: 
excessive, illusionary, and ironic. Bataille, and Nietzsche too, insisted on the 
inseparability of good and evil, but for the latter only as secondary or 'foreground' 
moral evaluations, which are theorised together only in order to be surpassed 
together. Baudrillard's symbolic operates in a distinct way, it seems that the object is 
not (re) absorbed within symbolic ritual, a tension remains unresolved, a principle of 
evil is affirmed: 
Unlike the subject, it [the object] is a poor conductor of the symbolic order, 
but a good conductor of the fatal - that is to say of a pure objectivity, 
sovereign and incorrigible, immanent and enigmatic (1983/1990: 183). 
r ýhe 
principle of evil is not fixed; it is manifest as a "spiral of worsening". 
As the subject reflects the principle of evil, mirrors it in certain of its excessive 
actions, the object enters into such a spiral of "negativity" even the symbolic order is 
unable to contain it\ For Baudrillard the ironic, seductive nature of the world is its 
primal, inexpungeable state and precedes symbolic ritual. Fatal, ironic and seductive 
objects are not reducible to the symbolic. 
The 'subject' too can become fatal, can pursue fatal strategies. The 
strategies of the fatal subject Baudrillard refers to in this study, involve again, 
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redoubling, intensification, excess. He posits a human 'will-to-spectacle' and 
illusion deeper and more powerful than the will-to-truth. Analogously objects, 
"things" and nature, rather than being characterised by a biomaterial or molecular 
Teal' are inherently or fundamentally excessive, disobedient, able to out-wit and 
elude all control, all productive connections, all liberations through desire. For 
Baudrillard the subject as well as objects; natural and technological, are somehow 
drawn towards the fatal, the spectacular, and the catastrophic. Such "fatal 
eccentricities" Baudrillard argues here 'protect(s) us from the real and its disastrous 
consequences' (1983/1990: 1850 
MEDIA, SIMULATION AND EVIL 
Baudrillard's 1984 lecture 'The evil demon of images' deals with 
contemporary media and technological image production, the "diabolical seduction 
of images". This explosion of images takes place within what Baudrillard earlier 
termed the "third order of simulacra", an order where the sheer technical perfection 
of image production and dissemination, in accordance with pre-defined codes and 
models, creates for Baudrillard an "evil demon of conformity" or a "fatal strategy of 
conformity": 
When it [the image] appropriates reality for its own ends, when it anticipates 
it to the point that the real no longer has time to be produced as such ... the image has taken over and imposed its own immanent, ephemeral logic; an 
immoral logic without depth, beyond good and evil, beyond truth and 
falsity; a logic of the extermination of its own referent, a logic of the 
implosion of meaning in which the message disappears on the horizon of the 
medium (Baudrillard 1987: 16&23). 
In an intensely media-tized system the referent, real or reality principle is 
submerged, depleted, de-realised by the instantaneous perfection of images, the 'real' 
becomes a fleeting, peripheral impression. Where the evil demon of images 
dominates, 'reality' is the fatality. 
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Baudrillard announces the death of reality like Nietzsche's madman 
announces the death of God, the analogy becomes clear in an interview that followed 
the lecture. Baudrillard locates his notions of seduction, play and "objective irony" 
iiot just beyond morality and therefore 'amoral', but actually within the immanent 
and reversible collapse of morality, that is rather as immorality. Baudrillard terms 
his position "fundamentally irrational"; drawing on Manichaeism which had posited 
creation, and therefore reality, as the actions of an evil demon: 
According to Manichaeism, the reality of the world is a total illusion; it is 
something which has been tainted from the very beginning; it is something 
which has been seduced by a sort of irreal principle since time immemorial. 
In this case what one has to invoke is precisely this absolute power of 
illusion ... The rationality that one has to invoke in order to make the world 'real' is really just a product of the power of thought itself, which is itself 
totally anti-rational and anti-materialist ... But nevertheless one has to 
recognise the reality of the illusion; and one must play upon this illusion 
itself and the power that it exerts (1987: 44-45). 
For Baudrillard it is, and always has been, fundamentally impossible to reconcile 'the 
illusion'of the world with the'reality'of the world: 
... here the 'illusion' is not simply irreality or non-reality; rather, it is in the literal sense of the word (il-ludere in Latin) a play upon 'reality' or a mise en 
jeu of the real ... the issuing of a challenge to the 'real' - the attempt to put the 
real, quite simply, on the spot ... like the Manichaeans I do not believe in the 
possibility of 'real - ising' the world through any rational or materialist 
principle (1987: 45-6). 
For Baudrillard any such 'reality principle' is necessarily enmeshed in the 
serniotic orders which, in modernity, entails that the 'real' becomes hyperreal. The 
fatal and evil are not alternative 'reality principles' they are ftindamental aspects of 
the primary illusion upon which 'reality' is built and the material from which the 
modem disjunction between real and'unreal'is derived. 
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Baudrillard's next detailed engagement with the notion of evil, Yhe 
Transparency of Evil (1990/1993) represents a considerable development'of his 
earlier positions. Pointedly, Baudrillard states: 
For the real Droblem, _the only _pKqblem,, 
is: where did Evil go? And the 
answer is: everywhere - because the anamorphosis of the modern'f6rms of 
Evil knows no bounds. In a society which seeks - by prophylactic measures, 
by annihilating its own natural referents, by-_. whitewas. hing violence, by 
share, by, performing exterminating all germs and all of the accursed, 
, cosmetic. - surgery on. the negltiye - 
to concern itself solely with quantified 
management and with the discourse of the Good, in-. a society where it. is no 
longer possible to speak Evil, Evil has metamorphosed into all the viral and 
terroristic forms that obsess us (1990/1993: 81). 
e vhere exce . _exqeptý)y -1. 
ALis ey i3, N , Lia verp- here here L _Ih 
p and ceremog_, 
_ý 
it might be recognised or affirmed collectively. The "spiral of worsening" is crucial 
here, 'bourgeois' production and utilitarianism has now mutated into "hyperbolic 
positivity" and perpetual 'orbital' capital flows and virtual technologies. In turn the 
principle of evil mutates, growing in 0 potency, increasingly able to disrupt and disable 
contemporary function and operationality. The notion of virus; viral infection, and 
prophylactics become crucial in this work. Evil and viral contagion do not operate 
merely as metaphor they carry a literal charge. Baudrillard's analysis cannot be 
reduced to a materialism or materialist energetics, such as Bataille's. Baudrillard 
opposes, rigorously, the idealism of the contemporary 'universe of synthesis and 
prosthesis, a universe which is positive, consensual and synchronous' (1990/1993: 
71). Accursed or heteronomous elements rise ithin the system; allergies, 
sickness, rejection mark the collapse even of the positivity/negýtivit distinction, any Y.. --1. -ý. I 
form of coding. They represent 'a singular kind of energy, a visceral energy which 
has replaced negativity and critical revolt and bred our times most emblematic 
phenomena, viral pathologies, terrorism, drugs, delinquency' (ibid. ). 
Baudrillard's recent work makes clear that 'inexplicable' or deracinated 
violence; contemporary death-events should also be approached in this way. 
According to Baudrillard the "insurrection" of such "singularities", 
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... may assume violent, anomalous, irrational aspects from the viewpoint of 'enlightened' thought - it may take ethnic, religious or linguistic forms but 
also, at the individual level, temperamental and neurotic ones. (Baudrillard 
1997/1998: 13). 
For Baudrillard these are forces of disproportion, repulsion, rejection. The 
social core or nexus of Durkheimian sociology, re-worked by Bataille as the 
fundamental axes of attraction and repulsion, have for Baudrillard become so 
enervated that 'the social' as such no longer exists, is no longer suspended between 
these poles. The socius required for its life, its power to communify a sense of the 
inseparability of good and evil, of attraction and repulsion. Bataille's fundamental 
'rapport' of the malefic and the beneficent not as. opposed dualisms but as an entirety, 
,a 
whole, is lost. For Baudrillard any residual sense of negativity has been effaced in 
the techno-operational order, the principle of the accursed share is denied but takes 
jqý. Iýyengq. This is the excess of ppsitjNýity, h er-positivit that constitutes "viral', ' . A. _ 
gq- 
_. 
4_ 
collapse. Viral pathologies do not emanate from the depths or wellsprings of the 
communal or social nexus, to strengthen or revivify it; they are manifest unmediated, 
uncontrolled, emptied of cultural meaning, along the ruptured surfaces of 
technological culture. This is not the 'return of the repressed', the revenge of 
negativity but the immanent revolt of objects or things in a system of hyper-positivity 
that allows no expenditure, loss or negativity. 
According to Baudrillard then, Bataille's vision of sacrificial expenditure as 
, fundamental -'need'- 
is no Ionizer adequate, the contemporary system is able to re- 
, channel, re-invest practically all expqrlditure. As Lyotard (1974/1993) argues there 
are no subversive regions, occupied by ceremonial forms for example, that might 
challenge or transform the system. For Baudrillard anomalies, singularities, excesses 
are no longer negatives, outside the system in some sense, they are immanent to it. 
Singularities are not abnormal but hypernornial, liyperpositive. Here there is a 
fundamental shift in the form taken by radical social theory. For - 
Bataille writing in, 
the first half of the 20'h 
. 
century e. ý, ' appeared 'beyond' or 'outside' the 
ýyýtems_of rationality and morality. These systems were argued to be limited and so 
vulnerable to critical assaults from the 'outside'. For Bataille subjectivity-as-excess 
embodied the limit of the system and so threatened it. In the latter 20th century the 
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vast expansion of consumer and communications technologies, the 'real' resulted in a 
'globalised' system of capital that no longer required well-defined 'values' of 
morality or even rationality, in order to function. Hence it becomes increasingly 
difficult to theorise excesses outside or beyond the confines of an apparently 
tunlimited' system. Excess for Baudrillard is the result of the (hyper) function of the 
system not some 'subversive region' outside it. Yet the system is fundamentally 
unstable, prone to "viruses", anomalies, and evil, the contemporary manifestations of 
Baudrillard's symbcýjlic p! ýnciplq These forms are objective not _, ýqf reversibili 
subjective, not the return of archaic (theological, moral) evil but a new form 
Baudrillard terms the 'transparition of evil' (Baudrillard in Gane 1993: 178). 
Baudrillard affirms and prizes such viral eruptions as "a precious and 
supernatural sign of denial", not as aberrations to be combated or legislated against. 
Indeed because any cultural comprehension of evil has been lost or denied such 
events cannot be combated. 
/No 
rites of reversibility can be invoked against evil 
since it is no longer defined, rather evil now appears as the principle of reversibility. 
The object has taken over the power of creating events, "the evil genie has taken up 
residence in things: this is the objective energy of evil" (1990/1993: 108)\ 
Returning to the examples of 'inexplicable' evil, Baudrillard's position 
suggests that Thomas Hamilton, the West's or the killers of James Bulger were not 
'subjects' as such, subjectivity being irradiated by the technologies of transparency. 
According to Baudrillard otherness, "as gaze, as mirror, as opacity" are neutralised, 
resolved into 'difference'. Evil, otherness and excess become transparent or trans- 
paritional, 'Without the Other as mirror, as reflecting surface, consciousness of self is 
threatened with irradiation in the void' (1990/1993: 122). Without the other to act as 
mirror, seducer, object, 'self loses its meaning, its identity, subjectivity is 
"dispossessed" (Baudrillard 1997/1998: 19). The 'transparition' of evil is a process 
whereby the (hyper) banal technologies of transparency accelerate, or suddenly 
reverse into fatal or catastrophic events. Baudrillard terms this theýýpU e (the 
fatal)" (1983/1990: 72). These events are 'pure' or "fatal" in that they are completely 
unpredictable; they cannot be comprehended through political, historical or 
genealogical enquiry. Such events then are 'inexplicable' to dominant rationality. 
Contemporary death-events should be approached through the notion of the 
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'transparition' of evil. They occur in the paradoxical, 'inexplicable', post-dialectical 
s ace were banality fuses with excess. Individuals such as Thomas Hamilton, the p 
children who murdered James Bulger, and Frederick and Rosemary West should be 
sieen as both products of contemporary culture, of the 'irradiation' of subjectivity by 
object, image and 'screen', and as excessive singularities with it. That is as the 
paradoxical or 'undecideable' point where the hyper-logic of the system generates 
sudden anomalies, extremities. These events and individuals then cannot be 
interpreted as 'vital signs' or as a 'critique' of the system in dialectical fashion, they 
are both the system and its point of collapse. ' 3 
In the contemporary system the object, like otherness and evil can no longer 
be easily identified, comprehended or defined. Rather than such excess residing in 
the specificity of a particular concept or idea (Satan, sin, death) evil no longer has a 
transcendent concept, it becomes an immanent process, a diffuse and unknowable 
property of things. This is the principle of evil, a new and distinctive order of evil 
after the demise of evil as moral problem. 
Good and evil are still posed as opposites, adversaries, but evil, crucially, has the 
advantage: 
The Good consists in a dialectic of Good and Evil. Evil consists in the 
negation of this dialectic, in a radical dissociation of Good and Evil and by 
extension in the autonomy of the principle of Evil. Whereas the Good 
presupposes a dialectical involvement of Evil, Evil is founded on itself 
alone, in a pure incompatibility. Evil is thus master of the game, and it is 
the principle of Evil, the reign of eternal antagonism, that must eventually 
carry off the victory (Baudrillard 1990/1993: 139). 
Baudrillard's recent work Yhe Perfect Critne (1995/1996) builds on the 
exploration of the vital power of illusion. Evil is not examined in great detail 
however jt-iý_cleaLthat-the,,, 4pp)ýehension of evil had been a crucial dimension of the 
yitali! y oý the radical illusion of the world, and its (attempted) expulsion and 
elimination (the perfect crime) has lethal effects. Illusion becomes the crucial new 
term of Baudrillard's vocabulary and unlike Bataille, Baudrillard does not claim evil 
as 'obscene', material reality, but as an elusive and shifling cultural effect, an effect 
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of contemporary systems of meaning, not of any 'deeper' reality that supposedly lay 
behind them. 
Evil is a strategy of destruction, a fatal strategy. It is an attack on the corpse 
of dead sociality that redoubles or accelerates through the 'hypermoral' codes of 
mainstream culture. In this sense 'society' experiences the aberrations it deserves, 
solicits the evils it encounters. As long as these evils are treated as merely 
'inexplicable' they are contained and so do cannot confront the mainstream with the 
mirror of itself. Here the category 'inexplicable' itself becomes socially useful, a 
utility in the face of excess: 
So the world goes its way naturally, by a logical enchainment of Evil which 
seems much more capable of accounting for it than the opposite 
enchaininent of Good ... Nothing is exchanged in terms of positive 
equivalence - the only things really exchanged are absence and the negative. 
Evil has to be given and returned for human beings to be bound by profound 
_peciprocity. 'Suc 
is the economy of the accursed share, of which the 
, nothing,. 'Ibe_ -evil, 
the irreducible, and absence are the symbolic- 6pekators 
(Baudrillard 1995/1996: 79). 
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION ON EVIL 
This chapter offers a reading of the shifting symbolisation of 'evil' in the 
thought of Bataille and Baudrillard. I do not wish to assert an evolutionary schema, 
of either a progressive or regressive kind. However as the theory of Bataille, 
Baudrillard and others has shown, general cultural-historical shifts and mutations can 
at least be specified in schematic form. This cannot enable a definitive rational 
'understanding' of evil itself but traces something of the changing symbolisation of 
evil in western culture. 
Evil is not explicable or soluble through the terms of rational discourse and 
the 'real'; its resistance to rational, systematic thought is clear in the instabilities 
inherent in the work of Augustine, Aquinas, Kant and Hegel, Nietzsche, Arendt and 
Bauman. The force of evil is not confined to realities or materialities, if it were it 
would be a far less threatening. Rather it ruptures 'realities', whether they are 
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moral, bureaucratic or libidinal. Evil is not confined by, or contained within the 
real/unreal disjunction; it precedes it and is not conceptually amenable to it. Evil is 
all the more terrifying because its effects, ramifications are not restricted by the 'real' 
ahd rational. Rather evil grows and accelerates through myth; it can be justified by 
appeal to mythic notions; such as those of racial superiority. Evil is re-enforced by 
myth, re-created or re-directed through it. Evil actions are not dissuaded by appeals 
to the 'real', any more than education or moral guidance delivers us from evil. 
It would be highly problematic to assert Bataille, Baudrillard or other 
theorists manage a definitive break with established forms of Western thinking on 
evil and excess. The theoretical speculations of these thinkers all involve particular, 
idiosyncratic reworkings of the immensely influential 'myth' of human falleness. For 
Bataille the 'fall' from immanent continuity with animality and nature, and for 
Baudrillard, a 'fall' from the realm of symbolic enchantment. Perhaps all Western 
ulLin aýLeIyLeqs upon some sense ofTall'. Such an assertion in no way LL 
implies that such theories are thereby mistaken or without val ue. In fact the reading 
of Nietzsche, Bataille and Baudrillard presented here argues 'myth' should not be 
taken as a pejorative tenn, connoting confusion, superstition or error; something less 
than 'real'. Rather nh' should be interpreted as the invocation of something more 
than merely 'real', (not hyperreal in Baudrillard's sense of 'the more real than the 
real'). That is as a crucial and inevitable principle of cultural meaning and, 
inevitably of non-meaning, of mystery, terror and otherness. Symbolic myth 
precedes the opposition of real/unreal, true/false, and rational/irrational, in its cultural 
force, impact and diffusion and 'evil' always appears on this symbolic level. 
It is mistaken to assume that-apparpntly archaic, sacred and religious forrns 
Etk_ 
-hay -been 
definiti ely superseded-and are without valu . This assumption Q oitight ýe ve 
can result in vulgar materialism, which is commonplace in contemporary thinking of 
both a scientific and popular nature. The force of symbol, myth and illusion are 
crucial for any understanding of the theorists discussed here. Further I contend they 
are important for a new and alternative approach contemporary death-events, 
'excessive' violence, 'inexplicable evil'. 
This chapter stressed the importance of Bataille's assertions concerning the 
weakening of the divine and reciprocal strengthening and 'unleashing' of evil, and 
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Baudrillard's notion of a contemporary "spiral of worsening" and the viral 
immanence of evil in the 'whitewashed' and transparent culture of today. Beforethe 
era of state and capitalist organisation, evil (and good) were inscribed, encoded 
culturally, and expressed within the social totality of myth, illusion and magic. The 
age of enlightenment reason had, or so it seemed, triumphed over superstition and 
illusion but the movement of reason created the new residual category 'unreason'. 
Evil in enlightenment systems of thought was further radicalised and s tr engthened b Y 
demolition of sacred, collective.. and _'religious' 
feeling. Far from modem 
enlightened societies surpassing the superstitions of gods and devils, the encoding of 
these cultural forces were lost or weakened to the point that they possessed no 
influence or meaning. While the systems of universalised religion collapsed, and 
with them any sense of fixed, transcendent 'Good', the cultural insecurities and 
'intuition' of evil remained, and grew ever more powerful since the force of the Good 
3Aýqs__ýoMp o Lsed and disarticulated from Evil. This is the fundamental 
assertion of Bataille and Baudrillard, which enables a new reading of extreme events 
and the generalised horror they provoke. 
Much modem social theory is guided by domesticating gestures, 
imprisoning 'evil', excessive and destructive behaviour in the conceptual mirror 
space of Christian moralism. However it has no way of approaching 'gratuitous' 
inutile or 'inexplicable' evil, except as the construction of a resentful imaginary, not 
as material or actual. 
Bataille moves beyond this impasse through the notions of base materialism, 
expenditure and evil but there are problems and tensions in this approach particularly 
between base materialism and the theorisation of evil. Baudrillard works with these 
themes and wrests them from residual forms of naturalism, functionalism, and the 
theoretical inadequacies of (base) materialism. This marks an important shift in the 
nature of radical, marginal social theory, away from materialism as 'deep' or 
'authentic' substance to thinking based on genealogical principles. Baudrillard offers 
an idiosyncratic form of genealogical thought through the competing orders of 
banality and fatality, of transparency and evil, of material illusion and radical 
illusion. 
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When faced with the horror of contemporary death-events modem thought 
encounters the impasse of inexplicability/incommensurability. This failure must be 
seen as a product of modem, technological reason. However by pursuing an 
idiosyncratic path through the terrain of Post-structuralism evil can be approached in 
a more cornmensurate way. By reading Nietzsche, Bataille and Baudrillard both 
together and against each other, I have tried to sketch the possibility of a 
general(ised) economy of expenditure and excess in relation to contemporary 
instances oVinexplicable evil'. 
Events, processes and objects that can appropriately be termed 'evil' clearly 
exist and occur repeatedly. Evil exists as a fundamental axis of human cultural 
experience, but it is felt at, or beyond, the boundaries of discursive thought. There 
can be no fully satisfactory theoretical explanation, let alone 'solution' to the problem 
of evil, however this in no way implies that evil is non-existent. This assumption 
replicates the privative conception of evil, postulating such phenomena in terms of 
absence, lack or temporary 'lapse'. Both Bataille and Baudrillard move out of this 
restrictive frame of reference through their notions of the sacred and the symbolic 
respectively. They offer a general economic reading that affirms evil, the diabolic 
and destructive without operating simplistic dualisms of mind/body, 
rational/irrational, conscious/unconscious, real/mythic. 
Evil exists; it is actual, not only as event, but also more fundamentally as 
cultural myth and illusion, as symbol, trauma and spectacle. In this sense evil is 
more radical, more threatening than if it operated merely as 'real'; be it a moral, 
bureaucratic or libidinal 'real'. Evil is only experienced, perceived, encoded, 
rendered culturally meaningful through myth illusion. This assertion applies 
equally to the 'radical', or in Nietzschean terms, affirmatory illusions of 'primitive' 
societies, and the, in Baudrillardian terms, banal, material illusions of contemporary 
thought. Myth and illusion express and inscribe evil, though different myths do this 
in very different ways and with very different effects. The mytha of enlightenment 
reason have tended to unbound, release and 'strengthen' evil, often were the aim has 
b5ýýýdený-degn-Qunce-Qr-r. PpE-qss- Today 'evil' erupts immediately into the mythic, 
but these are myths that are divorced from any sense of cultural cohesion, of 
collective meaning. They are myths concerned with the restriction and contaim-nent 
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of evil within supposedly perverted, damaged or pathological individual subjects. 
They are myths concerning the validity of juridical decision making, of justice and 
legal neutrality, and of individual or subjective identity. They are the myths of 
stientific meta-narratives of progress, solution, treatment, cure and rehabilitation. 
These are myths which not only efface their own mythic status in order to condemn 
'other' forms of thought, but they are also mythic structures which fail to engage in 
commensurate terminology with the phenomena of evil, that are rendered powerless 
by such events. 
Faced with the trauma of 'evil' shock waves reverberate through society, 
initial reactions take the symbolic-mythic forms of grief and mourning. Only later 
come the pseudo-rationalisations, the domestication and structuralisation. In cases 
such as the murder of James Bulger or the Dunblane massacre, in the first moments, 
hours of reaction evil confronts us as evil, as cultural horror and abjection, as void 
destructive of all project, meaning and security. A symbolic or mythic terror 
saturates the rational-discursive order, more terrifying than any 'real' fear, any 
rational insecurity. Only later, after the enactment of symbolic ritual, time, duration 
and 'reason' re-emerge. Along the fault-lines and blindspots of contemporary culture 
are manifest contemporary 'fatal' forrns; no longer ceremonial - 'human', but viral; 
contagious, implosive and catastrophic; as 'decoded' 10 inhuman aberrations beyond 
social exchange. 
It might be argued that appeals to myth and illusion are themselves idealist, 
are a flight from materialist or base materialist realities. However the mythic as it 
appears in Nietzsche, Bataille and Baudrillard is no comforting, superstitious sham. 
As Baudrillard argues, illusion or simulacra cannot be merely dispelled or 
transcended. The veils of illusion do not peel back in order to reveal the 'truth'. Any 
strong ontological claims must be regarded with considerable suspicion, whether the 
foundational principle is theological, rationalist or libidinal. " Further, both Bataille 
and Baudrillard emphasise that the mythic is a cruel order, not a long-lost golden 
a 12 
Returning to Baudrillard specifically, his position is of course far from 
unproblematic. There is a certain incaution in his writing style; some polemics are 
more successful than others. Further, where much contemp2rary theor_ 
. 
awing on y, r 
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the work of Foucault and Deleuze in particular, advocates complexity as a theoretical 
model, Baudrillard seems to favour 'post-complexity' or 'decomplexification'. 
Baudrillard does not so much attempt a carefully thought out 'break' with western 
thought as to scorn it, drive it. beyond its accepted boundaries, turn it against itself 
Further Baudrillard's theoretical positions go beyond the idealist and materialist, 
relativist and absolutist. For this reason his thought is often dismissed as inherently 
contradictory. However such a paradoxical approach is also enabling, facilitating 
refleption on an immensely wide range of phenomena and processes as Gane 
(1995: 113) and Genosko (1998) have argued. 
Baudrillard offers a position that is not dependent on structuralist- 
functionalist conceptions of good and evil, as the necessary principles of stable 
societies. Durkheim approaches evil in this manner, and in places Bataille too is 
perilously close to it. Such an approach does, at least, take evil seriously. 
Durkheim and Bataille are then crucial influences on Baudrillard's theory. Yet 
Baudrillard and Bataille go beyond this position by offering a general economy of 
violence, destruction and evil. Their related approaches are able to operate both on 
the level of cultural meaning/non-meaning, and at the level of individualised 
psychical and perceptual phenomena. 
Baudrillard's idiosyncratic thinking on illusion and evil allows him to work 
simultaneously on a culturalist and a psychical register, without necessarily resorting 
to functionalism, materialism or idealism as final instance or foundational principle 
in either case. Baudrillard's methodology approaches evil, not as structural- 
functional form, nor as individualised intention, but as objective force or energy. 
Jhis is vital because the question of psychological motivation or intent is central to 
most contemporary accounts of 'evil' which draw upon psychology for juridical 
purposes. In both popular and juridical discourse 'intent' is crucial for the 
demonstration of guilt and culpability; intention defines the distinction between 
criminality and insanityý-. In the examples of murderous destruction cited below, the 
question 'how could they do such thingsT is central to popular and media reactions. 
Intentionality is made to bear the burden of explanation, the acceleration of horror 
and the falling back onto the language of evil occur when notions of individuality, 
intention and responsibility fail to make events more manageable, more 
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rationalisable. It might be said that by establishing intention we show that a merely 
cruel or destructive action is actually an 'evil' one, yet it is where any understandings 
of intent or purpose break down that such cases become all the more 'inexplicable'. In 
the cases chosen notions of intention, responsibility and even awareness 14 provide 
no clear avenue of rationalisation. This is the point where 'moral' evil disappears 
and 'objectal' or 'transparitional' evil appears. 
It is the impasse of mainstream rationality that makes radical thinkers such 
as Nietzsche, Bataille, Baudrillard and others so important. This chapter has stressed 
the ways in which such thinker's challenge social theoretical, popular and scientific 
understandings of cultural change, 'progress', reason and subjectivity through their 
readings of excess, negativity and evil. Further they offer, radical and distinctive 
approaches to an increasingly salient contemporary trend, that of 'inexplicable' 
violence, destruction and death, events which we can only call 'evil'. 
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NOTES 
1) See Bataille's essay'The Old Mole and the Prefix Sur'in Bataille (1985). 
2) Klossowski's analysis focuses, closely, on the French revolution, 
specifically the sacred crime of regicide; the execution of Louis XVI that he terms 
'the simulacrum of the putting to death of God' (Klossowskil992: 55). Klossowski 
situates the philosophy of Sade in opposition to the catholic counter-revolutionary 
social thinkers, Joseph de Maistre, de Bonald and Maine de Biran. Where they 
viewed the execution of Louis XVI as a 'redemptive martyrdom' that expiated the 
collective crime of the nation, for Sade the death of the king creates, according to 
Klossowski, as vicious circle which 'plunges the nation into the inexpiable' (ibid. ), 
the rule of arbitrary violence resulting in 'the consummation of evil to its extreme 
limits' (1992: 57). Sade's political tract'Yet another effort, Frenchmen, If you would 
be Republicans', which forms part of his Philosophy in the Bedroom, introduces the 
notion of the laws of Nature as crucial to the founding of a new social order. His 
understanding of the force of Nature is not greatly dissimilar to that of Bataille's 
notion of the accursed share as has frequently been noted. This view presents Nature 
as characterised by an irremediable, inexpungable drive towards loss, destruction and 
death. This assertion is fundamental to Sade's assault on the 'illusory' and idealist 
prescriptions of Christianity. For Sade 'the most sacred of Nature's movements ... [is] 
that of preserving ones own existence at no matter whose expense' (in Klossowski 
1992: 600. With this assertion Sade's social system, which Klossowski terms 'a utopia 
of evil' (Klossowski 1992: 62) bears a obvious similarity with the emergent capitalist 
economic order and the notion of 'survival of the fittest' popularised within 
Darwinian evolution and classical liberal political economy. 
3) Bataille relationship to Nazism is far from clear-cut and has received a 
considerable amount of critical attention. Some earlier critics had claimed that 
Bataille himself was a Nazi, yet such a claim has no support and is similar to 
untenable accounts of Nietzsche, presenting him as a Nazi. For a recent discussion 
of these themes, see Besnier in Bailey-Gill Ed. (1995: 12-25). Bataille's work The 
Psychological Structure offascism is reproduced in Bataille (1985). 
4) See Bataille (1947) and also Baudrillard (1997/1998: 25-30). 
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5) Baudrillard's idiosyncratic, even perverse approach straddles 
epistemological critique and cosmological assertion, combining what is 
conventionally always separate; materialism and idealism, relativism and historicism. 
These moves do not claim to 'resolve' standard debates but to explode their 
limitations. Here both the style of theoretical reflection and the object of that 
reflection operate beyond the boundaries erected by enlightenment thought. 
6) Indeed Baudrillard's emphasis on the persistence of evil and the 
fundamental irreducibility of seduction, the accursed share and the fatal, to modem 
reason, cannot be made from within the paradigm of strict cultural relativism. 
7) Baudrillard discusses the Chernobyl disaster in Baudrillard (1992/1994: 34- 
53), arguing that it was the objective condition of the unsafe power station, rather 
than the subjective relations of diplomacy, that brought about the 'end' of the cold 
war. 
8) Important here is Baudrillard's In the shadow of the silent nzajorities 
(1978/1983), particularly on the mass and hyper-conformity as fatal strategy. 
Baudrillard's work after S. E. D. provides little detail on the precise nature of the 
epochal shifts that are crucial to his theory. However it seems that the symbolic 
cultures incorporated evil within their ceremony whereas in later cultures, Christian 
and bourgeois-secular, the symbolic is reduced or lost to the extent that it is no 
longer sufficient to encompass the principle of evil. Evil then separates off from the 
-inscription and. elxchange rituals of the community, This tension was clearly apparent 
in the conflict and competition between the Gnostic and Manichean sects and the 
Christian mainstream which did not appear to many believers to offer a satisfactory 
account of the nature of evil. If Christianity preferred to expel or repress evil rather 
than engage with it on its own terms this was far more true of the enlightenment, 
(with the partial exception of the later Kant) of bourgeois and scientific thought. 
However the influence of Durkheimian functionalism is still evident in such 
assertions and is reproduced in the sociological and anthropological assumptions of 
Bataille, particularly in his later more scientific work. Here evil tends to be 
conceived as fixed quanta of social experience for which rituals, ceremonies and later 
institutions are designed to manage. The separating off of evil from the cultural 
mainstream is traced by Bataille and Baudrillard, in different though related ways, 
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which constitute an original departure from functionalist sociological models in that 
the foundational ontological and epistemological dualistic assumptions are radically 
questioned, or pushed beyond the limits of sociological utility. In treating the 'evil 
genie of the social' Baudrillard has much in common with Nietzsche, arguing that the 
crucial historical unfolding,. of society, is. determined by irrunoral principles; 
competitiveness, struggle,, glory, -fashion- and seduction. 
Baudrillard argues that the 
social as such never existed, 'no group has ever really considered itself as social, that 
is to say in solidarity with its own values and coherent in its collective project' 
(1983/1990: 75). At this point in his argument Baudrillard makes references to so- 
called primitive societies and the work of Bataille on Aztec sacrifice in particular. 
For Baudrillard, as for Bataille, such peoples implicitly understood and affinned the 
inevitability of death, depense and evil, of cruelty, irony and reversibility. It was 
central to their approach to issues such as social power, authority and hierarchy, 
Baudrillard refers to, though does not properly reference, the reversibility of social 
power and prestige that operate in such societies. Here the king or chief, would, if 
social customs dictated it, be sacrificed (either actually or via a substitute) in order to 
safeguard the position of the tribal group from the influence of malefic forces. Their 
appears to have existed a generalised social injunction or taboo against the pursuit of 
individual wealth, power and prestige and this applied particularly to the king or 
chief who often had little 'real' power and would be obliged to take the role of 
scapegoat in certain circumstances. This point is also discussed by Sahlins (1974). 
The social fragments when the forces of attraction/repulsion are eroded, the impact 
of capital, technology and market on the social have been the subject of much neo- 
Marxist thought, however Baudrillard has greatly expanded the ten-ns of this critique 
in what could be termed a general economic manner. 
9) However this 'real' from which the human world needs 'protection' should 
not be identified with a 'raw' unmediated, bio-materialist real, as Baudrillard makes 
clear, rather this 'real' is itself an idealism, a fiction dependent on modem myths and 
metaphors. 
10) Deleuze and Guattari, with differing conceptual resources and 
methodological operations follows a similar pattern in specifying the distinctions 
between 'Primitive' uncoded cultures, and modem - coded and decoded cultures. 
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Deleuze and Guattari are very close to this position in Anti-Oedipus where they 
argue, '... primitive codes, at the moment they are acting on the flows of desire with a 
maximum of vigilance and extension, binding them in a system of cruelty, maintain 
ah infinitely greater affinity with desiring-machines than does the capitalistic 
axiomatic ... (T)his is because in the primitive socius desire is not yet trapped, not yet 
introduced into a set of impasses, the flows have lost none of their polyvocity... ' 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1972/1984: 184-5). 
Here it is clear that the 'primitive socius' is a system of codings, of mythic orderings, 
yet of a very different nature from those of modernity, encodings of an 'infinitely 
greater affinity' with the fundamental nature of human collectivity and experience. 
For Deleuze this is expressed by,, the. term 'desiring-machines', for Bataille it is the 
sacred, for Baudrillard the symbolic. However these terms are not synonymous, in 
Forget Foucault (1977/1987) Baudrillard makes the case for the superiority of his 
terminology over that of both Foucault and Deleuze. In short Baudrillard approaches 
myth and illusion not through libidinal machinism, which he views as a replication of 
the productivist, realist and utilitarian assumptions, characteristic of Marx and the 
industrial age but through the terms of the object, the fatal and evil. Similarly, 
Deleuze's work on the diabolical immanence of the pack, swarm and multiplicity 
works on the plane of socio-cultural functionality, that is as the modes of securing 
against becoming-animal. It also offers a means of thinking the excessive at the level 
of psychical process. 
However there are important divergences between the approaches of Bataille, 
Baudrillard and Deleuze and Guattari. In Anti-Oedipus patterns of consumption, no 
matter how destructive are presented not as inutile 'excesses' but as an aspect of all- 
encompassing ontology of production. Deleuze seems to lack a theory of 
expenditure s! ýýýies, -all-intensities-tend-to-be-relocated or reinvested. 
This 
is not the place to evaluate the complexities of Deleuzian thought, however his 
system is far from unproblematic. Their rejection of Bataille (Deleuze and Guattari 
1972/1984: 4n. ) is somewhat simplistic and serves to obscure other proximities and 
similarities betwecn Bataille, Baudrillard and themselves. Baudrillard however 
distances himself increasingly from both Deleuzian and Bataillean readings of 
general economy, by attacking not merely restricted economies but also the restricted 
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materiality, of the theories offered by Deleuze and Bataille. Baudrillard's method 
could then perhaps be termed objective or general illusionism. Evil, the accursed, 
the negative and destructive continue to be central yet not as 'deep' base material 
riWities, rather Baudrillard operates on a cosmo-illogical level, one suggestive of 
chaos theory. Baudrillard's emphasis on indifference differs strongly from the 
Deleuzian economy of productive connectivity. There are, of course, considerable 
problems with the Deleuzian positive ontology of desire and while Baudrillard 
rejects it in too cursory a manner (Baudrillard 1987: 9-64) the term desire certainly 
possesses a distinct affinity with the language of consumer capitalism and the New 
Right's privileging of individual choice. It is notable that Foucault, who was a 
companion and admirer of Deleuze, made it clear in a late interview that he regarded 
the term as unsatisfactory. The later work of Foucault seemed to depart, 
increasingly, from Deleuze and his emphasis on desire. In this respect Foucault's 
situating of desire as a discursive movement crucial to modem culture (see Foucault 
1976/1979; 81-91) is more akin to the view expressed by Baudrillard (1979/1990: 5- 
11). It seems likely that Baudrillard would regard Deleuzian desiring-machines to 
offer a theory of the third order of simulacra, or perhaps of the collapse of the second 
order; characterised by productivity, into the third order of coded re-productivity. 
However Baudrillard's own interest has turned to what he has termed the collapse of 
the codes of the third order into the Tractal' and increasingly 'transparent' 
contemporary order. Baudrillard's recent terminology of the virus, the catastrophe 
and the fractal do appear more contemporary, at least in a superficial sense, Deleuze's 
emphasis on machinic connections of productivity, in particular the example of the 
'handyman' in Anti-Oedipus. However the viral and immanent collapsing of 
Baudrillard's 'code' does seem similar to the Deleuzian notion of the rhizomatic 
'plane of immanence' which is often presented in cultural or sociological as well as 
ontological terms. 
There are then, certain parallels between Baudrillard's later work and the Deleuze of 
decoded uncontrolled flows across the social field oth refer to inhuman, a-cultural, 
anti-social energies, that which even the earliest 'primitive' or symbolic cultures 
dreaded, yet which were coded, in however an unstable form within the myth and 
ritual of the socius. Yet classical and modem society attempt to expel or deny such 
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forces or flows not engage them, with the result, for Baudrillard that contemporary 
culture is entirely at their mercy. The most fundamental divergence with Deleuze 
then consists in Baudrillard's cultural pessimism against Deleuze's liberatory 
optimism. 
11) Týý is not to say that weak, minimal or even moderate ontological claims 
are impossible or cannot be made. For a recent discussion of these and related 
themes see Sayer (1997). 
12) Bataille's discussion of the Aztecs appears, in its most pointed form, in 
Bataille (1967/1988: 45-61). It is sometimes claimed that Bataille abuses or 
exaggerates ethnographic and historical data to suit his own ends, for comparisons 
with standard text-book accounts of the Aztecs see, for example, Vaillant (1944). 
13) Nor can events such as these be interpreted as "homeopathic" as "vital", 
signs of denial as Baudrillard (1990/1993) suggests of some instances of reversal, 
breakdown or malfunction, for example computer viruses or temporary breakdowns 
of television networks. Such events do not serve to restore 'equilibrium' as the term 
'homeopathic' might suggest. Perhaps then to use Baudrillard's terms specifically 
the ultra-violent individuals involved in contemporary death-events, are 'the 
catastrophic development internal to the system' (Baudrillard 1997/1998: 47) and so 
represent 'banal strategies' of the subject. They are not representative of 'fatal 
strategies' which would 'explode not the truth of the system, but its logic' (ibid. ), and 
so 'thwart' the development of the system. The subject is not a fatal strategist, it is 
the object and, above all radical thought which are fatal strategy, 'There is perhaps 
but one, fatal-strategy-and only one: theory' (Baudrillard 1983/1990: 181). 
14) It is reported that the children convicted of killing James Bulger no longer 
have any awareness or memory of the event. According to two detailed accounts of 
the James Bulger case, Morrison (1997) and Smith (1994), the two boys detained for 
the murder no longer appear to be aware that they were responsible for the death, or 
for any related crime. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
'he 
'What good is theory? If the world is hardly compatible with the concept of the real which 
we impose upon it, the function of theory is certainly not to reconcile it, but on the contrary, to seduce, 
to wrest things from their condition, to force them into an over-existence which is incompatible with 
that of the real' (Baudrillard 1987/1988: 98). 
This thesis confronts contemporary culture with its most monstrous 
creations, its extreme limit cases. It is a challenge to dominant social theory, yet it 
also challenges the alternative theoretical formulations of Bataille and Baudrillard to 
exist, to survive in a system that confines them to the margins. It challenges their 
theories to continue to disrupt, divert and threaten the dominant discourse of 
rationality. It has sought this in the principles of the sacred and symbolic, in 
seduction, evil and the Accursed share, notions which will not submit to the routines 
of legitimate academic thought but continue to haunt its margins. 
This task is not a simple one. In a generalised, global, or limit-less system, 
excess resides within rather than beyond the system. Rationality has long broken free 
of any determinable moorings in moral or utilitarian calculation, and since it does not 
generate strong or distinctive values of any kind it no longer exists in opposition to 
any 'opposed' value systems. It is not sufficient to invoke 'radicalism' as if it is 
located in a space that is 'outside', sealed and separated from dominant rationality 
and somehow able to displace it. As Baudrillard argues contemporary rationality 
reduces difference to plurality, forging an homogeneous yet vacuous cultural terrain, 
a culture of transparency where symbolic spaces, social and individual are irradiated 
by 'generalised communication and surplus information' (1990/1993: 74). Ye. t_ 
ý2ntqpip re, nd prophylactic technologies, jqý_qry, quttur. , driven by orbital capital flow a 
by the limitless proliferation of energy and the annihilation of all otherness, also 
, constitutes 
the 'mqdýqT_ history of the appursed_ 
_. 
share'. Here the regeneration or 
mutation of accursed, inassimilable and irreducible elements, results in 'the reign of L,. -- -., I I. - I.. '' -- ----------- 
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incoherence, anomaly and. catastrophe' (Baudrillard 1990/1993: 108). These are the 
conditions Of the appearance of contemporary death-events. 
Though the approaches of Bataille and Baudrillard are closely related, the 
specific theorisation of excess; of the excessive, the marginal, the inassimilable, 
differs considerably. For Bataille such excess, thought through the notion of the 
accursed share, resides in the subject-as-excess, subjectivity at "boiling point". This 
conception does not correspond to phenomenological or psychoanalytic accounts of 
subjectivity as limited, of a 'rift-in-being'. For Bataille being is rift or wound, 
"accursed" excess energy floods 'subjectivity' and rationality becomes the residue, 
the remainder. 'Subjectivity' then is always at the limit; subjectivity is the limit of 
the human that always borders the inhuman, the animal, the sacred. Extreme 
violence is an inevitable consequence of the accused share on the social order and, 
for Bataille, such violence becomes all the more frequent and extreme as the sacred 
in dismantled, marginalised or transposed into the terms of moral productivist 
thought. Here we must ask not why do 'contemporary death-events' occur, but why 
do they not occur more frequently? Perhaps now they are occurring with far greater 
frequency, the current spate of mass, shootings in America suggests this. 
Bataille's thought then can be made to function as an alternative discourse 
on excess, as an account of horror and violence, albeit a powerful and neglected one. 
For Baudrillard however, such a theorisation of excess is no longer adequate. 
-ýccording to Baudrillard - 
it, 
- 
is 
- 
"the world" that 
.. 
is excessive, not the subject. 
Subjectivity, in whatever form, is the construct of rational thought, which posits a 
'real' and then develops thSgy to reflect upon it. The adequacy of an particular p- J ------ 
theory can be_questioned, developýd or modified., through dialectical and critical 
,t nking, yet 
these strategies remain "banal" for Baudrillard because they do not 
_quýeýt ýipn or challepgq 
the status of the real itself. Excessive objects, excessive events 
elude the banal theories of contemporary reason. Excess resides with the object, 
which eludes subjective thought, with the event which eludes genealogical thought, 
with the world which eludes human thought. Excess is on the side of the object, not 
the subject. Here there is a fundamental shift in radical or marginal thought based on 
both the shift in emphasis from subject to object as excess, and relatedly, in the 
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, thinking of the 'real', from a (base) materialist fonn in Bataille, to a construct of 
rational thought in Baudrillard. 
In order to escape "banal theory, " in favour of "fatal theory. " Baudrillard's 
later writings depart from any notion of theory as accurate reflection of the 'real'. 
Rather, he argues, theory must challengq. the real. By ruse and seduction, theory 
must lay traps 'in the hope that reality will be na7fve enough to fall into it' 
(Baudrillard 1990/1993: 110). Radical thought is, for Baudrillard, the only fatal 
strategy, thought which does not assume the "complicity" of the object but its 
impenetrable, inexplicable otherness, yet which is at the heart of the contemporary 
system. 
The reality of contemporary death-events is certainly excessive, far in 
excess of the conventional explanatory paradigms of the social sciences. But how 
can radical theory 'partake of and become the acceleration of' (Baudrillard 
1987/1988: 99) this 'logic' of extremity? How can theory be excessive or fatal? 
There is a fundamental ambiguity or undecideability here. In Baudrillard's thought 
the distinction, relatively stable in Bataille's work, between utility and excess breaks 
down, excess becomes the logic, or hyper-logic of the mainstream. This point is 
crucial to an appreciation of the theoretical distance separating Bataille and 
Baudrillard. Further the distinction on which a theory of excessive events must be 
based becomes reversible and, in a sense undecideable as Baudrillard argues/. This 
per-verse spiral, applied to theory, here becomes an increasingly undecideable 
'distinction' between excess (as symbolic, sacrificial, excluded) and excess (as 
hyper-positivity, hyper-banality, accelerated)\ Here there are two modes or phases 
of excess, the excess of the system, and excess of foriner systems somehow 
antagonistic to, yet not properly 'outside', the system. These relations are expressed 
byLBauýqllard through the notions of fatal, ironic and banal. strategies, where banal 
strategies may accelerate in a curvature that seems to merge them with the fatal, so 
ecoming "puqre" fatal events -beyond, 
the grasp_. qf dominant -thought. 
Since stable 
distinctions between forms of excess are, perhaps, undecideable theory divides into a 
number of conflicting and irreconcilable hypotheses. Baudrillard's transparency or 
"transparition" of evil expresses the same situation. This notion refers to a process 
whereby the increasing. transpqrency -of contemporary culture generates new 
forms of 
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evil, not as lapses, failures or remainders but as a part of its (hyper) normal 
functioning. Evil resides in the process of "transparition" not 'outside' it. 
Contemporary death-events, sudden, inexplicable events are excesses, both the 
excess of the contemporary systems of hyper-positivity, the neutralisation of 
otherness, and the excess of the excluded, the expelled, the accursed share. 
In this compulsion to resemblance, every extradition of difference, in all 
contiguity of things and there own image, all conflation of beings and their 
code, lies the threat of an incestuous virulence, a diabolical otherness boding 
the breakdown of all this humming machinery. This is the reappearance of 
the principle of evil in a new guise. No morality or guilt is implied, 
however: the principle of evil is simply synonymous with the principle of 
reversal, with the turns of fate (Baudrillard 1990/1993: 65). 
This thesis then cannot contend that the theories of Bataille and Baudrillard 
provide a definitive or complete account or 'explanation' of such events. Indeed 
throughout the course of this thesis the intractability and impossibility of 
'comprehending' such events has been emphasised. The theories of both Bataille 
and Baudrillard insist on ipcompletion, loss, uncertainty and undecidability. 
Nevertheless it is important and possible to present theoretical and conceptual 
notions that appear better able to approach extreme events. 
This thesis has offered detailed theoretical engagements with the 
mainstream sociological tradition. This was argued to be compromised by utilitarian 
and productivist assumptions and unable to approach excess in anything like a 
corru-nensurate way. In order to begin thinking the excessiveness of contemporary 
death-events it was necessary to break out of individualist and utilitarian paradigms. 
The theories of Bataille and Baudrillard provide precisely this. 
Bataille-and-Baudri-Ilard'q. ýheme-of-ýýadical. negativity" was-contrasted with 
_Jhe_qoncgpt _qLýýg4tiVity 
in enlig4tqruRqnt,. _ and -modem 
thought- influenced., by- 
ics of 'useful' or 'rational' negativity,,,. --Bataille's 
thinking on 
"unemployed negativity", the sacred, transgression and sacrifice was presented as a 
crucial alternative means of thinking contemporary death-events. Such events, it was 
argued, can be read as contemporary transgression, as radically individualised, 
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deracinated forms of heterological expenditure, as 'sacrifice' after the sacred. Here 
&evil' is the only remaining form of transgression. 
In Bataille's reading the 'subject' is terrorised by mortality drained of 
collective meaning or sacred significance. Death, as the ultimate limit of modem 
subjectivity, becomes infused with eroticism and sexuality as the only remaining 
activities that retain a profound meaning or intense value. Bataille approaches 
extreme violence in terms of the sacred and its erosion in modem society. 
Baudrillard differs, ftindamentally in his theorisation of death, it appears not 
as absolute bio-chemical termination but as symbolic, reversible form'. The erosion 
of symbolic and ritual processes, and their reappearance in new and uncontrolled 
forms is crucial to the application of Baudrillard's thought to contemporary death- 
events. Further the movement of excess from a subjective to an "objectal" form is 
according to Baudrillard both 'fortunate' and 'v, ital',, (1990/1993: 108). The subject 
becomes "mass"; it is "disinvested", "dispossessed" by objective or objectal 
--relations,... 
Contemporary excess passes into events, processes, and objects. 
Baudrillard's notion of "singularity'_'As., crucial. -here, since 
it-refers to events so 
strange, alien or catastrophic that they defy rational explanation. These aspects of 
Baudriflard's thought were related to contemporary death-events and to literature on 
serial killing where aspects of rational subjectivity, moral responsibility or personal 
'culpability' break down. 
The often-asserted connections between sexuality and extreme violence 
were interrogated. Here the 'reality' of sex and sexuality is presented as the ultimate 
rationale for extreme violence. Such thinking is inadequate in a number of respects, 
which were highlighted through a reading of Bataille and Baudrillard. For Bataille 
eroticism is not the manifestation of (Freudian) drives but has a fundamentally social 
dimension, related to the taboo/transgression pairing. Excess opening the individual 
to a domain beyond subjective agency, rationality and morality. Yet Bataille 
suggests the tumult of eroticism is alien to the modem 'pathological' forms of sexual 
violence such as sadism since it eliminates the rational agency on which sadistic 
destruction, as ultimate subjective mastery and control, depends. 
Baudrillard's controversial notion of seduction was also related to 
contemporary death-events. The "diabolic" and "objectal" nature of seduction is 
f 
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emphasised and Baudrillard's proximity to Foucault's theorisation of sexuality is 
addressed. Baudrillard approaches extreme violence not as the result of innate 
drives, or of energy excess. For Baudrillard extreme violence should be understood 
as ceremonial or ritual neither as 'bloodlust' nor as sacrificial 'need'. Where 
symbolic ritual is eroded, and where the reciprocal and reversible form of seduction 
is denied or rejected "abberational" forms such as fetishism and sadism may emerge. 
These are theorised as contemporary residues of seductive exchange. The activities 
of Frederick and Rosemary West are addressed in this way as fetishistic, as 
fascination without seduction. Existing literature on serial killers is unable to 
approach the distinctiveness of such cases convincingly. The murder of James 
Bulger was also re-examined though these themes. Existing attempts to explain 
mitigate or even contextualise these events are dismally inadequate. No 'rational' 
account of such an event is possible, or is commensurate with the intensity and 
horror of its violence. Reason itself was disabled and the language of evil 
reappeared, apparently as a necessary and continuing feature of the operation of 
reason. That is reason needs to retain 'unreason' as its supplement, where it can 
dump unwanted or unthinkable events. 
The form of evil utilised by reason when confronted by contemporary horror 
remains the moral-Christian form. This conception, ostensibly privative but also 
characterised by latent dualism allows the 'agents' of evil to be both condemned as 
substantively evil while containing the horror of the event through appeals to the 
ultimately privative form of moral evil. The 'aggressor' or 'agent' of evil is 
neutralised through imprisonment despite the extreme difficulties in locating stable 
subjective guilt or culpability in such cases. Victims and their families suffer in 
incomprehension while society in general, traumatised and terrorised can only wait, 
impotently, for the next event of this kind to occur. The only beneficiary here is 
reason, contemporary rationality. Reason still prefers to embrace (moral) evil rather 
than risk confrontation with its own inherent failings. Such a confrontation demands 
a thinking of contemporary forrns of evil, which elude the moral-privative system of 
thought, the privative conception of evil that is disabled when confronted by 
contemporary death-events. The radical force of evil is that it shifts and mutates into 
new forms while remaining the 'accursed share' of any value system. Both Bataille 
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and Baudrillard explore this conviction in detail. A number of differing orders or 
regimes of evil were specified in this thesis in order to theorise the contemporary 
experience of 'inexplicable' events. It argues that contemporary death-events should 
be approached as a new and distinctive regime of evil. 
Bataille's exploration of evil suggests a strengthening or 'unleashing' of evil 
in modernity while his departure from Nietzsche's approach to evil is central to an 
appreciation of the distinctiveness of his thought and its relation to contemporary 
death-events. Baudrillard's fatal theory and "principle of evil" is irreducible to either 
the genealogical method, as developed by Foucault, or the nihilist relativism of 
which he is sometimes accused. The "transparency of evil" represents a new terrain 
in the thinking of excess. The disarticulation of the values of good and evil is argued 
to lead to a new condition of "viral" "interstitial" evil, which eludes rational 
explanation. These themes offer an alternative thinking of the 'inexplicability' of 
contemponýry_deatk-ýeypnts. 
Modem reason is disabled by the horror of contemporary death-events. 
Conventional social scientific, as well as popular, media and juridical thinking are 
forced to attempt to reconstruct or expand reason to cope with such events. Reason 
attempts to locate and contain evil within individuals and their acts. This 
contaim-nent protects no only existing power distributions but more importantly the 
status of reason itself. Contemporary death-events strike at the heart of modem 
reason. They open a void of horror that cannot be bridged by reason in any of its 
fanns. They demand a thinking of excess that is inadmissible to rational thought. 
What. good is theory if it cannot reflect, reconcile or critique the real? What 
can theory do? Fatal theory challenges the culture of transparency, the culture of 
contemporary death-events, and it challenges rationality, which both generates and 
denies the horror of extreme violence. Contemporary reason excludes the excess of 
sacrifice, of expenditure but generates the excess of the "transparition of evil". 
Contemporary death-events are suspended, undecideably, between these forins. 
*erhaps radical or "fatal" thought can recreate symbolic spaces, recreate zones of 
density, seduction and enchantment that would combat the culture of transparency 
and its catastrophic events. Such dreams only become possible when the worst 
horrors of contemporary life are confronted in all their intensity. 
\ 
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APPENDIX 
This section offers a brief outline of the facts of each case. Interpretation is 
kept to a minimum here as the contention of this thesis is that a new and alternative 
theoretical approach is needed to facilitate a more adequate reading of such events. 
THE DUNBLANE MASSACRE 
On the 13th March 1996 Thomas Hamilton entered the primary school in the 
town of Dunblane, Scotland and opened fire on a class of five-year old children. He 
killed 16 children, their teacher and then himself. He carried several weapons, all of 
them legally possessed. The event generated intense media interest, for a time, and 
this was focussed on the character, background and upbringing of Hamilton. A 
confused quasi-religious terminology of good and evil appeared in the media with 
phrases such as 'evil psycho' used (Daily Record 14/03/96 Quoted in Scott & 
Watson-Brown 1997/8). Parallels were drawn with the earlier 'spree killer', Michael 
Ryan in Hungerford, 1987. 
Very quickly the media procured the testimony of local people who claimed 
to know Hamilton. The media reported simplistic and tautological 'explanations' of 
Hamilton's actions, labelling him a 'fat, balding 43 year-old', a 'weirdo' and 
gpervert'. It was rumoured that Hamilton, who was unmarried, frequently 
entertained youthful male 'callers' and was never seen in the company of women. 
He also worked voluntarily in local boys clubs. These 'facts' were presented as 
evidence that Hamilton was a 'potential' murderer, a 'time-bomb' waiting to 
explode. 
The tabloid press conflated homosexuality with paedophilia and 'murderous 
impulses' creating the impression that Hamilton's crimes were somehow inevitable, 
wired into his sexuality. Other media speculation dwelt on 'irregularities' in 
Hamilton's upbringing. He had been 'abandoned' by his father and brought up 
largely by his grandparents. However no evidence of deprivation or abuse, sexual or 
otherwise, was located. Instead in the days and weeks which followed attention, 
both media and political, focussed on reforms to firearms legislation and provoked 
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conflict between political parties and gun lobbyists. Limited changes to the licensing 
of handguns and the handling of firearms in gun clubs were made in 1997. 
The event seemed to have only a limited media lifespan and the recent third 
anniversary of the massacre passed with little interest. No book-length studies of this 
event have yet appeared to my knowledge. 
FREDERICK AND ROSEMARY WEST 
On the I't January 1995 Frederick West hanged himself in Winson Green 
Prison, Birmingham. He was awaiting trial, charged with the murder of 12 people 
including his first wife, his eldest daughter and numerous long-term and casual 
sexual partners. All of the crimes took place in the Gloucester area. 
The murders began in 1967 and may have continued until the early 1990's 
when West was held in a low-security bail-hostel awaiting trial for the rape of his 
daughters. Unofficial estimates of the full extent of West's killings suggest a figure 
of around sixty (Wansell 1996). In 1972 Fred West married Rosemary Letts, his 
second wife, who had been his sexual partner since 1969, when she was 15 years old. 
They had five children together, although during their marriage Rosemary gave birth 
to three other children, fathered by her 'clients' as she worked as a prostitute with her 
husband's encouragement. 
During the 1970's and 1980's the couple imprisoned, raped, tortured, 
murdered, dismembered and buried at least ten young women. The details of these 
murders are grotesque; the women were drugged and kidnapped. Some were kept 
imprisoned for days; they were systematically raped and tortured. Sometimes bones 
were removed, in all probability while the victims were still alive. In one case a 
foetus was dislodged and torn from the womb during an 'abortion'. According to 
Wansell (1996) some victims were made to kneel over a pit and were then 
decapitated. 
Rosemary West was charged with ten murders and sentenced to life 
imprisonment in November 1995. Her claims that she had not known what her 
husband had been doing where rejected by the jury while the mass media felt able to 
declare that she was actually 'far worse' than her husband. 
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In addition to these murders Fred and Rose West systematically raped and 
abused their children throughout the course of their time together. The couple were 
remarkably skilled at eluding the attentions of social workers, police and other 
professionals. The authorities investigated West many times, dating back to 1961 
when alleged incest charges were thrown out by Hereford Assizes. In November 
1969 West was imprisoned for 3 days for non-payment of fines. In 1970 he was 
imprisoned for 9 months for theft. In 1973 Fred and Rose West pleaded guilty to 
charges of Actual Bodily Harm and Indecent Assault, and were fined f 50 each. In 
1980 Fred West was convicted of receiving stolen goods. SoC Services 
investigations of the West's date back to the rnid-1960's. Despite these events Fred 
West maintained the appearance of a hardworking, amiable, petty-criminal who was 
proud to work as a police informant on certain occasions. Local people knew him as 
friendly, helpffil though "weird". He was according to Wansell (1996) a very 
accomplished liar. 
During the trial of Rose West the media speculated over who had been the 
dominant personality in the murderous relationship. Many declared it to be Rose 
though there is little evidence for such an assertion. Fred had murdered twice before 
meeting Rose, yet the facts suggest she was an equal partner, certainly able to match 
Fred for brutality and destructiveness. 
Neither Fred nor Rose West ever expressed any guilt or remorse for their 
actions. Wansell (1996) speculates that, within the logic of their "private world" 
they had the power and therefore the "right" to take sexual pleasure by whatever 
means they chose. Wansells' account reviews a number of genetic and psychological 
'explanations' of the West's behaviour. Expert opinion agrees on one fundamental 
point, neither Fred nor Rose was in any sense 'mad' or 'insane'. Both seemed to act 
'in full possession of their senses'. This leads Wansell to reject scientific accounts of 
genetic or psychological malfunction and instead aff-irin 'evil' as the only appropriate 
designation of their actions. 
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THE MURDER OF JAMES BULGER 
On 12'h February 1993 two 10 year-old boys truanting from their local 
primary school abducted, tortured and murdered James Bulger, aged two. 
The boys were classmates though had known each other for only about one 
year. On the morning of the murder the boys truanted in the Strand shopping centre 
in Bootle, Merseyside. The boys had a reputation for being cheeky and n-dschievous 
but were regarded by teachers; peers and local people as a minor irritation not a 
serious problem. Neither had shown any inclination towards violent Or aggressive 
behaviour. 
On this particular morning the two boys stole small toys, pens and sweets 
but became "bored" and decided to "get a baby lost". This activity was clearly 
premeditated since security video-footage revealed the abduction of James Bulger 
was their second attempt, the first ending in failure. 
It is impossible to piece together the events of that afternoon since the boys 
admitted only what direct evidence prohibited them from lying about. However 
James was left unattended for only a matter of moments before being lured away. 
He was carried, pulled and dragged almost two and a half miles across Liverpool. 
The boys were seen by many witnesses but managed to persuade the few who 
enquired that they were taking the boy home. The boys claimed they tried to leave 
James at the local police station, but he would not enter alone. They also admitted to 
leaving him by a busy road hoping he might wander onto it and be knocked down. 
Clearly the boys were now 'bored' with James and wanted to be rid of him while 
avoiding any difficult questions being directed at themselves. James was taken to a 
railway line, only 50 yards from the police station. It was now getting dark. Here 
James was punched, kicked and stamped upon. Paint was thrown into his face; 
bricks were thrown at his head. An iron fishplate weighing 22 pounds was thrown at 
his head, leaving him unconscious. Then his lower clothing was removed. Both the 
boys, after their arrest, refused to answer any questions concerning sexual abuse but 
the body of James was found with the foreskin of the penis pushed back in a way that 
could not be caused by kicks or punches. There was also some suggestion that one 
of the boys had pushed a small battery up their victim's anus., though the two boys 
266 
blamed each other for this. Since medical examinations found no evidence of 
injuries consistent with this act it seems the boys made a half-hearted attempt to 
simulate the appearance of a sex attack, for which an adult would be suspected. 
The boys then built a small platform using bricks to cover the body, which 
was put on a railway line. Morrison (1997) not unreasonably, interprets the 'burial' 
as a mark of respect, while for Smith (1994) and the police investigation team, this 
'burial' merely ensured the body would be severed by the next on-coming train. 
James Bulger received 41 separate injuries, mostly to the head. 
The two boys, Jon Venables and Robert Thompson were found guilty of 
abduction and murder on 24h November 1993. The Judge, Mr Michael Morland 
dwelt on the issue of 'inexplicability' and stressed the effects of 'video nasties' 
though their was no evidence, even circumstantial, that these played a role. This 
event seems devoid of all 'reason' and allows no 'explanation'. The boys involved 
were 'average'. Detailed psychiatric and psychological analysis revealed nothing 
except that the boys were 'sane' and 'fit to stand trial'. Both police and psychiatric 
interviews established that the boys knew 'right' from 'wrong' and to kill a baby was 
4wrong'. The boy's education had involved a definite Christian and moral 
dimension. Both Sereny (1995) and Morrison (1997) stress that the city of Liverpool 
possesses an unusually strong sense of community or 'solidarity' that has been lost in 
other urban centres. Before admitting the attack Jon Venables repeatedly declared to 
his mother that whoever was responsible should be severely punished. 
There is no evidence that either boy had ever been mistreated or abused, 
sexually or otherwise, but parents or anybody else. Jon Venables was brought up in 
a stable and affectionate family atmosphere. Though his parents divorced the family 
remained very close and according to Sereny (1995) his parents remained lovers. 
There was never any financial hardship. Robert Thompson's upbringing was not so 
straightforward. His father left his mother for another woman when Robert was four. 
Robert had four brothers and their mother found it difficult to cope alone. Money 
was scarce and the older brothers were known to the police as petty offenders. 
Robert however was close to his mother and stayed out of trouble with the police. 
He often looked after his baby brother. All the Tbompson brothers were 
inunediateIy discounted by local police as suspects for the murder of James Bulger. 
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According to Smith (1994) both Robert and Jon had, shortly before the murder, 
become more settled and well behaved at home and school. 
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